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122



John Pintard.


Watson





THE

HISTORY

OF THE

REIGN

OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

VOL. II.

THE

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REIGN

OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

By ROBERT WATSON, LL.D.

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIV.

AFTER the death of Requeſens, who had been prevented from nominating his ſucceſſor by the violence of his diſeaſe, the council of ſtate aſſumed the reins of government; and as the king heſitated for ſome time in his choice of a governor, he found it neceſſary to confirm their authority.

1576.

The government in the hands of the council of ſtate

THIS revolution afforded great ſatisfaction to the people of Holland and Zealand; who flattered themſelves with hopes, that, now, when the adminiſtration was lodged in the hands of their fellow-citizens, the war would not be carried on with the ſame animoſity and ardour as before. At firſt, however, the council entered heartily into the late governor's deſigns, and proſecuted, with vigour, the plan of operations which he had left unfiniſhed. And they continued to do ſo till their attention was called to objects of a ſtill more intereſting nature, than the reduction of the maritime provinces.

BOOK XIV.

1576. Mutiny of the Spaniſh troops.

THE Spaniſh cavalry had, as already mentioned, begun to mutiny before the death of Requeſens. During the ſiege of Ziricſee, the infantry remained obedient to their commanders, partly from being kept in perpetual employment, and partly from the hopes of enriching themſelves by the plunder of that city; but being diſappointed in theſe hopes by the articles of the capitulation, and large arrears being due, to the payment of which even the contributions of the people of Ziricſee were not applied [a], they flew to arms, depoſed their officers, elected others, and a commander in chief from among themſelves; and then, having ſworn mutual fidelity over the ſacred hoſt, they abandoned all their conqueſts which had coſt them ſo much labour and blood, and paſſed over to Brabant; intending to take poſſeſſion of ſome conſiderable fortified place, from whence they might make excurſions, and plunder the neighbouring towns and villages.

They ſeize on Alloſt.

THE council of ſtate ſent count Manſveldt to appeaſe them; but no offers or promiſes which the count was empowered to make, could divert them from their deſign. They hoped, by the rapidity of their march, to have entered Bruſſels by ſurpriſe; but both the inhabitants and garriſon were prepared to oppoſe them. They failed likewiſe in an attempt on Mechlin. Then leaving Brabant, they turned ſuddenly towards Alloſt in Flanders, and made themſelves maſters of the town, by climbing over the walls, in the middle of the night, when the citizens were off their guard. They could not have acquired poſſeſſion of a place more ſuitable to their deſign; as it was ſituated in the midſt of a rich and fertile country, and lay at nearly an equal diſtance from Bruſſels

[a] Meteren ſays, that the Walloons laid hold of the money and with great dexterity excluded the Spaniards from the town

ſels, Ghent, and Antwerp. They had no ſooner diſplayed the ſtandard of rebellion in Alloſt, than they were joined by moſt of the other Spaniſh troops in the Low Countries; after which they began to exerciſe every ſpecies of violence and outrage, both againſt the citizens and the inhabitants of the country round. BOOK XIV. 1576.

THE prince of Orange remained not idle or unconcerned, in this critical conjuncture. He had too much ſagacity not to diſcern, and too much zeal and dexterity not to avail himſelf of ſo favourable an opportunity of advancing his deſigns. By his letters, and emiſſaries, he endeavoured to rouſe the ſpirit of the people, and to perſuade the council, "That now was the time when they might deliver themſelves for ever from the tyranny of Spain. By the good providence of God, the government had fallen into their own hands. It ought to be their unalterable purpoſe, to hold faſt the power which they poſſeſſed, and to employ it in delivering their fellow-citizens from that intolerable load of miſery under which they had ſo long groaned. The meaſure of the calamities of the people, and of the iniquities of the Spaniards, was now full. There was nothing worſe to be dreaded than they had already ſuffered; and nothing to deter them from reſolving either to expel their rapacious tyrants, or to periſh in the glorious attempt."

THESE exhortations, enforced by accounts which were propagated of the enormities committed by the Spaniſh troops, found an eaſy admittance into the minds of perſons of all ranks. The council of ſtate were no leſs enflamed than the people; and reſolved to publiſh an edict, declaring the Spaniards to be rebels againſt the king. Barlaimont, Manſveldt, Viglius, even the Spaniſh officers of the higheſt rank, and Rhoda, preſident They are declared rebels by the council.

BOOK XIV. 1576.

of the council of tumults, ſeemed at firſt inclined to concur with the other counſellors; but perceiving that their reſentment was not confined to the mutineers, but extended likewiſe to all the friends of the Spaniſh government, they began to alleviate the outrages of the ſoldiers, and openly oppoſed the publication of the edict; alleging, that troops which had mutinied on account of not receiving their pay, could not juſtly be conſidered as rebels; and that the edict would ſerve only to exaſperate them ſtill more againſt the people, while the council was not provided with force ſufficient to reſtrain their exceſſes. But theſe reaſons were held in great contempt by a majority of the council; who, having expelled the diſſenting members, accuſed them of holding correſpondence with the mutineers, and threw them into priſon. Then having elected the duke d'Arſchot for their preſident, in the room of Viglius, they publiſhed an edict in terms ſtrongly calculated to increaſe the odium againſt the Spaniſh troops; calling on the people to concur with them in driving out that lawleſs and rapacious crew, who, under the pretext of procuring payment of their arrears, would, if they were not ſpeedily prevented, bring utter ruin upon the Netherlands.

Hoſtilities between the Spaniards and Flemings.

NOTHING could have been more conſonant to the general ſpirit of the Flemings, than the ſentiments contained in this edict. It ſerved as fuel to that flame which was already kindled, and which now burſt out with redoubled violence. To give greater weight to the meaſures which had been already taken, and to thoſe which they intended to purſue, the council called an aſſembly of the States; and all the provinces, Luxemberg excepted, ſent deputies to attend. This aſſembly had no ſooner met than hoſtilities were begun. The citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Valenciennes, and Utrecht were in the hands of the Spaniards. Romero

mero commanded in Lieres; and Maeſtricht was garriſoned by ſome companies of German infantry. To acquire poſſeſſion of theſe important fortreſſes, and to prevent the Spaniſh troops from uniting themſelves into one body, were the objects upon which the States beſtowed their firſt and principal attention. They were ſucceſsful in gaining over to their ſide the regiments of Walloons in the Spaniſh ſervice; and they raiſed ſo great a number of the militia of the country, as, when joined with the Walloons, formed a conſiderable body of troops.

THE Spaniards, on the other hand, prompted by Rhoda, and animated by the brave and active d'Avila, exerted themſelves no leſs ſtrenuouſly in counteracting their deſigns. An officer of the name of Vargas, having drawn together eight hundred horſe in the neighbourhood of Maeſtricht, had advanced as far as Viſenach, in his way to Alloſt, in hopes of prevailing on the mutineers to act in concert with him. At Viſenach he was met by two thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, which the States had ſent to oppoſe him. But the Spaniards were not ſo much inferior in number, as they were ſuperior in military diſcipline. Vargas ſupplied his want of infantry by making a company of Burgundians quit their horſes. The Flemiſh troops, though they began the attack with great impetuoſity, fell ſoon into diſorder; and the Spaniards broke in upon their ranks, and put them to flight, with conſiderable ſlaughter.

VARGAS continued his route to Alloſt; and was ſeconded, in his application to the mutineers, by d'Avila and Romero; but neither the importunity of their officers, nor a regard to the honour of their nation, or to their perſonal ſafety, could overcome their obſtinate reſolution to remain in Alloſt, till they ſhould receive payment of their arrears. From Alloſt, Vargas led his troops, with

BOOK XIV. 1576.

with the utmoſt expedition, to Maeſtricht, which, he was informed, the Germans in garriſon there had agreed to deliver to the States. The execution of their deſign had been retarded by ſome companies of Spaniards, a part of whom were in poſſeſſion of one of the gates, and the reſt ſtationed in the town of Vich. This town lies on the eaſt ſide of the river, and is connected with Maeſtricht by a bridge over the Maeſe. Vargas, having tranſported his troops, and joined his countrymen at Vich, had a ſharp engagement with the townſmen upon the bridge; but as they were not ſupported by the Germans, he ſoon compelled them to retire. They paid dear for this attempt to aſſert their liberty. The Germans, inſtead of acting as their friends, united with the Spaniards, and both together plundered the town without mercy [b].

The ſacking and plunder of Antwerp by the Spaniards.

BUT the memory of the calamities which the people of Maeſtricht experienced on this occaſion, was effaced by thoſe which ſoon afterwards befell the citizens of Antwerp. The States had laboured in vain to perſuade the Spaniſh garriſon in the citadel to deliver it into their hands. They now reſolved to compel them; and, with this view, they had brought into the city a numerous body of Walloons and other troops. They had much reaſon for that ſolicitude with which they deſired to get poſſeſſion of this important fortreſs; which, on the one ſide, communicated with the town, by a ſpacious eſplanade, and on the other, with the adjacent country. The States were not ſufficiently aware of the danger to which, from theſe two circumſtances united, the city of Antwerp was expoſed. Champigny [c] the governor had endeavoured to rouſe their attention to this danger, and had earneſtly exhorted them to block up the eſplanade

[b] Meteren, p. 164. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

[c] He was brother to cardinal Granvelle, and was as averſe from the Spaniſh intereſt as his brother was attached to it.

eſplanade by batteries and trenches; and, at the ſame time, to order all the troops that could be ſpared, to encamp without the town, ſo as to prevent the Spaniards at Alloſt and other places from entering the citadel. But they wholly neglected the latter part of this advice, and they were too late in beginning to put the former in execution. They believed that the garriſon would not venture to ſally out upon the town, in which there was ſo great a number of troops to oppoſe them; and they flattered themſelves with the hopes of being able to compel them to ſurrender, before they could receive aſſiſtance from their countrymen. For this purpoſe, two ſtrong batteries were planted on the eſplanade; while the townſmen were employed either in puſhing forward the trenches, or in raiſing mounds for the ſecurity of the town.

THE ſiege of the caſtle of Ghent was carried on at the ſame time, and the States had conceived the moſt ſanguine expectation of ſucceſs; when the noiſe of the artillery reached from both places to the mutineers in Alloſt; and, awakening in them ſome ſparks of their native warlike ferocity, produced a more powerful effect upon their minds, than all the exhortations and entreaties of their commanders.

NAVARESE, their elect or leader, ſeized dexterouſly this opportunity which their preſent diſpoſition afforded him; and, calling them together, exhorted them to reflect upon the folly of ſuffering the fortreſſes beſieged to fall into the hands of the Flemings. "That artillery," ſaid he, "which is now thundering in our ears, is levelled againſt us, no leſs than againſt the garriſons of Ghent and Antwerp. When the Flemings ſhall have ſubdued the reſt of our countrymen, can we doubt that they will next turn their arms againſt us, who are the principal objects of their reſentment? Can you imagine that the States

BOOK XIV. 1576.

will then lend a more favourable ear, than at preſent, to your requeſts? Believe me, they will ere long extinguiſh the debt which they owe you, in your blood. Let us march inſtantly to the relief of the citidal of Antwerp. We ſhall ſoon oblige the enemy to raiſe the ſiege. We ſhall, in ſpite of the townſmen, and the raw troops which they have brought to their aſſiſtance, make ourſelves maſters of the richeſt city in the world, and take ample revenge for the unworthy treatment we have received."

HE would have proceeded; but was prevented by ſhouts of applauſe, and exclamations from every quarter, to arms! To arms! They were now as impatient to leave Alloſt, as they had formerly been reluctant. On the 3d day of November, and only a few hours before ſunſet, they began their march; hoping to reach the citadel of Antwerp early next morning, unobſerved by the enemy. Having found greater difficulty in paſſing the Scheld than they expected, they did not arrive till noon; notwithſtanding which, being joined by four hundred horſe, under Vargas and Romero, who had acted in concert with Navareſe, they entered the citadel, without meeting the leaſt oppoſition. The citizens were no ſooner informed of their arrival, than they ſuſpected their deſign, and were filled with the moſt dreadful apprehenſions. Champigny the governor, whoſe advice had been ſo unfortunately diſregarded, ſaw the approaching ſtorm, and did every thing in his power to avert it.

BUT the impetuoſity of the mutineers did not leave him time for completing the arrangements which he intended. Theſe men, impelled at once by avarice and revenge, rejected with diſdain the invitation given by d'Avila to repoſe and refreſh themſelves after their march. With rage and fury in their countenances, they demanded the ſignal

nal to advance; calling out, that they were determined, before night, either to periſh in the conflict, or to fix their quarters in the city. They were in number between two and three thouſand, and the garriſon, together with the troops brought by Vargas and Romero, amounted nearly to the ſame number. Navareſe the elect led on the mutineers, and the remainder were commanded by Romero. Nothing could exceed the intrepidity with which theſe two determined bands, vying with each other, attacked the trenches. The citizens diſplayed at the firſt onſet, great bravery and reſolution; but, being unable long to withſtand the impetuous attack of the Spaniards, and being galled at the ſame time by the artillery of the citadel, they at length gave way, and fled with precipitation along the two ſtreets which lead from the parade into the centre of the city. The Spaniards were ſeconded by their cavalry; which bore down all before them, and followed cloſe upon the rear of the vanquiſhed, till they reached the great ſquare, in the centre of which, ſtands the Guildhall or Palace. There the fugitives, being joined by ſome freſh troops, made a halt, and rallied; but they were ſoon broken a ſecond time, and would have been all cut to pieces, if they had not taken ſhelter in the palace, and in the houſes of the ſquare. From the windows they kept, for ſome time, a briſk fire upon the enemy, and did conſiderable execution; but the Spaniards, who were accompanied by the retainers of their camp, ſet fire to the houſes, with hay, ſtraw, and other combuſtible materials, not ſparing even the palace itſelf; which was eſteemed one of the richeſt and moſt magnificent in the world. It was quickly reduced to aſhes; and of thoſe who had taken refuge in it, ſome periſhed in the flames, and ſome by the ſword, in attempting to eſcape, while others frantic with deſpair flung themſelves headlong from the windows[d].

1576.

THE

[d] Thuanus.

BOOK XIV.

1576.

THE Spaniards then diſperſed themſelves over the city; overpowering all oppoſition with irreſiſtible impetuoſity. Had their number been ſufficient either to murder, or to overtake the prodigious crowds that fled before them, the blood and carnage of that memorable day would have been ſtill more dreadful. Of the citizens near ſeven thouſand periſhed; while the loſs of the Spaniards amounted only to two hundred men. So great is the ſuperiority in battle, of regular diſcipline, and prompt obedience to command. For though the citizens fought with extraordinary courage, like men whoſe all was at ſtake, they acted not in concert, and although they had been marſhalled by Champigny, as well as the time would allow, yet, from want of practice, they were ſoon thrown into confuſion; and, from the ſame cauſe, they were unable to recover their ranks, or return to the charge.

JUSTICE would oblige us to beſtow on the Spaniſh troops the praiſe due to the moſt heroic valour, if, beſides the rapacity which impelled them, they had not disfigured the luſtre of their victory by exerciſing a degree of barbarous cruelty, of which, at that period, the Spaniards alone, of all the nations in Europe, ſeem to have been capable. Antwerp, at the time of this cataſtrophe, was in the moſt flouriſhing condition. Companies of merchants from almoſt every commercial nation, reſided in it, poſſeſſing ſtorehouſes and factories filled with the moſt precious commodities. Great numbers of the citizens too were the wealthieſt in Europe. Their magnificent houſes were adorned with the moſt coſtly furniture; and their ſhops and warehouſes ſtored with prodigious quantities of gold and ſilver ſtuffs, and all other kinds of valuable effects, collected from every corner of the globe. Upon theſe the Spaniards ſeized, without any diſcrimination of the owners, and without conſidering

ng whether the perſons whom they pillaged, friends or enemies. The plunder that lay and unconcealed was immenſe; but was far being ſufficient to ſatiate the avarice of the iards. They exerciſed the moſt unrelenting ty upon all whom they ſuſpected to have con- d their treaſures; and nothing was to be heard e city, but either the ſhrieks and groans of the rers, or the lamentations of thoſe whom they xelled to witneſs the torments of their huſ- s, wives, or children. Contemporary hiſto- have deſcribed ſome of the ſeveral ſpecies of re which they inflicted; but the reader's mo- would be offended, and his humanity ſhock- the recital[d].

this manner were theſe men, for three days nights, employed in plundering and butcher- y turns, a people who were ſubjects of the prince as themſelves, and from whom (what- ground of complaint they might pretend ıſt the council of State) they had never re- d the ſmalleſt injury, or provocation. Nor it appear that their officers interpoſed their au- ty, to moderate their exceſſes, till the ſoldiers, ıſted with fatigue, were about to give over emſelves.

HE money in ſpecie which was extorted, ınted at leaſt to eight millions of guilders, be- a prodigious quantity of gold and ſilver, in , ſtuffs, and furniture, which the owners were ble to redeem. The loſs which the people ntwerp ſuſtained by the burning of ſo many ings, was not leſs than what they ſuffered by apacity of the ſoldiers. The moſt beautiful of the city was burnt to the ground; and great ers of ſhops and warehouſes, containing the ſt goods, were conſumed to aſhes[e].

WHILST

[d] Thuanus and Meteren. [e] Meteren, p. 164. Thuanus, i. p. 471. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

BOOK XIV.

1576.

WHILST the barbarity exerciſed againſt the inhabitants of Antwerp, excited ſentiments of compaſſion towards the unhappy ſufferers, it greatly augmented that abhorrence which the Flemings already entertained towards the Spaniards, and made them more ſolicitous than ever to deliver themſelves from a yoke which was now become intolerable. But the great ſuperiority which the Spaniſh troops diſcovered on every occaſion over the raw undiſciplined forces of the States, created much anxiety, with regard to the ſucceſs of their endeavours. The council of ſtate perceived the neceſſity of having recourſe to foreign aid; and they willingly accepted an offer, which was made them at this juncture by the prince of Orange, of ſome cannon, ammunition, and troops, with which they puſhed forward the ſiege of the citadel of Ghent, and ſoon obliged the garriſon to capitulate.

The States receive aſſiſtance from the Prince of Orange.

THIS ſeaſonable aſſiſtance contributed not a little to advance the prince's views. Immediately after the death of Roqueſens, he had projected a ſcheme of uniting all the provinces, and had exerted himſelf with great activity and addreſs, in carrying it into execution. The States entered readily into his ideas. Deputies were appointed, and inveſted with proper powers, by the ſeveral provinces; and in the congreſs, which was held at Ghent, a treaty of confederacy was concluded, under which all the provinces, except Luxemburg, were comprehended.

The confederacy of Ghent.

November 8th, 1576.

IN this confederacy, ſo well known in the hiſtory of the Netherlands by the name of the Pacification of Ghent, it was agreed between the Catholic provinces on the one hand, and thoſe of Holland and Zealand, with the prince of Orange, on the other, that there ſhould ſubſiſt between them, an inviolable alliance, peace, and friendſhip; that all paſt injuries ſhould be buried in oblivion; that all priſoners,

oners, and in particular the count de Boſſut, uld be ſet at liberty without ranſom; that the tracting parties ſhould, to the utmoſt of their ver aſſiſt each other in expelling the Spaniards n the Netherlands; that as ſoon as the provinces uld be delivered from theſe bloody oppreſſors, tranquillity eſtabliſhed, a general aſſembly uld be held of the States of all the provinces, redreſſing grievances, reforming abuſes, and oring the conſtitution to its primæval ſtate; t the prince of Orange ſhould remain high ad- al and governor of the maritime provinces; that he, and all others, whoſe property had n confiſcated, ſhould be reinſtated in their poſ- ons and dignities; that the decrees of the :e of Alva, relative to the tumults and hereſy, uld be aboliſhed; but that in the Catholic pro- :es, only the Roman Catholic religion ſhould be rciſed; while in thoſe of Holland and Zealand, matters, whether civil or religious, ſhould re- n on their preſent footing, till a general aſſem- of all the States ſhould be held[f].

Arrival of Don John of Auſtria.

THE deputies who were now convened, whom hiſtorians call likewiſe by the name of the :es, entered immediately upon the execution of articles of this confederacy, by tranſporting to frontier of France ſuch of the Spaniards as had n taken priſoners in the citadel of Ghent: and y had begun to make preparations to diſlodge n from other places, when they were inform- that Don John of Auſtria, whom Philip had le choice of for governor, had arrived in the vince of Luxemburg. In ſome reſpects, Don n was admirably qualified for this new ſtation, which his brother had appointed him. His af- le and inſinuating manners were fitted to con- ciliate

[f] Meteren, p. 169. Bentivoglio, l. 9. ſub fine. Thuanus, . ſect. 13.

BOOK XIV. 1576.

ciliate the affections of the people whom he was ſent to govern; and his military accompliſhments qualified him to purſue the war with vigour, againſt the revolted provinces. But in the critical ſituation into which the late enormities of the Spaniards had brought the Netherlands, other talents beſides theſe were requiſite; ſuch as prudence, patience, and ſelf-command, together with ſkill and dexterity in managing the paſſions, and the prejudices of men; qualifications which Don John poſſeſſed not in any conſiderable degree.

His imprudence.

HIS conduct upon his firſt arrival was ill calculated to allay thoſe ſuſpicions which the Flemings entertained of the king's deſign in ſending him to the Netherlands. Having ſtopt at Luxemburg, he wrote letters to the council and the States, in which he informed them, that he would not come to Bruſſels, the uſual reſidence of their governors, unleſs hoſtages were given him for their peaceable behaviour, a guard appointed for the ſecurity of his perſon, and the ſame unlimited command of the fleet and army conferred upon him, which the preceding governors had enjoyed. He lamented the outrages which had been committed by the Spaniſh troops; and promiſed, that, if the States and people ſhould maintain their obedience to the king, and their profeſſion of the catholic faith, the injuries which they had ſuſtained, ſhould not paſs unpuniſhed. But he added, that if they failed in either of theſe reſpects, they ſhould, in that event, find him no leſs prepared for war, than he was inclined to peace[s].

The States apply for advice to the Prince of Orange.

THE States and council were ignorant, till they received theſe letters, of the light in which their late conduct was conſidered by the court of Spain. They believed that, as the ſteps which they had taken were neceſſary for the preſervation of the people,

[s] Meteren, p. 174.

people, it was impoſſible they could be offenſive to the king; and they were extremely ſurpriſed, thus to meet, not only with diſtruſt, but even threats, and a defiance, where they were conſcious of having merited approbation and applauſe. They trembled therefore at the thoug hts of puttingthemſelves in the power of the new governor, and were greatly at a loſs to determine what anſwer they ſhould return to his demands. On this occaſion, they had recourſe to the Prince of Orange for advice. And William readily embraced the opportunity, which was thus preſented to him, of confirming his countrymen in thoſe ſuſpicions to which the governor's conduct had given riſe. BOOK. XIV. 1576.

His advice. Dated November 30th, 1576.

"As it was but too manifeſt," he ſaid, "from the ſtrain of Dohn John's letter, that he intended to tread in the footſteps of his predeceſſors, the States and council had much need to exert all their firmneſs, prudence, and circumſpection. They ought ſeriouſly to conſider of the important charge with which they were intruſted; and to remember, that, upon their preſent conduct it depended, whether they, and their wives, and children, and fellow citizens, ſhould for the future enjoy thoſe rights which belonged to them as natives of the Low Countries, or ſhould be again expoſed to the lawleſs tyranny of the Spaniards. They ought to exerciſe with vigour the power which they poſſeſſed, and reſolutely reject all terms of agreement with the governor, by which the fundamental laws of the State might be brought into danger, or their own authority abridged. Enter not, ſaid he, into any accommodation with him, till the Spaniards, and all other foreign troops be actually diſmiſſed. Truſt not to any ſoothing promiſes which he may give you, of diſmiſſing them at a more convenient ſeaſon. Remember how the king himſelf, when he went to Spain, aſſured you, that the troops which he then left behind him, ſhould, in three months afterwards,

BOOK XIV. 1576.

afterwards, be withdrawn, and yet they were ſuffered to remain for more than a year and a half; and would, notwithſtanding your ſolicitations, have ſtill remained, if the calamity which befell his army for him in Africa, had no tmade it neceſſary to remove them. Let no conſideration perſuade you to liſten to Don John's requeſt of being inveſted with the unlimited command of your forces. By granting this, you will furniſh him with weapons againſt yourſelves. Nothing can expreſs his diſtruſt more ſtrongly, than his unprecedented requiſitions of hoſtages, and a guard for the ſecurity of his perſon. If you comply with theſe demands, you will enable him to annihilate your authority, and to trample under foot your moſt ſacred rights and laws. It is impoſſible to believe that one who diſcovers ſo much ſolicitude to ſtrip you of your power, can ſeriouſly intend your welfare. Is it not more reaſonable that the governor ſhould truſt the States, than that the States ſhould lay themſelves at the mercy of the governor? Such demands were never made, even by your princes themſelves; whoſe practice always was to come unarmed to your aſſemblies, and to take an oath to maintain your privileges, before they received from you any promiſe of obedience. Conſent not to put yourſelves under the power of John of Auſtria, upon eaſier terms than have been ever inſiſted upon with your native princes. Require him, previouſly to his admiſſion, to interpoſe his authority for the immediate departure of the Spaniſh troops; and ſolemnly to engage to govern the State according to its fundamental laws[h]. To theſe conditions, your late fatal experience will juſtify you, if you add, that you ſhall have the power of aſſembling yourſelves twice, or even thrice a year, if you ſhall judge it to be expedient; that the citadels ſhall be raſed

[h] Here the prince mentions the particular privileges to which he alludes, and the times when they were obtained. Meteren, p. 175.

raſed to the ground; that the right of appointing the governors and magiſtrates ſhall be veſted in you; and that without your conſent, no military force ſhall be levied, and no garriſons ſtationed in the towns or forts. At preſent, it little imports you to conſider whether or not this conduct will give offence to the king, for it is mere deluſion, if you flatter yourſelves that you have not already offended him. Promiſes, ſoothing ſpeeches, and profeſſions of affection on his part, will not be wanting; but you will diſcover the laſt degree of weakneſs, if, after what you have experienced for ſeveral years paſt, you are not ſenſible, that nothing now remains for you, but either miſerably to bend under the yoke, from which you have ſo happily eſcaped, or to employ with vigour and fortitude the means with which Providence has furniſhed you; and which, I doubt not, may yet prove effectual for your ſecurity, provided you maintain harmony and concord among yourſelves [1]." BOOK XIV. 1576.

THIS letter, in ſome meaſure, produced the deſired effect. It put to ſilence all thoſe who were for receiving Don John on his own terms; and the States, more ſuſpicious than ever of his deſign, reſolved to inſiſt upon the diſmiſſion of the troops, and the confirmation of the pacification of Ghent, as conditions, without which they would never agree to acknowledge his authority. And that they might not be found unprepared, in caſe of his refuſal, they gave orders for making new levies; drew together an army at Wavre, between Bruſſels and Namur; and diſpatched ambaſſadors to ſolicit aſſiſtance from foreign courts. The States apply for aid to foreign powers.

IN Germany, where they were powerfully ſeconded in their applications by the prince of Orange, they engaged in their intereſt, John Caſimire, count palatine of the Rhine. In France they did not confine their application to the Cal-

[1] Meteren, p. 175, 176. Bentivoglio, lib. ix. ab initio. Thuanus, l. lxii. ſect. 15.

Book XIV. 1576.

viniſts, but likewiſe prevailed upon the duke of Anjou, the king's brother, to eſpouſe their cauſe, by ſetting before him the proſpect of an eſtabliſhment in the Low Countries, more ſuitable to his rank than he could expect to obtain in his brother's dominions. From the queen of England, their envoy met with the moſt gracious reception. It was matter of the higheſt ſatisfaction to this ſagacious princeſs, to ſee her inveterate enemy thus embroiled with his Flemiſh ſubjects; but, as ſhe was ſtill deſirous to avoid an open rupture with Philip, ſhe choſe to aſſiſt them with money rather than with troops, and gave them 40,000 pounds, with a promiſe of continuing her favour, on condition (which ſhe added in order to ſave appearances) that they ſhould adhere to the pacification of Ghent, and not throw off their allegiance to their legal ſovereign.

Their negociation with Don John.

While the States were making theſe preparations to vindicate their rights by force of arms, they ſincerely deſired to attain their end, by negociation with the governor. For they had too long groaned under the calamities of war, not to wiſh moſt earneſtly for peace, provided that bleſſing could be ſecured, without making a ſacrifice of their liberties. Don John, on the other hand, diſcovered an extreme reluctance to comply with the conditions which they required of him; but he endeavoured to diſſemble his ſentiments, and attempted, by fair ſpeeches, to cajole and deceive them. Still, however, he continued to ſhew his diffidence, by inſiſting upon having a numerous guard for his perſon; and by refuſing his conſent to the departure of the Spaniards, unleſs the States ſhould at the ſame time diſmiſs all the foreign troops in their ſervice, and give hoſtages, to remain in the hands of a neutral power, till their engagements ſhould be fulfilled.

The States, whoſe jealouſy was kept alive by the repeated warnings of the prince of Orange, eaſily

eaſily penetrated into Don John's deſigns; and they reſolved, if poſſible, to convince him, by one deciſive ſtep, that it was in vain for him to expect they would ever depart from the terms propoſed. In their aſſembly at Bruſſels, on the 5th of January, 1577, they drew up a new deed of union, in which they engaged in the moſt ſolemn manner, to maintain inviolably for ever the pacification of Ghent; to ſpare neither their goods, their perſons, nor their lives, in order to fulfil it; and to regard as perjured traitors, all thoſe who, participating in the preſent union, ſhould by word, deed, or counſel, counteract it. A copy of this deed, ſubſcribed by the governor and deputies of all the towns and provinces, by the nobility, prelates, and other dignified eccleſiaſtics; and by the members of tribunals, councils, colleges, and chapters, together with a ſolemn ratification of it by the council, was ſent by the States to Don John, as their final anſwer to his demands [k].

BOOK XIV. 1576. 1577.

THIS meaſure contributed not a little to promote the end propoſed. It gave Don John a proof of firmneſs, on the part of the States, which he little expected, and ſhewed him the neceſſity of either agreeing to the conditions which they ſo earneſtly required, or of reſolving inſtantly to have recourſe to arms. Inflamed by ambition and the love of war, he would not have heſitated a moment what part to act, had not his inſtructions from the king required that he ſhould avoid coming to an open rupture with the Catholic provinces. He conſidered likewiſe, that the States had got the ſtart of him, and were already well prepared to repel force by force. Nor was he ignorant of the encouragement which they had received, to hope for ſuccour from the neighbouring powers; or of the danger to which great numbers of the Spaniſh troops, ſurrounded by their enemies, were expoſed, of being reduced by famine. Influenced by theſe conſiderations, and truſting, that ere long, after quieting their ſuſpicions, opportunities would

Their agreement with him.

[k] Meteren, p. 179.

Book XIV. 1577. offer of depriving the States by degrees of that power of which they were at preſent ſo tenacious, he entered into a negociation with their deputies at Marche en Famine, a city in Luxemburg; and after many obſtructions and difficulties, concluded March 12th. a treaty with them, which they fondly termed the perpetual edict.

In this treaty he engaged, that all the foreign troops in the ſervice of Spain ſhould leave the Netherlands, and never return thither without the conſent of the States; that the Spaniards and Italians ſhould depart within the ſpace of forty days, and the Germans, immediately after receiving ſatisfaction with regard to their arrears; and that all the cities and forts poſſeſſed by theſe troops ſhould, as ſoon as they were relinquiſhed, be delivered to the States, together with the ſtores of ammunition, arms, and proviſions. He ratified the pacification of Ghent. He conſented that all priſoners detained on account of the late diſturbances, ſhould immediately be ſet at liberty, except the count of Buren[1]. And he promiſed that diligent enquiry ſhould be made, concerning the outrages lately committed by the troops; that juſtice ſhould be executed againſt the guilty, and a reaſonable compenſation made to the ſufferers, either in the Netherlands, or in Spain, according as the king ſhould be pleaſed to determine.

The States, on the other hand, engaged to preſerve inviolable their allegiance to the king; to maintain the profeſſion of the Roman Catholic faith throughout all the provinces; to receive Don John as governor general of the Netherlands, and immediately to furniſh him with 600,000 florins, for the payment of the Italian and Spaniſh troops, in order to prevail on them the more eaſily to depart for Spain or Italy.

The States of Holland refuſe to concur. As ſoon as this treaty was concluded, ambaſſadors were diſpatched by the Catholic States, who alone were concerned in it, to the prince of Orange,

[1] Son of the prince of Orange.

Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, to deſire their concurrence. It might eaſily have been foreſeen, that this application could not be attended with ſucceſs. For although the maritime provinces had conſented, in the pacification of Ghent, to ſubmit the queſtion of religion to the deciſion of a general aſſembly, to be held after the departure of the Spaniards; yet in that aſſembly they knew that they would have leiſure to employ all their influence in behalf of their religion, and to offer ſuch reaſons againſt proſcribing it, as they hoped would prove a ſufficient counterpoiſe to the religious zeal of the popiſh States. Without this expectation it can hardly be ſuppoſed, that Proteſtants, whoſe ſincerity in their profeſſion was ſo unqueſtionable, would ever have agreed to leave to others the determination of a matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted: and therefore it is not ſurpriſing, that they declined acceding to the treaty now preſented to them, in which this important point had, without obtaining their conſent, been ſo haſtily decided. But leaſt they ſhould alarm the bigotry of the Catholic provinces, they took no notice in their anſwer, of this, which was their principal objection. They began with ſaying, that they could not enough praiſe that generous zeal which the States had diſplayed, in delivering their country from the tyranny of the Spaniards; and they rejoiced to find that they ſtill perſiſted in their reſolution of adhering to the pacification of Ghent. But after conſidering attentively the treaty which had been tranſmitted to them, they were ſorry to obſerve, that it was extremely ill calculated to anſwer the laudable intentions of the States. For beſides ſeveral other objections of great weight, there was no proper proviſion made, in this treaty, for the regular calling of aſſemblies: in a convention, held on purpoſe to reſtore and ſecure their rights, an open infraction of them was ratified, by their conſenting to the unjuſt detention of the count of Buren; the States had failed in the reſpect and gratitude

BOOK XIV. 1577.

BOOK XIV. 1577.

which they owed to the queen of England and the duke of Anjou; and certain articles of the treaty were derogatory to the honour of the Netherlands; particularly that article, by which, inſtead of inſiſting upon a reſtitution of thoſe invaluable effects, of which the Spaniards had plundered the inhabitants, they had promiſed money to thoſe men, notwithſtanding their having been ſolemnly declared traitors and rebels by the States themſelves, and by the council of ſtate, when clothed with the authority of the king.

Departure of the Italian and Spaniſh troops.

THE Catholics could not but be ſenſible of the ſtrength of theſe objections. Their impatience to be delivered from the Spaniſh troops, and their eager deſire of peace, had betrayed them into that precipitation of which they had been guilty. They could not avail themſelves now of the ſuperior penetration of the prince of Orange. The treaty was already concluded, and nothing remained for them, but to watch the governor's motions with an attentive eye, till the troops were removed to ſuch a diſtance, that they could not eaſily be recalled. Don John was at great pains to diſpel their ſuſpicions. For that purpoſe, he employed all his influence to perſuade the Spaniards to depart; and he at length prevailed, though not till he had diſtributed among them the money which he had received from the States. This brave, but ferocious, and ſavage band then ſet out upon their march for Italy, like an army in triumph; loaden with the ſpoils of their fellow-ſubjects, and without compunction for the rapacity and violence which they had exerciſed [m].

Don John's admiſſion to the government.

THEIR departure diffuſed univerſal joy throughout the Netherlands, and the people indulged the flattering hope, that the king, having been at laſt touched with their calamities, had reſolved to treat them with greater lenity and moderation than they had experienced ſince the beginning

[m] Thuanus, lib. lxiv. ſect. 6.

ginning of his reign. Their ſatisfaction was heightened by the popular character of the governor, who was in the prime of life; elegant and graceful in his perſon and deportment; lively, facetious and affable, and who gained exceedingly from the compariſon which men naturally formed of his inſinuating manners, with the reſerve and auſterity of the king. He was received in Bruſſels with ſuch marks of reſpect as had never been ſhewn to any former governor; and perſons of all ranks flattered themſelves with the proſpect of a juſt and mild adminiſtration. 1577.

His impolitic conduct.

THEY did not long enjoy this alluring proſpect. Although Philip himſelf had ratified the perpetual edict, and Don John had, before his admiſſion to the regency, ſworn in the moſt ſolemn manner, to obſerve it, it ſoon appeared that nothing was farther from the intentions of either. The limitations which that edict impoſed upon the ſovereign's authority, were utterly repugnant to Philip's temper, as well as to the plan which he had formed for the government of the Netherlands; nor would he ever have empowered his brother to make ſo many conceſſions to the States, as the perpetual edict, or pacification of Ghent, contained, but in order more effectually to ſtrip them afterwards of that very power which he now conſented they ſhould enjoy. But Don John was, from his natural impetuoſity, incapable of executing this ſcheme, which required a much higher degree of circumſpection and experience, as well as patience and diſſimulation, than he poſſeſſed. His court was perpetually filled with Spaniards, and other foreigners, who had rendered themſelves obnoxious to the natives; nor were any of the Flemings admitted into his confidence, but ſuch as had ſhewn themſelves devoted to the Spaniſh intereſt; while thoſe who had diſcovered an attachment to the liberty of their country, were kept at a diſtance, and treated with indifference or contempt.

BOOK XIV. 1577.

tempt. This circumſtance contributed not a little to revive that jealouſy of his deſigns, which he had been ſo ſolicitous to allay. But the States were ſtill more alarmed, when he made them the following propoſals: that they ſhould not any longer withhold from him the authority which his predeceſſors had enjoyed, but allow him to act as captain-general, as well as governor of the provinces: that they ſhould empower him, without waiting for the determination of the general aſſembly of the States, to execute the two articles of the late treaty, which related to the obedience due to the king, and the re-eſtabliſhment of the Catholic religion; and that, if the prince of Orange would not immediately agree to accede to the perpetual edict, the States ſhould break off all correſpondence with him, and reduce him and the maritime provinces to obedience, by force of arms. With theſe propoſals the States refuſed to comply, but expreſſed their refuſal in the ſofteſt terms; and without taking notice of his demand, to be allowed to act as captain-general, they repreſented to him that, by the pacification of Ghent, both he and they were bound to wait for the meeting of the general aſſembly of the States; to whoſe deciſion the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, had engaged to ſubmit.

His duplicity

DON JOHN perceiving that he was not likely to perſuade them, grew more impatient than ever under his preſent reſtraints, and reſolved now to employ either force or fraud, as opportunities ſhould offer. The States could not fully penetrate his deſign, but they perceived how much he was diſſatisfied with his ſituation, and what difficulty they would find to obtain the fulfilment of his engagements in the perpetual edict. This ſerved to render them more than ever ſolicitous for the departure of the German troops, which, it had been agreed, ſhould remain in the Netherlands, till they received payment of their arrears. Theſe arrears amounted to a very great ſum, which the States

tates were utterly unable to raiſe at the preſent Book XIV.
ıncture. But, having raiſed a part of it, they
ıade an offer of that to the Germans, and deſired 1577.
ıey would accept of goods and ſecurity for the
ſt. In order to make a further trial of Don John's
ncerity, they intreated him to employ his influ-
ıce, to procure their conſent. Don John readi-
agreed to his requeſt; and declared that, if the
ermans ſhould refuſe to comply, he would, at
ıe hazard of his life, compel them. Having
ımmoned their commanders to meet him at
ſechlin, he went thither, as if on purpoſe to per-
ıade them; but in reality to inflame their minds
gainſt the States, and to exhort them to remain
ı the Netherlands, in the ſervice of the king.
laving had the ſucceſs which he deſired with ſome
f the principal officers, and judging it neceſſary
ow to redouble his hypocriſy with the States, he
rote to them, lamenting that a much greater
ım was neceſſary to ſatisfy the German troops,
ıan could be procured in the Low Countries; and
ffering to ſend his ſecretary Eſcovedo to repre-
nt their ſituation to the king. This artifice was
ot altogether without effect. The States could
ot believe that Don John was capable of ſo great
eceit, as he was now practiſing againſt them.
hey agreed to his propoſal, and, as an expreſ-
on of their gratitude, they ſettled a penſion of
ooo ducats on Eſcovedo, who ſet out immedi-
ely for Spain; but with a deſign extremely dif-
rent from that which was pretended.

Don John in the mean time carried on his in- He ſeizes on the caſtle of Namur.
igues with the German officers, and hoped ſoon,
y their means, to get poſſeſſion of the fortified
owns in which they lay. But before any of the
lans which he had formed with this view were
ut in execution, he judged it neceſſary to with-
raw from Bruſſels, and, if poſſible, to make himſelf
aſter of ſome place of ſtrength near the frontier,
here he might remain in ſafety till he ſhould find
himſelf

Book XIV. 1577. himſelf in a condition to take the field. Of all the frontier towns, Namur appeared the fitteſt for his purpoſe; being conveniently ſituated for the reception of the troops, to which he expected the king would ſoon give orders to return from Italy. It happened that Margaret de Valois, queen of Navarre, intended at this time to paſs through Namur in her way to Spa. On pretence of paying his reſpects to Margaret, he left Bruſſels, and arrived in Namur, with a great number of the nobility and others, who were favourable to his deſign. But as the governor of the caſtle was a perſon of ſtrict fidelity, Don John was obliged, in order to accompliſh his aim, to have recourſe to the following ſtratagem. Feigning to ſet out in the morning for the chace, he took his way by the caſtle; where having ſtopt, and enquiring for the governor, he pretended a curioſity to ſee the fortifications of the place. The governor, flattered with this viſit, and ſuſpecting nothing hoſtile from men who ſeemed equipped only for hunting, readily admitted, not only Don John himſelf, but his attendants; ſome of whom having arms concealed under their apparel, immediately ſeized upon the gate [n].

July 24th.

JOHN having thus ſecured poſſeſſion of the caſtle, the town was, by the aſſiſtance of count Barlaimont, governor of the province, ſoon ſubjected to his authority. He obſerved with triumph, that the day on which this event happened, was the firſt day of his regency. It might with greater propriety have been ſaid, that it was the firſt of thoſe calamities which purſued him to the grave.

AFTER ſuch an open violation of his faith, there could be little room for any future negociation with the States. Yet, in a letter which he wrote to them on this occaſion, he regretted that the plots which had been laid to deprive him of his life

[n] Bentivoglio, lib. x. p. 192. 195. Meteren, p 185.

life or liberty, had obliged him to have recourſe to ſo hoſtile an expedient: and he affirmed, that he was ſtill ready to obſerve the conditions of the perpetual edict; but declared that he would not quit his preſent ſituation, till they ſhould make proviſion for the ſecurity of his perſon, againſt the machinations of his enemies. BOOK XIV. 1577.

THE States and council were greatly aſtoniſhed, when they received intelligence of this event. They had wiſhed for nothing ſo much as to preſerve the provinces from being plunged afreſh into the calamities of war. They conſidered that ſome of the principal cities in Brabant were in the hands of the Germans. They knew not what part theſe troops might act, if hoſtilities with the governor ſhould take place; and they could not imagine that he would have ventured on ſo manifeſt a breach of the perpetual edict, without the proſpect of ſome powerful ſupport. They immediately diſpatched ambaſſadors to remonſtrate with him on the nature and conſequences of his conduct, and to requeſt him to return to Bruſſels. They promiſed to make the moſt ſerious enquiry into the machinations of which he complained, deſired that he would name the perſons guilty, and aſſured him, that nothing ſhould be wanting on their part to provide, in the moſt ſatisfactory manner, for the ſecurity of his perſon. The aſtoniſhment of the States.

OF the reality of theſe machinations he could produce no other evidence, but ſome anonymous letters, which, he ſaid, had been tranſmitted to him. But as no perſon was named in theſe letters, and the authors of them were utterly unknown, all men believed them to be a forgery of his own, or of his courtiers, deſigned to ſerve as a pretext for his preſent treachery.

THE anſwer which he made to the States ſhewed clearly, that, in the ſtep which he had taken, he had been influenced by a motive very different from

Book XIV. 1577.

from that which he pretended—That the States ſhould put him in full poſſeſſion of the authority, which the preceding governors had exerciſed; that they ſhould give him the entire command of the army; break off all communication with the prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, and compel them to accede to the perpetual edict. Theſe were ſome of the conditions, to which if they did not agree, he acquainted them, that he was unalterably determined not to return. The States repreſented the inconſiſtency between the former of theſe demands, and the perpetual edict; and reminded him of the utter impoſſibility, under which they found themſelves, of complying with the latter, without violating their faith, which they had pledged, in the pacification of Ghent, to the maritime provinces. He ſtill perſiſted in his reſolution; and the States were equally inflexible.

Diſcovery of his deſigns.

THEY were confirmed in their purpoſe, by ſome letters writ by Don John and Eſcovedo to the king, and Antonio Perez his ſecretary, which were intercepted in Gaſcony by the king of Navarre, and ſent by him to the prince of Orange, who tranſmitted them to the States. In theſe letters, the neceſſity of the ſpeedy return of the Italian and Spaniſh troops were urged with the utmoſt earneſtneſs and importunity. The diſeaſes of the Netherlands, ſaid Don John, admit of no other cure, but lopping off the parts affected: and, to the ſame purpoſe, Eſcovedo obſerved, That fire, and the ſhedding of blood, were the only means by which the diſorders that prevailed could be remedied. For no man here, ſaid he, whether among the nobility or people, perſorms the duty that he owes either to God or the king. Opinions the moſt abominable univerſally prevail; and every man lives as he liſts, without law or rule. To which he added, That if the king did not ſend the neceſſary troops and money ſoon, he was afraid that Don John, who could not endure his preſent ſituation,

ation, would quit the Netherlands, and try his fortune elſewhere.

1577. WHILE theſe letters ſerved to alienate the Flemings more than ever from Don John, they raiſed to the greateſt height their admiration of the penetration and ſagacity of the prince of Orange, who had given them early warning of the governor's duplicity, and whoſe predictions were now ſo remarkably fulfilled. They entered with greater ardour than ever into his views, and in conformity with his advice, they reſolved to loſe no more time in negociating, but without delay to put the provinces into a poſture of defence, before the return of the Spaniſh forces. Whilſt their levies, and other military preparations, were going on, they laboured with great ſolicitude to perſuade the Germans to deliver up the towns in their poſſeſſion. Their ſucceſs was in ſome meaſure retarded by the governor's intrigues with the officers; but the States, having at this time greater facility than Don John, in employing either money or force, according as the one or the other was moſt likely to prove effectual, had greater influence with the ſoldiers; who not only refuſed to liſten to their officers, but put ſome of them under arreſt, and gave them up to the States, together with the towns and citadels. In this manner the States recovered Bergen-op-zoom, Tolen, Breda, Bois-le-duc, and ſeveral other places; and they had the good fortune likewiſe to defeat a body of Germans, in the governor's intereſt, who were upon their march to ſurpriſe the citadel of Antwerp. After which, prompted partly by the apprehenſions which this attempt, though unſucceſsful, had excited, and partly by the remembrance of the many calamities which the citadels, in other places as well as Antwerp, had occaſioned to the inhabitants, they reſolved to demoliſh theſe fortreſſes; and gave orders for this purpoſe, which were executed by the people with inexpreſſible alacrity*.

The States get a number of towns into their poſſeſſion.

DON

* Meteren, p. 187. Bentivoglio, tom. ii. p. 212.

BOOK XIV. 1577.

DON JOHN, in the mean time, endeavoured to make himſelf maſter of ſome places in the neighbourhood of Namur; and he ſucceeded in his attempts upon Marienburg and Charlemont. But, being forſaken by the duke of Arſchot, and almoſt all the other nobility who had attended him to Namur; and perceiving that the States were much farther advanced than himſelf in their military preparations, he ſent them word that he had ſolicited the king for liberty to leave the Netherlands; and would immediately retire to Luxemburg, to wait the iſſue of his application, provided the States would agree to deſiſt from hoſtilities till the king's inſtructions ſhould arrive. But the States, ſuſpecting from their former experience that he intended nothing by this propoſal but to render them more remiſs in their preparations, gave him for anſwer, that before they would liſten to any terms of accommodation, he muſt deliver up the city and caſtle of Namur. To this Don John refuſed to conſent; and thus the negociation was broken off, and all hopes of terminating the diſpute amicably were extinguiſhed [p].

The States invite the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels.

THE States, conſidering war now as unavoidable, reſolved to invite the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels; and accordingly five of their number were appointed to carry him an invitation, couched in terms ſo flattering and reſpectful, and ſo expreſſive at the ſame time of their gratitude for his former ſervices, that it was impoſſible he could heſitate to comply with their requeſt. Having obtained the conſent of the States of Holland and Zealand, he went firſt to Breda, and thence to Antwerp and Bruſſels. His reception in the places through which he paſſed, was ſuch as might be expected from a people, by whom he was held in the higheſt reſpect and veneration. Ardent to behold him, after an abſence of ſeveral years, during which he had undergone ſo many labours, and been expoſed to ſo many dangers in their ſervice, they poured out in multitudes, to the diſtance of ſeveral miles, to meet him. In his paſſage from Antwerp

His reception.

[p] Bentivoglio, p. 198.

Antwerp to Bruſſels, one ſide of the canal was lined by the inhabitants of the former of theſe places, and the other, by thoſe of the latter; while the banks reſounded with the joyful ſhouts of a grateful people, who ſaluted him with the glorious appellations of the Father of his Country, and the Guardian of its Liberty and Laws. Nor were theſe demonſtrations of joy confined to the vulgar, who are always ſincere, but often precipitate and inconſtant in their applauſes; perſons of all ranks vied with each other in teſtifying their reſpect and gratitude; and immediately after his arrival, the States of Brabant and the States-general concurred in electing him governor of the province of Brabant [q]; a dignity which had been hitherto beſtowed only on the viceroys, or governors-general of the Netherlands. 1577.

The promiſing condition of the Netherlands.

By his wiſdom and moderation, as well as by his vigilance and induſtry, William fulfilled the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen. But, notwithſtanding his addreſs and prudence, and ſkill in managing the minds of men; qualifications which he poſſeſſed in the moſt eminent degree; he could not preſerve that unanimity among the Flemings, which it was of ſo much conſequence for them, in the preſent juncture, to maintain. At no period had they enjoyed ſo fair a proſpect of ſecuring their liberty on a firm and permanent foundation. Beſides the advantage of having a perſon of ſo great experience and abilities to guide their counſels, the Spaniſh troops were entirely withdrawn; the king's finances were greatly exhauſted with the wars in which he had been continually engaged; almoſt all the fortified places were in the hands of the States; and the people were animated univerſally with the moſt violent abhorrence of the Spaniſh government. But the States were prevented from improving the opportunity which this fortunate concurrence of circumſtances afforded them, by a ſpirit of diviſion and

[q] Vide Hiſt. Metallique, tom. i. p. 235.

BOOK XIV. 1577.

and animoſity, which ſprung up, partly from the jealouſies of the nobility, and partly from the intemperate religious zeal and bigotry of the people.

Sources of animoſity and diſcord.

PHILIP de Croy duke of Arſchot, the marquis of Havrée his brother, the count de Lalain, and ſeveral others of the catholic nobility, had, ſince the death of Requeſens, diſtinguiſhed themſelves as ſtrenuous aſſertors of the liberties of their country. They had promoted with all their influence the pacification of Ghent, and had concurred with their countrymen in the invitation given to the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels. But when they reflected upon the extraordinary marks of attachment which William had received, and ſaw him veſted with an authority and dignity in Brabant, which only the ſovereign or his viceroys had hitherto enjoyed; above all, when they contemplated his great abilities and experience in the conduct of affairs; they foreſaw that they muſt content themſelves with acting a ſubordinate part in the government, and that the States would, in every branch of adminiſtration, be directed by the prince of Orange, who muſt therefore reap the glory of whatever ſhould be atchieved, and, without the name of ſovereign, exerciſe a ſupreme and ſovereign authority. Stung with envy, and deſirous to conceal the motive of their conduct, they began to affect an extreme anxiety at the danger to which the catholic faith was expoſed, by the States repoſing ſuch unreſerved confidence in one who was an avowed friend of the new religion. On this pretence, which never received any colour from the prince's conduct, they formed themſelves into a confederacy, with a deſign to counteract him. And in order to give their party conſiſtency, weight, and influence, they reſolved to invite the archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to take upon him the government of the provinces.

The Flemiſh nobles give an invitation to Matthias.

THIS reſolution they not only formed, but executed, without the knowledge or authority of the States.

States. They diſpatched a meſſenger to Matthias with the greateſt ſecrecy, and intreated him to leave Vienna without delay. BOOK XIV. 1577.

NOTHING could exceed the temerity of thoſe who gave this invitation, but the imprudence of Matthias in accepting it. For beſides, that he was called only by the leaſt powerful of the two parties into which the Flemings were divided, he could not be ignorant how injurious and affronting his conduct muſt be thought by his kinſman the king of Spain. It is ſome alleviation of his folly, that he was only twenty-two years of age; and that, conſidering the numerous progeny which his father had left behind him, there was little probability of his obtaining any ſettlement in Germany, ſuitable to his rank. At the time of the death of Requeſens, he had made an offer of his ſervice to the States, and he accepted greedily of the preſent invitation. His enterpriſe being of ſuch a nature that he durſt not diſcover it to the emperor, he ſet out from Vienna in the middle of the night, with a ſmall number of attendants. No ſooner was his brother appriſed of his deſign, than meſſengers were diſpatched to bring him back, and letters ſent to the princes whoſe States he muſt paſs through, intreating them to ſtop him; but Matthias travelled faſter than the meſſengers, and, in a few days, reached the town of Lierras in Brabant. His arrival.

THE States, aſtoniſhed at the news of his arrival, and highly incenſed againſt thoſe who had invited him, complained loudly of the inſult offered to their authority; and would have inſtantly formed the reſolution of rejecting him, had they not been diſſuaded from it by the prince of Orange. William foreſaw the advantages which might ariſe from that rivalſhip, into which Matthias had entered with his kinſman Don John, and from the ſeeds of enmity which were thereby ſown between the German and Spaniſh branches of the houſe of Auſtria. He reckoned it rather fortunate, that He is admitted governor by the States.

BOOK XIV. 1577.

Don John had received ſo unpardonable an offence from the catholic nobility: and he conſidered how fatal to the general intereſt of the provinces all diviſion muſt neceſſarily prove, in the preſent critical conjuncture of their affairs.

INFLUENCED by theſe conſiderations, he exhorted the States to overlook the injurious treatment which they had received, and perſuaded them to agree, not only to receive Matthias with all the reſpect due to his high rank, but even to elect him governor, on ſuch conditions as they ſhould judge proper to require. This conduct, the moſt prudent that could have been adopted in the preſent circumſtances, furniſhed no ſort of triumph to the duke d'Arſchot, and the other catholic nobility. On the contrary, it mortified them exceedingly, to obſerve that Matthias owed his election not to them, but to the prince of Orange; whoſe authority, which they intended to have controlled, was now conſiderably augmented, and more firmly eſtabliſhed than before.

Mortifications of the nobility.

SOON after this, they received a ſtill more ſenſible mortification. The duke d'Arſchot having lately been appointed governor of Flanders, had ſet out for the city of Ghent, to take poſſeſſion of his government. Not long after his arrival, a deputation of the inhabitants having urged him with much importunity to reinſtate them in their ancient privileges, of which they had been deprived, in the time of Charles V. he was heard to declare, that that ſeditious multitude, which made ſo much noiſe about their privileges, ſhould ere long be puniſhed as they deſerved, notwithſtanding their being ſupported by the prince of Orange. This ſaying being repeated by ſome who heard it, and circulated all over the city, inflamed the minds of the people with rage and indignation. They ran to arms, ſurrounded the governor's houſe, and threw him, and his friends and attendants, into priſon. The prince of Orange, dreading the conſequences

ſequences of ſo violent a procedure, and believing the duke to be now ſufficiently humbled, interceded with the Ghenteſe, and procured his liberty; but no ſolicitations could induce them to releaſe his adherents. In this manner was the duke d'Arſchot's importance in the Netherlands almoſt annihilated. Matthias perceiving this, ſaw it to be his intereſt to connect himſelf with the party of which the prince of Orange was the head; and readily accepted the government, with a condition to which the States required his conſent, that the prince ſhould be his lieutenant general in all the branches of adminiſtration. BOOK XIV. 1577.

MATTHIAS made his joyful entry into Bruſſels, in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ſeventy-eight, when both he and the prince of Orange were admitted to their reſpective offices, after taking an oath to maintain the laws, and to regulate their conduct according to the inſtructions which ſhould be given by the States[r]. 1578.

DON JOHN ſent an ambaſſador to proteſt in his name againſt theſe proceedings. But the States had ſome weeks before this time declared him an enemy to the Netherlands, and paid no regard to his proteſtation. As they were perſuaded, however, that they had done nothing but what was authoriſed by the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, they wrote an account of their proceedings to the king, declaring that they ſtill held their allegiance to him inviolable; and praying, that he would confirm their election of his kinſman Matthias, as the moſt likely means of reſtoring tranquillity to the provinces. They had very little reaſon to expect that Philip would liſten to this requeſt. He looked upon their conduct in a light extremely different from that in which they themſelves regarded it; and conſidered their preſumption in rejecting the governor whom he had appointed, Application of the States to Philip.

[r] Meteren, p. 196. 202.

BOOK XIV. 1578.

pointed, and ſtill more that of nominating another without his conſent, as an act of the moſt audacious rebellion. The States were too well acquainted with his character, not to entertain ſome apprehenſions that ſuch might be his ſentiments; and therefore, while they omitted nothing in their power to aſſuage his reſentment, they endeavoured to ſecure themſelves againſt the effects of it, by intereſting the neighbouring powers in their behalf, and by eſtabliſhing unanimity between the religious parties into which the provinces were divided.

IN order to accompliſh this laſt and moſt important object, a new treaty of union was concluded, in which, beſides confirming the pacification of Ghent, the catholics and proteſtants promiſed mutually to ſupport each other; and engaged, that they would join together in oppoſing all perſecution, on account of religion, from whatever quarter it ſhould come [a].

The emperor.

THE neighbouring powers were not unconcerned ſpectators of theſe tranſactions. The emperor [b] ſaw with much anxiety, that thoſe flames which had burnt ſo long in the Netherlands, were now likely to burſt out with greater violence than ever. But having been educated at the court of Madrid under Philip, with whom he wiſhed to live on amicable terms, he had ſhewn himſelf exceedingly diſpleaſed with the conduct of Matthias; had given Philip entire ſatisfaction with regard to his own intentions; and had reſolved to take no other part in the diſſenſions of the Netherlands, but that of employing his interceſſion and advice. He did not however oppoſe the levies which the count Palatine was making for the ſervice of the States, either becauſe he knew that his prohibition would not have been regarded, or becauſe he deſired to preſerve a ſtrict neutrality between the contending parties.

HENRY

[a] Meteren, p. 197. [b] Rodolph II.

HENRY III. of France was too much occupied in his own dominions, to have leiſure to enter deeply into the affairs of the Netherlands. For many ages, France had ſeen no king of whoſe reign the people entertained more ſanguine expectations. Having, in his early youth, been appointed commander in chief by his brother Charles, he had given ſignal proof of uncommon abilities. The French nation had flattered themſelves with the hopes of ſeeing their kingdom reſtored by him to its ancient ſplendor; his fame was univerſally diffuſed; and the Poliſh nobility had, with general applauſe, conferred upon him their elective crown. But when, upon his brother's death, he left Poland, and ſucceeded to the crown of France, it is inconceivable how great a change he ſeemed to have undergone. Irreſolute, inconſtant, indolent, and voluptuous, with a mixture of the moſt ridiculous ſuperſtition, he loſt the confidence of the catholics as well as proteſtants, whom he favoured and betrayed by turns. The unſteady and unſkilful hand, with which he held the reins of government, added daily new force to the virulence of faction, till every member of the ſtate, and almoſt every individual in the kingdom was infected. The queen-mother employed all her art and influence to ſupport his authority, but could not reſtrain her younger ſon, the duke of Alençon, now duke of Anjou, from putting himſelf at the head, ſometimes of one party, and ſometimes of another, in oppoſition to the king. To this prince, who was now the preſumptive heir of the crown, the Flemings addreſſed themſelves, after having in vain applied to the king himſelf for protection. Anjou liſtened with much pleaſure to their application; and having conceived hopes of obtaining the ſovereignty of the provinces, he made them the moſt flattering promiſes of aſſiſtance. Henry, far from oppoſing the duke's deſigns, conſidered his leaving France as the moſt fortunate event that could happen; ſince he would be thereby deliver-

BOOK XIV.

1578.

Henry III. of France.

The States apply for aid to the duke of Anjou.

Book XIV. 1578.

ed from a great number of reſtleſs intriguing ſpirits, by whom the tranquillity of his kingdom had been diſturbed. But as he declined on this occaſion to aſſiſt his brother in levying forces, partly from inability, and partly from the dread of embroiling himſelf with Philip, Anjou was not in a condition, till ſome time after the preſent period, to fulfil his engagements.

They receive aſſiſtance from Elizabeth.

THE Flemings mean-while received the moſt ſeaſonable aſſiſtance from the queen of England. Don John had, ſome months before, endeavoured to prepoſſeſs Elizabeth in *his* favour; by repreſenting, that the diſturbances in the Netherlands were entirely owing to the prince of Orange, and his adherents, who had broken the pacification of Ghent, and by their intrigues prevailed upon the States to violate the perpetual edict. Elizabeth pretended to give credit to this repreſentation, and ordered her ambaſſador to reproach the States with their infidelity, and even to threaten them with her reſentment, in caſe they ſhould refuſe to adhere to their engagements. Thus far this artful princeſs went, in order to perſuade Philip that ſhe ſeriouſly deſired his ſubjects in the Netherlands to maintain their allegiance. But in reality ſhe wiſhed for nothing leſs. In a political light (that light in which the conduct of Elizabeth ought almoſt always be conſidered) nothing could be more deſirable to her, than that the troubles of the Low Countries ſhould continue; and, if either of the two contending parties ſhould finally prevail, that victory ſhould fall rather on the ſide of the people, than of the king. But when ſhe conſidered the inequality of the diſpute between him and the Flemings, ſhe dreaded that the latter, if left to themſelves, muſt ſoon be compelled, either to relinquiſh their pretenſions, or to throw themſelves for protection into the arms of France. She had therefore reſolved to watch carefully over their conduct,

conduct, and to afford them, from time to time, such assistance as their circumstances should require. She lent a favourable ear to the defence which was made by the prince of Orange and the States against Don John's accusation; and she admitted of their justification the more willingly, as in the representation given her of Don John's conduct on this occasion, she found reason to believe that his intentions were no less hostile with regard to herself, than with respect to the States and the prince of Orange. For William had taken particular care to inform her of some intercepted letters of Don John's, from which it appeared, that he entertained a secret correspondence with the queen of Scots; that he had formed a plan, to which the pope was privy, for setting that princess at liberty; and that he was incited to attempt this, not only by the desire of distressing Elizabeth, but likewise by the wild ambition of marrying the Scottish queen, and attaining, through her, possession of the British crowns.

AFTER this discovery, Elizabeth resolved no longer to keep any measures with Don John, but to exert herself with vigour in opposing his re-admission into the government of the Netherlands. With this intention she gave the most gracious reception to the marquis d'Havrée, the ambassador of the States, and entered readily into a treaty, by which she engaged to furnish them with an immediate supply, both of money and troops; upon condition, that the commander of these troops should be admitted into the council of state; and that, during the continuance of the war, no step should be taken, nor any alliance formed, without her consent [a].

ELIZABETH had no sooner subscribed this treaty, than being still desirous to avoid an open

[a] Meteren, p. 197. Bentivoglio, p. 202. Camden, anno 1577, &c.

BOOK XIV. 1578.

breach with Philip, ſhe diſpatched an ambaſſador* to Madrid, to repreſent to him, that in her late tranſaction with the States, it was far from her intention to encourage them to withdraw their allegiance; that, on the contrary, ſhe had employed the only means likely to prove effectual to prevent them from caſting themſelves in deſpair into the hands of ſome other power. She was deeply intereſted, ſhe acknowledged, in ſaving her neighbours from oppreſſion; eſpecially the Flemings, with whom the commercial intereſts of her ſubjects had long been, and ſtill were ſo cloſely connected. This ſhe hoped would plead her excuſe for exhorting him to ſubſtitute in the room of his brother a governor, in whom the people could repoſe greater truſt and confidence; and with whom ſhe herſelf could maintain a more friendly intercourſe, than ſhe could ever hold with Don John, after having diſcovered his deſign to invade her dominions. She concluded with intreating him to redreſs the grievances of his Flemiſh ſubjects; offering to mediate between him and them, if her mediation could be of uſe; and declaring, that if they ſhould refuſe to fulfil their late engagements, or attempt to make any innovation contrary to the pacification of Ghent, ſhe would aſſiſt him in reducing them to obedience by force of arms*.

ELIZABETH could not mean any thing by this embaſſy, but the fulfilling of an empty ceremonial, which was received by Philip, and performed by her with equal inſincerity. She did not wait for a return to her embaſſy, but proceeded inſtantly to carry into execution her treaty with the States. Both the troops and money which ſhe engaged to furniſh, were immediately ſent over; and the latter was remitted by the States to prince Caſimire, to enable him to complete his levies.

THE

* Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the council. * Carte, book xviii. Camden.

THE States had collected a conſiderable body of forces, which they ſtationed in the neighbourhood of Namur; and if they had followed the counſel of the prince of Orange, who exhorted them to lay ſiege to that important fortreſs, they might have made themſelves maſters of it, and prevented the return of the Spaniſh troops. But many among them were ſtill unſhaken in their allegiance to the king, as well as in their attachment to the popiſh faith; whom nothing but their remembrance of the cruelties of Alva, and the late enormities of the Spaniſh troops, could have induced to concur in the meaſures which the majority had adopted. Theſe men fondly imagined that Philip would be moved with their calamities, and perſuaded to comply with their requeſts. Being for this reaſon unwilling to begin hoſtilities, they urged ſtrongly the expediency of a defenſive war: and thus the army was ſuffered, for ſeveral months, to remain inactive, and time imprudently given for the arrival of the Italian and Spaniſh troops [y]. 1578. Imprudent delays of the States.

ALTHOUGH Philip did not entirely approve of his brother's conduct, and deſired to have obtained his ends by negociation and artifice; yet, having failed in this way, he reſolved, without heſitation, to employ force; and he had accordingly ſent orders to Alexander Farneſe, the prince of Parma, to lead back the troops from Italy, to the Netherlands, without delay. On their arrival at Namur, being joined by other troops, which Don John had levied in the neighbouring provinces, they compoſed an army of fifteen thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe; while that of the States amounted only to ten thouſand foot and one thouſand five hundred horſe; and was no leſs inferior to the enemy in diſcipline, than in number. The States now The return of the Spaniſh troops.

[y] Meteren, book viii. ab initio.

BOOK XIV. 1578.

now ſaw their folly in having neglected to make themſelves maſters of Namur, as an entrance had thereby been ſecured for the Spaniards into the centre of the Netherlands.

DON JOHN was at this time in a ſituation much more ſuitable to the talents which he poſſeſſed, than thoſe negociations and treaties in which he had been hitherto engaged. He had longed with extreme impatience for the arrival of the forces, and ardently deſired to be revenged upon the States for the injurious treatment which he imagined he had received. Having got information that their army, commanded by the Sieur de Goignies, had left their camp in the neighbourhood of Namur, and were retiring towards Bruſſels, he reſolved to attack them on their march. With this intention he ſent his cavalry before, under the prince of Parma, and followed them himſelf, as quickly as poſſible, with the foot. Farneſe executed the truſt committed to him with great valour. At the head of his battalion he attacked the Flemiſh cavalry with uncommon fury, and though they gave him a ſpirited reception, he ſoon compelled them to retire. In the mean time Don John came forward with a choſen body of infantry, and afforded him ſuch a powerful ſupport, as enabled him to drive the enemy's horſe before him, till he entered along with them into the ranks of their main army. The Flemings believing the whole Spaniſh forces to be at hand, and being utterly unprepared for ſo ſudden an attack, were ſoon thrown into confuſion and diſperſed. About three thouſand were killed, and a great number, with the commander in chief, were taken priſoners. The loſs on the ſide of the conquerors was inconſiderable.

Battle of Gemblours.

January 31ſt

AFTER this victory Don John reduced Gemblours, Louvain, Sichem, Nivelle, and ſeveral other places, both in Brabant and Hainault. He deſired likewiſe to have laid ſiege to Bruſſels; but his council of war were of opinion, that his ſtrength was

was not adequate to ſo great an enterpriſe, and thought it more expedient to aim at eaſier conqueſts, till his army ſhould be reinforced. BOOK XIV. 1578.

THE States in the mean time received an abundant compenſation for their loſſes in the ſouthern provinces, by the acquiſition of Amſterdam. To this wealthy city, which even at the preſent period was the greateſt in the northern provinces, the duke of Alva had, as mentioned above, given the moſt particular attention; having expelled the proteſtants, and put the government entirely into the hands of rigid catholics. Theſe men, ſupported by a numerous garriſon, had baffled all the attempts which had been made by the States of Holland to reduce them. But being now hemmed in by their countrymen both by ſea and land, and their trade almoſt ruined, they at laſt conſented to accede to the pacification of Ghent, and agreed to diſband the popiſh garriſon, to recall the proteſtant exiles, and to allow them to hold their religious aſſemblies without the city. It was not long before they repented of theſe conceſſions. The proteſtants being inflamed with zeal for their religion; impatient under the reſtraints which in the late agreement had been laid upon them, fired with reſentment for former injuries, and ſuſpicious that the catholics were again meditating ſchemes for their expulſion, they flew to arms, and having ſuppreſſed the exerciſe of the popiſh faith, they drove all the prieſts, and others whom they ſuſpected of malignant deſigns, out of the city [z]. Amſterdam accedes to the confederacy. February 8th

IN the midſt of theſe tranſactions John de Noircarmes, Baron de Selles, arrived from Spain, with Philip's anſwer to the application which the States had made to him ſome months before. It was ſuch as they had reaſon to expect, and contained an abſolute denial of their requeſts, with regard to the removal of Don John, and the ratification of the election of Matthias. Philip's anſwer to the States.

CONVINCED

[z] Van Meteren, p. 207.

BOOK XIV.

1578.

CONVINCED by this denial, of the folly of thoſe hopes which they had entertained, that the king would yield to their entreaties, and ſenſible that they had ſuffered conſiderable loſs, from that want of diſpatch and ſecrecy which is incident to the procedure of a numerous aſſembly; they enlarged the powers of Matthias and the prince of Orange, and inveſted them, and the council of ſtate, with authority to conduct the operations of the war, without having recourſe on every occaſion to the aſſembly of the States.

The States proſecute the war.

No time after this was unneceſſarily loſt. The troops which had been diſperſed at Gemblours were collected, and of theſe, and the new levies, an army was compoſed, amounting to eight thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, partly Flemings, and partly Scots and Engliſh. This army was ſtationed in the neighbourhood of Lierres, in the centre of Brabant, under the command of the count de Boſſut. Don John's army, after he had put garriſons into the towns which he had taken, was ſtill ſuperior in number; and therefore he reſolved to march towards Boſſut, before the auxiliaries, which the States expected from France and Germany, ſhould arrive. But he ſoon found that he had now to contend both with troops and a general much ſuperior to thoſe whom he had encountered at Gemblours. Boſſut had, from a ſenſe of the inferiority of his forces, pitched his camp near the village of Rimenant, in a ſituation extremely advantageous for preventing the enemy from penetrating further into the provinces. On the one ſide it was defended by the Demer, and on the other, by a wood; and was fortified both before and behind with ſtrong entrenchments. Notwithſtanding this, Don John reſolved to attack it, unleſs he could provoke the count to quit his lines, and give him battle. The prince of Parma, who from his early youth was no leſs wiſe than brave, remonſtrated againſt this reſolution, as being

Battle of Rimenant.

The prince of Parma.

g dangerous and deſperate. But Don John, BOOK
g confirmed in his purpoſe by the other XIV.
rs, gave orders for his army to advance, after 1578.
ıg ſent before a ſelect body of troops, to at-
an important poſt, without the camp, which
guarded by ſome Engliſh and Scotch forces,
r colonel Norris. Among the aſſailants was
Alphonſo Martinez de Leyva, at the head of
npany of two thouſand men, whom he main-
d at his own expence, and who were all
r gentlemen, or ſoldiers who had diſtinguiſhed
ıſelves in former wars. Theſe men attacked
Britiſh troops with uncommon fury. After a
: reſiſtance, the latter began to retreat, but in
l order, and with their faces turned towards
enemy. The Spaniards, to ſecond whom
John had ſent ſeveral battalions of freſh troops,
uſpecting any artifice, and believing the ene-
o be intimidated, followed them with much
pitation, till they had paſt a narrow defile
in reach of the artillery of the Flemiſh camp.
is then returned to the charge, and the combat The Spa-
renewed with greater fury than ever. He niards re-
reinforced with troops ſent him from the Engliſh.
p, and both parties, being nearly equal,
ıed determined to die or conquer. This gal-
Engliſhman animated his army by his own
ıple, and had three horſes killed under him.
Scots, impatient of the heat, fought in their Auguſt 1ſt.
s, and aſtoniſhed the enemy with the ſingula-
of their appearance. In the mean time, a
y of troops, which had been placed in ambuſh,
:ked the Spaniards in flank, and Boſſut conti-
l to fire upon them inceſſantly with his artillery.
y muſt all have periſhed, had not the prince of
na obtained liberty from Don John to advance
ıe head of the cavalry to their relief. By his
rior prudence, he would have prevented this
nſiderate enterpriſe; and now, by his prudence
bravery united, he ſaved the troops from
e fatal conſequences, to which through their
own

BOOK XIV. 1578.

own and the general's confidence, they had been expoſed. About nine hundred men however fell on the field of battle, and a few more were taken priſoners [a].

DON JOHN, having thus failed in his attempt, and being ſenſible that he could not, with his preſent army, keep the field againſt the numerous forces that were ready to pour in upon him from France and Germany retreated, with the reſolution of acting for the future on the defenſive only, and pitched his camp under the fortifications of Namur.

Treaty of the States with Anjou.

THE States concluded about this time their treaty with the duke of Anjou, which conſiſted of the following articles:—That, under the title of Protector of the Netherlands, the duke ſhould furniſh, at his own expence, ten thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe: that all the conqueſts which he ſhould make on the Flanders ſide of the Maeſe, ſhould belong to the States; and thoſe on the other ſide to himſelf: that, for the accommodation of his troops, Landrecy, and Queſnoy in Hainault, and Bapaume in Artois, ſhould be put in his poſſeſſion: that the States ſhould not enter into any agreement with Don John, without the duke's conſent: and that in caſe they ſhould hereafter think proper to elect another ſovereign, they ſhould make choice of the duke; but that in the mean time the government ſhould remain entire in the hands of the States.

Deſigns of the States.

AGREEABLY to the firſt article of this treaty, Anjou had aſſembled a conſiderable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Mons, to which place the States ſent a ſolemn embaſſy to intreat that he would quicken his march into the interior provinces. They intended, that their own army ſhould unite with his, and that of Caſimire, and that

[a] Bentivoglio, book x. Strabo, l. iii. Meteren, p 225. Thuanus, lib. lxvi. ſect. xii.

that all the three armies ſhould act in concert with one another, in expelling Don John, before he ſhould receive a reinforcement from Spain or Italy. Nor was it without apparent reaſon that they entertained the hopes of accompliſhing this deſign. Prince Caſimire had paſſed the Rhine and the Maeſe, and advanced as far as the town of Dieſt in Brabant. His army, when joined with that of the States, amounted nearly to forty thouſand foot and twenty thouſand horſe, and was greatly ſuperior to any which Don John could muſter to oppoſe it.

Their numerous army

BUT a variety of cauſes concurred in rendering almoſt uſeleſs theſe mighty preparations; and a ſpirit of diviſion aroſe, by which the people in the more fertile provinces loſt for ever that liberty, for which they had ſo ſtrenuouſly contended, at the very time when it was moſt in their power to ſecure it on a firm and permanent foundation. For although, according to the teſtimony of the catholic, as well as the proteſtant hiſtorians, nothing could exceed the prudence and moderation with which the prince of Orange conducted the affairs of government, it ſoon appeared, that no human wiſdom was ſufficient to preſerve harmony and concord, where there were ſo many grounds of jealouſy and diſcontent. Of this diſcontent and jealouſy, religious bigotry was the principal, but not the only cauſe. Ambition and intereſt joined their influence to that of religion, and not only divided the people themſelves into factions, the moſt inveterate and hoſtile, but created ſuſpicion and diſcord between them and the foreign powers which they had called to their aſſiſtance.

Its operations rendered ineffectual.

THE queen of England had heard, with great uneaſineſs, of the late treaty between the States and the duke of Anjou. She knew not, at this time, how far Henry was concerned in his brother's enterpriſe, nor what ſchemes of conqueſt theſe two princes might have formed. She conſidered

BOOK XIV. 1578.

ſidered what great advantages their neighbourhood afforded them for the execution of theſe ſchemes; and foreſaw the prejudice which might accrue to the Engliſh nation, if the Netherlands were to fall under ſubjection to the crown of France. In order to prevent this, and counterbalance the power and influence of Anjou, ſhe had made ſuch ample remittances of money to prince Caſimire, as had enabled him to augment the number of his army, which conſiſted wholly of proteſtants, conſiderably above what the States had either expected or deſired. This alarmed the jealouſy of all the catholics in the Low Countries, who dreaded the approach of ſo great an army of reformers, and ſuſpected that Caſimire, in concert with Elizabeth, had conceived the deſign of extirpating the popiſh faith. They did not conceal their apprehenſions. Even the prince of Orange, and other moderate proteſtants, joined in remonſtrating with Caſimire on the neceſſity of his diſmiſſing a part of his forces. But this remonſtrance ſerved only to alienate him from the prince of Orange and the council, and to render him leſs attentive to their inſtructions with regard to the conduct of the war. He was likewiſe highly offended with the preference which the States had given to the count of Boſſut, by appointing him commander in chief of the army; and he made them feel his reſentment, by the ſlowneſs of all his military operations, and his continual demands of ſupplies for the payment of his troops [b].

Intemperate zeal and ambition of the Proteſtants.

BUT the intemperate zeal and ambition of the proteſtants was productive of ſtill more pernicious effects. Not ſatisfied with the ſecurity from perſecution which they had enjoyed ſince the pacification of Ghent, they took courage from the great number of proteſtants in the army, and petitioned Matthias and the States, to be allowed to hold their religious aſſemblies openly in churches, and to be admitted, on the ſame footing with the

[b] Reidanus, p. 25, 26.

the catholics, to the ſeveral offices of government. They ought certainly to have remained ſilent, as they had done hitherto, till the common enemy had been expelled, and the public tranquillity eſtabliſhed. Yet their conduct admits of ſome apology; their party had greater influence now than it was likely to poſſeſs, if the catholics were delivered from their dread of the Spaniards, and they could not foreſee thoſe fatal conſequences with which their application was afterwards attended.

But whatever judgment may be formed of their diſcretion, the States thought it neceſſary, leſt the army ſhould have proved refractory, to comply with their requeſts. The pacification of Ghent required that religion ſhould remain on the ſame footing on which it ſtood at the time of that treaty, till the States of all the provinces ſhould be aſſembled; yet the States, now partially aſſembled, conſented, not only that the proteſtants ſhould have acceſs to all public offices, but likewiſe that they ſhould have churches allowed to them in every place where a hundred families reſided; upon this condition, that in Holland and Zealand the ſame indulgence ſhould be granted to the catholic inhabitants. To this decree they gave the name of the Peace of Religion; and each of the provinces was left at liberty to accept or reject it, as they ſhould judge expedient.

In ſome cities it proved a ſalutary remedy for the diſorders with which they were diſtracted; but, in many others, it added malignity to that poiſon, which raged in the minds of the more violent religioniſts, and was the ſource of the moſt pernicious animoſity and diſcord. It gave no contentment to the zealots of either party, but contributed to inflame them more than ever againſt each other, by adding freſh materials to that inveterate jealouſy and rancour which their bigotry inſpired, but which had been laid aſleep for ſome time paſt, by their apprehenſions of the common

The unhappy conſequences.

BOOK XIV. 1578.

common danger. The catholics every where, but in a few cities of Flanders and Brabant, oppoſed the execution of this decree; and the reformers derived little advantage from it, except in thoſe places where they overpowered their antagoniſts by ſuperior numbers. In the provinces of Artois and Hainault, the people rejected the decree with the moſt determined obſtinacy, and refuſed to allow the exerciſe of any other religion but the catholic within their territories; while the proteſtants in Ghent and other places, actuated by the ſame intolerant and bigoted ſpirit, expelled the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, ſeized their effects, and ſpoiled the churches of their ornaments.

Diſcord between the Walloons and Flemings.

BETWEEN the people of Ghent and the Walloons a particular ground of enmity had ſubſiſted, ever ſince the former had caſt the duke d'Arſchot and his attendants into priſon. For moſt of theſe were perſons of rank in the Walloon provinces; and the Ghenteſe had not only rejected every ſolicitation in their behalf, but had even treated them with ſeverity during their confinement. The Walloons were, for this reaſon, the more readily incenſed by the accounts which they received of the late enormities committed againſt the catholics, which they juſtly regarded as a violation, on the part of the proteſtants, of their late engagements. Forgetful therefore of the danger which threatened them, and liſtening only to the voice of indignation and reſentment, they began to ſeparate themſelves from the other provinces, and refuſed to contribute their ſhare of the money neceſſary for the payment of the troops. "We took "arms," ſaid they, "to vindicate our liberty; "but what will it avail us to be delivered from "the Spaniſh yoke, if we muſt ſubmit to a yoke "no leſs galling and intolerable, impoſed upon us "by our countrymen; who, under the pretext of "great zeal againſt the tyranny of the Spaniards, "ſhew now that their only deſign has been to "tyraniſe

"tyranniſe over us themſelves." The other provinces repreſented to them the miſchievous conſequences with which their conduct muſt be attended, and accompanied their repreſentations with prayers and threats; but the Walloons remained inflexible, and ſoon afterwards they gave a ſtriking proof of their hoſtile diſpoſition, by refuſing to deliver the towns of Landrecy, Quenois, and Bapaume, to the duke of Anjou, in conformity to the treaty above recorded. Not ſatisfied with this, they began to prepare openly for war, and employed the contributions, which had been raiſed for paying the army of the States, in levying forces againſt the Flemings. The Flemings quickly armed themſelves in their defence, and ſeveral rencounters happened between the Walloons and them, that were equally pernicious to both. BOOK XIV. 1578.

PRINCE Caſimire's troops and thoſe of the States had been for ſome time paſt united, and Don John was not poſſeſſed of a force ſufficient to oppoſe them; but the factious and refractory ſpirit of the Walloons and Flemings had diffuſed itſelf into almoſt every part of the Netherlands, except the provinces of Holland and Zealand. Many cities withheld their contributions, and the army was extremely ill provided with every thing neceſſary to render the operations of the campaign effectual. Boſſut's principal object was to compel the enemy to a general engagement; and for this purpoſe, after taking two or three towns of little conſequence, he led his troops within view of the camp in which Don John had entrenched himſelf, under the fortifications of Namur. With an army ſo much ſuperior in number to the enemy, the count might have forced the entrenchments; but being neither furniſhed with pioneers, cannon, or a ſufficient quantity of ammunition, and finding Don John unalterably determined to keep within his camp, he was obliged to retire. His troops, in the mean time, were highly diſcontented, on account of their want of pay. His The effects of that diſcord.

BOOK XIV. 1578.

diſcipline was unavoidably relaxed. The country was oppreſſed and plundered. Caſimire accepted of an invitation from the Ghenteſe, to aſſiſt them with a part of his forces againſt the Walloons. It became dangerous to keep the remainder of the army any longer in the neighbourhood of the Spaniſh camp, and it was ſoon afterwards found impracticable to ſupport it. A part of the troops therefore was diſbanded, and the reſt were put into garriſon in the fortified towns.

THE duke of Anjou's army was not better provided with the means of Subſiſtence than that of the States, and its operations were equally inſignificant. Conſcious of his inability to fulfil his engagements, Anjou graſped at thoſe pretexts for eluding them, which the conduct of Caſimire, and that of the Walloons, afforded him. He complained bitterly of the treatment which he received from the latter, who not only refuſed him admittance into the towns which the States had promiſed for the accommodation of his troops, but ſhewed themſelves no leſs unwilling to furniſh him with proviſions, than if he had come to invade, and not to protect and defend them. He ſeems likewiſe to have ſuſpected, and not without ſome reaſon, that Caſimire had formed ſome private deſigns, inconſiſtent with that eſtabliſhment which he himſelf had in view in the ſouthern provinces; and that he had carried his troops to the aſſiſtance of the people of Ghent, in order to pave the way for executing thoſe deſigns. He therefore refuſed to join his army with that of Boſſut, unleſs Caſimire ſhould return to it; and when Matthias and the prince of Orange failed in their endeavours to prevail on Caſimire, (to whom the Ghenteſe had advanced a conſiderable ſum of money, to induce him to remain with them) Anjou broke up his camp, and ſuffered a part of his army to go over to the Baron de Montigny, who was commander in chief at that time of the forces of the Walloons [c].

SUCH

[c] Meteren, p. 233. Grotius, p. 60.

1578. Concluſion of the campaign.

SUCH was the concluſion of this campaign, and ſuch the iſſue of all the mighty preparations which the States had made for a vigorous proſecution of the war. The people themſelves, inſtead of uniting their efforts againſt the common enemy, wage war with one another, in violation of the moſt ſolemn engagements, into which they had entered only a few months before; and the princes, who had undertaken to deliver the Flemings from the Spaniſh yoke, inliſt themſelves, in oppoſition to each other, under the banners of thoſe inveterate factions, which threaten this unhappy people with deſtruction.

CASIMIRE went over to England to juſtify his conduct to Elizabeth, and Anjou ſent an ambaſſador to the States to make an apology for *his*, by repreſenting, that his troops had joined thoſe of Montigny without his conſent; but that the States had no reaſon to dread the conſequences of that ſtep, ſince the Ghenteſe would be thereby more eaſily reſtrained from their exceſſes. The States, thinking it prudent to diſſemble their reſentment, admitted of his apology; and, that they might ſtill remain on friendly terms with him, they aſſured his ambaſſadors, that they had a juſt ſenſe of gratitude for the efforts which the duke had made in their behalf; that, as ſoon as poſſible, they would refund his expences; and that, if they ſhould ever find it neceſſary to elect another prince, in the place of the king of Spain, they would make him an offer of the ſovereignty.

Death of Don John of Auſtria.

DURING the courſe of the tranſactions that have been related, Don John had kept his troops within their camp at Namur. They might now have left it without danger; but Don John had been ſeized, ſome weeks before, with a violent illneſs, which cut him off before he had reached the thirtieth year of his age. His death was by ſome aſcribed to poiſon; but, according to others, it was owing partly to diſeaſe, and partly to that

BOOK XIV. 1578. October.

chagrin which he conceived from the negligence with which his repeated applications for money and troops were treated by the Spaniſh miniſters. Fond to exceſs of military glory, and conſcious of talents which would probably have enſured ſucceſs, he lamented bitterly the neceſſity which the weakneſs of his army impoſed upon him, of remaining ſo long inactive, and ſolicited his brother for a reinforcement with the moſt earneſt importunity. Nor was it only becauſe Philip was averſe from a vigorous proſecution of the war, that he deferred complying with his requeſt. After that renown, which Don John acquired in the battle of Lepanto, his conduct, as above related, contained ſo clear a diſcovery of his views, as could not but alarm the ſuſpicious temper of the king, who thenceforth kept a watchful eye upon all his brother's moſt ſecret motions; and when he ſent him to the Netherlands, reſolved never to intruſt him with ſuch a numerous army as might enable him to execute any ambitious deſign. Philip's ſuſpicions were, during his brother's reſidence in the Low Countries, kept perpetually awake, by reports of his having formed a deſign of marrying the queen of Scots. To theſe reports Philip gave credit, perhaps too eaſily. By *his* orders, Don John's favourite, and ſecretary Eſcovedo, who had fomented his maſter's ambition, were privately put to death. It was believed by many, that he iſſued the like orders with regard to his brother, and that this young heroic prince died of poiſon, given him by certain popiſh eccleſiaſtics, inſtigated by the court of Spain. But whatever ground there was for this perſuaſion, there is little room to doubt that, from jealouſy of his brother, more than any other cauſe, Philip withheld the ſupplies neceſſary for carrying on the war. And to this circumſtance, the troops of the States were indebted for their preſervation from that ruin, to which their diviſions had expoſed them [d].

THE

[d] Meteren, p. 234. Grotius, &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XV.

DON JOHN having on his death-bed appointed the prince of Parma to ſucceed him, his choice was ſoon afterwards approved, and ratified by the king. Book XV. 1578. The prince of Parma governor.

THIS young prince had on many occaſions, ſince his arrival in the Netherlands, given proof of conſummate prudence and the moſt intrepid valour. Temperate, vigilant, and indefatigable, he could deſcend to the moſt minute detail in all military operations, and was always the firſt to expoſe himſelf to toil and danger, and the laſt to retire. Pliant in his manners, and inſinuating in his addreſs; he could ſpeak moſt of the European languages, and accommodate himſelf to the ſoldiers of all the different nations of which the army was compoſed. He poſſeſſed a vigour of bodily conſtitution equal to that of his mind, joined with an elevated martial air and aſpect, which ſerved, in the time of battle, to fill the enemy with terror, and to inſpire his own troops with courage and confidence of ſucceſs. His character.

BOOK XV. 1579.

He had no ſooner performed the laſt offices to his friend and kinſman, than he applied himſelf aſſiduouſly to fulfil the duties of that important ſtation to which he was now advanced. While the army of the States remained in the field, he was obliged, through the ſmallneſs of his numbers, to follow the ſame plan which his predeceſſor had purſued, and to keep his little army ſtrongly fortified within their camp; but when, from the cauſes above explained, not only the army of the States, but likewiſe the Germans and French under Caſimire and Anjou, were all either diſbanded, or put into winter-quarters, Farneſe, conſidering this as the proper ſeaſon for action, reſolved to undertake the ſiege of ſome important place, by the acquiſition of which he might encreaſe his reſources for carrying on the war.

HE heſitated for ſome time, whether he ſhould enter firſt upon the ſiege of Maeſtricht, or that of Antwerp. The benefit which he would have derived from the poſſeſſion of the latter of theſe places, was greater than any which could ariſe from that of the former, as Antwerp was the principal ſeat of wealth and commerce in the Netherlands, and was ſituated in the moſt advantageous manner for proſecuting the conqueſt of the maritime provinces; but having weighed attentively the difficulties to be ſurmounted in the ſiege of a place of ſo great extent and ſtrength as Antwerp, he wiſely reſolved to begin with the ſiege of Maeſtricht, in which he could engage with fewer forces, and a greater probability of ſucceſs [a].

IN order to conceal his deſign from the States, he directed his march towards Antwerp, and had a ſharp rencounter with a body of French and Britiſh forces, which were ſent out to obſtruct his approach. Theſe he forced to retire under the fortifications of the city; immediately after which he

[a] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

he turned back ſuddenly, and inveſted Maeſtricht, before the States had time to furniſh that town with the neceſſary ſupplies of ſtores and proviſions. BOOK XV. 1579.

THE inhabitants were not numerous in proportion to the extent of the place [b]; but it was ſtrongly fortified, and the want of numbers was abundantly ſupplied by the martial ſpirit of the people, who, being expoſed from their ſituation to frequent invaſions from foreign enemies, were well accuſtomed to the uſe of arms. About fifteen hundred of them were enrolled; and by theſe, and a thouſand regular troops, together with two thouſand of the country people, who ſerved as pioneers, Maeſtricht was defended for almoſt four months, againſt an army of 15,000 foot and 4000 horſe, the beſt-diſciplined and braveſt troops in Europe, whoſe operations were directed by the greateſt military genius of the age. Amongſt the beſieged there were two perſons, Scwartzenbourg de Herle, a Fleming, and Tappin, a Frenchman, who conducted the defence with a degree of wiſdom and intrepidity that excited univerſal admiration and applauſe. He lays ſiege to Maeſtricht.

THE prince of Parma, having arrived before the town in the beginning of March, ſent Mondragone, with a part of the army, to the eaſt ſide of the river, to inveſt the town of Vich; whilſt he himſelf remained on the other ſide, where he intended to make his principal attack. His firſt object was to prevent the States from introducing any ſupplies or reinforcements. With this view, he ſhut up the Maeſe with two bridges of boats, one above and the other below the town, and drew quite round his camp, on both ſides of the river, ſtrong lines of circumvallation. Immediately after taking this precaution, he began to make his approach to the walls by trenches. The garriſon had the courage to make ſeveral ſallies, by which his Conduct of the ſiege.

[b] It is five Italian miles in circumference.

BOOK XV. 1579.

his operations were retarded. At length, however, when by perſeverance and the power of ſuperior numbers, his trenches were ſufficiently advanced, he planted two batteries, one againſt the gate of Tongres, and the other againſt the curtain, between the gate of Hoxter and that of the Croſs. While the batteries were played off with great ſucceſs, the royaliſts puſhed forward the trenches, and were ready to enter into the foſſé, or ditch. The breach at the gate of Tongres, was the firſt made practicable, and Farneſe reſolved to aſſault it with a ſelect body of troops, drawn from the ſeveral nations of which his army was compoſed. By thus mingling them together, he enflamed their ardour and emulation; but they met with equal ardour on the part of their opponents, and, after an obſtinate and bloody conflict, were obliged to retire.

Brave defence of Maeſtricht.

THE prince, believing that this firſt attempt had failed through the ſmallneſs of the breach, renewed the fire of his batteries with redoubled fury, and prepared for a ſecond attack. In order to weaken the garriſon by dividing it, he reſolved to make an aſſault at each of the two breaches at the ſame time. His troops advanced, in the face of the enemy's cannon, with the moſt undaunted intrepidity. The beſieged ſtood undiſmayed till they approached, and nothing could exceed the fury with which both parties began the combat. Their fire-arms ſoon ceaſed to be of uſe to them; for they came immediately to cloſe fight, in which they could employ only their pikes and ſwords. In one of the breaches De Herle, and in the other Tappin, gave the moſt ſplendid proofs of capacity and valour. The aſſailants, enraged at meeting with ſuch obſtinate reſiſtance from an enemy ſo much inferior in number, exerted their utmoſt vigour to overpower them. The action was furious and deſperate. The ruins of the wall, and the ground on both ſides, were ſtrewed with the

the dead and dying. Stones hurled down from the bulwarks, and artificial fires, which the beſieged launched among the aſſailants, increaſed the confuſion. Thoſe fires happened to lay hold of the barrels of gun-powder which ſtood near for the uſe of the combatants. The exploſion was terrible, and many on both ſides periſhed by this fatal accident. The air reſounded with cries, and ſhrieks, and groans. The earth was covered with mangled carcaſſes; yet thoſe who ſurvived ſtill maintained their ground with the ſame unconquerable obſtinacy as before, and, from the horrid ſcene which lay around them, ſeemed only to derive freſh rage and fury. The prince of Parma gave orders at laſt, with much reluctance, for ſounding a retreat. The reſolution and fortitude of the beſieged, he perceived, were not to be overcome. Even if he could have mounted the breach, and kept poſſeſſion of it, this would not have availed him, as other fortifications had been raiſed within, which rendered the town almoſt as impregnable as before.

UPON reviewing his troops, the prince found that many of his beſt officers had fallen, and that the regiments of Spaniſh veterans were extremely diminiſhed. He ſoon completed his numbers by making draughts from the garriſons of the towns in his poſſeſſion. But when he reflected on the character of the beſieged, he perceived the neceſſity of laying aſide all thoughts of taking the town by ſtorm, and reſolved to content himſelf with the ſlower method of undermining the fortifications, employing for this purpoſe a prodigious number of pioneers, and taking effectual care in the mean time, to render it impoſſible for the beſieged to receive any reinforcement or ſupplies.

THE States were not neglectful of the preſervation of a place, where both the garriſon and inhabitants had ſhewn themſelves ſo worthy of their attention. Having ſome time before received the celebrated

The States attempt in vain to relieve it.

BOOK XV. 1579.

celebrated La Noue into their ſervice, they had appointed him governor of Maeſtricht, and given him the charge of conducting thither the reinforcements which they intended for the relief of the beſieged. Nothing was omitted by La Noue to fulfil their expectations; but ſo pernicious were the conſequences of that ſpirit of diſcord, which ſtill raged as furiouſly as ever, between the proteſtants and catholics, that, although the council of ſtate, ſeconded by the prince of Orange, gave him all the aſſiſtance in their power, he was never able to collect a force ſufficient to execute his purpoſe. The ſituation therefore of the beſieged was become extremely deplorable. The garriſon, which in the beginning of the ſiege conſiſted of a thouſand men, did not amount to more than four hundred, and the citizens and country people had ſuffered a proportionable diminution. Their proviſions began to fail, and their ſtore of gun-powder was nearly exhauſted.

THEIR diſtreſſes were much augmented towards the middle of June, by their loſs of a ravelin, which had enabled them to give great annoyance to the enemy. To acquire poſſeſſion of this ravelin had been the chief object of the prince of Parma's operations for ſeveral weeks; and, though he met with the moſt ſpirited reſiſtance, he at length accompliſhed his deſign, and could, with a large cavalier which he conſtructed, overlook the walls, and ſcour the town with his guns, almoſt from the one end to the other. Still however the beſieged, animated by the hopes of relief, refuſed to capitulate.

Maeſtricht taken by ſurpriſe.

BUT the ſiege was brought to a concluſion much ſooner than either of the two contending parties had reaſon to expect. On the 29th of June, it was ſuſpected by ſome Spaniſh ſoldiers, that the wonted vigilance of the garriſon was relaxed. In order to know the truth with certainty, theſe men crept

crept ſilently to the top of the rampart, and found that the defendants were not only few in number, but overpowered with fatigue and heat, and buried in ſleep. Of this they carried information to the general; who without delay ordered ſuch of his troops as were neareſt, to aſcend the rampart with as little noiſe as poſſible. They were immediately followed by all the reſt of the army. The garriſon were thus ſuddenly overwhelmed, and almoſt all of them were put to the ſword. The inhabitants fought deſperately; but they ſunk at laſt under the ſuperior force of the aſſailants, who ſpared neither ſex nor age; and continued the ſlaughter, till of eight thouſand citizens, only three hundred remained. De Herle eſcaped by diſguiſing himſelf in the habit of a menial ſervant; and Farneſe iſſued ſtrict orders to ſpare the life of the valiant Tappin [c].

1579.

The prince of Orange labours to quell the tumults in Ghent.

DURING the ſiege of Maeſtricht, various political negociations were carried on by the oppoſite parties. The prince of Orange had at this time the chief direction of all the meaſures that were purſued by the States and council; Matthias having, from a conſciouſneſs of his own want of experience, left the entire adminiſtration in his hands. The diſſenſions between the Walloons and Flemings had from the beginning given him deep concern, and he had omitted nothing in his power to heal them. Among the Walloons he had little influence, by reaſon of their abhorrence of his religion, and the jealouſy which they had conceived of his deſigns. On the other hand, the Ghenteſe, who in that age, were noted for their turbulent and ſeditious ſpirit, had been wrought up by certain factious leaders to a degree of madneſs, and were long deaf to all the remonſtrances which he could employ. St. Aldegond, whom he ſent to deal with them, exerted, but in vain, all the addreſs and eloquence for which he was ſo highly celebrated. The interpoſition of Matthias and the

[c] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Meteren, lib. ix.

Book XV. 1579.

the States was equally ineffectual. Nor did they pay any greater regard to the repreſentations and threats of Elizabeth, who ſent over an ambaſſador [d] on purpoſe to perſuade them. At length the prince of Orange went himſelf to treat with them. They had lately inveighed againſt him, with great ſeverity, for his moderation towards the catholics; and had ſuffered ſome of their preachers to arraign him on this account, as inſincere in his religious profeſſion. But, being flattered with that regard and confidence of which his preſent viſit was expreſſive, they reſumed their wonted affection to his perſon; and, after he had ſtaid among them ſome weeks, they complied with the ſeveral requeſts which they had hitherto rejected. They conſented to make reſtitution of the goods of which they had plundered the popiſh eccleſiaſtics; permitted the re-eſtabliſhment of the rites and ceremonies of the Romiſh church, forbad all abuſive language, whether in the pulpit or in private aſſemblies, and engaged to yield a more prompt obedience for the future to the authority of the States [e].

It ſoon however appeared, that nothing but William's perſonal influence had induced them to make theſe conceſſions. In a few months afterwards, being incited by the ſame factious leaders to whom they had formerly liſtened, they indulged themſelves in the moſt unjuſtifiable exceſſes; they plundered the churches and monaſteries, expelled the eccleſiaſtics from the town, and ſeized their effects, which they diſtributed among the Germans, whom they had called to their aſſiſtance againſt the Walloons. Theſe and other enormities occaſioned the prince of Orange to viſit the Ghenteſe a ſecond time; when they made him an offer of the government of the province. He prudently declined accepting this offer; but having again employed all his influence to quaſh the preſent diſſenſions in the city, he ſucceeded

[d] Mr. Davidſon. [e] Thuanus, lib. lxvi.

ceeded ſo far as to be able to compel Imbiſe the chief magiſtrate, together with his factious adherents, to leave the city. He likewiſe put the magiſtracy into the hands of the more moderate reformers, ſet at liberty ſuch of the Walloon nobility as were ſtill in priſon, and procured for the catholic inhabitants, liberty of private worſhip, and ſecurity from moleſtation [f]. BOOK XV. 1579.

WILLIAM laboured with no leſs earneſtneſs to aſſuage the reſentment of the Walloons, who, although they had not been the firſt aggreſſors, perſiſted in their hoſtile diſpoſition, with the moſt unconquerable obſtinacy. By the artifices of Matthew de Moulard, biſhop of Arras, the count de la Lain, the marquis de Roubais, and others of the nobility, who beheld with deep malignity William's unrivalled credit and authority, the people had conceived the moſt incurable ſuſpicions, that, far from being actuated by a diſintereſted attachment to the civil or religious liberty of the provinces, he intended only his own exaltation, and was preparing to eſtabliſh it upon the ruins of the catholic faith. They lent a deaf ear therefore to every plan of accommodation that was propoſed, either by the prince himſelf, or by Matthias and the States; who, they knew, were entirely directed by his councils [g].

THE prince of Parma was too ſagacious not to diſcern the advantage which this diſpoſition of the Walloons afforded him, for drawing them back to their allegiance. Soon after the death of Don John of Auſtria, he had, for this purpoſe, begun a negociation with their leaders; upon which he had beſtowed particular attention, in the midſt of thoſe military occupations in which the ſiege of Maeſtricht had engaged him. In order to fruſtrate his endeavours, the prince of Orange and the States remonſtrated to the Walloons on the infidelity which would be juſtly imputed to them, if

The prince of Parma gains over the Walloons.

[f] Grotius, lib. iii. [g] Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 29.

BOOK XV. 1579.

if they ſhould enter into any ſeparate terms of agreement; and repreſented to them the danger to which they would thereby expoſe *themſelves*, as well as the other provinces, of being again enthralled by the Spaniards. The Walloons could not entirely diveſt themſelves of the ſcruples, which theſe remonſtrances were calculated to excite; nor were they free from thoſe apprehenſions of the Spaniſh tyranny, by which the other provinces were ſo much diſquieted. They had not forgot the ſcenes of treachery and violence, of which they had been ſo often witneſſes; and found it difficult to rely on the promiſes of thoſe, whoſe inſincerity they had ſo frequently experienced. On the other hand, their bigotry, joined with the inveterate jealouſy which the nobility entertained of the prince of Orange, formed an inſurmountable obſtacle againſt any agreement with the Flemings. *That* hatred with which they had been long actuated againſt the Spaniards, began to yield to a more implacable averſion againſt the proteſtants; and in this they were confirmed by the addreſs of the biſhop of Arras, and the other agents of the prince of Parma; whoſe propoſals of accommodation they were now inclined to embrace, provided it could be done conſiſtently with thoſe ſolemn engagements, under which they had lately come to the other provinces. To theſe engagements, according to the ſenſe in which they themſelves underſtood them, they adhered with inflexible fidelity; and perſiſted to the laſt in requiring that all foreign troops ſhould be immediately diſmiſſed; that the pacification of Ghent ſhould be fully executed; and that Philip ſhould recogniſe their right to form alliances either within or without the Netherlands, in caſe of any infraction on his part of the articles of this pacification.

The Spaniſh and Italian troops ſent out of the Netherlands.

OF their ſeveral demands, there was none which the prince of Parma found it ſo difficult to digeſt, as that of ſending away the foreign troops. *Their* place, he knew, could not be ſupplied by the undiſciplined

undiſciplined forces of the country; and he dread- BOOK
ed that he ſhould be obliged to abandon the plan XV.
which he had formed, for ſubduing the maritime 1579.
provinces. The king, to whom he applied for
preciſe inſtructions, was no leſs averſe from this
conceſſion. But Philip, conſidering the recovery
of the Walloons (the moſt warlike of all the inha-
bitants of the Netherlands) as a matter of the laſt
importance; eſpecially in the preſent juncture,
when his exchequer was drained by the expence
which he had incurred in the conqueſt of Portugal;
and hoping, that by the indulgent meaſures which
he had reſolved to eſpouſe in his treatment of the
Walloons, he ſhould be able ere long to obtain
their conſent to whatever he ſhould require of
them, he ſent orders to Farneſe to haſten the con-
cluſion of the treaty; and it was accordingly con-
cluded on the following terms: That all foreign May 17th.
troops in the ſervice of the king, ſhould leave the
Netherlands in ſix weeks, and never return thither
without the conſent of the Walloon provinces:
that an army of national troops ſhould be levied,
to the payment of which the king might apply the
ſubſidies to be granted by the States: that all per-
ſons in public offices ſhould take an oath to main-
tain the catholic religion: that all the privileges of
the provinces ſhould remain inviolate: and that
the government ſhould be preſerved in the ſame
form in which it had been left by the late emperor
when he reſigned his dominions [h].

THIS treaty was ſigned, on the part of the pro-
vinces, only by the deputies of French Flanders, Ar-
tois, and Hainault. The other provinces were not
called, as Luxemburg had never concurred in any
of the late tranſactions; and the greateſt part of
Limburg and Namur had already ſubmitted to the
king's authority.

THE prince of Orange, no ſtranger to the ſecret The union of
motives of the leading men among the Walloons, Utrecht.

[h] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

BOOK XV. 1579.

having foreſeen that this agreement would certainly take place; had, in order to provide a counterpoiſe againſt it, ſet on foot a new treaty of alliance among the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Guelderland, Frieſland, Brabant, and Flanders. This alliance was called the Union of Utrecht, from the place where it was brought to a concluſion. It may juſtly be conſidered as the firſt foundation of the republic of the United Provinces. It is ſtill regarded as containing the fundamental laws of the conſtitution, and proves its author, by the wiſdom, moderation, and extenſive views which it diſcovers. It contains neither any avowal, nor any expreſs renunciation of their allegiance to Philip; but the provinces tacitly aſſume to themſelves the ſovereign authority, and lodge it partly in the general aſſembly of the States, and partly in the States of the ſeveral provinces. The principal articles of this confederacy are thoſe which follow: "That the ſeveral provinces contracting, unite themſelves together in one political body, renouncing for ever the power of ſeparating from each other; but reſerving each to itſelf all the rights which it poſſeſſed before.

"THAT the ſaid provinces ſhall aſſiſt each other to repel the attacks of any foreign power; and, in particular, to repel whatever violence may be offered to any of the contracting parties, in the name of the king of Spain, under the pretext of eſtabliſhing the catholic religion, or on account of any tranſaction in the Netherlands, ſince the year 1558; leaving it always to the generality of the union to determine in what proportion each province ſhall be obliged to furniſh its ſupplies, either of money, or of troops.

"THAT in Holland and Zealand, no religion but that which is already eſtabliſhed ſhall be openly profeſſed; and that the other provinces ſhall be at liberty to allow either of the proteſtant religion, or the catholic, or both, as they themſelves ſhall judge expe[illegible]:

expedient: that reſtitution ſhall be made of the effects which belong to the convents and churches, in all the provinces except thoſe of Holland and Zealand; and in theſe, that penſions ſhall be appointed to the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, to be paid them whereſoever they reſide.

"THAT all frontier, and other towns, which the general and provincial States ſhall think proper to fortify, ſhall be fortified at the joint expence of the generality, and of the particular province in which they lie; but if the General States ſhall on any occaſion think proper to build new forts, without the conſent of the particular province in which they lie, the generality ſhall furniſh the whole expence.

"THAT all fortified towns ſhall be obliged to receive ſuch garriſons as the generality ſhall appoint, on condition that the troops ſhall, beſides their oath of allegiance to the General States, take a particular oath to the province and town in which they are ſtationed.

"THAT the General States ſhall not conclude any peace or truce, nor undertake any war, nor impoſe any taxes, without the conſent of the majority of all the provinces and towns of the union; and that on the other hand, no town or province ſhall enter into any alliance with any foreign prince or power, without conſent of the generality.

"THAT in caſe any prince or ſtate ſhall incline to accede to this alliance, he may be admitted, with the conſent of all the members of the confederacy.

"THAT all the male inhabitants of the provinces, from the age of eighteen to that of ſixty, ſhall, in a month after the publication of the preſent treaty, inſcribe their names in a regiſter to be laid before the General States at their firſt aſſembly, to aſſiſt them in judging what forces each province is able to furniſh.

BOOK XV. 1579.

"THAT in order to procure the money neceſſary for the ſupport of the forces, all the taxes ſhall be farmed out publicly, to thoſe who ſhall make the higheſt offer; and laſtly, that the ſaid taxes ſhall be heightened or lowered according as the General States ſhall judge the exigencies of the confederacy to require."

THIS confederacy was not immediately attended with thoſe advantages which it was deſigned and calculated to produce. It behoved the religious parties to experience, for ſome time longer, the miſchievous effects of their intemperate zeal and bigotry, before they could live at peace. In ſeveral places, the people were ſtill agitated by the moſt violent animoſity againſt one another. In Bois-le-duc, the proteſtants and papiſts took arms, and coming to blows, had ſeveral hundreds of their number killed. Soon after this, the proteſtants, being ſeized with a ſudden panic, abandoned the town to their enemies, who immediately ſubmitted to the Spaniards.

Violence of the proteſtants.

IN Antwerp, where the proteſtant party was the moſt powerful, the people inſulted the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, when employed in one of the ſolemn proceſſions of their religion; and in ſpite of Matthias and the prince of Orange, who interpoſed their authority to protect them, they obliged them to leave the city.

Count Egmont's attempt on Bruſſels.

THESE violences, which the reformers, impelled by their religious zeal, exerciſed in Antwerp and other places, ſerved only more eaſily to reconcile the catholics to the Spaniſh government; and contributed not a little to make ſeveral of the nobility forſake the party of the States. Among theſe was count Egmont, ſon of the great, unfortunate count Egmont. This young nobleman had hitherto diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his zeal againſt the Spaniards; but reſolving now to make his peace with them, he attempted, with a regiment of Walloons, to render himſelf maſter of Bruſſels, in order to

to deliver it to Farneſe; and he ſucceeded ſo far in his deſign, as to get poſſeſſion of one of the gates, and introduce his troops into the city. The citizens ran inſtantly to arms; and, being joined by ſome regular forces in the ſervice of the States, they quickly recovered the gate by a ſingular ſtratagem. Having driven violently towards it, ſome waggons loaded with hay and ſtraw, they ſet fire to theſe combuſtible materials, and the wind blowing the flame and ſmoke towards count Egmont's ſoldiers, they were ſoon obliged to betake themſelves to flight. The whole inhabitants had, in the mean time, got under arms, and Egmont, with the reſt of his men, was ſhut up in the market place, hemmed in on every ſide, and without any proſpect of deliverance. There they remained during that day and the night following; neither of the two parties being inclined to begin hoſtilities. The citizens meanwhile indulged their reſentment, by reproaching the count with his treachery, in forſaking thoſe who had taken arms to revenge his father's death; calling out to him, that only eleven years before, on the ſame day of the year, and in the very place where he then ſtood, his father had died a martyr for that cauſe, which *he* now wanted ſo baſely to betray. This bitter remembrance drew tears from the young man's eyes. The people were moved with that compaſſion for the ſon, which they owed to the memory of the father, and conſented to ſuffer him and his troops to leave the town [1].

BOOK XV. 1579.

DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions, conferences for reconciling the Netherlands to Philip were held in the city of Cologn, at the requeſt and under the mediation of the emperor, the pope, and the electors of Treves and Cologn. The pope ſent thither Caſtagna, archbiſhop of Roſſano, who afterwards attained the papal dignity, and aſſumed the name of Urban VII. The chief of the emperor's embaſſy

Conferences for peace at Cologn.

[1] Grotius, p. 64. Meteren, book ix. p. 250.

BOOK XV. 1579.

embaſſy was count Scwartzenburg. Philip named the duke de Terra Nuova for his ambaſſador, and the duke d'Arſchot was at the head of the deputies from the States. From this nomination of perſons of ſo great eminence and diſtinction, ſuperficial obſervers were apt to imagine, that the negociation committed to them could not fail to be brought to the deſired concluſion. But this was not the judgment of perſons of greater penetration. They conſidered, not only that the prince of Orange, and the other popular leaders, by whom the States were governed, had already gone too far to expect forgiveneſs from the unrelenting temper of the king; but that the opinions of the reformers were more widely diffuſed, and their zeal, if poſſible, more ardent than ever. And as there was no reaſon to believe that they would ever be perſuaded to abandon their religion, ſo there was little ground to hope that Philip's bigotry would ſuffer him to agree to any terms of peace, whilſt they adhered to it. It was in reality this cauſe chiefly, by which the preſent negociation, as well as all preceding ones, was fruſtrated. Philip acted on this occaſion with his uſual duplicity, and gave private inſtructions to his ambaſſador, of a very different import from thoſe which had been communicated to the emperor [k]. At firſt, he ſeemed willing to ratify the pacification of Ghent; and by one of the articles of that treaty, religion was to remain on its preſent footing, till a general aſſembly of the States ſhould alter it. But in the courſe of the conferences it appeared, that the re-eſtabliſhment of popery was a condition, without which he would agree to no accommodation. Neither would he conſent to the convoking of the aſſembly of the States, nor to the ratifying of the election of Matthias; and he ſtill inſiſted peremptorily, that all cities, forts, and military ſtores, ſhould be immediately delivered into the hands of the prince of Parma. In a word, the terms

[k] Strada, lib. v.

terms offered on this occaſion were, in every material article, the ſame with thoſe which had been formerly rejected by the provinces of Holland and Zealand, when they ſtood alone, and unſupported by the other provinces; and therefore it is difficult to ſuppoſe that Philip could, from the beginning, have intended any thing by the preſent negociation, but to gratify the pope and emperor, at whoſe deſire it was begun.

Philip attempts to gain over the prince of Orange.

BEFORE the diſſolution of this congreſs, however, he humbled himſelf ſo far as to make private offers to the prince of Orange. Theſe were, the payment of his debts, the reſtitution of his eſtates, a compenſation for the loſſes which he had ſuſtained during the war, and the liberty of his ſon the count of Buren, upon whom, if the prince himſelf ſhould incline to retire into Germany, the king promiſed to beſtow the government of Holland and Utrecht. Theſe offers were made in Philip's name by count Schwartzenburg, who pledged his faith for the ſtrict performance of them. William could not but be flattered with the teſtimony which was thus given, by an enemy ſo great and powerful, of the dread that was entertained of his abilities. But being ſuperior to the allurements of intereſt, he preferred the glory of ſaving from ſlavery a people who confided in his integrity, to all the advantages which he or his family could have derived from the favour or forgiveneſs of the king. "He would liſten to no propoſal," he ſaid, "that related to himſelf only. He was conſcious, that in all his conduct, he had been animated by a diſintereſted affection towards the public good; and no conſideration would induce him to enter into any agreement, from which the States and people were excluded: but if *their* juſt claims were ſatisfied, he would not reject any terms for himſelf, which his conſcience and honour would ſuffer him to accept[1].

SOON

[1] Reidanus, p. 29. Grotius, p. 66.

BOOK XV.

1579. Diſſolution of the congreſs.

SOON after this, the congreſs was diſſolved; and no other effect was produced by it, except that the duke d'Arſchot, and ſome other deputies of the States, embraced the opportunity, with which it furniſhed them, of reconciling themſelves to the king.

THE negociations for peace did not entirely interrupt the operations of the war. By the aſſiſtance of the catholic inhabitants, the prince of Parma acquired poſſeſſion of Mechlin; and ſome time afterwards of Villebrock. Theſe loſſes were compenſated to the States, by ſome acquiſitions which their forces made under the count of Renneberg; who, beſides reducing the province of Frieſland, made himſelf maſter of Deventer and Groningen. In the ſouthern provinces, the Flemings and Walloons were engaged in perpetual hoſtilities againſt one another, but no exploit was performed by either party, ſufficiently intereſting and important to deſerve to be recorded.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVI.

DURING the courſe of the preceding tranſactions in the Netherlands, Philip was aſſiduouſly employed in preparing to aſſert his claim to the kingdom of Portugal, an object fitted to inflame a more moderate ambition than that of Philip, and worthy of all the attention and expence which he beſtowed in acquiring it. Under a ſucceſſion of kings, who placed their glory in promoting commerce among their ſubjects, and in making diſcoveries in the remoteſt regions of the globe, the Portugueſe had attained a degree of conſideration among the European nations, from which the narrow limits of the kingdom, and the neighbourhood of the Spaniſh monarchy, ſeemed for ever to exclude them. Beſides eſtabliſhing ſettlements in Africa, and the adjacent iſlands, they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, which no European mariners had ever attempted, and had penetrated boldly into almoſt every corner of the great eaſtern ocean, diſcovering lands unknown,

Book XVI. 1579. State of Portugal.

BOOK XVI. 1579.

known, and founding cities, with a view to the advancement of their trade. And not ſatisfied with their acquiſitions in the eaſt, they had turned their arms towards America, and planted in Braſil, that valuable colony, of which they ſtill retain poſſeſſion.

Don Sebaſtian.

JOHN the third, the laſt of thoſe great kings under whoſe government the Portugueſe performed ſuch mighty atchievements, died ſeveral years before the preſent period, leaving his throne to Sebaſtian, his grandſon, who was then only three years old. This young prince gave early indications of many ſplendid accompliſhments, which excited in the minds of the Portugueſe the moſt ſanguine hopes of a proſperous and happy reign; but unfortunately for himſelf, as well as for his people, he was animated with the moſt chimerical ambition, which led him not to imitate the example of his illuſtrious anceſtors, by ſtudying to promote the true happineſs of his ſubjects, but prompted him to extend his dominions, in order to propagate the Romiſh faith.

His romantic ambition.

THIS paſſion was cheriſhed in him by Don Alexis de Menezes, his governor, and Lewis de Camarra, a jeſuit, his tutor or inſtructor; the former of whom was perpetually celebrating the praiſes of his predeceſſors, on account of their victories over the Moors in Africa and the Indies; while the latter impreſſed his young mind with a perſuaſion, that it was the firſt duty of a Chriſtian king, and the moſt acceptable ſervice which he could perform to the Deity, to extend the knowledge of the true religion. By theſe means, his ambition was inflamed to a degree of madneſs; and, in order to accompliſh that deſign which appeared ſo meritorious and honourable, he once reſolved to ſail with a fleet and army to India; nor could his courtiers perſuade him to relinquiſh that romantic project, till they propoſed that, in place of

of it, he ſhould undertake an expedition againſt the Mahometans in Africa. From this enterpriſe likewiſe his wiſeſt counſellors laboured with much ſolicitude to divert him; but their exhortations proved ineffectual. Sebaſtian adhered to his purpoſe with inflexible obſtinacy, and exerted himſelf with great activity, in making preparations for carrying it into execution. 1579.

State of Morocco.

IN the midſt of theſe preparations an opportunity preſented itſelf, which he conſidered as a declaration of Heaven in favour of his deſign. On the death of Abdalla, king of Morocco, his ſon, Muley Mahomet, had ſeized upon the crown, in contradiction to an eſtabliſhed law of ſucceſſion, that the kingdom ſhall devolve to the brother of the deceaſed king. A civil war enſued, and Mahomet, after having loſt ſeveral pitched battles, was compelled to leave his uncle, Muley-Moluc, a prince of great abilities and virtues, in poſſeſſion of the throne. After attempting in vain to engage Philip to eſpouſe his cauſe, Mahomet applied to Sebaſtian, and offered, if he would reinſtate him in his dominions, to put certain towns into his hands, and to become tributary to the crown of Portugal.

Sebaſtian reſolves to invade Morocco.

SEBASTIAN liſtened to theſe offers with the utmoſt pleaſure, and readily engaged to paſs over himſelf to Africa with a fleet and army.

To enable him to fulfil this engagement, he ſolicited aſſiſtance in troops from his uncle the king of Spain, from ſome Italian powers, and (which ſhews how anxious he was to inſure ſucceſs) from the prince of Orange.

IN anſwer to the application which he made to Philip, that monarch propoſed an interview with him, in the town of Guadaloupe in Caſtile. Sebaſtian agreed to this propoſal; and the Spaniſh hiſtorians relate, that, in the interview which was held

BOOK XVI. held ſoon afterwards, Philip endeavoured to diſſuade him from his intended enterpriſe; but that, having found him inflexible, he promiſed, before they parted, to aſſiſt him with fifty gallies and five thouſand men. They add, that not long after, Philip, dreading that the great number of Turks in the ſervice of Muley-Moluc, might reduce Morocco under the dominion of the Sultan, made an offer of his friendſhip to that prince, who, being likewiſe under apprehenſions of danger from the Turks, gladly accepted of it, and entered into the propoſed alliance. The ſame hiſtorians inform us, that about this time Philip obtained, through the interceſſion of the Venetians, a truce of three years from the Sultan; and that he was prompted to humble himſelf ſo far, as thus to treat with the inveterate enemies of Chriſtianity, (which he had never vouchſafed to do before) by the anxiety which he entertained with regard to the tranſactions in the Netherlands [a].

1579.

THE prince of Orange was not leſs anxious concerning the iſſue of theſe tranſactions, yet his conduct was extremely different from that of Philip; whether it proceeded from his native magnanimity, joined with a deſire of giving proof, in the ſight of all Europe, of the ſtrength of the confederated provinces, or from the hopes of ſecuring Sebaſtian's friendſhip to the confederacy in ſome future period; by whichſoever of theſe motives William was influenced on this occaſion, he gave the kindeſt reception to Da Coſta, the Portugueſe ambaſſador, and afterwards ſent three thouſand Germans to the aſſiſtance of Sebaſtian [b].

His army. THESE troops, with ten thouſand Portugueſe, and ſome Italians and Spaniards that were ſent him by Philip, notwithſtanding his late treaty with Muley-Moluc, made up an army of fifteen thouſand men. With this army, and a great number of pioneers, Sebaſtian ſet ſail from Portugal, in the

[a] Ferreras, vol. x. p. 306. 312. [b] Thuanus.

ming of ſummer 1578, and landed them at Arzile and Tangiers, where he was y Mahomet, the exiled king, with a bod. ſh troops.

ey-Moluc, having received early intel- of his deſign, had endeavoured to di n it, by offering him certain territories to thoſe ſea-coaſt towns in Africa which d to the crown of Portugal. This he had been the more ſolicitous to prevent 's invaſion, becauſe he laboured under terate diſeaſe, which he believed would ove mortal; and he was deſirous to leave inions in peace to his brother, whom he ed as his rightful heir. But when he ebaſtian deaf to his propoſal, he had ex- ll his native vigour in preparing for his , and had drawn together an army con- of more than ſixty thouſand horſe and foot.

H this army he advanced towards the and when he had arrived within a few f their camp, as he doubted the fidelity of of his troops who had formerly been at- to the intereſt of his nephew, he publiſhed amation, giving liberty to all, who ſhould to paſs over to the Portugueſe. But few n embraced this opportunity which was them. His magnanimity, and other vir- ad overcome their attachment to Mahomet, termined them faithfully to ſupport their ſovereign.

ASTIAN was earneſtly entreated by experienced officers, and by Mahomet, who eatly diſcouraged at ſeeing ſo ſmall a deſer- om his uncle's army, to keep within his in- ments, near the ſea-coaſt, and not to expoſe ops to the riſk of a battle; but that raſh imprudent prince rejected with diſdain this ſome counſel, becauſe he thought that it ſa- l of timidity, and not only led out his army

from

BOOK XVI. from the camp which he had fortified, but marched into the centre of the country to meet the enemy.

1579. MOLUC's diſtemper, in the mean time, had made the moſt rapid progreſs; yet the ſtrength of his mind was unabated. If he had not dreaded the quick approach of death, he would have been ſatisfied with cutting off Sebaſtian's communication with his ſhips, and as the Portugueſe were badly furniſhed with proviſions, have brought the war to a concluſion without fighting; but he dreaded the effect which his death might produce upon his troops, and therefore reſolved to bring on, as ſoon as poſſible, a general engagement. Sebaſtian's raſhneſs rendered it eaſy for him to execute this reſolution. Without regard to the great ſuperiority of Moluc's forces, that infatuated prince ventured to advance into an open country, where the whole Mooriſh army, horſe as well as foot, could be employed. Moluc improved, with great dexterity, the advantage which was thus afforded him. Having drawn up his army in the form of a half-moon, he went in his litter through all the ranks, exhorting his troops to remember, that their religion and liberty were at ſtake; and aſſuring them, that whatever pretext Sebaſtian had offered to juſtify his preſent unprovoked invaſion, his real deſign was, to reduce the Moors to ſlavery, and to extirpate their religion. Then, after he had given all the inſtructions which he thought neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs, finding his ſtrength almoſt quite ſpent, he committed the command of the army to his brother, and retired to a little diſtance from the field.

Battle of Alcazar. THE battle was begun with a furious diſcharge of the artillery; but the two armies came ſoon to cloſe fight, and the Portugueſe infantry repulſed the Moors in different places with great ſlaughter. In the mean time the Mooriſh cavalry, amounting to thirty thouſand, having wheeled round from both

ngs, had incloſed the enemy on every immediately after which, they attacked the flanks, and in the rear, while they rſuing the advantage which they had ver the Mooriſh infantry. By the Porhorſe, a body of the Moors were repulſed, n towards the place to which Moluc had

Fired with indignation at the ſight, he mſelf out of his litter, and having got on k, by the aſſiſtance of his attendants, he is flying troops, and was about to lead ck to the field of battle. But by this the ſmall remains of his ſtrength were xhauſted. His officers ſeeing him unable rt himſelf on his horſe, carried him to , where he fainted, and only recovered to at thoſe about him would keep his death ll the battle ſhould be decided: immeafter which, putting his finger to his as a further injunction of ſecrecy, he ex-

RE ſtriking diſplay of ſtrength of mind ot in the annals of hiſtory. He was endued with every amiable and reſpectable iſhment, being no leſs conſpicuous for id generoſity, and in all the ſtrength of a native of Africa, integrity and candour, prudence, vigour, magnanimity, and E. his bravery and conduct reſtored s kingdom from the oppreſſion of a uſurper; and if he had not, by his death vanced it to a degree of proſperity which it has never attained.

troops remained on the field of battle ſtill a number of their beſt men, of them fell. The Portuguese and Germans fought with intrepidity, but the Moors by their force, broke their ranks and made ſion. The Mooriſh cavalry, who had

BOOK XVI. 1579.

the male-heirs in the direct line were extinct. Gregory had conceived a violent desire to make his natural son a king, and he had once flattered himself with the hopes of making him king of Ireland, through the assistance of Philip. But as it is inconceivable how he could ever expect to persuade Philip to quit *his* claim, so nothing but folly or dotage could have determined him to prosecute his own, in opposition to so powerful an antagonist.

THE pretensions of Catherine of Medicis, and her hopes of success, if she ever entertained any, were not less chimerical than those of the pope. It can hardly be believed, that this political princess could, in her present competition, have any other end in view, but to obstruct the ambitious designs of Philip, and to furnish the court of France with a pretence for opposing him.

FROM the dukes of Savoy and Parma, Philip knew that he should not meet with opposition; since, besides that his claim was better founded than theirs, these princes were in close alliance with him, and depended much upon his support and protection. Could Don Antonio have proved his mother's marriage, his right to the throne would have been unquestionable. He attempted to prove it, but in vain. Still, however, he persisted in his purpose, and with some address and great activity, he gained over a considerable party among the people. Most of the nobility, on the other hand, and the king himself, who knew the vanity of Antonio's pretensions to legitimacy, were inclined to support the claim of the dutchess of Braganza[c]; whose right, they thought, was clearly preferable to that of Philip, not only because she was descended from Emanuel by a male, and Philip by a female; but because an ancient and fundamental law required, that the crown should not be inherited by a stranger.

PHILIP'S

[c] The duke of Braganza himself was sprung, though not in a direct line, from the royal blood.

1579.

PHILIP's agents at the court of Liſbon allowed, that if the dutcheſs of Braganza's father had been alive, his title would have been indiſputable; but they maintained, that ſince he had died without attaining poſſeſſion of the throne, nothing but the degree of conſanguinity to Emanuel ought to be regarded; and that as the dutcheſs and he were equal in that reſpect, the preference was due to a male before a female. And they farther inſiſted, that the law which excludes ſtrangers from inheriting the crown, was not applicable to *him*, ſince Portugal had formerly belonged to the kings of Caſtile. Philip's title

BESIDES theſe conſiderations, which had very little weight, except with thoſe who were for other reaſons inclined to eſpouſe Philip's intereſt, the duke de Oſſuna, his ambaſſador, endeavoured to impreſs the ſcrupulous and timid mind of Henry with a perſuaſion, that, in oppoſition to ſo powerful a competitor as the king of Spain, it would be impoſſible for the duke of Braganza to maintain poſſeſſion of the throne; and that the fruits of all the glorious diſcoveries and conqueſts which had been made by his father and brother would be loſt, and the kingdom itſelf involved in the calamities of war.

HENRY's deſire to prevent theſe unhappy conſequences, determined him to proceed with great deliberation in examining the pleas of the contending parties. He conſulted civilians in different parts of Europe, and called a convention of the States of the kingdom, to give him their opinion with reſpect to the meaſures proper to be purſued. The members of the convention differed widely in their ſentiments from each other, and while ſome of them adviſed him, without delay, to nominate for his ſucceſſor whichſoever of the competitors he thought fit, others exhorted him deliberately to examine the ſeveral claims that had been offered. In compliance with this laſt advice the candidates were cited to appear; Don Henry diſcuſſes the claims of the competitors.

BOOK XVI.

1579.

and they all ſent commiſſioners, who pleaded the cauſe of the princes whom they repreſented, before Henry, as they would have pleaded any ordinary point of right before a civil judge.

Henry's deliberations.

THIS extraordinary trial, in which ſo great attention ſeemed to be paid to juſtice, was ſuited to the feeble and irreſolute character, as well as to the habits of the king, who had ſpent his life in liſtening to the idle diſputes of theologians. But his conduct was ſeverely cenſured by all men of prudence and underſtanding. They conſidered that the fate of kingdoms can almoſt never be decided by the forms or principles of law; and they regarded this farcical trial, not only as uſeleſs for the purpoſe which was intended, but as calculated to divide the kingdom into factions, which muſt ſooner or later produce a civil war.

His imprudence.

HE ought in the beginning, it was ſaid, to have declared himſelf in favour of the dutcheſs of Braganza, whoſe right, according to the moſt common and obvious law of ſucceſſion, was unqueſtionable; and who, beſides, was much more acceptable to the nation, than any other of the candidates. He ought, after this, to have cauſed her right to be recogniſed by the convention of the States, who would cheerfully have conſented to acknowledge it; he ought to have required an oath of allegiance to her, in the event of his own demiſe, from the army, and all perſons in public offices; and then, inſtead of loſing his valuable time in conſulting and deliberating, he ought to have employed it, in putting the kingdom into a poſture of defence againſt the king of Spain.

BUT Henry was incapable of forming any reſolution that required ſo much courage, vigour, and activity. He was no leſs attached to the dutcheſs of Braganza, and no leſs averſe from Philip, than his nobility and people; yet he ſtill continued to heſitate between them with as much deliberation as if he had expected to live for many years.

IN

In order to extricate himself from this perplexity, Henry began to think seriously of a proposal, which had been made to him by some of his counsellors, to marry; and accordingly, notwithstanding his great age, his infirmities, and his having borne so long the character of a priest, he sent an ambassador to solicit a dispensation from the pope. There was little probability of his living to fulfil his intention, and much less of his leaving any issue behind him; yet Philip, being greatly alarmed at his design, sent Ferdinand de Castello, a Dominican friar, to dissuade him from it, by reminding him of the offence which his marriage would give to all true catholics, and the triumph it would afford to the Lutherans, and other sectaries of the age: and when Henry refused to admit Castello to an audience, a circumstance that furnished Philip with a stronger proof of Henry's alienation from him, than any which he had hitherto received, he employed all his interest at Rome, to prevent the pope from granting the dispensation.

In the mean time he spared no pains to conciliate the favour of the principal nobility; and having spread his emissaries over the kingdom, he published a manifesto, in vindication of his title, calling upon the people to turn their eyes towards *him*, as the only person who would have a right to the throne after the decease of the present king. This manifesto, while it irritated Henry more than ever against him, served in no degree the purpose for which it was designed. The Portuguese entertained the thoughts of falling under the dominion of the Castilians with an hereditary and violent aversion; and there was nothing in the character of Philip by which their prejudice could be overcome.

If Henry had availed himself of the disaffection of his subjects, and acknowledged the duchess of Braganza for his successor, and the whole kingdom would have concurred to support her claim; and so great a force might have

BOOK XVI. 1579.

prepared, as, with the aſſiſtance of foreign powers, would have either determined Philip to abandon his deſign, or have prevented him from carrying it into execution. But as the duke and dutcheſs of Braganza were deterred from exerting themſelves, by their dread of Philip, and the weak irreſolute conduct of the king; ſo Henry ſtill flattered himſelf with the vain conceit, that Philip, as well as the other competitors, would ſubmit to his deciſion.

Don Antonio declared illegitimate.

TOWARDS his nephew, Henry acted with much leſs heſitation and reſerve, than towards the other candidates. Having obtained a bull from the pope, empowering him to judge of Antonio's claim to legitimacy, he examined the witneſſes whom Antonio produced to prove his mother's marriage; and, having extorted from two of them a confeſſion of their having been ſuborned, while the other two contradicted each other in delivering their evidence, Henry, on this foundation, joined with the circumſtance of the prior's being mentioned by his father in his latter will as his natural ſon, paſſed ſentence, declaring him to be illegitimate.

ANTONIO had influence afterwards to perſuade the pope to recall his bull, on the pretence of the king's having exceeded his powers. By this treatment Henry was highly exaſperated both againſt the pope and Don Antonio; and he indulged his reſentment againſt the latter, by baniſhing him firſt from the court, and afterwards from the kingdom. In obedience to this ſentence, Antonio retired for ſome time into Caſtile; but he ſoon returned, and found, that his uncle's conduct towards him had not produced that effect upon the people which Henry had expected. Their attachment to the prior remained as ſtrong as ever; and, as no pains were taken to form a party in the intereſt of the dutcheſs of Braganza, great numbers of the people were entirely devoted to him, and regarded him as their only reſource againſt the tyranny of Spain.

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Book XVI.

1580.

In the midſt of their deliberations and diſputes the king died, leaving the nomination of his ſucceſſor to five perſons, to whom he committed the regency of the kingdom.

Death of Henry, Jan. 31ſt, 1580.

The firſt act of the adminiſtration of the regents was to ſend ambaſſadors to Philip, to diſſuade him from having recourſe to arms, till, according to the will of the late king, they ſhould deliver their judgment concerning his right to the ſucceſſion. But to this requeſt, Philip, whoſe preparations were now complete, gave the following reply: "That his right was clear and indiſputable; that he would not ſubmit it either to the regents, or to the States, and that he did not deſire to have any judgment whatever paſſed in confirmation of it."

By this anſwer the regents were thrown into great perplexity. A majority of them ſtood well affected towards Philip, but they were prevented from declaring in his favour, by their dread of the indignation of the people, and were obliged to iſſue orders for equipping the fleet, and ſtrengthening the fortifications and garriſons of the frontier towns. But the great exertion which had been made lately by Sebaſtian, and the exhauſted ſtate to which the kingdom had been reduced, by the numberleſs expeditions to India and America, from which no fruit had been yet derived, ſufficient to compenſate either for the expence which they had coſt, or the loſs of men which they had occaſioned, rendered it impoſſible for the regents, if they had been ever ſo much inclined, to ſecure the kingdom againſt ſo great a force as the Spaniſh monarch had prepared.

Philip's fleet and army.

His army, including four thouſand pioneers, amounted to thirty-five thouſand men, and his fleet conſiſted of thirty men of war, ſeventeen frigates, and ſeventy gallies and ſhips of burden loaded with proviſions and military ſtores. It was

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He gave the [illegible] quis of Santa Cruz, [illegible] naval officer in [illegible] time with regard [illegible] place at the head of his naval forces. His reputation, however, did not proceed from any [illegible] which he entertained [illegible] abilities of his generals. For the duke of Alva was ſtill alive; whom Philip knew to be poſſeſſed of every qualification requiſite to ſecure the ſucceſs of his intended enterpriſe.

Alva, upon his return from the Netherlands, [illegible] had been admitted by Philip to the ſame degree of favour and confidence which he had formerly enjoyed. But his ſon, Don Garcia de Toledo, having debauched one of the maids of honour, under a promiſe of marriage, Philip had put him under arreſt, and given orders that he ſhould not be releaſed till he ſhould conſent to fulfil his engagement: notwithſtanding which, his father [illegible] ed him in making his eſcape; and, [illegible] fectually to diſappoint the King, [illegible] concluded a marriage between [illegible] a daughter of the marquis [illegible]

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BOOK XVI. 1580.

to employ their interceſſion in his behalf; but all his applications for forgiveneſs had hitherto been ineffectual, and he had remained almoſt two years in confinement. This ſeverity, exerciſed, for ſo ſmall an offence, towards an old friend and ſervant, in the decline of life, was by ſome aſcribed to Philip's imperious temper, and his implacable reſentment; whilſt others ſaid, that he had been long diſguſted with Alva's arrogance; and that the duke's conduct in the affair of his ſon, was only a pretence which Philip made uſe of, to juſtify himſelf for diſmiſſing from his preſence a man whoſe temper and manners were become intolerable.

To whichſoever of theſe motives Philip's treatment of Alva could be aſcribed, it was expected, that neither his pride, nor his natural ſuſpicion and diſtruſt, would have ſuffered him to commit the charge of an enterpriſe of ſo great importance as the preſent, to one towards whom he had ſhewn himſelf ſo inexorable; and it excited great ſurpriſe, when he ſent two of his ſecretaries to the duke, to inquire whether his health would permit him to undertake the command of the army which he had prepared for the conqueſt of Portugal. To this inquiry, Alva, without heſitation, replied, that he was ready to devote the little health and ſtrength that were left him to the ſervice of the king, and immediately afterwards he ſet out for Barajas to receive his inſtructions. He deſired liberty to pay his reſpects to Philip at Madrid. But ſo ungracious was this prince even towards ſuch of his miniſters as he eſteemed the moſt, and ſo incapable of entirely forgiving any offence or injury, that he refuſed to grant him admittance into his preſence; and, having tranſmitted his inſtructions to him at Barajas, he ordered him to join the army as ſoon as poſſible. Thoſe who remembered the barbarous cruelty which Alva had exerciſed in the Netherlands, were not ſorry for the mortification which he ſuffered on the preſent occaſion; but they could not with hold the tribute

tribute of applauſe which was due to him, on account of that inflexible fidelity ſo becoming in a ſubject towards his ſovereign, which determined him, in the extremity of old age, to expoſe himſelf to all the hazards and hardſhips of war, in order to advance the intereſt of a prince by whom he had been treated ſo ungratefully.

March of the Spaniſh troops. June 1580.

FROM Barajas, Alva went, as ſoon as he had received his inſtructions, to join the troops, which were aſſembled at Badajox; and ſoon afterwards he began his march towards Elvas and Olivença. Theſe, and all the other towns which lie north from the Tagus, as far as Setubal, on the weſtern coaſt, though extremely averſe to the Spaniſh government, yet being utterly unprepared for reſiſtance, opened their gates, and proclaimed Philip for their ſovereign.

THE marquis de Santa Croce, who had ſet ſail with the fleet from Port St. Mary, near Cadiz, found the ſame facility in reducing Faro, Lagos, and other towns on the coaſt of Algarva and Antejo; and he came in ſight of Setubal, in a few days after the arrival of the land forces at that place.

Progreſs of the Spaniſh arms.

HITHERTO almoſt no blood had been ſhed, and neither the fleet nor army had met with any oppoſition to retard their progreſs. The duke of Alva intended next to march without delay to the capital, but it was neceſſary, he thought, to proceed now with greater circumſpection than before, as Don Antonio had drawn together a conſiderable body of forces, had been admitted into Liſbon, where he was proclaimed king by the people, and had ſtrengthened ſeveral of the towns and forts by which the Spaniſh army muſt paſs in their approach to that city.

THREE ways of reaching Liſbon were propoſed in a council of war that was held on this occaſion.

One

BOOK XVI. 1580.

One of theſe was to croſs the Tagus, ſome miles above the city, at the towns of Almerin and Santaren; another, to ſend round the fleet to Almada, and to put the troops on board at that place, which lies almoſt directly oppoſite to Liſbon; and the third, to carry the army round by ſea from Setubal to Caſcaes. The two firſt of theſe ways were thought preferable to the laſt, by moſt of the officers, becauſe they were ſafer; yet the laſt was embraced by the duke of Alva. He acknowledged the juſtneſs of what his officers advanced in ſupport of their opinion, but he obſerved, that, as the fleet was at hand, the army could be immediately put on board; that the paſſage to Caſcaes was not long, and that, as the enemy were ill prepared for their defence, his ſucceſs would be greatly facilitated by the celerity of his approach.

ALVA was not diſappointed in his expectation of the effect which his ſudden arrival was calculated to produce upon the Portugueſe. They were drawn up along the ſhore, as if they had intended to diſpute his landing; but no ſooner had the ſhips begun to fire upon them, than they retired, and ſuffered him to land, and put his men in order, without giving him the ſmalleſt moleſtation. They might ſtill have obſtructed his approach to Caſcaes, as his road thither lay over a hill, defended with a battery of cannon, and full of rugged rocks and brambles, of which Don Diego de Menceſes, commander in chief of the Portugueſe under Don Antonio, had taken poſſeſſion with between three and four thouſand men. Alva ordered the Spaniards to attack them, without being deterred, either by the ſtrength of the ground, or the number of the enemy. An old experienced officer, of the name of Barietto, an intimate friend of Alva's, aſked him in a whiſper, Whether his attempting, with ſo little precaution, to diſlodge an enemy ſo ſtrongly ſituated, did not reſemble the action of an ardent young warrior, rather than that of an experienced

experienced general? Alva ſmiled, and replied, That a good general ought on ſome occaſions to employ the prudence and circumſpection of old age, and in others, the ardour and confidence of youth. The event ſhewed that his conduct, though apparently raſh, was well adapted to the preſent circumſtances. The Spaniards, inſpired with their general's confidence, advanced boldly, and the Portugueſe (almoſt all of whom were raw and undiſciplined) retreated, without waiting for their approach.

ALVA laid ſiege immediately afterwards to the town and caſtle of Caſcaes, and by the briſkneſs of his operations he ſoon compelled the garriſon to ſurrender. But on this occaſion he ſullied that renown which his wiſdom and vigour would have procured him, by the cruelty which he exerciſed towards ſuch of the Portugueſe as had thrown themſelves upon his mercy. In violation of his promiſe to Don Antonio de Caſtro, lord of Caſcaes, who had joined him upon his firſt arrival in the kingdom, he gave up the town to be plundered by the Spaniards, and having ſent all the ſoldiers in the garriſon to the gallies, he put to death, without any form of trial, Don Diego de Meneſes, a nobleman of an illuſtrious family, and one who, on account of his perſonal merit, was univerſally reſpected and beloved. To this barbarity Alva was prompted by private reſentment againſt Meneſes [d]; although, it may be preſumed, that he would not have ventured to indulge it on the preſent occaſion, if he had not known that his conduct was conformable to the ſentiments of the king. It was calculated to inſpire the Portugueſe with terror, but it ſerved likewiſe more than ever to alienate their affections; and conſidering how much ſuperior the Spaniſh fleet and army were to any force which had been prepared to oppoſe them, it could not be coloured with the tyrant's ordinary plea of neceſſity.

FROM

[d] Thuanus, c. lxx. c. x.

BOOK XVI. 1580.

FROM the town of Caſcaes, Alva led his army againſt the forts of St. John and Belen, both which he ſoon reduced to the neceſſity of ſurrendering; and being ſeconded in his operations by the fleet, the example of theſe places was quickly followed by Almada, and almoſt all the other fortified places on both ſides of the river.

Don Antonio

DURING theſe tranſactions Don Antonio, after having, from a conſciouſneſs of the weakneſs of his party, eſſayed in vain to obtain advantageous terms from Philip, had pitched his camp, with all the forces which he could collect, on the eaſt ſide of the river of Alcantara, on the road to Liſbon.

ALVA amuſed him for ſeveral days with the hopes of an accommodation, in order to afford time for the operation of a ſpirit of deſpondency that prevailed in Antonio's army. Meanwhile he omitted not to procure the moſt accurate information concerning the ſituation and ſtrength of his camp; and, on the 25th of Auguſt, he reſolved to attack it. Before he could approach the entrenchments, it was neceſſary that he ſhould make himſelf maſter of the bridge of Alcantara, or lead his army to a conſiderable diſtance up the river, the banks of which were ſo ſteep and rugged, as rendered it impoſſible to tranſport either horſe or foot in ſight of the enemy. Having drawn up his main army in order of battle, directly oppoſite to the Portugueſe camp, he ſent the horſe under his ſon Ferdinand de Toledo, and two thouſand ſelect infantry, under Sancio d'Avila, to croſs the river ſeveral miles higher, where the banks were practicable, whilſt he ordered Colonna, with the Italians, to make an aſſault upon the bridge.

COLONNA's troops were twice repulſed, but in the third onſet, being ſupported by a body of Germans, which the duke ſent to their aſſiſtance, they

hey drove the Portugueſe before them, and ſe- BOOK XV.
:ured poſſeſſion of the bridge.

Soon afterwards Toledo and d'Avila appeared. 1580.
The Portugueſe, aſtoniſhed at the ſight of them, and dreading that their communication with the city might be intercepted, threw down their arms after a ſhort reſiſtance, and betook themſelves to flight. The Spaniards purſued, and ſlew between two and three thouſand before they could reach the town.

Don Antonio, who diſplayed on this occaſion neither fortitude nor conduct, had fled with his troops to Liſbon. There he knew that he could not long remain in ſafety, as, beſides the inſufficiency of the fortifications, the magiſtrates, and many of the inhabitants, were diſaffected to his intereſt; and therefore, immediately after releaſing all the priſoners in the city (a poor expedient to recruit his ruined army) he ſet out, attended by the count de Vimioſo, and the biſhop of la Guarda, two of his moſt zealous friends and partizans, with a ſmall number of troops, for the town of Santaren.

The magiſtrates of Liſbon did not heſitate a moment in reſolving to ſubmit to the conqueror, and the town was, immediately after the battle, delivered into his hands. The Portugueſe fleet at the ſame time ſtruck their colours to the marquis de Santa Croce, and received ſuch a number of his Caſtilians on board as gave him the entire command.

It was now become Philip's intereſt to provide for the ſecurity of Liſbon and its ſuburbs, as much as for that of any of his towns in Spain; and Alva ſo far fulfilled his engagement with the magiſtrates, as to prevent any formidable number of his troops from entering the town; but he gave up the ſuburbs (which were at that time no leſs conſiderable

BOOK XVI. 1580.

conſiderable than the town itſelf[e]) to be ranſacked and plundered, without making any diſtinction between the friends and enemies of the king. He ſuffered them likewiſe to pillage the houſes of ſuch of the inhabitants within the town as had diſcovered any attachment to Don Antonio, and he allowed parties to go out and plunder all the country and villages in the neighbourhood. A Spaniſh hiſtorian ſays, that the ſoldiers committed theſe enormities without the duke's permiſſion, yet no puniſhment was ever inflicted on them, and no reſtitution was ever made to the many thouſand innocent perſons, who were involved in the ſame common ruin with the guilty.

AFTER a conduct ſo barbarous and impolitic, there was little reaſon to expect that the people of Liſbon would be able ſoon to overcome their averſion to the Spaniſh government. From their dread of Alva's tyranny they took the oath of allegiance which was preſcribed to them; and, from the ſame motive, they witneſſed thoſe public rejoicings which he appointed to be celebrated on account of his ſucceſs; but being unable to conceal the anguiſh of their minds, the acclamations which they uttered were feeble and languid, and intermixed with ſighs and groans.

THE duke of Alva's joy, ſoon after his entrance into Liſbon, was interrupted by intelligence which he received from Spain, that Philip had fallen ſick, and that his phyſicians were extremely apprehenſive of the iſſue of his diſtemper. Alva knew that the king's death, at this criſis, would probably render all his labours and ſucceſs in Portugal abortive, and therefore he ſuſpended for a while the proſecution of the war.

New preparations of Don Antonio

IN this interval Don Antonio exerted himſelf with great activity, and employed every expedient which

[e] Thuanus, c. lxx. c. x.

which he or his partizans could deviſe to raiſe another army, flattering himſelf with the hope of being able to maintain his ground, till the French, or ſome other foreign power ſhould be perſuaded to eſpouſe his cauſe. In the town of Santaren he had lately been received by the people as their only rightful ſovereign, and every mark of affection and reſpect had been ſhewn him; yet ſo great a change had his defeat and flight produced, that they refuſed to admit him within the town, till he engaged that he ſhould not remain in it beyond a limited time; and, immediately after his departure, they ſent ambaſſadors to the duke of Alva, with an offer of ſubmiſſion. BOOK XVI. 1580.

FROM Santaren Antonio directed his courſe northwards, and in the province which lies between the Minho and Douro, he prevailed upon eight or nine thouſand of the inhabitants to take up arms. With theſe tumultuary troops he procured admittance, partly by force and partly by perſuaſion, firſt into Aveiro, and afterwards into the city of Oporto; but in both theſe places he exerciſed a degree of ſeverity towards thoſe whom he ſuſpected to be his enemies, that was extremely ill calculated to increaſe the number of his friends.

HE remained at Oporto till he was informed that the duke of Alva, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the king's health, had ſent a part of his forces againſt him, under Sancio D'Avila, who was advancing towards the banks of the Douro with great rapidity. D'Avila had under his command only five or ſix thouſand horſe and foot, and Antonio's army conſiſted of about nine thouſand; but from paſt experience, the latter was deeply ſenſible of the difference between his undiſciplined forces and thoſe of d'Avila, and he was well acquainted with the character of that general; who, in the Netherlands, and other places, had given the moſt conſpicuous proofs of military ſkill and intrepidity. His ſafety he knew depended on

BOOK XVI. 1580.

his preventing the Spaniards from croſſing the Douro, which, for many miles above Oporto, was ſo deep and rapid, that without boats they could not attempt to paſs it. He exerted himſelf therefore with diligence in removing the boats and barks from the ſouth ſide of the river, and planted his troops at different places on the north ſide, to watch the motions of the enemy.

Progreſs of the Spaniards under d'Avila.

IN the mean time d'Avila advanced, and took poſſeſſion of Villanova, a little town which ſtands oppoſite to Oporto. From that place he ſent a party of his troops in ſearch of boats; who returned without ſucceſs: but d'Avila being reſolved to omit nothing in his power to accompliſh his deſign, ſent them back with orders to purſue their march a great way further up the river, which they did accordingly, and collected about twenty boats, from places at ſo great a diſtance from Oporto, that Antonio had judged it unneceſſary to remove them. Still, however, moſt of the Spaniſh officers thought it impracticable to effectuate their paſſage with ſo ſmall a number; and it was impoſſible to bring them down the river, by reaſon of certain armed veſſels which Antonio kept ready to intercept them. To remedy this inconvenience, d'Avila ordered a part of his troops to march up to the place where the boats lay, and there he tranſported them, without oppoſition, to the oppoſite ſide. Theſe troops had time to intrench themſelves, before the enemy received intelligence of their landing; and, under the ſhelter of their intrenchments, the reſt of the forces were immediately carried over in the ſame way.

Defeat of Don Antonio.

THIS unexpected ſucceſs in the beginning of his enterpriſe, gave d'Avila the higheſt aſſurance of victory, and demonſtrated how little reaſon he had to dread the efforts of an enemy, who, on ſo critical an occaſion, had ſhewn themſelves ſo deficient both in courage and vigilance. Their conduct

duct afterwards was ſuch as their negligence and cowardice, in permitting the Spaniards to land in ſmall bodies, one after another, gave reaſon to expect. D'Avila drove them before him, till, with very little bloodſhed, they were entirely routed and diſperſed. This active general loſt no time in ſending a party of horſe in purſuit of Don Antonio, who had fled, accompanied by a ſmall number of his partizans, to Viana, a town on the ſea-coaſt near the northern frontier of the kingdom. Upon the approach of the Spaniards to that place, he attempted to make his eſcape by ſea, but was driven back by a violent ſtorm, which overtook him ſoon after he had embarked. He then diſmiſſed his attendants, and, diſguiſing himſelf in the dreſs of a common ſailor, eluded the ſearch of his purſuers. Philip had recourſe to his favourite weapon, a proſcription, and offered a reward of eighty thouſand ducats to any perſon who ſhould deliver him into his hands. Notwithſtanding this, ſo great was the averſion of the Portugueſe towards the Caſtilian government, or ſuch their attachment to Antonio, that no perſon was tempted by the proffered reward, either to ſeize him, or to give information of the place of his retreat. Antonio remained in the country between the Minho and Douro from November till May, living ſometimes in the houſes of the nobility, and ſometimes in monaſteries and convents, till he found an opportunity of going by ſea to France.

BOOK XVI. 1580.

Entire ſubjection of Portugal.

AFTER the diſperſion of the prior's army, all the towns between the Minho and Douro opened their gates, and ſubmitted to the conqueror. The regents appointed by the late king, had ſome time before declared themſelves for Philip; and the duke of Braganza, who ſeemed to have deſpaired from the beginning of being able to aſſert his wife's title to the throne againſt ſo potent an antagoniſt, had taken the ſame oath of fidelity and allegiance that was required from others.

BOOK XVI.

1580. and of the colonies.

THE colonies in America, Africa, and the Indies, which belonged to the crown of Portugal, quickly followed the example of the mother-country; nor did Philip find employment for his arms in any part of the Portugueſe dominions but the Azores, where Antonio's agents had perſuaded the people to proclaim him king. Some troops which were ſent againſt them under an officer of the name of Valdes, were defeated by the governor of Angra. In the following year Antonio obtained from the court of France, a fleet of ſixty ſhips, with about ſix thouſand troops, which he landed on one of the iſles called St. Michael; but the marquis of Santa Croce coming upon him with a fleet and army much ſuperior to his, obtained a deciſive victory over the French both by ſea and land, and afterwards reduced all the inhabitants to a ſtate of entire ſubjection and obedience [f].

THE ſucceſs of Philip's arms, and the great acceſſion of dominion which he had thereby acquired, occaſioned much anxiety to the neighbouring powers; and excited in the Dutch and Flemings the moſt alarming apprehenſions. They had with infinite difficulty withſtood his efforts, while he was employed in the purſuit of that plan of conqueſt which he had now carried into execution; and they ſeemed, at this time, to have much greater reaſon than ever to dread that they ſhould ſoon be obliged to ſubmit to whatever terms of peace he ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. Yet, as will appear in the ſequel, Philip's acquiſition of the Portugueſe dominions in India ſerved rather to expoſe him to the aſſaults of his revolted ſubjects, than to furniſh him with the means of ſubduing them, and contributed more than any other event to that wealth and greatneſs which they afterwards attained [g].

THE

[f] Antonio eſcaped, and once more returned to France, and the marquis de Santa Croce treated all his French priſoners as pirates, becauſe war had not been declared between France and Spain.

[g] Thuani hiſt. ſui temp. ann. 1579-80. Cabrera, l. xiii. Ferreras, part xv. &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVII.

WHILE Philip's arms were employed in ſubduing the Portugueſe, the prince of Parma had little room for the exertion of that activity and enterpriſe by which he was ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed. Having, according to his late agreement with the ſouthern provinces, diſmiſſed his Spaniſh and Italian forces, he had thereby weakened his army ſo much, as to render it unable to keep the field. The States of theſe provinces had laboured in vain to fulfil their part of the agreement. Their finances were exhauſted, all their levies were carried on ſlowly, and their cavalry were ſo few in number, that they had been obliged to conſent that Farneſe ſhould retain ſome of the foreign horſe for his body-guard.

1580. State of affairs in the Netherlands

IT was fortunate for him, that at this juncture the confederates were in a ſimilar ſtate of weakneſs. After the departure of their auxiliaries, only a ſmall number of troops remained; and, after the

BOOK XVII. 1580.

the revolt of ſo many of the nobility, and the death of the count de Boſſut, which happened about this time, there was ſcarcely a ſingle officer, a native of the Netherlands, whom they could intruſt with the chief command. Matthias, a young man of no experience, bore the name, but was incapable of diſcharging the duties of governor. The whole weight of the adminiſtration lay upon the prince of Orange, who was involved in an endleſs maze of the moſt intricate political negociations; and without his continual preſence, activity, and vigilance, the weak frame of the confederacy would quickly have fallen to pieces. William was therefore obliged to leave the direction of military affairs to the count of Renneberg, La Noue, and Norris; and although theſe men were not deficient either in ſpirit and intrepidity, or in prudence and good conduct, yet they neither had forces ſufficient to undertake any important enterpriſe, nor means to ſupport ſuch as were under their command [a].

THE greateſt part of Brabant and Flanders had acceded to the union of Utrecht; but the ſtrength of the confederacy was not proportioned to its extent. The union of the ſeveral members was not ſufficiently compact, the adminiſtration was not properly aſcertained, and there was no common centre of power and authority eſtabliſhed. The troops were ſcattered in ſmall bodies throughout the provinces; no adequate proviſion was made for their pay; they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants; and, as luxury is the conſtant attendant of licentiouſneſs, the country was miſerably oppreſſed and plundered, and the people reduced to an incapacity of furniſhing the neceſſary contributions and ſupplies. In this ſituation many perſons lamented that they had not embraced the opportunity lately afforded them, of making their peace with the king; and they began to accuſe the prince of

[a] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

of Orange who had adviſed them to reject the conditions that had been offered, of having preferred his private intereſt to that of the provinces. A ſpirit of diſcontent prevailed every where, except in Holland and Zealand, and it was generally believed, that they muſt ſoon either make their peace with the king of Spain, or elect ſome other ſovereign, who was able to deliver them from the calamities with which they were overwhelmed.

The cauſes of their diſtreſs.

THE prince of Orange was at this time in Ghent, employed in quieting the diſturbances above mentioned. At the deſire of the States he publiſhed a vindication of his conduct, together with his ſentiments concerning the cauſes of that diſtreſs in which the provinces were involved, and the means of their deliverance. As what he ſaid on this occaſion, and ſome weeks afterwards, in the aſſembly of the States at Antwerp, contains an intereſting view of the ſituation of the Netherlands at the preſent period, it will not be improper to lay before the reader an abſtract of the principal particulars.

Explained by the prince of Orange.

HE began with complaining of the injuſtice of thoſe by whom he had been accuſed of having contributed to render ineffectual the late negociation of peace at Cologn. "For no perſon in the Netherlands, he ſaid, had greater reaſon than himſelf to wiſh for peace, ſince without it he could never hope to obtain either the liberty of his ſon, whom he had not ſeen for many years, or the recovery of the many rich inheritances which he had loſt, or the power of paſſing the remainder of his life, which now began to decline, free from labour and anxiety. But while for theſe reaſons, joined with compaſſion for the miſeries of the people, no perſon could more ardently deſire to have an end put to the war, he could not help regarding war, with all its calamities, as infinitely preferable to the proffered peace; by one article of which many hundred thouſands of the inhabitants would have been driven into exile; and by another,

BOOK XVII. 1580.

ther, all who remained, expoſed to the mercy of the Spaniards, without any ſecurity either for their liberty or their lives, but the promiſes of thoſe by whom the moſt ſolemn oaths had been often violated. Theſe were not his ſentiments only of the peace that had been offered, but the ſentiments likewiſe of the States, and of all the ſincere friends of their country; nor could that detraction and calumny in which many perſons had of late indulged themſelves, be aſcribed to any other cauſe, but the ſecret machinations of thoſe, who, from ſelfiſh views, were deſirous of reducing the Netherlands under the Spaniſh yoke?

"There was much ground, he acknowledged, for complaining of the irregularities of which the troops had been guilty in ſome of the provinces; but nothing could be more unjuſt than to throw the blame on thoſe who were entruſted with the reins of government. The governors of ſtates ought to be judged of ſometimes by the orders which they iſſued, and not by the ſucceſs with which their meaſures were accompanied; for what could it avail to interpoſe their authority, when they wanted power to enforce obedience? The diſregard ſhewn by many, to the orders of the States and council, was the principal ſource of the evils complained of. In all the provinces, except Holland and Zealand, there was ſcarcely a ſingle town that would admit the garriſons appointed for its defence. To this was to be aſcribed that facility with which the enemy had made themſelves maſters of Alloſt, and other places; and it was owing to the ſame cauſe, that the troops were ſo much ſcattered throughout the provinces; the conſequence of which was, that the inhabitants of the country and of the open towns, ſuffering equally from the forces of the States that lived at free quarters upon them, and from the incurſions of the enemy, were totally diſabled from contributing their ſhare of the public expences. Thus there was no fund ſufficient for the regular payment

ment of the troops; without which, it was in vain to expect either that they could be kept under proper diſcipline, or employed ſucceſsfully in any important enterpriſe. BOOK XVII. 1580.

"To remedy the abuſes complained of, the moſt effectual method was to place numerous garriſons in the frontier towns. For if this were done, the great number of ſmall garriſons would become unneceſſary; and the interior parts of the provinces being thereby delivered both from the oppreſſions of their friends and the devaſtations of the enemy, the people would be more able to furniſh their proportion of the ſupplies, the troops would be paid more regularly, and diſcipline more eaſily maintained.

"THE States ought not however to ſtop there, but to exert themſelves ſtrenuouſly in drawing together ſuch an army of regular forces, as might face the enemy in the field, or at leaſt diſturb and interrupt their operations. It was their want of ſuch an army that had occaſioned the loſs of Maeſtricht; and, if care were not taken to ſupply that want, there was ground to apprehend, that the confederacy would ſoon be ſtript of all the towns in the inland provinces. But in order to carry this, or any other expedient into execution, it was neceſſary that, inſtead of ſuffering each town or province to diſpoſe of its troops and contributions as it thought fit, a ſenate or council ſhould be eſtabliſhed, with authority to determine every thing relative to the application of the public funds and the conduct of the war.

"HE was far from intending that this council ſhould be inveſted with the power either of impoſing taxes or of enacting laws. He meant only that it ſhould be empowered to levy ſuch taxes as were impoſed, and to execute ſuch laws as were enacted, by the general States of the union. That it ſhould not be ſubject to be controuled by particular towns

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BOOK XVII. 1580.

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William exhorts the confederates to renounce their allegiance.

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His reaſons.

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BOOK XVII. 1580.

or provinces; nor obliged, in applying the public money, diſtributing garriſons, and regulating the motions of the troops, to have recourſe on every emergency to the States; but ſhould have ſuch a degree of diſcretionary power conferred upon it, as would enable it to ſeize the opportunities of action when they offered, and to conduct the operations of the war with ſecrecy and diſpatch."

William exhorts the confederates to renounce their allegiance.

BESIDES theſe and ſome other points of leſs importance, William ventured, both in the writing which he publiſhed, and afterwards in the aſſembly of the States, to explain his ſentiments concerning another ſubject, which he had long revolved, and concerning which he had founded the inclinations of many of the deputies. Having, before the preſent period, deſpaired that peace could ever be reſtored between the king and the confederated provinces, he exhorted the deputies to conſider, whether they were not now in a ſituation which required that, renouncing their allegiance to Philip, they ſhould transfer it to ſome other prince, who was able and willing to defend them.

His reaſons.

IN the eyes of the greater part of Europe, this propoſal appeared in the higheſt degree audacious. Philip had, ever ſince his acceſſion, been conſidered as the moſt powerful prince of the age; he had lately received an immenſe increaſe of power by the acquiſition of Portugal, and men could not doubt that the revolted provinces muſt ſoon yield to his ſuperior arms, and bitterly repent of the offence which they had given him.

REASONS however were not wanting to ſhew, that the meaſure propoſed was the beſt which the people of the Netherlands could embrace in their preſent circumſtances. If they could have entertained the proſpect of obtaining peace on tolerable terms, it might be difficult perhaps entirely to vindicate their conduct. The evils which accompany a change of government, are generally ſo great, and the

igation to maintain the preſent, ſo ſtrong
werful, that nothing but the moſt urgent
y can ever juſtify a people for ſhaking off
legiance to their legal prince. But, from
e of the late negociations at Cologn, it was
ſt, not only that Philip was unalterably
n his purpoſe to govern the Netherlands
ſpotic authority, in contradiction to their
ental rights and laws; but that the utter
ion of the proteſtants, who were now be-
e moſt conſiderable part of the people, was
tion, without which he was determined
be reconciled. Deſolation therefore, and
muſt have been the certain conſequences
, and no greater evils could be apprehended
continuance of the war. "Even allowing
e prince of Orange, in the aſſembly of the
that the king ſhould be perſuaded, by any
g power, to grant us ſuch conditions as
ſciences would ſuffer us to accept, yet
curity can we obtain for his fulfilling them?
, before this time, been ſet at liberty by
e from his moſt ſacred obligations. It is
liſhed maxim of Philip and his counſellors,
h heretics, ſuch as we are, no promiſes or
e binding. Although he were of himſelf
to fulfil his engagements, yet the Roman
nd the Spaniſh inquiſitors would reclaim,
perſuade him to alter his intention. It
ſaid by ſome, continued William, that
prince of a compaſſionate diſpoſition, and
may ſafely rely upon his mercy. Of the
this, we can beſt judge from what we have
known. Do the deeds that have been
ted by his command, in India, in Italy, or
ada, authoriſe us to form this favourable
t of his character? Has not every corner
etherlands been overflowed with the blood
ands of our countrymen, barbarouſly but-
by his command? Are not all the neigh-
kingdoms filled with his ſubjects, who
have

BOOK XVII. 1580.

thus confirmed in their purpoſe of abjuring the dominion of Philip, the aſſembly proceeded next to conſider, whether they ſhould ſubſtitute another ſovereign in his place, or eſtabliſh a republican government, upon the plan of that confederacy which was already formed. The latter of theſe meaſures would have been embraced by all the deputies; by the proteſtants, from the conformity between the principles of a commonwealth, and thoſe of their religion; and by the catholics, from their perſuaſion that ſuch a government would neither be ſo highly affronting to the king, nor ſo effectually preclude the hopes of a future reconcilement. But the preſent feeble ſtate of the United Provinces obliged them to ſacrifice their inclination to their preſervation and ſecurity. From the repreſentation which the prince of Orange made of the diſorders that prevailed, together with the view which he exhibited of their ſtrength and reſources, they were convinced, that however ſtrenuouſly they might exert themſelves, they would be able to wage only a tedious defenſive war; by which their ſtrength would be gradually waſted, till they were at laſt compelled to accept of ſuch terms of peace as the king ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. To have recourſe therefore to the aſſiſtance of ſome foreign prince, ſeemed not only expedient, but neceſſary; and to engage the prince of whom they ſhould make choice to eſpouſe their cauſe with greater zeal and ſincerity than they had hitherto experienced in their allies, they reſolved to confer upon him the ſovereignty of the provinces, with all the prerogatives which had been enjoyed by the princes of the houſe of Burgundy.

Motives for chuſing the duke of Anjou.

NOTHING now remained but to fix upon the perſon to whom the offer of this high dignity ſhould be made. The prince of Orange, having beforehand ſounded the inclinations of the emperor and other German princes, had found them utterly averſe from taking any concern in the affairs

irs of the Netherlands. The queen of England, the duke of Anjou, brother to the king of nce, were the only princes at that time in Eue, between whom the States thought there was und to heſitate; and they were determined to cur in giving the preference to Anjou, by the ice of Orange; who, beſides repreſenting to m the neceſſity of electing a ſovereign who uld reſide in the country, informed them that ir making choice of the duke, would be highly eptable to the queen. "For ſhe had writ to 1 on the ſubject, and given him aſſurances of nting the States her aſſiſtance, in caſe the ſoeignty were conferred on one with whom ſhe l ſo much reaſon to expect to live on amicable ms[d]."

1580.

FROM this it ſhould ſeem, that William had ered to employ his influence in favour of Eliseth; and it may be preſumed, that unleſs he l found her averſe to his propoſal, neither he nor : other proteſtant leaders would have been ined to give the preference to Anjou. Very ferent motives indeed were aſſigned for the nce's conduct, by his enemies. His principality Orange, they obſerved, lay in the centre of ance. He had lately married Charlotte de Bourn, of the blood royal of that kingdom[e]. For ıny years he had maintained an intimate corpondence with the leaders of the Hugonots; d he flattered himſelf with the hopes of enjoying e entire direction of the duke of Anjou, a weak ince, who would probably be more attentive to s pleaſures, than to the affairs of government. heſe intereſted conſiderations, it is likely, were ɔt entirely without their influence; but the other rcumſtance above mentioned ſeems to afford a ill more ſatisfactory account, ſince there was in ality no room for heſitation between Elizabeth ıd Anjou; and Elizabeth, as will appear in the quel, would certainly have rejected the ſovereignty,

[d] Meteren, lib. x. [e] Daughter of the duke de Montpenſier.

BOOK XVII. 1580.

reignty, in caſe an offer of it had been made to her. This political princeſs expected to derive advantage from that animoſity which the election of Anjou was likely to produce between the courts of France and Spain. And the prince of Orange knew, that as it would be eaſier to reconcile the catholics in the United Provinces to the election of a prince of the ſame religion with themſelves, than to that of a proteſtant; ſo, without making ſuch a choice, there was little probability that he ſhould ever prevail on the Walloons to accede to the confederacy. Whatever were William's motives, a great majority of the deputies entered readily into his opinion, and they would have proceeded inſtantly to the election, if it had not been deemed a matter of too much conſequence to be decided without conſulting their conſtituents.

La Noue taken priſoner.

IN the mean time the operations of the war were not wholly diſcontinued, although neither of the two contending parties was in a condition at this period to make any great or vigorous exertion. By means of a ſtratagem conducted by count Egmont, Farneſe acquired poſſeſſion of Courtray in Flanders, as he did by the like means of ſome other places. On the other hand, count Egmont and his brother were taken priſoners by La Noue in the town of Ninove: and not long afterwards La Noue himſelf loſt his liberty. This gallant officer having been attacked unexpectedly by the marquis de Roubais, commander in chief of the Walloon forces, was overpowered by numbers, and obliged, through the diſadvantage of his ground, to ſurrender himſelf a priſoner of war. The States were ſenſibly affected by the loſs of a perſon of ſuch uncommon abilities, and they offered to give in exchange for him count Egmont and the baron de Selles, who had been taken priſoner at Bouchain. But the prince of Parma refuſed to conſent to this exchange, and ſaid, that he would never agree to give one lion for two ſheep. La Noue was conducted to the caſtle of Limburg,

where

where he remained long; and, during his confinement, employed himſelf in writing thoſe military and political diſcourſes which were afterwards publiſhed, and much admired by his cotemporaries. Count Egmont's relations, and thoſe of de Selles, ſolicited Philip with great importunity to conſent to the exchange propoſed. But this prince, who never hearkened to the voice of gratitude or compaſſion where his intereſt interfered, declined complying with their requeſt; and, rather than yield to the enemy ſo great an advantage as the recovery of La Noue, he choſe to leave his friends to languiſh in priſon for ſeveral years.

THESE two noblemen bore this indignity with extreme impatience. De Selles, conſcious of having exerted himſelf with the moſt fervent zeal in detaching the Walloons from the revolted provinces, fell a ſacrifice to the indignation and chagrin which the king's ingratitude and his own unfortunate ſituation were calculated to inſpire. The ſame cauſes produced a different, but no leſs melancholy effect, on count Egmont, whom they deprived of the uſe of his underſtanding. Through the tender aſſiduous care of his ſiſter, whom the States permitted to attend him, he recovered from this diſtreſs. But Philip ſtill declined conſenting to the exchange, till the year 1584, when La Noue engaged in the ſtricteſt manner never to bear arms againſt him in the Netherlands; and the king of Navarre, the duke of Lorrain, and others, became ſureties for his fulfilling this engagement. It is difficult to determine whether Philip's conduct afforded on this occaſion a more ſtriking proof of puſillanimity or ingratitude, while no ſtronger teſtimony could have been given of the extraordinary merit of La Noue, and the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities [f].

[f] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 39. and Meteren.

BOOK XVII.

1580.

Defection of count Renneberg.

ABOUT the time when La Noue was taken priſoner, the confederacy ſuſtained another loſs by the defection of count Renneberg. This young nobleman having been appointed governor of Frieſland by the States, had ſubdued the cities of Deventer and Groningen, beſides ſeveral other places of conſiderable conſequence; and his zeal and ſervices were the more highly valued, as all his relations adhered to the Spaniſh intereſt, and he himſelf was of the catholic perſuaſion. But theſe circumſtances which gave him ſo much merit in the eyes of his countrymen, were the means by which he was enticed to abandon the cauſe which he had hitherto ſo illuſtriouſly ſupported. The prince of Parma readily perceived the advantage which they afforded for gaining him over from the confederates; and, with this view, he employed the count's ſiſter and her huſband, the baron de Monceaux, to offer him the following terms of accommodation: That he ſhould be confirmed in the government of Frieſland, and have that of Overyſſel annexed to it; that twenty thouſand crowns ſhould be immediately paid him, beſides an annual penſion of twenty thouſand florins; that a town, of which he was feudal ſuperior, ſhould be erected into a marquiſate; and that he ſhould have two regiments of troops to be diſtributed throughout his governments, in whatever ſtations he ſhould think fit. Beſides theſe enticements, another object was held forth to him, more tempting perhaps than any of the reſt; he was flattered with the hopes of obtaining in marriage the counteſs of Megen, of whom he was greatly enamoured, and who poſſeſſed one of the richeſt fortunes in the Netherlands. His religious principles conſpired with theſe allurements, and made him lend an open ear to his ſiſter's repeated repreſentations of the danger to which the catholic faith was expoſed, and of the deſigns formed by the prince of Orange for its deſtruction. He heſitated however

ever for ſome time, and trembled at the thoughts of the infamy in which he was about to be involved; but at laſt he conſented to accept of the terms propoſed, reſolving to conceal his having done ſo, till he ſhould take proper meaſures for delivering the towns and forts into the hands of the Spaniards. BOOK XVII. 1580.

HIS deſign could not however entirely eſcape the penetrating eye of the prince of Orange. Various circumſtances concurred to alarm William's apprehenſions, which made him reſolve, without delay, to prevent, if poſſible, the fatal effects of his intended treachery. He inſtantly went into Frieſland, under the pretence of quelling ſome diſturbances in that country, and ordered ſome officers to draw their troops together, and lead them againſt Lewarden, Harlingen, and Staveren. Theſe orders were executed with ſecrecy and diſpatch, and all the three places were wreſted out of the hands of thoſe to whom count Renneberg had committed them.

THE count, who reſided at this time in Groningen, was thunderſtruck when he received intelligence of this diſaſter, which at once ſhewed him that his perfidy was detected, and put it in a great meaſure out of his power to fulfil his engagements to the prince of Parma. Still, however, he was either not prepared, or he had not courage, to throw off the maſk. He complained loudly of the affront that had been offered him, and of the ingratitude with which his ſervices had been repaid. Among the officers who witneſſed his confuſion on this occaſion, there were two to whom, as he knew their fidelity to the States to be inviolable, he had not communicated his deſigns. Theſe men, thinking it ſtill practicable to preſerve him in his duty, exhorted him to go immediately to the prince of Orange, in order to clear himſelf from the ſuſpicions which were entertained againſt him. "This is the only expedient in your power, ſaid

BOOK XVII. 1580.

one of them, if you are conſcious of innocence; nor can I doubt that you are, when I conſider, that by perſiſting to act the part which your duty and honour require, you muſt promote your intereſt more effectually, than by violating theſe ſacred obligations, and involving your name in perpetual infamy." Renneberg liſtened attentively to this diſcourſe, changed colour frequently, and at laſt burſt into tears. He repeated his complaints of the treatment which he had met with, but he would not explain his intentions, nor comply with his friend's advice. The two officers then left him; and, after acquainting the chief magiſtrate of what had paſſed, they withdrew privately from the city.

BY a popular and inſinuating behaviour, accompanied with ſtrong aſſeverations of the falſehood of the reports which had been propagated, Renneberg laid aſleep the ſuſpicions both of the magiſtrates and the people, till the plot which he had formed was ripe for execution. Having brought in ſecretly a body of troops, which he concealed in the palace, and put arms into the hands of his domeſtics; with theſe, and the catholic inhabitants devoted to the Spaniſh intereſt, he overpowered the garriſon; and having thus made himſelf maſter of the town, he proclaimed himſelf governor, in the name of Philip, and then mounted the fortifications with the troops which he had introduced.

Renneberg's remorſe and death.

BUT he did not long enjoy any of the advantages which he expected to derive from his revolt, and ſome of them he never attained. The money promiſed him was never paid, and the counteſs of Megen was given in marriage to another. His health being impaired by the fatigues which he had undergone in his military enterpriſes, the remembrance of his treachery filled his mind with anguiſh and remorſe, which preyed upon his ſick-

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ly frame, and carried him off in the prime of his age, lamented even by thoſe whom he had betrayed, who felt for his misfortunes, on account of his many amiable accompliſhments [s]. BOOK XVII. 1580.

THE loſſes which the confederacy ſuffered from La Noue's impriſonment, and the infidelity of Renneberg, ſerved only to confirm them in their reſolution of conferring the ſovereignty on ſome foreign prince; and the reaſons above mentioned, joined to the influence of the prince of Orange, determined the States of the ſeveral provinces and towns to give the preference to the duke of Anjou. The election was made accordingly in due form by the General States, and a ſolemn embaſſy ſent to give intimation of it to the duke, who readily accepted the offer, and conſented to all the conditions annexed to it. They were contained in a treaty ſigned by him and the ambaſſadors of the States at Pleſſi-les-Tours, on the 29th of September; and the principal articles were thoſe which follow: "That the States of the United Provinces having elected Francis de Valois, duke of Alençon and Anjou, for their ſovereign, did thereby confer upon him all the titles and prerogatives which their former princes had enjoyed. That in caſe the duke ſhould die without iſſue, the States might elect another ſovereign, and that the Netherlands ſhould in no event be annexed to the crown of France. That in caſe the duke ſhould die leaving ſeveral ſons behind him, the States ſhould have power to determine which of them ſhould ſucceed him in the ſovereignty, and that if the prince whom they ſhould make choice of were under age, they might aſſume the government into their own hands till he ſhould arrive at the age of twenty. That the duke ſhould maintain inviolate, all the rights and privileges of the people; that he ſhould ſummon the general aſſembly of the States to meet at leaſt once a year; and that, if he ſhould fail

Election of Anjou.

The conditions of it.

[s] Grotius and Meteren.

BOOK XVII. 1580.

fail to iſſue letters of convocation, they ſhould themſelves have power, agreeably to ancient form and cuſtom, to meet together as often as they ſhould judge expedient. That the duke ſhould fix his reſidence in the Low Countries; but if his affairs ſhould, on any occaſion, call him thence, he ſhould nominate for governor ſome nobleman a native of the Netherlands, with the conſent and approbation of the States. That all his counſellors ſhould be natives of the provinces, except two or three of the French nation, who might be admitted into the council, provided the States ſhould give their conſent. That he ſhould make no innovation in religion, but afford his protection equally to the proteſtants and catholics. That Holland and Zealand ſhould, both in reſpect of government and religion, remain in their preſent ſtate, being obliged, however, to contribute their proportion of the ſupplies requiſite for the ſupport of the confederacy. That the duke ſhould ſpare no pains to engage his brother the king of France to aſſiſt him in carrying on the war; that he ſhould accede to all the treaties that ſubſiſt between the States and foreign powers, and ſhould not himſelf form any new alliance without their conſent. That all foreign ſoldiers ſhould be diſmiſſed on the firſt requiſition of the States: And laſtly, That if the duke ſhould fail in performing any of the foregoing conditions, his right to the ſovereignty ſhould ceaſe, and the provinces be no longer bound to yield obedience to his authority."

As this treaty was negociated in France, Philip complained to Henry of his breach of friendſhip in permitting it; and Henry affected to be much offended with his brother's conduct, but in reality he did not feel that diſpleaſure which he pretended. On the contrary he ſecretly rejoiced in the proſpect of being delivered from a brother, whoſe levity and caprice had given him much inquietude; and

and it is ſaid, that he aſſured the States privately, that he would ſend them either troops or money, as ſoon as the troubles of his kingdom were compoſed. BOOK XVII. 1580.

BUT whatever reaſon Philip had to be offended with the French monarch, he was much more highly incenſed againſt the prince of Orange, whom he conſidered as the contriver, as well as the chief promoter of the revolution that had taken place. Having oftner than once attempted, by negociation and artifice, to free himſelf from an enemy, who had furniſhed employment to his ableſt generals and beſt diſciplined forces for ſo many years, he had recourſe, on this occaſion, to the ignoble expedient of exciting ſome wretch or deſperado to make an attempt upon his life. For this purpoſe he publiſhed an edict of proſcription againſt him, in which he accuſed him of having excited and fomented that ſpirit of diſcord, which had proved the ſource of ſo much miſery to the Netherlands; interdicted all the ſubjects of the crown of Spain from holding communication with him, and from ſupplying him with bread, or drink, or fire; and offered to any perſon, who ſhould deliver him dead or alive, or take away his life, the ſum of twenty-five thouſand crowns, beſides making him and his aſſociates noble, if they were not already noble, and granting them a full pardon of all crimes, however enormous, of which they had been guilty. Philip's proſcription of the prince of Orange.

THIS practice of commanding aſſaſſination, almoſt unheard-of ſince the days of the Roman triumvirate, was ſuitable to the dark, revengeful, and ungenerous nature of Philip. The prince of Orange could have retaliated the injury; but he ſcorned ſo ignoble a revenge, and choſe rather to reſt his defence on an appeal to the world for his integrity.

HIS

BOOK XVII. 1580. His Apology.

HIS Vindication or Apology, addreſſed to the aſſembly of the States, and of which he ſent copies to the ſeveral courts in Europe, is one of the moſt precious monuments of hiſtory. It contains an intereſting relation of many particulars, which throw light, not only on William's own character and that of Philip, but likewiſe on the characters of ſeveral of the other principal actors in the Netherlands. The author has, in ſome parts of it, indulged himſelf in the language of keen reſentment, and ventured to aſſert boldly ſeveral facts, of which the cotemporary hiſtorians have ſpoken with reſerve. Some allowance perhaps muſt be made for that juſt indignation with which he was inflamed; but when it is conſidered, that no perſon had better acceſs to information; that no prince poſſeſſed a higher character for ſincerity and truth, having never, in a ſingle inſtance, been convicted by his numerous enemies of inſincerity and falſehood; that the relation of the facts which he aſſerts was publiſhed at the time when they are ſaid to have happened, and when it was eaſy for the perſons accuſed, if accuſed unjuſtly, to have confuted him; that their intereſt and honour called loudly for a confutation; and yet, that no ſuch confutation, nor any vindication of their characters, which had been arraigned as odious at the bar of the univerſe, was ever attempted. When all theſe circumſtances are duly conſidered, there does not appear any ſufficient reaſon for calling in queſtion the facts contained in this Apology, although ſome of them are of ſuch a nature as to require the ſtrongeſt evidence to juſtify the reader for yielding his aſſent [h].

Adopted by the States.

THE conduct of the confederated States on this occaſion was ſuch as William had reaſon to expect. After employing ſeveral days in examining his Apology,

[h] An abſtract of this Apology is ſubjoined to the concluſion of this work.

Apology, they voted him an affectionate addreſs, in which they atteſted the falſehood of thoſe imputations on which Philip had founded his proſcription. They declared, that as the prince had been regularly elected into the ſeveral offices which he held, ſo he had never accepted of any office but in conſequence of their moſt earneſt entreaties. They prayed him ſtill to exerciſe the authority with which they had inveſted him, expreſſed their gratitude for his many eminent ſervices to the commonwealth, and promiſed to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his commands. They concluded with expreſſing their anxiety for his life, and made him an offer of maintaining a company of horſeguards, of which they intreated him to accept, being perſuaded that on his preſervation their own ſecurity depended. Book XVII. 1580. Dec. 17.

In a few days afterwards they gave him another proof of that zeal and ſincerity with which they had eſpouſed his cauſe. Their election of the duke of Anjou was a virtual renunciation of their allegiance to their former ſovereign; yet all public acts ran as before in the name of Philip and that of the States; the oath adminiſtered to perſons entering upon public offices had not been altered, and the people in ſome of thoſe cities in the confederacy, which had conſented to Anjou's election, were extremely averſe to alter it, from that attachment which men often diſcover to exterior forms, even after the inſtitutions on which they were originally founded have been aboliſhed; but the States, ſenſible at laſt of the incongruity between theſe forms and the ſteps which they had lately taken, and apprehenſive of danger from leaving it in any reſpect ambiguous to whom the people owed their allegiance, agreed now to remove all ground of ambiguity by a ſolemn abjuration of Philip as their ſovereign. 1581. Solemn renunciation of their allegiance to Philip.

An

BOOK XVII. 1581.

AN act of abjuration was accordingly paſ with great unanimity, in an aſſembly held on p poſe at the Hague, conſiſting of deputies fr Brabant, Guelderland, Zutphen, Flanders, H land, Zealand, Utrecht, Overyſſel, and Frieſla In this act, after enumerating the principal gri ances which had prompted them to form tl preſent reſolution, they declared it to be a ri inherent in every free people, to withdraw tl allegiance from a prince who obſtinately refu to fulfil the duty which he owes them; and m more from one who violates the fundamental la and acts the part of a tyrant and oppreſſor. Tl pronounced Philip to have forfeited for ever authority in the Netherlands. They forbade judges and others to uſe his name, arms, or ſe and they required the magiſtrates of towns, and other perſons in public offices, to bind themſel by an oath to oppoſe him and his adherents to utmoſt of their power.

THESE reſolutions were carried into immed execution. All Philip's ſeals were broken, commiſſions and letters patent in his name w cancelled, and the new oath was adminiſtere every perſon who poſſeſſed any civil or milit employment. It was not without difficulty t the magiſtrates in ſome towns were perſuade take this oath. Some remaining ſcruples of c ſcience, ariſing from a regard to their former oa gave uneaſineſs to ſeveral; and others doubte the expediency of ſo ſtrong a meaſure at the p ſent criſis, on account of the ſhips and merchan belonging to the people of the Netherlands, wh were in the ports of Spain. But no pains w ſpared to remove theſe objections, and at almoſt the whole inhabitants of the above me oned provinces entered into the views of

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States, and took the oath that was preſcribed them [1].

About this time Matthias left the Netherlands, after having reſided there between three and four years, without having acquired either reputation to himſelf, or any advantage to the people whom he had been called to govern. He had employed all his influence to perſuade the States to make choice of him for their ſovereign; but the motives above explained having determined them to give the preference to the duke of Anjou, it ſhould ſeem that the prince of Orange had been able to ſatisfy Matthias as to the neceſſity of that meaſure, ſince he remained in the country for a conſiderable time afterwards, and accepted of an annual penſion of fifty thouſand guilders from the States [k]. 1581.

During the courſe of theſe civil and political tranſactions, the troops were not wholly unemployed. In Frieſland, the king's forces were commanded by Schinch and Verdugo, between whom and colonel Norris and count Hohenloe ſeveral ſharp rencounters paſſed, with various ſucceſs; but the only important event which happened at this time in the northern provinces, was the acquiſition of Breda, into which the Spaniards were treacherouſly admitted in the night by ſome of the garriſon, whom the agents of the prince of Parma had found means to corrupt [l].

The

[1] Upon a repreſentation of the prince of Orange, the States formed at this time ſeveral uſeful regulations relative to the adminiſtration of juſtice, to the finances, and the troops. That council of ſtate likewiſe was eſtabliſhed, of the neceſſity of which William had laboured to convince them, which was inſtituted partly to remedy the inconveniencies ariſing from the ſlowneſs, with which the deliberations of the State were unavoidably conducted, and partly to ſerve as a check upon the future ſovereign. Grotius An. l. iii. Meteren, &c.

[k] Matthias had afterwards a better fortune. His brother reſigned to him the kingdom of Hungary in 1608, and that of Bohemia in 1611, and the year following he obtained the Imperial crown. Strada, lib. vii. Meteren, p. 317.

[l] Meteren, p. 313.

BOOK XVII. 1581.

THE prince himſelf was, in the mean time, intent on the reduction of Cambray. But not having a ſufficient number of troops to carry on the ſiege with vigour, he was obliged to convert it into a blockade. D'Inchi, the governor, had recourſe for relief to the duke of Anjou, and was warmly ſeconded in his application by the States and the prince of Orange. Anjou perceiving how deeply his honour was concerned to gratify this firſt deſire of his new ſubjects, publiſhed at the court of France his intention of attempting to raiſe the ſiege. This was no ſooner known, than a great number of the nobility flocked from all parts of the kingdom, to his ſtandard. With their aſſiſtance, he collected in a few days an army of near twelve thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, and marched directly towards Cambray. The prince of Parma, too prudent to contend with an army, which, beſides being greatly ſuperior to his own in number, was conducted by a brave and warlike nobility, quitted his intrenchments and retired. In this manner was Cambray delivered, after it had been blockaded for ſeveral months, during which the inhabitants had been reduced to great diſtreſs. Anjou having brought along with him an ample ſupply of proviſions, it was immediately introduced; and ſoon after, he made a magnificent entry into the city, amidſt the applauſes of the people, who ſaluted him, the Protector of their Liberty. He then laid ſiege to Chatteau-Cambreſis, and quickly compelled the garriſon to ſurrender [m].

THIS ſucceſs which attended Anjou's firſt enterpriſe afforded inexpreſſible pleaſure to the confederated provinces, and ſerved to heighten their expectations of his future government. He was earneſtly intreated by the States to improve the preſent opportunity, and to advance with his army towards Flanders. But it was not in his power, he

[m] Meteren, p. 315. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii.

[illegible] pay. [illegible] his [illegible] queen of England in [illegible]

[illegible] be French king [illegible] which he now [illegible] delivered from the [illegible] who had greatly [illegible] he would have [illegible] of the catholic [illegible] ds related had been [illegible] Guise, on pretence of providing for the of the catholic religion, but in reality to the sovereign's authority. But Henry in a condition at this time to make each with Philip. By his indolence and oufnefs, added to the numberleis calami- which his kingdom was involved, his fi- were exceedingly reduced; and the king rre on the one hand, and the duke of Guise other, furnished more than sufficient em- nt to all the policy and power which he l. Promises therefore of future aid were Anjou could obtain from him, and this ntment determined the duke to set out im- ly for England, where it should seem he ter ground to hope for assistance than in ve country.

ELIZABETH

Book XVII. 1581.

ELIZABETH had for ſome time paſt appeared to lend a favourable ear to a propoſal of marriage which he had made to her; and his expectations were at preſent raiſed to the greateſt height. On his arrival in England, ſhe gave him the moſt gracious reception. Soon afterwards, ſhe ordered her miniſters to prepare the marriage contract; and, in the preſence of many witneſſes, after a long diſcourſe with him apart, ſhe took a ring from her own finger, and put it upon his; which both the ſpectators and the duke interpreted as a declaration of her conſent. It is impoſſible to believe with ſome hiſtorians, that Elizabeth meant only to amuſe Anjou, and thereby to advance ſome political deſign. It is inconceivable how any deſign whatever could be promoted by carrying her diſſimulation to ſo great a length. This wiſe princeſs, notwithſtanding the many extraordinary accompliſhments which adorned her character, was not exempt from the weakneſſes that are peculiarly incident to her ſex. Flattered by the court which Anjou had long aſſiduouſly paid her, ſhe appears to have entertained the moſt partial ſentiments of affection towards him, and ſeriouſly to have intended to liſten to his propoſal. But at laſt her prudence, her ambition, and that love of independence which ſhe had cheriſhed through her whole life, prevailed over the temporary paſſion into which ſhe had been betrayed. She made an apology to Anjou, for her change of reſolution, and gave him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of aſſiſtance and ſupport in his new dominions. The marriage was no more mentioned, and the duke, after a ſtay of three months in England, ſet ſail for the Low Countries; eſcorted by a fleet, on board which there

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Book XII. 1511.

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XVIII.

1582.

Anjou's arrival in the Netherlands.

AFTER a paſſage of three days, the duke of Anjou landed on the 10th of February, at Fluſhing. From Fluſhing he went to Middleburgh, and was conducted from thence by a fleet of fifty ſhips of war to Antwerp. The banks of the Scheld, the entrance into the town, and the ſtreets which led to the palace, were lined by the citizens, to the number of twenty thouſand in arms; and no expence was ſaved, which a wealthy commercial city could afford, to expreſs their attachment and reſpect. After having taken the uſual oath to maintain their rights and privileges, he received from the States the oath of allegiance; and then entered upon the ſovereignty, while all around him wore a face of happineſs and joy.

IN Antwerp, the public exerciſe of the catholic religion had for ſome time paſt been prohibited. But now, in order to gratify the new ſovereign, it was permitted in one of the churches; and all

BOOK XVIII. 1582.

catholics were allowed to worſhip there, according to the rites of their religion, upon condition that they ſhould abjure the king of Spain, and ſwear allegiance to the duke. Only a few accepted of this indulgence, while the greater part choſe rather to forego the privilege held forth to them, than ſo ſolemnly to renounce their former ſovereign. On this occaſion the States, as well as the duke, were not a little alarmed; and thought it neceſſary without delay to provide againſt the danger that might ariſe from perſons who gave ſo clear a diſcovery of their diſſaffection to the preſent eſtabliſhment. They firſt publiſhed *one* edict, impoſing a fine of 200 guilders on thoſe who ſhould decline taking the oaths; and ſoon afterwards another, by which the recuſants were baniſhed from the Netherlands[a].

Attempt to aſſaſſinate the prince of Orange.

IN the midſt of theſe tranſactions, that joy which Anjou's arrival had diffuſed throughout the provinces was interrupted, by an attempt which was made, not many days after his inauguration, upon the life of the prince of Orange. The deſign was firſt conceived in Spain, by a man of the name of Iſonca; and it was ſuggeſted by him to Gaſpar Anaſtro, a Spaniſh banker in Antwerp, of ruined circumſtances, as an expedient for retrieving his affairs. To induce Anaſtro to undertake the execution of the bloody purpoſe, Iſonca ſent him a ſign-manual of the king, in which Philip engaged to pay him eighty thouſand ducats as ſoon as the aſſaſſination ſhould be perpetrated. Anaſtro had not courage himſelf to execute ſo bold and deſperate an enterpriſe, and therefore he communicated Iſonca's propoſal to John Jauregui, a menial ſervant in his family, a young Biſcayan, of a thoughtful, melancholy diſpoſition,

[a] Meteren, p. 325.

diſpoſition, whom he knew to be both truſty and audacious. With this young man Anaſtro found there was little need for perſuaſion. "I am ready, ſaid he, to perform inſtantly what the king ſo earneſtly deſires. I deſpiſe equally the proffered reward, and the danger to which I ſhall be expoſed; for I know that I ſhall die. I only aſk that you will aſſiſt me with your prayers to God, and employ your intereſt with the king, to provide for my father in his old age." Jauregui was the better qualified to ſucceed in his deſign, as he ſpoke the German language fluently, and was in no danger of being known to be a Spaniard. He was confirmed in his purpoſe by a prieſt of the name of Timmerman; from whom he received abſolution of his ſins, and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that by putting to death ſo great a heretic as the prince of Orange, he would infallibly ſecure the favour of God and everlaſting happineſs.

UNDER a full conviction of the truth of what the prieſt had declared, this deluded wretch ſet out for the caſtle, and having taken his ſtation near the door of the apartment in which the prince had dined, he watched the opportunity of his coming out; when ſtepping up to him, he diſcharged a piſtol at his head, loaded with a ſingle ball. The ball entered a little beneath his right ear, and paſſing under his palate and upper teeth, came out on the other ſide. William was deprived for a moment of his ſenſes; which he no ſooner recovered, than he deſired his attendants to ſave the life of the aſſaſſin. But the guards, tranſported with ſudden rage, had diſpatched him. The appearance of the prince's wound, from the effuſion of blood, was extremely formidable, and as he was deprived of his ſpeech by the ſame cauſe, the ſpectators believed him to be at the point of death. The news of this diſaſter ſpread quickly over the town, and excited in all ranks of men, inexpreſſible

BOOK XVIII. 1582.

anguiſh and deſpair. The citizens poured in crowds from every quarter to learn the particulars of that calamity which had befallen them; and, as if each individual had loſt his own proper parent, as well as the common parent of the ſtate, there was nothing to be heard but the voice of ſorrow and lamentation.

IN the midſt of this diſtreſs, a rumour was propagated, that the French were the authors of the murder, and that it had been perpetrated in order to deliver the duke of Anjou from the reſtraints which had been impoſed on his authority. This report gained eaſy credit from the people. Their grief was now converted into fury, and they flew to the palace with an intention to execute a ſpeedy vengeance.

IN the mean time it was known at the caſtle, that the aſſaſſin was a Spaniard, from papers found in his pocket, by Maurice, the prince's ſon [b]. Of this diſcovery, notice was immediately carried to the prince, who had now recovered his ſpeech; and he was informed, at the ſame time, of the danger to which Anjou and his countrymen were expoſed. This intelligence affected William in the moſt ſenſible manner; and notwithſtanding his preſent critical ſituation, he wrote, with his own hand, a billet in exculpation of the French. By this, joined with the pains which were taken by St. Aldegonde, the people were undeceived and pacified. The aſſaſſin's body having being expoſed to public view, it was ſoon diſcovered that he had been a domeſtic of Anaſtro. Anaſtro himſelf had fled, but his ſecretary, whom he had left behind, to wait the iſſue of Jauregui's attempt, and Timmerman, the prieſt, were ſeized, and having confeſſed

[b] Maurice was at this time only fifteen years of age, but was even then remarkable for his attention and ſagacity.

confeſſed their guilt, they were condemned to ſuffer death. At the deſire of the prince of Orange, who never neglected an opportunity of inculcating humanity upon his countrymen, no tortures were inflicted on them. They were firſt ſtrangled and then quartered, and their heads and limbs fixed over the gates of the city [c].

WILLIAM's recovery was dubious for ſome time, on account of the difficulty which the phyſicians found in ſtopping the effuſion of blood; but after all their applications had failed, they made a number of perſons ſucceed one another in preſſing the mouth of the wound with their thumbs, without intermiſſion, for the ſpace of ſeveral days and nights; and this expedient proved at length ſucceſsful [d].

ANASTRO having gone from Antwerp to Tournay, where the prince of Parma then reſided, affirmed confidently that William had died of his wound. Farneſe too raſhly believed him, and wrote letters to the citizens of Antwerp, and other places, exhorting them to return now to their duty, ſince that perſon was removed by whom they had been led aſtray. Theſe letters would not have been calculated, in the preſent diſpoſition of the people, to promote the prince of Parma's deſign, even if the information on which he proceeded had been true: but as they did not arrive till after the people were delivered from their apprehenſions with regard to William's life, they ſerved only to excite their ridicule and indignation [e].

MEANWHILE

[c] They remained there till the city fell into the hands of the prince of Parma, when they were taken down by the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, and buried with every mark of veneration which their ſuperſtition could deviſe.

[d] While his life was in danger, a public ſupplication was offered up to heaven for his recovery; and when it was accompliſhed, a ſolemn thankſgiving was celebrated.

[e] Bentivoglio, p. 263. Meteren, p. 326. Thuanus, lib. lxxv.

BOOK XVIII.

1582. Return of the Spaniſh troops.

MEANWHILE the operations of the war were not diſcontinued by either of the contending parties. The States acquired poſſeſſion of the town of Alloſt, and the prince of Parma made himſelf maſter of Steenwick and Lierres. He was ſoon after enabled to act with greater vigour than the weakneſs of his army had hitherto permitted him to exert. Having conſented with great reluctance to the diſmiſſion of the Italian and Spaniſh troops, he had employed all his addreſs to convince the Walloons that it was in vain for them to expect, with their own forces alone, to bring the war to a concluſion. He found it extremely difficult to overcome their diffidence, and was obliged to obſerve the utmoſt caution, in order to avoid awakening thoſe ſuſpicions which they had long indulged againſt the Spaniards. At length however he accompliſhed his deſign through the marquis de Roubais, who, as was mentioned above, had acted a principal part in promoting the reconcilement of the ſouthern provinces. With this nobleman, Farneſe had formed an intimate connexion, and had laboured aſſiduouſly to make him ſenſible how neceſſary it was that the troops ſhould be permitted to return. The marquis, flattered with the familiarity to which he was admitted, and prompted by the view of advancing his credit with the king, yielded at laſt to the prince's ſolicitations, and then employed his influence with the States ſo effectually, that they not only conſented to the return of the forces, but even petitioned the king for it in the moſt earneſt terms [f].

NOTHING could be more acceptable to Philip than this application, and orders were immediately ſent to Italy for the march of four regiments of veterans, conſiſting of near ten thouſand men; who,

[f] Bentivoglio, p. 258.

who, together with several [illegible] and Germans, arrived in the Netherlands [illegible] the end of the former year. After the arrival of this reinforcement the prince of Parma's army amounted to [illegible] thousand horse; but finding himself more than the half of that number of [illegible] could keep only about [illegible] in the field; and a part of these was employed in Brabant under Verdugo, while the rest were under his own immediate command in the Walloon provinces. With these he invested Cambrai, Ninove, Geertsberg, and several other places; he attacked the army of the States which he compelled to retire under the cannon of Ghent, and then he laid siege to Bruges. But the severity of the season, and the difficulty of procuring provisions in a country which had been long the seat of war, obliged him to desist from his enterprise, and to put his troops into winter-quarters.[a]

The United States, on the other hand, discovered great alacrity and zeal in supporting their new established government. They raised their yearly revenue from two millions five hundred thousand, to four millions of guilders, with which they maintained, besides their native troops, a considerable number of British, French, and German forces. But so great a proportion of these forces was necessary for defending the forts and towns, that no army could be assembled sufficient to contend with the enemy in the field, nor even to raise the siege of any of those places which the prince of Parma attempted to subdue. Thus the number of towns belonging to the confederates was daily diminished, while their acquisitions were few and inconsiderable. And, as the enemy was now much more formidable than before, they were

fined

[a] Meteren, p. 334.

BOOK XVIII.

filled with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions when they looked forward to the opening of a new campaign. Anjou, who participated with them in the anxiety which ſo critical a ſituation was fitted to excite, did every thing in his power to procure from France the ſuccours which he had given them reaſon to expect. After many delays, the duke de Montpenſier and mareſchal Biron arrived in the Netherlands in the end of November, with between ſeven and eight thouſand men, partly Swiſs and partly French. With this reinforcement, under ſo able a general as Biron, Anjou perceived that he might retard the progreſs of the prince of Parma's arms, but that he could not hope either to expel him from his new conqueſts, or to bring the war to a concluſion: he therefore renewed his ſolicitations at the court of France, and endeavoured to engage his brother more heartily to eſpouſe his cauſe.

1582.

Anjou ſolicits aſſiſtance from his brother.

HENRY's counſellors were much divided in their opinions with regard to the meaſures proper to be purſued on this occaſion. By ſome of them, the preſent opportunity was repreſented as the happieſt that could offer for uniting the Netherlands to the crown of France. But, as theſe men did not intend to advance the intereſt of Anjou, they did not employ any argument addreſſed to Henry's friendſhip or generoſity; and inſtead of exhorting him to afford his brother aid ſufficient to eſtabliſh himſelf ſecurely in his new ſovereignty, they adviſed him only to give him ſuch aſſiſtance as might enable him to ſtop the progreſs of the Spaniſh arms. To this counſel they ſubjoined, that Henry ought to maintain a fleet in the Channel, and an army on the frontier of Luxemburg, in order to prevent the prince of Parma from receiving ſupplies from Spain or Italy. And in this poſture, they ſaid, he ought to wait, without expoſing his troops to the hazards of war, till the contending parties ſhould exhauſt their ſtrength, when it would be

Henry's deliberations.

be eaſy for him to drive the Spaniards out of the Netherlands, and his brother and the States, in order to obtain his protection, would gladly accept of whatever terms he ſhould think fit to impoſe. But ſuch a plan, which the great abilities of Farneſe would have diſconcerted, was too refined, and required too much labour, patience, attention and expence, to be reliſhed by a prince ſo indolent and voluptuous as Henry, who was ſo improvident of the future, and whoſe affairs were ſo exceedingly involved.

Henry refuſes the duke's requeſt.

He liſtened with leſs reluctance to a propoſal made him by ſome others of his counſellors, who being well acquainted with his character, perceived that his heſitation proceeded in a great meaſure from the ſhame of deſerting his brother, and that in reality he wiſhed for a pretence to reject his application. Theſe men, ſecret enemies to the duke, and partiſans of Philip, whoſe money it was believed they had accepted, were afraid to declare openly againſt a meaſure in which the heir-apparent of the crown, ſupported by the queen-mother, was ſo deeply intereſted. They affected to approve highly of the granting Anjou's requeſt, provided the king could comply with it conſiſtently with the intereſt of his kingdom. But both the intereſt and honour of France, they thought, required that the States ſhould previouſly agree, that, in the event of the duke's death without iſſue, the king and his heirs ſhould ſucceed him in the ſovereignty of the Netherlands. They knew that the States would not conſent to this condition. It was, however, propoſed to them, and having met with that reception from them which there was reaſon to expect, notice was ſoon afterwards ſent to Anjou by the queen-mother, and his other friends, of the unſucceſsful iſſue of their endeavours to ſerve him [s].

This

[s] Thuanus, lib. xxvii. c. 9. Meteren, lib. xi.

BOOK XVIII.

1582. Anjou's attempt on Antwerp and other places.

THIS diſappointment, which rendered it impoſſible for him to fulfil the expectations of his new ſubjects, was calculated to give him the moſt ſenſible concern. A candid and grateful prince would have thought himſelf bound more ſtrongly than ever to exert himſelf in their behalf; and, by a careful attention to their intereſts, joined to a faithful diſcharge of his other obligations, to atone for his failure in that engagement which he was unable to perform. Widely different were the ſentiments which aroſe in the mind of the faithleſs ungenerous Anjou. Apprehenſive that the Flemings, diſguſted on account of their diſappointment in thoſe hopes of aſſiſtance with which they had been deluded, might withdraw their allegiance from him, and reconcile themſelves to their former ſovereign; he reſolved to prevent them from executing this deſign, in caſe they ſhould conceive it, and in violation of all the oaths which he had ſworn ſo lately, he formed a plan of depriving them of their liberty, by making himſelf maſter of all the towns into which his troops had already found, or could by force or ſtratagem find admiſſion.

THIS ſtrange deſign, it is ſaid, was firſt ſuggeſted to him by his partiſans in France, in order to induce Henry to grant him the aſſiſtance which he ſolicited; and it was ſtrongly recommended by Fervaques, and other French nobility who had accompanied him to the Netherlands. Theſe men were all real or pretended friends to Anjou, and affected to be deeply concerned for his honour, with which they perſuaded him, that ſuch a limited authority as he poſſeſſed was utterly incompatible. Had they been his moſt inveterate enemies, they could not have adviſed him to a meaſure more likely to prove fatal to his intereſt. Yet this weak prince, without communicating his intention to Biron or Monpenſier, who would have

have refuſed their conſent, readily embraced the BOOK
counſel that was given him, and immediately XV.
proceeded to deliberate with his adviſers concern- 1582.
ing the means of carrying it into execution.

It was agreed, that the French troops, in all 1582.
the towns where they were quartered, ſhould, under the pretence of a mutiny, take up arms, and expel the garriſons; and in this manner he got poſſeſſion of Dunkirk, Dixmunde, Dendremonde, and ſeveral other places; but his principal object was the city of Antwerp. It would have been in vain, he believed, to attempt making himſelf maſter of ſo ſtrong a place by open force, with ſo ſmall a number of his troops as were within the city; and therefore, in conjunction with his counſellors, he exerted all his ingenuity in contriving how force and artifice might be united. On this occaſion, fortune ſeemed to favour his deſign. Towards the middle of January, after the froſt had continued for ſome time, the States ſignified their intention to have his troops employed in an expedition againſt ſome of the enemy's towns in Frieſland, which, on account of their wet ſituation, were acceſſible only in the time of froſt. Anjou pretended to enter with great alacrity into this deſign. He immediately gave orders to have his troops conducted to the villages in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, where he held them ready to march upon the ſhorteſt notice; and, under various pretences, he brought to his court at Antwerp almoſt all the French nobleſſe, who had been diſperſed throughout the Netherlands.

Being thus prepared, his plan was to ſeize upon the gate of Cronenburg, which lay next to the palace, with his body-guards, and to introduce his army ſilently in the night; but, on the day immediately

[h] Thuanus, l. xxvii c. 10. Meteren, p. 356.

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

immediately preceding, an obscure report of his intention was circulated among the citizens, and a general alarm excited. The prince of Orange and the magistrates thought it proper to inform the duke of this report, and proposed to hang up lights in the city, and to stretch chains across the streets and gates, in order to quiet the apprehensions of the people. Anjou could not, without confirming the suspicions entertained against him, refuse his consent to this proposal; but as he possessed a considerable share of his mother's duplicity and artifice, he assumed with so much seeming sincerity, the appearance of indignation against the authors of the report, accompanied with such strong professions of attachment to the Netherlands in general, and the city of Antwerp in particular, that not only the magistrates, but even the prince of Orange was almost persuaded of his innocence. The streets however were barricaded, the whole town was illuminated, and many of the citizens were under arms.

THESE circumstances having made it necessary for Anjou to change his plan, he went early next morning to the prince of Orange's apartment in the castle, and after informing him that he had ordered his troops to be drawn out for a general review before their departure for Friesland, he desired the prince to witness it. Whether William had still any suspicion of his design is uncertain; but he refused to accompany him, alleging the badness of the day, and the state of his wound, as an excuse for his refusal; and he advised the duke to put off the review till some future day, when the people would be entirely delivered from those apprehensions with which they were at present disquieted. Anjou pretended that he would comply with his advice, and left him; but soon afterwards he sent him notice,

tice, that, finding the day grown better, he ſtill reſolved to hold the review, as he had at firſt directed. He then gave orders to remove the barricades in the ſtreet which leads to the gate of Ripdorp, and ſet out, attended with a retinue in arms, amounting to between two and three hundred men.

HE had no ſooner paſſed the gate and the drawbridge, than his attendants fell ſword in hand upon the guards, and having butchered ſome of them, obliged the reſt to take ſhelter in the guard-houſe. The orders which he had ſent to the camp had been punctually executed. The whole army was in motion, and ſeventeen companies of foot, ſix hundred lances, and four troops of horſe were at hand, and ready to enter the city. They ruſhed in impetuouſly; and, having ſet fire to ſome houſes near the gate, as a ſignal for the reſt of the troops to haſten forward, they ſpread themſelves over the town, crying out, "May the maſs flouriſh: the city is taken."

THE citizens had been in ſome meaſure freed from their apprehenſions, by Anjou's proteſtations on the evening before; but they had not been put entitely off their guard. They flew inſtantly to arms, and quickly formed a cloſe compacted body, of ſufficient ſtrength to make head againſt the enemy. Their number was ſoon augmented by others, who flocked to their aſſiſtance from every quarter of the city. None declined expoſing themſelves to danger, or truſted to others for their defence. They remembered the devaſtations which had been committed ſome years before by the mutinous Spaniards, and were perſuaded, that they could not now avoid a repetition of the diſaſters which they then ſuffered, by any other means, but by exerting their utmoſt vigour, and ſhewing, each man for himſelf,

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

ſelf, a contempt of danger. Animated therefore by the dread of that ruin with which their fortunes, their friends, their wives and children, were about to be overwhelmed; and fired with indignation againſt their ungrateful, perfidious enemy, they advanced with a degree of fury which the French troops were unable to withſtand. Many of the French had entered the houſes for the ſake of plunder. Theſe men were quickly ſurrounded by the citizens, and put to the ſword; the reſt were driven back towards the gate. There they expected, either to be ſupported by their friends from the camp, or to make their eſcape out of the city; but, having neglected to ſecure the portcullis, the ſoldiers, who had ſhut themſelves up in the guard-houſe, had ſallied out and let it down. By this circumſtance, the French were thrown into deſpair, and the reſolution and ſpirit of the citizens augmented. The ſituation of the former was now truly deplorable: diſappointed of that aſſiſtance from without, on which they had depended, and crowded together into a narrow ſpace; while the citizens, who purſued, poured their ſhot upon them without a moment's intermiſſion; they fell in heaps above one another, till the gate was choaked with the dead and wounded.

THE citizens made next a deſperate attack on a body of French troops who had mounted the rampart, and either put them to the ſword, or tumbled them headlong from the wall. Of this ſcene, Anjou himſelf, and the Swiſs troops, who had attempted in vain to burſt open the gate, were ſpectators. At firſt he thought it was the citizens that were thrown down, and believed it muſt have been by accident that the portcullis had been ſhut. He could not ſuppoſe that the inhabitants, unaccuſtomed to the uſe of arms, could, in the ſpace of an hour, have diſcomfited ſo great

great a number of diſciplined forces; but he was ſoon undeceived in his conjecture. The citizens, ſtill inflamed with indignation, on account of his unprovoked, atrocious attempt, pointed their cannon towards the place where he ſtood, and and killed a conſiderable number of the Swiſs. BOOK XVIII. 1583.

THE prince of Orange, who lodged in the caſtle, at the oppoſite end of the city, remained ignorant for ſome time of what had paſſed, and when intelligence of it was brought him, he at firſt believed it to be ſome accidental ſcuffle between the inhabitants and ſoldiers; but at laſt receiving more certain information of the truth, he ſet out with a part of the garriſon for the ſcene of action. In his way thither he met Fervaques advancing towards him with a body of French troops, which had been left behind in the palace. At the firſt onſet, Fervaques himſelf was taken priſoner, and his troops, diſheartened by the loſs of their commander, and ſtill more by the conſciouſneſs of their treachery, were eaſily overcome. William then proceeded to the gate of Ripdorp, where he arrived in time to prevent the citizens from wrecking an uſeleſs, though merited, vengeance upon the priſoners.

NOTHING could be more affecting, ſays an hiſtorian [1], whoſe information was derived from eye-witneſſes, than the ſpectacle at the gate: the dead bodies piled one above another to a conſiderable height, and the wounded mingled with the dead, and ſtruggling to diſengage themſelves. At the prince's interceſſion the lives of all the priſoners were ſpared, and many of the wounded recovered, through the attention and tenderneſs of thoſe to whoſe care they were committed.

THE

[1] Van Meteren.

Book XVIII. 1583.

late atrocious attempt. Nothing could be more palpably unjuſt than to impute that attempt of the citizens of Antwerp, ſince, on the ſame day, the French troops had offered the ſame violence in other places. By the kind providence of Heaven, the plan concerted to enſlave them, had been fruſtrated, in ſuch towns as were of the greateſt importance; and it was their earneſt prayer, that the duke might become ſenſible of the iniquity of his conduct, and reſolve for the future to govern the provinces conformably to thoſe fundamental laws of the conſtitution, which, at his acceſſion, he had ſolemnly ſworn to obſerve."

THE news of what had happened, having been quickly diffuſed throughout the provinces, excited univerſal aſtoniſhment and indignation. The prince of Parma, deſirous to improve the opportunity which was preſented to him, attempted to reconcile the people to their antient government. But his endeavours were not more ſucceſsful now than formerly. The confederates were deaf to his propoſals; and even refuſed to appoint ambaſſadors to treat with him concerning peace.

Deliberations of the States.

THE States in the mean time were deliberating concerning the letter which Anjou had written to the ſenate of Antwerp. Had they liſtened to that juſt reſentment with which they were inflamed, they would not have heſitated to declare that he had forfeited the ſovereignty. But they conſidered how extremely critical their ſituation was become, while Anjou was maſter of ſeveral of their fortified towns, and the prince of Parma hovered round them with an army, againſt which they were unable to contend. In this perplexity they intreated the prince of Orange, who had hitherto remained ſilent, to aſſiſt them with his counſel. No perſon felt more ſenſibly for the diſtreſs into which Anjou's temerity had plunged the confederacy;

cleracy; and no perſon had a juſter ground of provocation. It was by his means chiefly that Anjou had obtained the ſovereignty; and yet it could not be doubted, that in ſending Fervaques with troops to the caſtle, as above related, the intention was to deprive him either of his life or his liberty. Notwithſtanding this, William had at firſt interpoſed to prevent the citizens from uſing any violence againſt the priſoners; and he now gave the following conciliatory advice to the States in writing, as he generally did in matters which he deemed of high importance.

"IT was not, he ſaid, without reluctance, that he had reſolved to deliver his opinion on the difficult queſtion which was now before them, as it had of late been the practice of many perſons to blame him for every misfortune that had befallen the confederacy. Even if he had been inveſted with abſolute authority, their cenſure would have been unjuſt, ſince the iſſues of things belong to God only, and no man can anſwer for the ſucceſs of the beſt concerted enterpriſe. Conſidering his age, and the injuſtice with which he had been treated, it would be prudent perhaps not to expoſe himſelf again to the obloquy of his detractors. But his concern for the proſperity of the Netherlands would not ſuffer him to maintain that ſilence, which a regard to his perſonal eaſe and ſecurity required; eſpecially as they had aſſured him that they would take in good part, and interpret favourably, whatever counſel he ſhould offer.

"NOTHING was farther from his intention than to attempt to juſtify that atrocious violence which had been lately perpetrated: on the contrary, he thought the conduct of the duke had been ſuch as proved beyond a poſſibility of doubt, that he

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

had forfeited his title to the ſovereignty. Notwithſtanding this, no perſon, he believed, who ſuffered himſelf to conſider attentively the courſe of events ſince their firſt connexion with the duke, would deny that this connexion had been attended with advantages. By his troops, not only the ſiege of Cambray, but that of Lochem too, had been raiſed, and the whole province of Guelderland thereby ſaved from the depredations of the enemy. In conſequence of his election, peace had been eſtabliſhed between the catholics and proteſtants in France, and the latter left at liberty to enter into the ſervice of the States. Not to mention what they ought perhaps to prize more than any thing elſe, that, by electing the duke for their ſovereign, not only the authority, but the name and arms of Spain, had been aboliſhed in the Netherlands, and a foundation laid, upon which their liberty might be firmly eſtabliſhed, provided they ſhould exert themſelves with their wonted zeal and vigour. When theſe things were conſidered, there would not appear much ground for the cenſures paſſed on thoſe by whom the duke's election had been promoted. But whether they had judged wiſely or unwiſely, the States muſt now reſolve either to make peace with the king of Spain, or truſt for the future to their own ſtrength, or enter into terms of accommodation with the duke.

"WITH regard to the firſt of theſe, he obſerved, that beſides that all the ſame reaſons ſtill ſubſiſted againſt returning under the Spaniſh yoke, which had formerly determined them to ſhake it off; it muſt appear prepoſterous to think of reconciling themſelves as ſubjects, to a prince, whoſe name and enſigns were obliterated, and whoſe authority they had ſo ſolemnly renounced. There was truth in what ſome perſons (friends of Spain more than their native country) had ſuggeſted, that

that it was more desirable for the people of the Low Countries to be subject to a distant, than to a neighbouring prince, as it must be more difficult for the former, than for the latter to encroach upon their liberty. But this maxim could not, in the present divided state of the Netherlands, be urged in favour of the dominion of the king of Spain; who, besides possessing a powerful army ready to overwhelm them, was absolute master of several of the provinces; and was therefore, in reality, much nearer to the confederacy than any other prince.

"PROMPTED by this and other considerations, they had bestowed the sovereignty on the duke of Anjou; and *he*, it could not be denied, had forfeited his title to it. This was acknowledged even by the duke himself, who was now sensible of his folly. But notwithstanding his repentance, there was much ground to doubt of the expediency of entering into a second agreement with one by whom the first had been so grossly violated. There was ground to dread that the same evil counsellors, by whom the duke had been once deluded, might again deceive him; and there was reason to suspect, that confidence could not be soon restored between the French troops and the people of the Netherlands.

"ON the other hand, he thought it his duty to call their attention to the consequences which must attend their refusing to be pacified. The duke would deliver all the fortified towns which he possessed, into the hands of the Spaniards. Both he and his brother, the king of France, would from friends be converted into the most bitter enemies; from whom all that mischief might be expected, that can be contrived and executed by those who are stimulated by ambition, and inflamed with animosity and resentment. An immediate stop would be put by the French king, to their commerce with his subjects; and while he would shut his

his harbours againſt their ſhips, he would open a paſſage through his dominions for the troops of the king of Spain. Even the queen of England, though highly diſſatisfied with the duke's conduct, yet were ſhe to be informed that the States had obſtinately refuſed to be reconciled, would be exceedingly offended. And if they ſhould loſe her favour, as well as that of France, to what other friend could they have recourſe, either able or willing to ſupport them? They muſt for the future truſt for their preſervation entirely to themſelves. They muſt, without delay, make a numerous augmentation of their forces; and yet he knew not where theſe forces could be raiſed, ſince the devaſtation of the war had been ſo great in every province of the confederacy, that ſcarcely a ſufficient number of the people remained, to carry on their trade and manufactures. In order to maintain ſuch an army as was neceſſary, much larger ſums of money were requiſite, than had hitherto been collected. What theſe were, would appear from the ſcheme which he now delivered to them, containing a particular deſcription of all the ordinary and extraordinary expences of the war. From the difficulty which they had experienced in procuring money for paying the garriſons alone, they might judge whether they were poſſeſſed of funds adequate to the expence both of theſe and of an army in the field; without which, it was impoſſible that they could for any conſiderable time reſiſt the enemy.

"He was far from cenſuring thoſe who adviſed them to truſt to the Almighty for protection. The counſel of theſe perſons was pious and well intended; but he thought, that to engage in an difficult enterpriſe without the means of carryin it into execution, was more properly to tempt th Divine Providence than to truſt in it; and th thoſe only could be ſaid to exerciſe a proper tr in God, who, after embracing the moſt favo

opportunities of action, had recourſe to Hea- BOOK
by prayer, to crown their undertakings with XVIII.
ſs. It behoved them therefore ſtill attentive- 1583.
conſider their ſtrength and their reſources;
if, without foreign aſſiſtance, they ſhould find
ſufficient for the purpoſes which they had in
, they would, in his opinion, judge wiſely in
ving to retain the ſovereignty in their own
ls.

THERE was a time when the people of the Ne-
ands might have eſtabliſhed themſelves in this
y ſtate of freedom and independence; when,
ite of the king of Spain, they might have ex-
d his brother John of Auſtria from the pro-
es. But our preſent ſituation, continued Wil-
, is widely different from what it was at the
of which I ſpeak. A powerful Spaniſh army,
ded by thoſe who were then our friends, is at
gates. The ſtrength of the confederacy is
ired. Even with the aſſiſtance of the French
ps, we have been unable to ſtop the progreſs
he enemy. If nevertheleſs you ſhall, upon
iry, find that you are able, by making greater
tions, to do more alone, than when you were
ed by others, baniſh for ever all thoughts of
ccommodation with the duke, and reſolve
eforth, alone and unaſſiſted, to oppoſe both
and the Spaniards. Proceed inſtantly to the
ution of your deſign. But I dread that be-
you can make the preparations neceſſary for
ring upon action, before you can collect either
roops or the money requiſite, and even before
can appoint a general to command your forces,
y of your towns will be taken; and many of
1 deſpairing of relief, will enter into terms of
mmodation with the Spaniards. For theſe
ns you will judge, perhaps, that in your pre-
circumſtances the wiſeſt reſolution which you
form, is to enter into a treaty of reconcile-
t with the duke. And if this ſhall be the re-
ſult

Book XVIII. 1583.

ſult of your deliberations, I have only one other counſel to ſuggeſt, which is, to give particular attention in your new agreement to prevent the fortified towns from being expoſed on any future occaſion to that danger from which the city of Antwerp has ſo narrowly eſcaped; and for this purpoſe to require, that no officer or ſoldier ſhall be admitted into garriſons without taking an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the States [o]."

Reconcilement of the States with Anjou. March 8th.

THIS reaſoning of the prince of Orange produced the deſired effect upon a great majority of the deputies, and a negociation was immediately begun, and ſoon afterwards a treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded on the following conditions: That all the French priſoners in Antwerp ſhould be ſet at liberty, the duke's papers and other effects reſtored, and ninety thouſand guilders given him for diſcharging the arrears due to his troops. That he ſhould deliver up all the towns which he had ſeized, retire to Dunkirk with four hundred foot and three hundred horſe, and remain there till every point of difference ſhould be entirely ſettled; that he ſhould renew the oath which he took at his inauguration, to govern the provinces according to the fundamental laws, and that all his troops ſhould take an oath of allegiance to the States, binding themſelves to ſerve them faithfully againſt their enemies, and never to be concerned in any attempt to the prejudice of their authority.

Attempts on the life of the prince of Orange.

As in promoting this agreement the prince of Orange appears to have acted under a conviction, that there was no other expedient by which the confederacy could be ſaved from ruin; ſo, in being able to perſuade the States to adopt it, he gave the moſt convincing proof of his unlimited influence over that aſſembly. The people in general,

[o] Van Meteren and Thuanus.

neral, eſpecially in Flanders and Brabant, were extremely averſe from all accommodation. Their hereditary antipathy againſt the French had, on this occaſion, riſen to the greateſt height. Many of the deputies too were animated with the ſame averſion and reſentment; nor can it be doubted, that if they had not been prevented by that deference which they had been long accuſtomed to entertain for William's opinion, they would have proceeded againſt Anjou to the utmoſt extremities, and have reſolved never more to acknowledge his authority. The Spaniards were not ignorant by whom the States had been prevented from forming this reſolution; and they were now convinced, that, till the prince of Orange were removed, no event, however promiſing, would induce the confederates to return to their allegiance. They had recourſe therefore to the diſhonourable means of private aſſaſſination; and to attempt it, different perſons were inſtigated about this time by Philip or his miniſters; one of them by Philip himſelf, according to the declaration of the criminal; but more probably, by his miniſters at Madrid; another by his ambaſſador at the court of France; and a third by the marquis de Roubais and the prince of Parma. The conſpiracy of the two former was detected, and they ſuffered death; and the laſt, a French officer, whom Roubais had taken priſoner, and who had pretended to agree to the propoſal, in order to procure his liberty, gave information to William's friends of the arguments which had been employed to perſuade him, and ſhewed by his conduct afterwards in the ſervice of the States, the ſincerity of his abhorrence of that unhallowed deed which he had been ſolicited to perform [p].

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

THE

[p] Meteren. p. 143

BOOK XVIII.

1583. Diſcontents of the people

THE danger to which the prince was ſo often expoſed from the inveterate reſentment of the Spaniards, ought to have endeared his perſon and counſels to his countrymen, and they produced this effect in a high degree upon all thoſe who were able to comprehend the wiſdom and moderation with which he had conducted their affairs. But great numbers having formed their judgment of Anjou's election to the ſovereignty, from the late unhappy conſequences with which it had been accompanied, could not refrain from aſcribing ſome ſiniſter intention to thoſe who had been active in promoting it. They were incapable of diſcerning the ſtrength of the motives by which William had been prompted to adviſe the States to renew their agreement, and they even foſtered ſuſpicions of his having attached himſelf to the duke, with a view to ſome private advantage. This ſpirit of diſcontent was not confined to the vulgar, but likewiſe infected ſeveral of the deputies of the States, who became ſullen and refractory; and by their contentious oppoſition to almoſt every meaſure that was propoſed, diſturbed and retarded the deliberations of that aſſembly. A great majority however of the members agreed to employ the French and Swiſs troops under mareſchal Biron, whom the duke had appointed to command them. Biron having not only had no concern in the attempt upon Antwerp, but having been conſidered by Anjou as one by whom it would have been oppoſed, was the moſt unexceptionable perſon to whom the command could have been committed, and he had been long diſtinguiſhed for his military ſkill and experience. At firſt his arms were attended with ſucceſs. He compelled the fort of Wouda to ſurrender, and with inferior forces he repulſed the prince of Parma, who had attacked his lines near the town of Roſendal. But it was impoſſible for him with ſo ſmall an army to ſtop the progreſs of the Spaniards

Spaniards in other places, or to face them in the open field. Farneſe therefore puſhed his conqueſts with great rapidity, and made himſelf maſter of Endove, Dieſt, and Weſterlo, while he practiſed every art of negociation and intrigue againſt Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Book XVIII. 1583.

During the courſe of theſe tranſactions the duke of Anjou fell into a lingering illneſs at Dunkirk, which was generally ſuppoſed to be the effect of thoſe hardſhips which he ſuffered in his retreat from Antwerp. Whether he believed himſelf inſecure in his preſent ſituation, while the prince of Parma was ſo briſkly carrying on his conqueſts in the neighbourhood, or found that his health required a change of air, and a relaxation from the fatigues of buſineſs, or whether he had conceived hopes at this time of obtaining, by a perſonal interview with his brother, more powerful aſſiſtance than he had hitherto received, does not appear with ſufficient evidence. But whatever was the motive which determined him, he left Dunkirk and ſet out for France.

Progreſs of the prince of Parma's arms.

The prince of Parma was no ſooner informed of his departure, than he quitted Herentals, and led his troops to Dunkirk. The States, aware of the importance of that place, ordered marſhal Biron to march with all his forces to its relief. But ſuch was the reſentment which the Ghenteſe and other Flemings had conceived againſt the French, that no conſideration could prevail upon them to ſuffer Biron to paſs through their territories. They had reſolved, they ſaid, never to accede to the late agreement with the duke, whom they could not truſt, and they would not be indebted to his troops for their defence. The conſequence to be expected followed. The garriſon of Dunkirk, which conſiſted wholly of French, gave up the town in a few days to the prince of Parma.

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

Parma. He then laid ſiege to Nieuport, and took it with ſo much facility, as gave ground for a ſuſpicion of treachery on the part of the garriſon. He intended next to have inveſted Oſtend, but having learnt that the prince of Orange had taken particular pains to provide for its ſecurity, he relinquiſhed his deſign; and having turned his arms againſt Dixmude and Meningen, he ſubdued theſe and ſeveral other places with a degree of celerity with which the people of the Netherlands had never been accuſtomed to ſee any military enterpriſes carried on. But his ſucceſs ſerved only to dazzle and confound the confederates, inſtead of opening their eyes to the fatal conſequences of that diſcord which had expoſed ſo great a number of their aſſociates an eaſy prey to the Spaniards. Except augmenting the garriſons of two or three towns, in the preſervation of which ſome of the deputies were perſonally intereſted, no vigorous reſolution of any conſequence was formed by the States, although they held their ſeſſions daily, and were daily alarmed with freſh accounts of ſome new loſs which the confederacy had ſuſtained.

Injurious ſuſpicions againſt the prince of Orange.

ABOUT this time an incident fell out at Antwerp which ſtrongly marks the ſpirit by which the Flemings were actuated on this occaſion. The prince of Orange having given orders for building an additional rampart for the greater ſecurity of the caſtle, ſome ſecret partiſans of Spain took occaſion from thence to inſinuate, that he intended to deliver that fortreſs to the French, and was now preparing it for their reception. The people too eaſily believed this injurious ſuggeſtion; and having taken up arms, they ran tumultuouſly to the caſtle, with a reſolution to expel the garriſon. William immediately preſented himſelf before them. The ſight of a perſon whom they had been ſo long accuſtomed to revere, joined to the evidence

evidence which they received on the ſpot, of the utter falſehood of that report which they had ſo raſhly credited, appeaſed the fury of the greater number, and quelled the tumult. But there were ſome among them more audacious and malignant than the reſt, who called him by the contumelious names of deſerter and traitor of his country. This treatment, ſo unmerited from a people whom he had ſaved from ruin, affected him in the moſt ſenſible manner. He admoniſhed the magiſtrates to take cogniſance of the licentiouſneſs which they had witneſſed; but finding, that, on account of the great number of the guilty, they were afraid to exerciſe their authority, he left Antwerp, and retired into Zealand, after having delivered directions to the magiſtrares in writing, for the government and defence of the city, and nominated the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, chief magiſtrate, or governor, for the enſuing year [q]. He retires to Zealand, July 22.

WILLIAM did not intend by changing the place of his reſidence to withdraw his attention from the ſouthern provinces. He intereſted himſelf as much as ever in their affairs, and meant only to provide for his own ſecurity, and to remove the aſſembly of the States (which was ſummoned to meet at Middleburg) to a ſituation in which the deputies would not be ſo much influenced by the emiſſaries of Spain, nor ſo much diſturbed in their

[q] Of the affection of the maritime provinces towards the prince of Orange, and of the truſt and confidence which they repoſed in him, he received about this time a conſpicuous proof, by a reſolution into which all the cities entered, except two, of creating him earl of Holland and Zealand, with all the powers and privileges which belonged to that ancient dignity. How far the prince himſelf contributed to their forming this reſolution, does not appear from the cotemporary hiſtorians. It did not contradict the treaty between the United States and the duke of Anjou; as, by that treaty, the maritime provinces had only bound themſelves to contribute their ſhare of the public expences. Yet it was matter of ſome obloquy againſt the prince, of whom it was ſaid, that he had not been inattentive to his private intereſt.

BOOK XVIII. 1583.

their deliberations by the tumultuous diſpoſition of the people. He ſtill employed all his intereſt to reconcile the cities of Brabant and Flanders to the continuance of the French troops in the Netherlands. And his endeavours proved effectual with Bruſſels, and ſome other towns which lay neareſt to the enemy; but Ghent, and moſt of the other cities, remained as inflexible as ever, and reſolved never to admit the French within their territories, or to be indebted to them for protection. The States therefore found it neceſſary to give orders for the departure of theſe troops, at a time when every friend of his country, who ſuffered himſelf to reflect on the critical ſituation of the confederacy, thought that the provinces ought rather to have made conceſſions to Anjou and the French king, in order to induce the latter to augment their number. Biron put them on board tranſports at Biervliet, and thence conducted them by ſea to France.

August 27.

THE Spaniards were now at liberty to purſue their conqueſts almoſt without oppoſition. Farneſe immediately formed the blockade of Ipres. Aloſt was ſold to him by an Engliſh and Walloon garriſon for the payment of their arrears. The country of Waes, and the town of Ruplemonde on the Scheld, were ſubdued, and Zutphen too was taken by ſurpriſe; the conſequence of which was, that the Veluwe, an extenſive territory between the Iſſel and the Rhine, was laid open to the incurſions of the enemy.

IN the mean time the ſecret partiſans of Spain were daily increaſing in Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Many perſons had declared themſelves againſt Anjou with ſo much violence, that they dreaded his return. Many were intimidated by the rapidity of the prince of Parma's conqueſts. Some having been intruſted with the public money, were afraid of being called to account for their management of it by the prince of Orange and the

the States, and all of them were allured to their first allegiance by the moderation with which Farneſe treated ſuch as had already ſubmitted to him, and the ſtrict fidelity with which he adhered to his engagements. BOOK XVIII. 1583.

AMONG the perſons, who, prompted by theſe motives, were deſirous of again reducing their country under the Spaniſh government, the prince of Orange had the mortification to find his brother-in-law, count Heremberg. This nobleman, weak, inconſtant, and governed by his wife, who was the prince's ſiſter, but had for ſome time been at variance with her brother, had formed the deſign of delivering the province of Guelderland, of which he had been appointed governor, into the hands of the Spaniards. His plot having been detected before it was ripe for execution, he was ſeized and impriſoned by an order of the States. But having been afterwards ſet at liberty upon his parole, he gave irrefragable proof of his guilt by flying over to the enemy.

Treachery of the prince of Chimai.

THE prince of Chimai's intrigues in Flanders were more ſucceſsful. This nobleman, eldeſt ſon of the duke D'Arſchot, had been educated in the catholic faith, but ſome time before the preſent period, he had openly profeſſed the reformed religion, and attached himſelf with much apparent zeal to the party of the prince of Orange and the States. Conſcious that both his religion and patriotiſm were mere grimace, he had laboured with conſummate artifice to remove any ſuſpicions that might be entertained of his ſincerity. He was perpetually ſurrounded with the proteſtant miniſters, with whom he lived on the moſt familiar terms; and he publiſhed an apology for his conduct, in which, with the higheſt encomiums on the proteſtant faith, he mingled the bittereſt invectives againſt Philip, beſtowing on him every reproachful

BOOK XVIII.

he died in great pain, at Chateau-Thierry, on the 10th of June, 1584, at the age of thirty.

1584.

His character.

SUCH was the concluſion of the reſtleſs life of this prince, whoſe weakneſſes and vices were equally pernicious to himſelf, to the Netherlands, and to France. Improvident of the future, and unable to judge for himſelf, he was a ſlave to the ſelfiſh purpoſes of others, as well as to his own humour and caprice. He ſeems likewiſe to have been incapable of diſcerning the merit or demerit of thoſe who approached him, or the ſoundneſs or folly of the counſels which they offered. He was not void of friendſhip or attachment, and he was active and ambitious; but he was entirely deſtitute of that patience, ſteadineſs, and reſolution, which are neceſſary in carrying on any important enterpriſe; and his conduct towards the United Provinces above related, too clearly juſtifies what was ſaid of him by his ſiſter Margaret, that if fraud and infidelity were to be baniſhed from the earth, there was in him a ſtock ſufficient from which it might be ſoon repleniſhed [p].

Aſſaſſination of the prince of Orange.

YET his death, at the preſent criſis, was a real calamity to the people of the United Provinces; but the memory of it was ſoon effaced by a much greater calamity, which in a few weeks afterwards befell them, in the death of the prince of Orange; againſt whom one of thoſe atrocious attempts, to which Philip's proſcription gave birth, proved at laſt ſucceſsful. It was planned and afterwards executed in Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, a native of Villefans in Burgundy. This man, in order to facilitate his admiſſion into the prince's preſence, had called himſelf the ſon of a French proteſtant, of the name of Guion, who had ſuffered for the ſake

[p] Bentivoglio, 275. D'Avila, l. vi. &c.

ſake of his religion. By this fictitious account of his extraction, joined to an artful affectation of zeal for the reformed religion and the ſervice of the States, he became known to the prince; and William was ſo far deceived by this impoſtor, that he put him into the train of an ambaſſador to the court of France. This mark of confidence did not divert him from his ungenerous deſign; on the contrary, he had no ſooner returned from France than he reſolved to carry it into execution; and he would have done ſo, as he afterwards declared, on his firſt arrival, when he was admitted with letters into the prince's apartment, if he had not neglected to furniſh himſelf with arms. But in a few days after, having returned to the palace, on the pretence of applying for a paſſport, he placed himſelf at the door of that apartment, in which the prince was at dinner with his wife Louiſa de Cologni, and his ſiſter the counteſs of Scwartzenburg, and waited there, with a cloak caſt round him, till they were retiring into another room. The princeſs, obſerving him look confuſed and pale, was grealy alarmed, and enquired what he wanted. He comes for a paſſport, anſwered the prince; when the aſſaſſin, ſtepping forward, ſhot him in the body with a piſtol loaded with three balls. William had time only to ſay, "God have mercy on me, and this afflicted people: I am grievouſly wounded." Immediately after which he fell down, and in a few moments afterwards expired [q]; the princeſs, overwhelmed with anguiſh, looking on; whoſe peculiar fate it was to ſee her ſecond huſband murdered, as her illuſtrious father, and her firſt huſband, the amiable Teligni, had been, in the maſſacre of Paris, ſome years before.

BOOK XVIII. 1584. July 10th.

[q] In the fifty-ſecond year of his age.

BOOK XVIII. 1584.

THE murderer, in the mean time had made his eſcape out of the palace by a back-door, and had almoſt reached the ramparts. He was preparing to throw himſelf into the ditch, which was full of water, in the hopes of being able to ſwim over, when he was overtaken by two of the prince's guards.

UPON his firſt examination he declared, that, ſix years before the preſent period, he had formed the deſign of putting the prince to death; that he had then been deterred from his purpoſe by his friends; that he had again reſumed it, when the king publiſhed his edict of proſcription; that having been in the ſervice of Du Pré, ſecretary to count Manſveldt, he had procured from him ſome blank ſubſcriptions of the count's, which, in order to gain credit, he had delivered to the prince; that he had communicated his deſign to four jeſuits in Treves and Tournay, who aſſured him, that if he ſhould die in the execution of it, he would be deemed a martyr by the church.

To theſe circumſtances, after the torture was applied, he ſubjoined, that the reward promiſed in the proſcription had been his principal motive; that he had made known his purpoſe to the prince of Parma, and had been adviſed by him to converſe with his ſecretary, Chriſtopher Aſſonville; that Aſſonville had deſired him to reflect on the difficulties which he muſt encounter; but had aſſured him, that he could not perform a more acceptable ſervice either to the king or the prince of Parma; that he might depend, with perfect ſecurity, upon receiving the money promiſed in the king's edict of proſcription; but exhorted him repeatedly to deny, in caſe of his being ſeized, that the prince of Parma had approved of his deſign; although the prince, he ſaid, had in reality approved of it, and had conſented to his uſing the blank ſubſcriptions.

WHEN

WHEN he was informed of the ſentence pronounced againſt him, in which it was ordained, that his right hand ſhould be burnt off, and the fleſh of his body torn from the bones with burning pincers, he was at firſt thrown into the moſt dreadful conſternation, and lamented bitterly that he had ſuffered the thirſt of wealth to betray him into an action, which had plunged him into ſuch intolerable miſery; but he ſoon recovered his natural fortitude, and ſaid, that, far from repenting of what he had done, he was conſcious of having merited the favour of God, and was ſure of being admitted into a ſtate of eternal happineſs. And in this temper of mind he remained, both in the interval before his execution, and the time of it, during which he exhibited a degree of compoſure and tranquillity that filled the ſpectators with aſtoniſhment.

THE higheſt encomiums were beſtowed on this deluded wretch by the popiſh eccleſiaſtics in the ſouthern provinces; and in many cities they would have lighted up bonfires, and celebrated public rejoicings, if the conſent of the people could have been obtained; but even the prince of Parma's troops refuſed to join in theſe rejoicings, and openly declared their condemnation of an act, which they found repugnant to the dictates of their hearts, whatever might be ſaid in juſtification of it, on the principles of crooked politics, or the popiſh faith.

THE reader will not need being told of the grief and conſternation, which this melancholy event diffuſed throughout the confederated provinces. Each perſon mourned as for his parent, his guardian, and friend, and felt for the loſs which the State had ſuſtained, as men are wont to feel for their private and domeſtic calamities. Being now deprived of the perſon whoſe wiſdom had, for many years, been their principal ſupport, they

BOOK XVIII. 1584.

they conſidered themſelves as deſtitute and forlorn, and were overwhelmed with the moſt gloomy apprehenſions of their future fate [r].

Character of the prince.

NEVER was any perſon better fitted than the prince of Orange for the difficult ſituation in which he was placed, or better qualified for the arduous taſk of delivering an injured people from the yoke of their oppreſſor. Even his bittereſt enemies allow him to have been poſſeſſed of vigilance, application, penetration, and ſagacity, joined with a peculiar dexterity in governing the inclinations of men, and in conciliating and preſerving their affections. To theſe accompliſhments both the hiſtory of his life, and the teſtimony of the beſt informed hiſtorians, authoriſe us to add the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity, of juſtice and equity, of patience, equanimity, and moderation, which were never perhaps found united in one perſon in ſo eminent a degree [s]. Amidſt all the variety of fortune which he experienced, he was never either elated or depreſſed; but whether the events in which he was intereſted were proſperous or adverſe, he preſerved on all occaſions the ſame compoſure and ſerenity of ſoul.

BY a reſpectable popiſh hiſtorian [t], he is accuſed of avarice and rapacity, yet that author has not been able to produce a ſingle fact to juſtify his charge. It appears not from any hiſtorian, that he was ever guilty of employing his power for the purpoſe of advancing his private intereſt to the prejudice either of individuals or the public. He always declined taking any concern in adminiſtering the finances. He did not even exact payment of the revenue which the States had appointed him; and at his death he left his private affairs ſo

[r] Van Meteren, p. 363. Bentivoglio, lib. xii. Thuanus in hoc anno. [s] Thuani Hiſtoria. [t] Bentivoglio.

ſo much encumbered, that the States found it neceſſary to make proviſion for the ſupport of his widow and children [u]. BOOK XVIII. 1584.

THE ſame hiſtorian has loaded him with the imputation of fraud and hypocriſy, of which however no proof was ever given but general invective, nor a ſingle inſtance of deceit produced by his moſt inveterate enemies. Before his rupture with Philip, he teſtified on all occaſions his diſapprobation of the meaſures that were purſued; and after it, he acted uniformly the part of an open foe. He had no religion, ſay ſome catholic writers, but what his intereſt and ambition dictated. Yet he was decent and irreproachable in his conduct, as well as punctual in diſcharging the functions of that religion which he profeſſed; nor do theſe authors pretend to offer any other evidence to juſtify their ſurmiſe, but that he gave up the catholic religion, in which he had been educated at the court of the emperor, and returned to that with which his mind had been tinctured in his earlieſt infancy. His religion was not indeed of the ſame ſpirit either with that of thoſe whom he forſook, or of many of thoſe whoſe cauſe he adopted. It ſuffered him not to regard either ſpeculative opinions or external rights, as ſufficient ground for haraſſing and butchering thoſe from whom he differed in opinion. But in an age of cruel gloomy ſuperſtition, with which almoſt all the companions of his youth were deeply infected, his religion, conformably to the example and precepts of its author, was mild, moderate, and humane. Nor was it to one ſect of Chriſtians only that his moderation and humanity extended. As he did what he could while he adhered to the catholic faith to put a ſtop to the perſecution of the proteſtants; ſo after he had embraced the reformed

[u] Wickfort, lib. ii.

BOOK XVIII. 1584.

reformed religion, he exerted his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to protect the catholics from violence, and to procure liberty for them to exerciſe their religion as far as was conſiſtent with the public peace. To infer from this conduct, that he had no religion of his own, is going a great deal farther than to aſſert the lawfulneſs of perſecution; it is equivalent to maintaining, that no Chriſtian can be ſincere who can live at peace with thoſe who differ from him in his religious perſuaſion.

IT is not to the purpoſe which the popiſh hiſtorians intended to ſerve by their portraits of William's character, to ſay of him that he was ambitious: in itſelf, ambition merits neither praiſe nor blame, but is culpable or laudable according to the end at which it aſpires, and the means which it employs. But if we judge concerning the character of the prince of Orange according to this criterion, it muſt be impoſſible for perſons ſo oppoſite in their principles, as the catholic and proteſtant hiſtorians, to agree.

IF with the former, we place the rights of all ſovereigns on the ſame foundation, without diſtinguiſhing between an abſolute prince and the ſovereign of a free people, and believe that every prince is, by an indefeaſible and divine right, intitled to exerciſe a deſpotic power over the religion and liberty of his ſubjects; if we believe, that with the permiſſion of the pope, a king may violate his moſt ſolemn oaths, and that the obligations of his ſubjects to obedience remain in force, even after every condition upon which they entered into them has been violated; if with ſuch principles as theſe, we judge of the character of the prince of Orange, it will be difficult not to conſider him as guilty both of perjury and rebellion; and, in this caſe, the moſt favourable verdict that can be paſſed upon his conduct, is to ſay, that it proceeded from a criminal ambition.

BUT

BUT if, on the other hand, we regard the pontiff's pretenſions to the power of ſeting men at liberty from their oaths as abſurd and impious; if we regard the rights of ſubjects as no leſs ſacred than thoſe of kings; if we diſtinguiſh between a prince inveſted with unlimited authority, and one whoſe power is circumſtanced by the fundamental laws of the State; between a prince whoſe right to his dominions is indefeaſible, and one who obtained his ſovereignty only upon certain terms, which he ſwore to fulfil, while his ſubjects engaged to yield their obedience on condition of his fulfilling them; in this caſe, our judgment of William's character will be extremely different from what it was on the former ſuppoſition. We will not be ſatisfied with barely aſſerting his innocence of thoſe crimes of which his enemies have accuſed him, but we will confer upon him the glorious appellations which his countrymen beſtowed, of the father of his country, and the guardian of its liberty and laws, who generouſly ſacrificed his intereſt, eaſe, and ſafety to the public good, and who, firſt by counſel and perſuaſion, and afterwards by force of arms, did more to reſcue his fellow-citizens from oppreſſion, than was ever done in ſuch untoward circumſtances by any patriot in in the world before.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIX.

THE prince of Parma did not neglect the opportunity which the diſtreſs occaſioned the death of the prince of Orange afforded to perſuade the confederated provinces to pt of peace. But their diſtruſt of Philip, attachment to the proteſtant faith, and the r cauſes mentioned above, ſtill retained their ence, and rendered them averſe from any re- ilement with a prince againſt whom their in- ation was more inflamed than ever, by the injury which they had lately ſuffered. They d attend to nothing now but how to proſecute war with vigour, or to teſtify their reſpect for nemory of the prince of Orange.

Book XIX. 1584. Temper and diſpoſition of the States.

WILLIAM's eldeſt ſon, the count of Buren, ſtill a priſoner in Spain; and his ſecond, prince rice[a], was engaged in the ſtudy of literature and

Prince Maurice.

[a] grandſon, by the mother's ſide, of the celebrated elector of y of the ſame name.

BOOK XIX. 1584.

and ſcience at the univerſity of Leyden. On this young man, who, at the time of his father's death, was only eighteen years old, of great hopes, and whoſe actions afterwards exceeded the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen, the States beſtowed the greateſt part of the dignities which which his father had enjoyed. Beſides creating him high-admiral of the Union, they conferred upon him the government of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. And, in order to ſupply his want of experience, and ſecure his being early inſtructed in the military art, they appointed count Hohenloe, the moſt accompliſhed officer in their ſervice, to be his lieutenant or deputy, till he ſhould attain to greater maturity of years and underſtanding.

Reduction of Bruſſels, Ghent, &c.

FROM this conduct of the States, which proved that William's aſcendant over them had not terminated with his life, Farneſe perceived that it would be impoſſible to bring the war to a concluſion in any other way than by force of arms. Diſmiſſing therefore all thoughts of peace, he proceeded with great activity in the military operations which he had begun in Brabant and Flanders; and his ſucceſs was in proportion to the prudence and vigilance which he exerted. Beſides the towns above mentioned, he had lately acquired Vilvorden and Dendremonde, but he had not yet reduced Ghent, Bruſſels, Mechlin, or Antwerp. To have proceeded ſeparately againſt each of theſe places in the ordinary way of ſieges, would have protracted the war to an exceſſive length. Inſtead of that method, he bethought himſelf of another, which was ſuggeſted by the ſituation of the ſeveral towns, and the nature of their reſources. This was to make himſelf maſter of the banks of the rivers and canals on which they ſtood, while he ſent out flying parties of horſe to ſcour the adjacent country. And thus he not only put a ſtop to their trade, without which they

uld not ſubſiſt, but cut off all of them but p from every ſort of communication with laces. For ſeveral months however the in- ts declined entering into any terms of ac- dation. But when they conſidered that, ie were obliged to draw off his troops by roach of a ſuperior army, they muſt ſoon ced to the laſt extremity, their reſolution they began to liſten more patiently to the tions which the ſecret partiſans of Spain ily ſounding in their ears; and, at length, them as were ſituated in the more interior irſt Ghent, and afterwards Bruſſels and , reſolved to return under the Spaniſh go- nt, upon conditions to which Farneſe had, erent occaſions, ſhewn himſelf willing to

heſe conditions, the moſt important were owing: "That the people ſhould engage owledge no other ſovereign but the king n: That no religion but the Roman ca- ould be permitted, but that the proteſtants e allowed to remain in the Netherlands for ars, in order to diſpoſe of their effects: ſum of money ſhould be paid for defray- expences of the war: That all paſt of- ſhould be forgiven, and all the antient nd privileges of the inhabitants reſtored intained inviolate."

lfilling his part of theſe conditions, Far- t only acted with ſtrict fidelity, but diſ- degree of lenity and moderation that was ly calculated to promote his views. Of of three hundred thouſand crowns, to he people of Ghent conſented in their f ſurrender, he demanded only two hun- ouſand. And although in his act of in- ſix perſons, more obnoxious than the d been excepted, he required from them only

BOOK XIX. 1584.

only a pecuniary fine. He was likewiſe at all times willing to liſten to the complaints of the proteſtants, and to redreſs their grievances [b].

Siege of Antwerp.

ALL the conſiderable towns in Brabant were now ſubdued, except Antwerp. The prince had early formed the reſolution of laying ſiege to that important city; and ſome time before his acquiſition of Ghent and Bruſſels, he had taken meaſures for beginning it. But in order to ſecure ſucceſs, it was neceſſary that his utmoſt ſkill and ſtrength ſhould be exerted; and he now applied himſelf to the proſecution of his deſign, with all the anxiety, zeal, and induſtry, which an object of the higheſt conſequence deſerved.

ANTWERP was at this time not only the richeſt and moſt ſplendid, but likewiſe the ſtrongeſt city in the Netherlands. As it lies extended along the banks of the Scheld, and the confederates ſtill maintained their ſuperiority at ſea; it was thought to be ſufficiently ſecured on one ſide by a ſtrong wall which ran parallel to the river; and on the other ſides it was fortified by ramparts of extraordinary ſtrength, and a ditch filled with water, of ſuch depth and breadth, as in the opinion of thoſe times rendered it almoſt impregnable.

SUCH was the judgment formed of it by the prince of Parma, and on this account he did not intend to attempt reducing it by ſtorm, but to have recourſe to the ſlower method of blockade, which he knew muſt ſooner or later prove ſucceſsful.

ON the ſide towards the land, he found it extremely eaſy to render the blockade complete, as the States had no army able to contend with him in the field, and all the neighbouring towns were in

[b] Meteren, p. 368.

in his poſſeſſion. But theſe circumſtances he perceived would be of little advantage, while the beſieged remained maſters of the Scheld; and therefore, to deprive them of this reſource, was the great object to which all his operations, during this celebrated ſiege, were directed. 1584.

THE people of Antwerp had penetrated into his deſign, and had omitted nothing in their power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. With this view they had conſtructed two forts, one on each ſide of the river, about three miles below the town; to one of which they gave the name of Lieffkenſoech, and to the other that of Lillo. Farneſe judged it neceſſary to begin his operations with reducing theſe forts. He ſent the marquis de Roubais againſt Lieffkenſoech, which ſtood on the Flanders ſide of the Scheld, while Mondrangone laid ſiege to Lillo. Roubais found no great difficulty in fulfilling the general's intention with regard to Lieffkenſoech. But Mondragone's attempt on the fort of Lillo was not attended with the ſame ſucceſs. This fort was valiantly defended by colonel Balfour, a Scotch officer of diſtinguiſhed merit, and Teligny, the worthy ſon of the brave La Noue. After battering the ramparts for ſeveral days, Mondragone attempted to take the fort by ſtorm, but was repulſed; and in his repulſe, and a ſally which the garriſon had made ſome days before, he ſuſtained the loſs of no leſs than two thouſand men.

UPON receiving intelligence of this diſaſter, the prince of Parma, after ſettling the government of the towns which he had lately conquered, came himſelf to view the ſcene of action. He found that all the time and pains and blood which had been ſpent in the ſiege of this fort had been miſapplied; and perceived, that as it ſtood at ſome diſtance from the banks, it did not materially interfere

BOOK XIX. terfere with his plan for putting a ſtop to the navigation of their river.

1584. FOR this reaſon, inſtead of puſhing the immediatere duction of it, he was ſatisfied with blockading it on the land-ſide, ſo as to prevent the excurſions of the garriſons.

The prince of Parma's plan for blocking up the Scheld. HAVING given inſtructions for this purpoſe, he called a council of his general officers, and laid before them his project for blockading up the Scheld, by building a bridge over it, to intercept the communication between the beſieged city and the maritime provinces; an enterpriſe which, had it failed, would have expoſed him to deriſion, but which ſhewed the boldneſs of his genius, and has contributed more than almoſt any other of his military atchievements, to raiſe his character to that exalted rank which it holds in the annals of hiſtory.

BY moſt of the officers this propoſal was regarded as chimerical. For where, ſaid they, can materials be found for ſo great an undertaking? And even if they ſhould be found, yet how is it poſſible to tranſport them hither? By land-carriage, it is utterly impracticable; nor would it ſeem to be much eaſier by water, while the enemy poſſeſſes ſo great a ſuperiority in naval force. Beſides that, no beams, they obſerved, were of ſufficient length to reach the bottom of the river.

To build a bridge of ſhips, they thought, would be equally impracticable, becauſe he did not poſſeſs ſo great a number as was neceſſary, and it would be impoſſible to collect them from different places, in the face of a vigilant enemy, of ſuperior merit and ſtrength. And even allowing it were poſſible, either with beams or ſhips to conſtruct ſuch a bridge as was projected, yet it would be quickly deſtroyed by the ice, or by the tides and ſtorms, or by the enemy.

BUT

BUT Farneſe, conſcious of reſources in the fertility of his genius, of which his officers could form no idea, was not diſcouraged by theſe obſtacles. He conſidered that the meaſure on which he had reſolved was the only one by which Antwerp could be reduced, and that till he ſhould reduce it, and thereby get poſſeſſion of a naval force, the towns lately acquired (which uſually carried on their trade by the way of Antwerp, muſt ſuffer the greateſt inconveniencies, and it would be in vain for him to attempt the conqueſt of the maritime provinces.

DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, he proceeded inſtantly to make the preparations neceſſary for executing his deſign. Having firſt ſounded the river, and meaſured its breadth in different places, he found, that between the village of Ordam in Brabant, and Caloo in Flanders, it was neither ſo deep nor ſo broad, as above or below. At this place therefore he reſolved to build the bridge. And he began with raiſing two ſtrong forts, oppoſite to each other on the different ſides of the river, beſides ſeveral redoubts, on which, as well as on the forts, he planted a great number of cannon, to defend the bridge when finiſhed, and to protect the workmen while engaged in building it.

IN the mean time he ranſacked all the country round for materials, and he had the good fortune to find at Dendremonde and Ghent, great quantities of every thing which he ſtood in need of. If he could have conveyed his materials down the Scheld to Caloo, a great expence of labour and time would have been ſaved. This he repeatedly attempted; but he ſoon found that it was impoſſible to eſcape the vigilance of the citizens, who being directed in all their operations by St. Aldegonde, lay in wait for his boats near Antwerp, and either took or deſtroyed them.

BOOK XIX. 1584.

IN order to avoid the repetition of this diſaſter, Farneſe made, on the Flanders ſide near Borcht, which ſtands higher than Antwerp, a large cut in the dike of the Scheld, by which he laid all the neck of land between Borcht and Caloo under water; opening an egreſs for the water by another cut near Caloo, and tranſporting his apparatus for the bridge acroſs the inundation. This expedient rendered it unneceſſary for his boats to paſs by Antwerp, and they likewiſe arrived ſooner at their deſtined port.

BUT St. Aldegonde having built a redoubt on the Brabant ſide, oppoſite to the cut at Borcht, and ſtationed ſome armed veſſels to cruize there, ſoon rendered the paſſage as difficult as before. Farneſe was therefore obliged to adopt another expedient, much more laborious than the former; but which he knew would certainly be attended with ſucceſs. This was to dig a canal fifteen Italian miles in length, to join the inundation juſt now mentioned, with a little river which falls into the Scheld at Ghent. That he might finiſh this arduous undertaking the more ſpeedily, he fixed his head-quarters at Beveren, in the neighbourhood of the canal, and was perpetually preſent himſelf, exhorting and encouraging the workmen; and ſometimes taking the ſpade and pick-axe into his own hand. The work was finiſhed with wonderful expedition, and fully anſwered his expectation. As the enemy could have no acceſs either to the canal, or the river with which it communicated, he conveyed all neceſſary materials and engines from Ghent without oppoſition and immediately afterwards began the conſtruction of the bridge.

Deſcription of the bridge

THE two extremities of this edifice were formed of huge beams, driven into the bottom of the river by the force of engines, and ſtrongly bound together by other tranſverſeor croſs beams. This part

f the work; [illegible] facades or [illegible] 1588.
m each ſide of the river towards the middle
as far as the depth of the water would
which on the Flanders ſide was two hun-
ret, and on the other one hundred. There
s were only three feet broad, except
ls the two extremities, near the mouth of the
where their breadth being increaſed to
eet, two forts were erected upon them, and
ed with artillery. The whole was covered
with ſtrong planks, and a parapet five feet
of the thickeſt planks, was raiſed upon it for
curity of the ſoldiers. A row of piles was
riven deep into the bottom of the river, pa-
o each ſide of the facades, at the diſtance of
feet from them, and ſtrongly faſtened to the
of which *they* were compoſed. Beſides
another row of long beams, pointed with
as placed horizontally a little above the ſur-
the water; ſtretching out to a conſiderable
from the bridge on both ſides, ſo as to
t dangerous for ſhips to approach.

this part of the work, the navigation of the
was conſiderably ſtraitened; but as there
open ſpace in the middle, between the heads
ſtacades, of more than one thouſand two
d and fifty feet, the enemy's ſhips taking
tage ſometimes of the night, and ſometimes
wind and tide, continued, though not with-
s, to paſs and repaſs as formerly; and the
s ſtill abundantly ſupplied with proviſions.
e having from the beginning intended to
the intermediate ſpace with ſhips, had with
lifficulty collected two and thirty, which he
to be a ſufficient number. Theſe veſſels,
e maſts had been taken out, were placed
eir ſides parallel to each other, at the di-
of about twenty feet. They were ſtrongly
d together by chains, and were fixed in

BOOK XIX.

1584. their places by anchors at both ends, in ſuch a manner that the ſailors could ſhorten or lengthen the cables, as the tide either roſe or fell. Over the intermediate ſpaces, ſtrong beams went from one ſhip to another. Above theſe were laid planks; and the ſame ſort of parapet was erected, as that which was raiſed on the ſtacados. Thirty ſoldiers and four ſailors were put on board each ſhip, and all the ſhips were planted with artillery.

FOR the greater ſecurity of this part of the work, a flota one thouſand two hundred feet long was conſtructed of barks, bound together in the ſame manner as the ſhips of which the bridge was formed, with the ſame ſort of beams pointed with iron, reſembling a file of pikes, ſtretching from that end of the barks which lay next to the enemy. Theſe barks were filled with empty caſks, to prevent them from being ſunk, and were fixed in their place by anchors. Of this kind of flota, two were conſtructed, conſiſting each of two and thirty barks, one above, and the other below the bridge, at the diſtance of two hundred yards.

1585.

THIS ſtupendous work [e] furniſhed employment to the prince of Parma's fleet and army for more than half a year. Without a fleet of conſiderable ſtrength it could not have been executed, and the procuring of this fleet in ſuch diſadvantageous circumſtances, was one of the many ſtriking proofs which Farneſe exhibited on this occaſion, of that extraordinary activity and enterpriſe by which his character is ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed. With infinite labour and difficulty he had equipped, at Ghent and Dunkirk, forty armed veſſels, and put them under the command of the marquis de Roubais; who being well ſupported by the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river, protected the workmen,

[e] It was finiſhed February 1585.

workmen, in ſpite of the moſt vigorous efforts which the beſieged could make to interrupt them. Book XIX. 1585.

FARNESE however would not probably have ſucceeded in his enterpriſe, if the united States had exerted themſelves with vigour, proportioned either to that of the enemy, or to the importance of the prize conteſted. It now appeared how great was the loſs which the confederacy had ſuſtained in the death of the prince of Orange. By William's ſuperior rank, wiſdom, and experience, ſome turbulent leaders had been reſtrained, who, after his death, indulged their factious, intereſted ſpirit, without regard to the pernicious conſequences which might enſue. Among theſe was Treſlong, whom the States had appointed commander of the fleet, deſtined for the relief of Antwerp. This man, whether from treachery or from private reſentment, paid no regard to his inſtructions; but on different pretences, at firſt delayed putting the orders of the States in execution, and at laſt told them that he would not ſail, unleſs ſome perſons with whom he had quarrelled were removed from the magiſtracy. On this occaſion, prince Maurice called an aſſembly of the States of the province, diſmiſſed Treſlong from his employment, and put him under arreſt. The command of the fleet was then given to count Hohenloe; but the time in which its operations might have proved effectual, was paſt; and the bridge, with all its fortifications, as above deſcribed, was almoſt finiſhed.

Conſternation of the beſieged.

No words can expreſs the aſtoniſhment which it excited in the minds of the beſieged. At the commencement of the work, they had regarded it rather as an object of deriſion, than as fitted to excite any ſerious apprehenſion or alarm. Their anxiety and terror now were in proportion to their former confidence and ſecurity. They ſaw an

BOOK XIX. 1585.

an entire ſtop put to their trade in every quarter. They already felt many of the inconveniencies of a ſiege. Their imaginations repreſented, in the moſt dreadful light, the calamities which they were about to ſuffer; and perſons of all ranks began to talk of the neceſſity of preventing them in time, by making their peace with the enemy. But they were diverted from forming any fixed reſolution by St. Aldegonde, who employed all his eloquence and addreſs to rouſe their abhorrence of the Spaniſh yoke, and to inſpire them with the hopes of being able to raiſe the ſiege.

Speech of St. Aldegonde.

"IT is not ſurpriſing, ſaid he, in an aſſembly of thoſe who held public offices in the town, that many of our fellow-citizens ſhould tremble at the proſpect of thoſe hardſhips which uſually attend a long continued ſiege. But while we caſt our eyes forward to theſe, let us reflect on the calamities which we have reaſon to dread from a ſurrender. We have ſeen, within theſe few years, two memorable ſieges, the ſiege of Haerlem, and that of Leyden. The people of Haerlem, rather than ſubmit to the laſt extremities, choſe to throw themſelves on the mercy of the Spaniards. But how bitterly did they repent of their having done ſo? And how much better had it been to have fallen in the field of battle, than to ſuffer, as ſo great a number of the braveſt did, that ignominious death to which they were doomed by the cruel Spaniard? The inhabitants of Leyden, on the other hand, reſolved rather to die, than to deliver themſelves up to ſuch a perfidious enemy; and the conſequence of their adhering to this reſolution was, that the ſiege was raiſed, and a period put to all their miſeries. Can we heſitate in deciding which of theſe examples we ought to follow? Is not death more eligible, than ſubmiſſion

to

to the dominion of an enemy, from whom we have endured ſuch intolerable outrage?

1585.

"If this city ſhall fall under the yoke of theſe oppreſſors, can we doubt that the citadel will be reſtored, and with it all the tyranny which they were wont to exerciſe? Will not our religion be proſcribed, and the inquiſition eſtabliſhed? This illuſtrious city will then become a colony of Spaniards. Her commerce will be ruined, and her inhabitants obliged to wander in ſearch of places of abode, forlorn and indigent. But why ſhould I thus deſcribe the diſaſters of a ſurrender? There is ſtill no reaſon for deſpair. It is impoſſible that this bridge can ſtand long againſt the efforts which we will make for its deſtruction. Let us not therefore be wanting to ourſelves; but with a fixt, unalterable purpoſe, let us embrace the glorious alternative of liberty or death."

By theſe exhortations, joined to the reſpect in which his character was held, St. Aldegonde gained over the citizens to a perfect conformity with his ſentiments; and perſuaded them to renew the oath which they had formerly taken, never to return under the dominion of the king of Spain. An edict was then publiſhed, prohibiting all perſons, under the ſevereſt penalties, from liſtening to any terms of accommodation that might be offered; after which they proceeded with redoubled ardour to put in practice ſuch expedients as had been deviſed for the demolition of the bridge.

Preparations of the beſieged for demoliſhing the bridge.

In order to effectuate this, they had been for ſome time paſt employed in preparing fire-ſhips, under the direction of Giambelli, a celebrated Italian engineer, who appears to have been the author of this invention. They were formed of the thickeſt planks, and had each of them a mine or chamber

BOOK XIX. 1585.

chamber in the middle. This mine was built in the ſtrongeſt manner, and filled with gunpowder, and with rugged ſtones, bullets, and ſuch other weighty materials, rammed hard and cloſe, on purpoſe to increaſe the reſiſtance, and augment the force of the exploſion.

THE citizens laboured at the ſame time in conſtructing a flat-bottomed veſſel of extraordinary ſtrength and ſize, with which they intended to attack the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river. This enormous machine was more properly a floating caſtle than a ſhip, and the town's people had, on account of the ſanguine expectations which they conceived from it, given it the name of the "end of the war."

WHILE the people of Antwerp were thus employed, the confederates who lay at Lillo, under count Hohenloe, made a vigorous attack on the fort of Lieffkenſoech, and compelled the garriſon to ſurrender. From Lieffkenſoech, they proceeded againſt another fort of the name of St. Antony, which they likewiſe reduced with the ſame facility. When intelligence was brought to the prince of Parma of their deſcent, he ſet out with a detachment of his army to oppoſe their progreſs, but both the forts had ſurrendered before he could arrive. Being enraged againſt the commanders of theſe forts, on account of their having made too feeble a reſiſtance, he ordered them both to be beheaded on the dike of the Scheld, in ſight of the enemy. He was the more concerned for the loſs of Lieffkenſoech, as it gave the enemy free poſſeſſion of the navigation of the river below the bridge, and thereby tended to facilitate the execution of any deſign which they might form for its deſtruction.

AT firſt he imagined that the ſolicitude which the confederates had ſhewn for the recovery of Lieffkenſoech,

Lieffkenſoech, had proceeded from their intending to make an attempt upon the lower ſide of the bridge. But it ſoon appeared, that their only view was to ſecond the operations of the beſieged, and to complete that ruin which they expected the exploſion of the fire-ſhips would certainly produce. BOOK XIX. 1585.

THESE veſſels were ſent down the river, with a favourable wind and tide, on the 4th of April. The Spaniards who had got ſome imperfect intelligence of their nature, were filled with the moſt anxious expectations. They knew them to be fire-ſhips from their unuſual appearance, and were variouſly affected, according to the various conjectures which they formed of the effects that were about to be produced. But they were all alike prompted by curioſity, to witneſs a ſpectacle which had never been exhibited in any ſiege before. And the banks of the river, the forts and redoubts, and even the bridge itſelf were crowded with ſpectators.

OF ſeveral veſſels which Giambelli had prepared, only two were conſtructed in the manner above mentioned, the one of which contained in its mine ſix thouſand pounds of gun-powder, and the other, ſeven thouſand five hundred pounds. One of them ran aſhore before it reached the bridge. But the other being more fortunate in its direction, was driven towards that part of the bridge, where the ſtacado on the Flanders ſide was united to the ſhips. A number of the Spaniſh officers and ſoldiers had the courage to jump on board, in order to extinguiſh the train, which Giambelli had contrived in ſuch a manner, as to require an hour before it could reach the mine. The prince of Parma had advanced a little way on the ſtacado, to wait for the event; but was prevailed upon by his officers to retire. He had ſcarcely

Book XIX. 1585.

ſcarcely entered the neighbouring fort, when the exploſion happened, with a noiſe more dreadful than the loudeſt thunder. A ſudden darkneſs overſpread the region round. The ground ſhook as in an earthquake. The river, diſturbed in its courſe, was thrown over its dikes, and poured into the fort of Caloo with inconceivable violence. Not only ſuch of the Spaniards periſhed as had ventured to go on board the fire-ſhips, but all thoſe too who were upon the bridge, and many of thoſe who ſtood upon the banks of the river. No language can deſcribe the horror of the ſcene which preſented itſelf after the ſmoke was diſpelled. The bridge, and both the ſurface and the banks of the river, were covered with the dead and wounded; whoſe bodies were disfigured in a thouſand hideous ways by the ſmoke and flames, and the various inſtruments of deſtruction with which the ſhip was ſtored. Eight hundred men were killed, and a great number maimed and dangerouſly wounded. Among the killed were many officers of diſtinction; but no perſon periſhed ſo deeply lamented by the prince of Parma, as the marquis de Roubais, the general of the horſe; a nobleman diſtinguiſhed by many ſhining accompliſhments; brave, active, and expert both in the arts of peace and war; once an enemy of Spain; but who, prompted by jealouſy of the prince of Orange, had abandoned the cauſe of liberty, and ſhewn for ſome years paſt no leſs zeal in reducing his countrymen under the Spaniſh yoke, than he had diſcovered formerly in aſſerting their independence. It was not only loſſes of this kind which the prince of Parma ſuſtained on this occaſion. The bridge likewiſe ſuffered conſiderable damage. Six of the ſhips which compoſed the middle part of it, were burnt; ſome were forced from their ſtations, and others turned with their keels uppermoſt, and daſhed to pieces.

IF the confederates had improved the opportunity which this havock afforded them, the whole work might have been demoliſhed; and in that caſe, a prediction of the prince of Orange would have been fulfilled, that if Farneſe with ſo ſmall an army ſhould undertake the ſiege of Antwerp, it would prove his ruin. But, as was obſerved by the old experienced Mondragone, it appeared from many circumſtances in the conduct of the confederates in this ſiege, that the prince of Orange was dead.

BY ſome ſtrange fatality, or ſome unaccountable inadvertence, or, as one hiſtorian inſinuates, by a miſunderſtanding between the magiſtrates of Antwerp and the admiral of the Antwerp fleet, thoſe fireſhips which had coſt ſo great an expence of money, ingenuity, time, and pains, were ſent down the Scheld before any concert had been formed with the confederates at Lillo; who were therefore unprepared to ſecond that mighty effort which had been made for opening the navigation of the river.—Giambelli, though extremely ſolicitous to know the ſucceſs of his invention, remained entirely ignorant of it for two days. A large reward was offered to thoſe who ſhould venture to go down the river forintelligence. But none had courage to advance far enough to make any certain diſcovery, nor did the citizens know any thing of what had happened till the third night after, when they received information of it by a meſſenger from count Hohenloe.

THE prince of Parma was in the mean time employed in repairing the bridge, and he exerted himſelf with ſo much activity and vigour, that it was made as ſtrong as ever before the beſieged were acquainted with the damage which it had ſuſtained. His late experience ſuggeſted to him an alteration in the work, which was found afterwards of great importance: this was to remove the flotas, and to form that part of the bridge which was compoſed of

Book XIX. 1585.

of the ſhips, in ſuch a manner that, in caſe the enemy ſhould repeat their experiment, it might be opened at different places to let the fire-ſhips paſs through and continue their courſe down the river.

Other attempts of the beſieged.

THE ſpirits of the beſieged were ſtill ſupported by the ſanguine hopes which they had conceived from that enormous veſſel, which they called the end of the war. This huge machine was entirely the work of the citizens, and was not approved of either by Giambelli or St. Aldegonde. It was found, on trial, too unwieldy to anſwer the purpoſe for which it was intended. After planting the lower part of it with cannon, and filling the higher part with muſketteers, they made an attack upon one of the Spaniſh redoubts; but they failed in their attempt, and the machine itſelf was ſo much ſhattered, as to be rendered almoſt unfit for future uſe.

AT Giambelli's deſire, the ſenate of Antwerp had again recourſe to their firſt expedient of fire-ſhips; but the enemy having learnt the nature of theſe machines, employed different means to render them ineffectual. They laid hold of them as ſoon as they appeared, and ſometimes extinguiſhed the trains, and ſometimes dragged the veſſels to the banks of the river, or through the openings in the bridge.

GIAMBELLI then bethought himſelf of another device, from which he believed that ſome more certain effect might be expected. Having bound together in one compacted body fifteen ſhips armed with pointed beams, and with ſcythes or falchions, for cutting the chains and cordage of the bridge, he ſent them accompanied with fire-ſhips down the river when the wind and tide were combined and favourable. The ſhock which this contrivance produced was very great, but through the wiſe precaution which Farneſe had taken, by making

making the openings juſt now mentioned, together with the unexampled boldneſs of his ſoldiers in laying hold of the fire-ſhips, the bridge received no greater damage than could be quickly repaired. Some other expedients were propoſed by Giambelli, but the ſenate was deterred from adopting them, partly by the expence and time requiſite to prepare his machines, and partly by the difficulty of mariners and ſoldiers willing to expoſe themſelves to the danger with which the putting his inventions in practice would have been attended.

1585.

THERE remained now for the beſieged only one reſource, to which, if they had given proper attention in the beginning, all the anxiety, expence and labour, which they beſtowed in attempting to demoliſh the bridge, might have been ſaved. In order to form a clear conception of what will be ſaid on this intereſting part of the preſent ſubject, it is neceſſary to remember that the ground on the north ſide of the Scheld, between Antwerp and Lillo, is much lower than the reſt of the country, and were it not for the dyke of the river would every tide be overflowed. This ground is generally covered with water in many places, but in other parts it furniſhes paſture for a great number of cattle with which the Antwerp market is ſupplied. Through the middle of this plain there runs from the village of Couveſtein, where the country begins to riſe, to the great dyke of the Scheld, a ſmaller dyke, called the Counterdike of Couveſtein, which had been formed to ſerve for a road or cauſeway. The confederates at Lillo could, by opening the dyke of the Scheld, lay all the ground under water between Lillo and the counterdyke, while the beſieged could, with the ſame facility, introduce the river into that part of the plain which lies between the counterdyke and Antwerp; and thus, by breaking down the counterdyke, the innundations on each

The counterdyke of Couveſtein.

BOOK XIX. each ſide of it could be united, and a free navigation opened between Antwerp and Lillo.

1585. THE reader will eaſily perceive, that while the bridge ſtood, the fate of Antwerp depended entirely on the counterdyke; and that, in caſe the confederates could make themſelves maſters of it, they might bid defiance to the prince of Parma, and without anxiety ſuffer him to retain poſſeſſion of the bridge. If, in the beginning, they had believed it practicable for him to execute his deſign of blocking up the river, they could have fortified themſelves on the counterdyke in ſuch a manner, that with the aſſiſtance of the inundation, they would have baffled his moſt vigorous efforts to expel them. But they were deceived by the contempt which they entertained of his intended enterpriſe, and did not perceive their error in neglecting to occupy this important ſtation till it was too late. The prince of Parma had already ſeized upon it, and taken every neceſſary precaution againſt the attempts which he doubted not they would ſooner or later make to wreſt it from him. He committed the charge of defending it to two of his moſt vigilant officers, Mondragone and Manſveldt. He ordered it to be made broader and higher than it was before. He ſtrengthened it with piles of wood driven into it tranſverſely, and he erected ſeveral forts upon it, beſides planting redoubts on the dyke of the Scheld, with which he intended to take the enemy in flank, in caſe they ſhould venture to approach.

THE confederates, however, deſpairing of being able to demoliſh the bridge, reſolved, if poſſible, to diſlodge him from the counterdyke. And their firſt attempt, after laying the ground on each ſide of it under water, was made in the beginning of May by count Hohenloe. That general had formed the plan of this attack in concert with St. Aldegonde, who was to have cooperated with him, and had agreed to ſet ſail with the

the Antwerp fleet immediately after lighting up, on a tower in the city, three fires, as a ſignal of his departure. By a miſtake of the perſon to whom the charge of this ſignal was committed, it was exhibited before the time, and through this untoward accident count Hohenloe was left alone in the execution of his enterprize. He conducted it however with vigour, and laid one of the forts and a part of the counterdyke in ruins; after which he thought it prudent to retire, and to reſerve his forces unimpaired till the beſieged ſhould be ready to ſecond his operations. This unfortunate attempt ſerved only to rouſe the prince of Parma to greater vigilance and exertion. Agreeably to his conjectures, he ſaw that the principal efforts of the enemy would henceforth be directed againſt the counterdyke: and, therefore, he not only applied himſelf with diligence to repair the damage which it had ſuſtained in the late attack, but viſited every day all the redoubts and forts, and reinforced the garriſons with choſen troops taken from the ſeveral nations of which his army was compoſed. BOOK XIX. 1585.

THE confederates at Lillo, and the people of Antwerp, were in the mean time indefatigable in making preparations for another attack. St. Aldegonde ſtood almoſt ſingle in his opinion on this occaſion, and endeavoured to convince his countrymen, that it would be eaſier for them to deſtroy the bridge itſelf, than to make themſelves maſters of the counterdyke, in oppoſition to an enemy ſo much upon their guard, and ſo ſtrongly fortified. But having, ſince their diſappointment with the regard to the effect of the fire-ſhips, been accuſtomed to conſidered the bridge as impregnable, they were deaf to whatever he could advance upon the ſubject, and he was obliged to concur (which he did with all his wonted activity) in the execution of that deſign of which the majority approved.

TOWARDS

BOOK XIX.

1585. Battle of the counterdyke.

TOWARDS the end of May every thing was prepared both at Antwerp and Lillo that was thought neceſſary to ſecure ſucceſs; and, on the 26th of that month, count Hohenloe, according to concert with St. Aldegonde, ſailed from Lillo early in the morning, with a ſquadron of more than a hundred ſhips, having on board a numerous body of troops, under the command of the moſt experienced officers n the United Provinces [d]. He reſolved to make his attack at the broadeſt part of the counterdyke, between the two middle forts, called the fort of the Paliſades and fort St. George, where there was room to intrench his troops. In order to facilitate his landing, he ſent before him four veſſels reſemblng fire-ſhips, with ſome trains of gunpowder, to which the ſoldiers, who were concealed within, ſet fire. This device produced the deſigned effect. The Spaniards taking the ſmoke and flame for the forerunners of an exploſion, retired haſtily from that part of the dyke to which they ſaw the veſſels approaching. The confederates in the mean time advanced, and landed between ſeven and eight hundred men. The Spaniards ſoon diſcovered the artifice by which they had been deceived, and immediately returned to the ſtation which they had left. An obſtinate and bloody action enſued, while the contending parties were ſupported on the one ſide by the cannon of the fleet, and on the other by thoſe of the forts on the counterdyke.

IN the midſt of this conteſt St. Aldegonde arrived with the fleet from Antwerp, which was nearly as numerous as that from Lillo. The confederates being thus powerfully reinforced, kept poſſeſſion of the ground which they had gained, and while ſome of them fought, others were employed in cutting the counterdyke, and in raiſing

[d] Juſtin de Naſſau, Iſelſtein, Fremin, Morgan, and Balfour.

ing temporary defences of piles of wood, and sacks of earth and wool, against the fire of the enemy. The combatants being cooped up in a narrow space, every stroke and shot did execution. But they received continual supplies of fresh men from the ships and forts, and their courage was superior to every danger. Both St. Aldegonde and Hohenloe mingled with the combatants, and by their example and exhortations nourished the desperate and intrepid ardour of the soldiers. "This is the last difficulty, cried St. Aldegonde, which remains to be surmounted. Persist as you have begun, and Antwerp, that bulwark of our confederacy, will soon be delivered. Your liberty, your future safety, and every thing dear and sacred, depend on the success of your present enterprise. We have now no choice left but victory or death." BOOK XIX. 1585.

THE Spanish generals were at no less pains to animate *their* troops. Both Mondragone and Mansveldt, though worn out with age and the fatigues of a long continued warfare, displayed on this occasion the utmost intrepidity. Notwithstanding their most vigorous exertions, the confederates still maintained their ground. They twice repulsed the Italians and Spaniards. Of the materials which they had brought along with them, they raised a considerable bulwark against the enemy's artillery. They made several openings in the counterdyke, and were so confident of victory, that St. Aldegonde and count Hohenloe, after assigning to the several officers their respective stations, set sail for Antwerp in a ship which had passed through one of these openings, and entered the city in triumph. Their design, it is said, was to consult with the magistrates concerning some future measures which they thought necessary

BOOK XIX.

1585. The confederates are defeated.

THE Spaniards, not ſatisfied with this victory, flung themſelves from the counterdyke, and purſued the fugitives as far as the depth of the water would allow. No quarter was given to thoſe whom they overtook. The counterdyke, and the water on both ſides of it, were covered with the ſlain, and many fell with diſhonourable wounds, who for ſeveral hours together had given inconteſtible evidence of the moſt heroic valour. The number of the killed on the ſide of the confederates, amounted to two thouſand five hundred, and that on the other ſide, to one thouſand. The recovery of the counterdyke was not the only advantage which Farneſe derived from his preſent victory: he likewiſe got poſſeſſion of more than thirty of the enemy's ſhips, with all the artillery and engineers that were on board. Immediately after which he proceeded to fill up the breaches in the counterdyke, and to repair the damage which his fortifications had ſuſtained.

THE beſieged, being thus cruelly diſappointed in their hopes of deliverance, were overwhelmed with conſternation and deſpair. By their late great exertions, their internal reſources were exhauſted, and they had little proſpect of any foreign aid that could arrive in time to prevent the neceſſity of ſurrendering. They had not indeed as yet experienced thoſe intolerable miſeries which attend on famine in a place beſieged; but they foreſaw that ere long theſe miſeries muſt certainly overtake them, and they conſidered, that to delay making peace with the enemy, could only ſerve to increaſe the difficulty of obtaining favourable terms. Such were the ſentiments of great numbers of every condition, notwithſtanding the ſolemn engagement under which they had lately come, of never ſubmitting to the Spaniſh government. St. Aldegonde, and the other magiſtrates, laboured to remove their apprehenſions, by aſſuring them, that not only their friends in the maritime

itime provinces were preparing forces to re- Book XIX.
them, but that the queen of England intended
xert herſelf in their behalf. St. Aldegonde 1585.
ſelf appears to have been animated with this
, and for ſeveral weeks it had the effect which
eſired on the minds of the citizens; but their
nce being at laſt worn out, they aſſembled in
nultuous manner, and peremptorily required
ambaſſadors ſhould be appointed to treat of
render. The magiſtrates, though extremely
tant, found it neceſſary to comply with their
eſt; and accordingly St. Aldegonde, and ſe-
others of the principal inhabitants, were ſent
e Spaniſh camp.

HEY were received by the prince of Parma in Capitulation of Antwerp.
moſt gracious manner, and much more favour-
terms of accommodation were offered, than
had reaſon to expect. Various motives con-
d in determining this prudent general to act
e preſent occaſion with the utmoſt degree
oderation which the king's inſtructions would
; for, beſides that the granting of equitable
itions to the citizens of Antwerp would con-
te to facilitate his future conqueſts, he con-
ed, that his troops had ſuffered great dimi-
n ſince the commencement of the ſiege; that,
ccidents which he could not foreſee, the
e might be demoliſhed; that he had with
difficulty reſiſted the efforts which the con-
ates had already made; that ſtill greater ex-
s were to be apprehended from deſpair;
that the beſieged, if compelled by ſeverity
nitate the example of Haerlem or Leyden,
t reſiſt his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to re-
them, till the queen of England, who was
rating on the ſubject, ſhould reſolve to ef-
their cauſe.

MOVED

BOOK XIX. 1585.

MOVED by theſe conſiderations, Farneſe ſhewed himſelf not only willing, but even deſirous to bring the treaty of ſurrender ſpeedily to a concluſion; but the ambaſſadors of the beſieged, ſtill flattering themſelves with the hopes of aſſiſtance, ſtudied to put it off as long as poſſible; nor was the capitulation ſigned till within three days of the time when the whole ſtock of proviſions in the city would have been conſumed. This circumſtance had been carefully concealed from the citizens, as well as from the prince of Parma, and was known only to the magiſtrates and maſters of police. It had not therefore the ſmalleſt influence on the terms of peace, which were as favourable now as if the ſurrender had been made ſome months before.

IN ſome reſpects they were more favourable than even thoſe which had been granted to Ghent and Bruges. Whereas the proteſtants of theſe places had been permitted to continue only two years, in order to ſettle their affairs; in Antwerp, they were allowed to remain four; and although Antwerp was much richer than any of the other cities, and the expence of the ſiege had been infinitely greater, yet he demanded a fine of only four hundred thouſand guilders for the payment of his troops. All the priſoners were ſet at liberty; all paſt offences were forgiven, and no exception whatever was made in the general act of indemnity; nor was any perſonal reſtriction laid upon any of the citizens, except St. Aldegonde, who was required to engage, that he would not carry arms againſt the king of Spain for the ſpace of a year. This circumſtance had the appearance of a puniſhment inflicted on this diſtinguiſhed patriot; but it ought to be conſidered rather as a mark of reſpect and honour, ſince it implied an acknowledgment of his ſuperior merit,

nerit, and diſcovered the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities.

1585.

NOTWITHSTANDING this public teſtimony which St. Aldegonde received from the Spaniards, he was accuſed of having delivered up the town without neceſſity; and ſo raſh and ill-informed were the States of Holland and Zealand on this occaſion, that they forbade him to take up his reſidence within their territories. Being conſcious of having acted with perfect integrity, he paid no regard to their interdiction, but ſoon after the ſurrender ſet out for Zealand, where he required the States to produce his accuſers, and to try him openly [s]; and, as no accuſer ever ventured to appear, he publiſhed a vindication of his conduct, calculated to put his enemies to ſilence, and to ſhew that, inſtead of cenſure, he had merited the higheſt praiſe [t].

THE ill-humour which the maritime provinces diſcovered on this occaſion, in their injurious treatment of a perſon ſo beloved and popular as St. Aldegonde, occaſioned the error of thoſe who aſſerted that theſe provinces were not diſpleaſed that the Spaniards had got poſſeſſion of Antwerp, and that their jealouſy of that commercial city was the cauſe why they did not exert themſelves with greater vigour to preſerve it. As the circumſtances above explained ſeem to afford a full account of their inactivity in the beginning of the ſiege, ſo, towards the cloſe of it, it ſhould ſeem they did every thing for the relief of the beſieged, which they could have done in their own defence. The only

[s] The account here given is taken from Meteren, the beſt informed of all the hiſtorians in matters relative to Antwerp. It differs materially from that of Reidanus.

[t] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xii. Thuanus, lib. lxxxiii. Reidanus, lib. iv.

BOOK XIX. 1585.

only object of their dread at this time was the power of Spain. They could not but conſider Antwerp as a bulwark againſt that power, and they could not foreſee thoſe commercial advantages, which they derived afterwards from the reduction of that wealthy city under the Spaniſh yoke.

Brabant deſerted by many of its inhabitants.

THEY ſoon experienced theſe advantages, by the removal of ſo great a number of the inhabitants of Brabant and Flanders to Amſterdam and Middleburg that it became neceſſary to extend the walls of thoſe cities in order to contain them. And thus the trade of the confederated States was greatly augmented, while that of the ſouthern provinces received a wound, of which it never afterwards recovered. The prince of Parma had provided carefully againſt this event, ſo fatal to the proſperity of his late acquiſitions, by the length of time which he allowed to the proteſtants for diſpoſing of their effects, and by the mildneſs of his adminiſtration; but, beſides that their averſion to the Spaniſh government was become unconquerable, and that for ſome years paſt they had taſted the ſweets of liberty, they were too ſincerely attached to the reformed religion, to bear the thoughts of ever complying with the catholic, or even to indure thoſe reſtraints to which it behoved them during their ſtay at Antwerp to ſubmit. Philip's bigotry had, in the time of the duke of Alva, tranſplanted great numbers of his ſubjects, together with their wealth and manufactures, into foreign ſtates, and it now increaſed the power of the revolted provinces, at the expence of thoſe which had returned to their allegiance. The Dutch began, not long after this period, to puſh their commerce to a greater extent than ever. They were more able than formerly to ſupport the

the burden of the war; and in a few years afterwards they found themſelves in a capacity, not only to defend their infant ſtate, but to attack their powerful adverſary, with ſplendor and ſucceſs, in the moſt diſtant regions of the globe. BOOK XIX. 1585.

THE

BOOK XX.

1585. They offer the ſovereignty to the king of France.

THE States were more ſenſible than ever of their inability to defend themſelves, without the aſſiſtance of ſome foreign power. In their treaty with the duke of Anjou, they had diſcovered great ſolicitude in guarding againſt the annexation of the provinces to the crown of France; but ſoon after the death of the prince of Orange, they were perſuaded, that with their moſt ſtrenuous efforts it would be impoſſible for them long to preſerve their independence, and that they muſt either ſubmit to Philip, or become the ſubjects of ſome other ſovereign, poſſeſſed of power ſufficient to defend them. Having towards the concluſion of the year one thouſand five hundred and eighty-four, deliberately maturely on the ſubject, they heſitated for ſome time between the king of France and the queen of England; but they came at laſt to fix their choice upon the former, partly becauſe they believed it would be eaſier for Henry, than for Elizabeth, to ſupport them; and partly becauſe, at Henry's death, his crown would devolve to the king of Navarre, in whoſe hands they believed that both their religion and liberty would be ſecure.

THAT the offer which they reſolved to make to the French monarch would be readily accepted, they could not doubt, when they conſidered that the principal reaſon why he had formerly declined to eſpouſe their cauſe, was their refuſing to conſent to his ſucceſſion, in the event of his brother's death. They could not but ſuppoſe that his ambition would be highly flattered with the opportunity of making ſo great an addition to his hereditary dominions; and they were not ignorant of the reſentment which he bore towards the king of Spain, who, under the maſk of friendſhip, had long fomented the troubles of his kingdom.

HENRY was not inſenſible to the force of theſe incentives. He gave the ambaſſadors whom the States

States had ſent to him on this occaſion, the moſt gracious reception; aſſured them of his gratitude for the truſt and confidence which the States were pleaſed to repoſe in him; and bad him rely upon him for every mark of friendſhip in his power to beſtow. But as their propoſal was of too much importance to be haſtily embraced, he deſired they would deliver it in writing, that it might be ſubmitted to the reviſal of his counſellors. BOOK XX. 1585.

HENRY would not have thus delayed giving them a deciſive anſwer, if he had been at liberty, either to purſue his own inclinations, or to conſult the intereſt of France. Peace indeed had been eſtabliſhed between the inveterate factions, into which his kingdom was divided; and the catholic league was apparently extinct. But the cauſes to which that pernicious confederacy owed its birth, ſtill ſubſiſted; and it required a much more dexterous and ſteady hand than that of Henry, to guide the reins of government in ſuch a manner as to prevent the paſſions of the parties from breaking out again with as much violence as before. Henry duke of Guiſe, ſon of the celebrated Francis, was ſuperior to his father in exterior accompliſhments, and not inferior to him either in military or political abilities. Like his father too, he was actuated with the moſt inordinate ambition; and could not endure that inſignificance, to which the king's averſion to his bold aſpiring character had reduced him. Enraged at being excluded from the government of the ſtate, while all the power which he and his adherents had formerly enjoyed was engroſſed by the minions of the king, he reſolved either to compel Henry to redreſs his grievances, or to deprive him of his crown. With the moſt indefatigable induſtry he applied himſelf to the proſecution to his deſign. His emiſſaries were ſpread every where; the kingdom ſwarmed with anonymous letters; and the pulpit reſounded with the imminent danger to which State of parties in France.

BOOK IX. 1585.

which the church was expoſed. "For the king, it was ſaid, notwithſtanding his pretenſions to ſanctity, had neither no religion at all, or was ſecretly attached to that of the Hugonots; for whom he had in his late treaty with them, diſcovered the moſt unjuſtifiable partiality. This alone was ſufficient to rouſe the indignation of every faithful ſon of the church; but there was ground for the moſt alarming apprehenſions, when it was conſidered, that the duke of Anjou being now dead, and the king without any hopes of iſſue, the crown muſt (if the people did not exert themſelves with vigour to prevent it) be inherited by the king of Navarre, a relapſed heretic, and a determined enemy of their holy faith [a]."

The catholic league.

By theſe means the duke of Guiſe united more than one half of the kingdom in a fanatical, but firm confederacy, with which he hoped to controul, and in time to annihilate the authority of the king. In order to gain greater reſpect to this confederacy, he placed at the head of it Charles, cardinal [b] of Bourbon, a zealous catholic, far advanced in years, and noted for the weakneſs of his underſtanding. Guiſe intended this prelate for Henry's ſucceſſor, in the event of the death or depoſition of that prince; and he expected under him to engroſs the whole adminiſtration, and to pave the way for his own acceſſion to the throne.

The king of Spain was not an unconcerned ſpectator of theſe tranſactions, in a kingdom, to the affairs of which he had, for ſeveral years, given the moſt particular attention. For, beſides the deep concern, which, agreeably to his general ſyſtem of politics, he had ever taken in all the conteſts between the catholics and proteſtants in almoſt every European ſtate, he was greatly intereſted

[a] Memoires de la ligue, tom. iii.
[b] Uncle to the king of Navarra.

tereſted to prevent the king of Navarre (whoſe dominions he held unjuſtly) from aſcending the throne of France; and there was no other means, he knew, by which he could deter the French monarch from lending aſſiſtance to the United Provinces, but to furniſh him with employment at home. 1585.

His views.

MOVED by this laſt conſideration, he had given aſſiſtance to the league, when it was firſt formed by the ſame factious leaders ſome years before. He was now more determined than ever to ſupport it; prompted partly by the motives that have been mentioned, and partly by this conſideration, that by fomenting the diſturbances in France, he would exhauſt the ſtrength of that mighty monarchy, and thereby either acquire poſſeſſion of it himſelf, or be at leaſt delivered from all dread of that power, which he believed to be the only one in Europe able to counteract his deſigns.

His treaty with the duke of Guiſe.

HAVING ſome time before the preſent period revived his negociations with the duke of Guiſe, and the other heads of the league, he gave orders to his commiſſioners, Morreo, and Baptiſta Taſſi, to form an alliance with them, without delay. And it was accordingly concluded between the Spaniſh envoys on the hand, and the dukes of Guiſe and Mayenne, and the ſieur de Menneville, agent for the cardinal of Bourbon, on the other, at Joinville, on the 2d of February, one thouſand five hundred and eighty-five, upon the following conditions:

"THAT in caſe the preſent king of France ſhould die without male-iſſue, the cardinal of Bourbon ſhould, as firſt prince of the blood, be declared king; and all thoſe perſons excluded from the ſucceſſion, who were either heretics themſelves or favourers of heretics.

"THAT

BOOK XX. 1585.

"THAT the cardinal of Bourbon ſhould, in the event of his ſucceeding to the crown, ratify the peace of Chateau-Cambreſis, between the courts of France and Spain.

"THAT he ſhould prohibit the exerciſe of every religion but the catholic, within his dominions.

"THAT he ſhould reſtore to Philip all the places which had been taken from him by the Hugonots, and aſſiſt him in ſubduing his rebellious ſubjects in the Netherlands.

"THAT, on the other hand, Philip ſhould contribute fifty thouſand crowns a month, for the ſupport of the confederacy, beſides aſſiſting it with a ſufficient number of troops, till hereſy ſhould be utterly extirpated. That he ſhould take the cardinal of Bourbon, the lords of the houſe of Guiſe, and all others who ſhould accede to the league, under his protection; and that neither of the contracting parties ſhould enter into any treaty with the king of France, without mutual conſent."

BESIDES theſe conditions, which were committed to writing, and ſubſcribed, Philip engaged to pay annually the ſum of two hundred thouſand crowns to the duke of Guiſe, to be diſpoſed of by him as he ſhould judge moſt conducive for the intereſt of the league. And it was agreed, that this whole tranſaction ſhould be concealed, till a more convenient ſeaſon for divulging it.

HENRY, however, received intelligence of the congreſs; and from former experience it was eaſy for him to conjecture the purpoſe for which it had been held. Soon after this, the embaſſy from the States of Holland arrived, and was received in the manner above mentioned. Mendoza, the Spaniſh reſident, could not be ignorant of what had paſſed at Joinville; yet he complained to Henry of his kind reception of the Dutch ambaſſadors, as being

being inconſiſtent with the friendſhip which he owed to the catholic king. Henry replied to this complaint, with a degree of firmneſs and dignity, which it had been happy for himſelf, and for his ſubjects, if he could have maintained uniformly in his conduct. "I do not, ſaid he, conſider the people of the Netherlands as rebels, but as men whoſe patience has been worn by oppreſſion. Humanity and juſtice incline me to take an intereſt in the diſtreſs of a neighbouring nation, once ſubject to the crown of France. I have not however as yet reſolved to concern myſelf in their affairs. I am unwilling to violate that peace which ſubſiſts between your maſter and me; although I know, that, on his part, it has been violated. My reſolution will appear, when I ſhall think fit to diſcloſe it. In the mean time I deſire it may be remembered, that I ſhall not be intimidated by the threats of the king of Spain; and that I am maſter of my conduct, and at liberty, without being anſwerable to any other prince, to make either peace or war, as I incline." BOOK XX. 1585.

AMONG Henry's counſellors there were ſome who exhorted him to embrace ſo tempting an opportunity as the preſent, of advancing the glory of his crown. The perplexed ſituation of his affairs, they ſaid, ought rather to determine him to enter into foreign war, than to deter him from engaging in it. It would prove the moſt effectual remedy for thoſe noxious humours with which his kingdom was diſtempered, by giving a new direction to that reſtleſs ſpirit with which his ſubjects had long been actuated; and it would be found the ſureſt method of diſappointing the deſigns of the duke of Guiſe, by depriving him of the aſſiſtance of the catholic king, to whom it would furniſh ſufficient employment in defence of his own dominions. Henry heſitates as to accepting the proffered ſovereignty.

Book XX. 1585.

SUCH was the reaſoning of thoſe who adviſed Henry to accept of the ſovereignty of the United Provinces. It was plauſible, but not ſubſtantial or ſolid. "For where," ſaid others of his counſellors, ſeconded by the queen-mother, "can troops be found in France ſufficient to carry on a war againſt an enemy ſo powerful as the king of Spain? Upon ſuch of the catholics as are in league with that monarch, the king can have no reliance. On the contrary, they would unite with Philip againſt their native ſovereign. To compoſe an army of ſuch catholics as retain their fidelity, and to ſend that army to the Netherlands, would be to abandon the kingdom naked and defenceleſs to the duke of Guiſe. And were the king to apply to the proteſtants for aſſiſtance, what purpoſe would that meaſure ſerve, but to excite an univerſal alarm, and to determine all the catholics in the kingdom to accede to the league?"

He declines accepting it.

HENRY could not reſiſt the force of theſe arguments. Finding himſelf therefore thus fettered by his factious ſubjects, he reſolved, though with much reluctance, to decline the tempting offer which the States had made to him; and having called their ambaſſadors, he informed them that the unhappy ſituation of his domeſtic affairs rendered it impoſſible for him at preſent to accept of their offer, or to undertake their protection; but that he would not fail to recommend their cauſe to the queen of England in the warmeſt manner [c].

Anxiety of the queen of England.

ELIZABETH had formerly approved of their election of the duke of Anjou, and had even contributed her endeavours to promote it. But ſhe dreaded the union of the provinces with France, as an event which would have raiſed the maritime power of that kingdom to a ſuperiority above her own,

[c] Reidan. lib. iv. D'Avila, lib. vii. Van Meteren, lib. xii. p. 376.

own, and therefore ſhe had regarded, with a jealous eye, their making a tender to Henry of their ſovereignty. No ſooner was ſhe informed of his reſolution to decline accepting it, than her anxiety taking another direction, ſhe dreaded that their deſpair would induce them to throw themſelves on the mercy of their former ſovereign, whoſe ſevereſt vengeance, ſhe could not doubt, would be poured out upon her, as ſoon as his affairs in the Netherlands were compoſed.

The States make her an offer of the ſovereignty.

IN order to prevent this effect of Henry's refuſal, which was a more immediate object of her dread, than any conſequence that could have ariſen from his acceptance, ſhe ſent an ambaſſador to rouſe their drooping ſpirits, and to give them hopes of her protection. The States were encouraged, by this mark of her attention, to form the reſolution of making the ſame offer of their ſovereignty to her, which they had made to the king of France: and ambaſſadors were accordingly appointed, and ſent over to England in the month of July 1585.

THESE ambaſſadors employed every argument which they could deviſe, to prevail upon Elizabeth to yield to their deſire. After teſtifying in the ſtrongeſt terms that gratitude with which the States were penetrated, on account of the favour which ſhe had already afforded them; they repreſented, "That they had now more occaſion than ever for her friendſhip, and muſt ſink under the power of Philip, who poſſeſſed ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, if ſhe did not ſpeedily interpoſe in their behalf. But although the power of the confederacy was ſmall, when compared with thoſe mighty efforts which which were made by the king of Spain to enſlave it, it was not unworthy of the queen's attention and regard. Beſides poſſeſſing ſome important towns in Brabant, Flanders, and Guelderland,

BOOK XX. 1585.

they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Frieſland, in which there were many flouriſhing and well fortified cities, capacious harbours, and navigable rivers, from which the queen's ſubjects would derive infinite advantage in the way of commerce; not to mention that, by the acceſſion of ſo numerous a fleet as that of the United Provinces, her navy would be able to give law to all the maritime powers in Europe. They were far from ſuppoſing that intereſt alone would determine the queen to regard their preſent application; they had already experienced her generoſity, and they now adreſſed her as the ſovereign of a powerful kingdom, who had ſhewn that ſhe was touched with their calamities. It was their earneſt deſire at this time, that ſhe would accept of the ſovereignty of the provinces, upon the ſame conditions on which their native princes had enjoyed it, and that ſhe would henceforth conſider the people of the Netherlands as her faithful ſubjects, who would vie with thoſe of her native kingdom in demonſtrating their attachment to her perſon, and in advancing the glory of her reign."

ELIZABETH received this propoſal with much complacency, and aſſured the ambaſſadors, that they ſhould not return without carrying ſuch an anſwer along with them as would entirely ſatisfy the States; but before ſhe could be more particular in her reply, ſhe muſt conſider the affair with that attention which it deſerved, and hear the opinions of her counſellors.

She deliberates on the ſubject.

THE ſame thing happened on this occaſion in the court of England, as in that of France ſome months before. Elizabeth's miniſters were no leſs divided in their ſentiments than thoſe of Henry, and formed their judgments as courtiers are wont to do in matters of doubtful iſſue, conformably either to the natural temper of their mind, or to the inclination of the prince.

THERE

THERE were ſome among them who thought, that both juſtice and prudence required that Elizabeth ſhould reject the offer that had been made to her; "for it was the common intereſt of princes, they ſaid, that ſubjects ſhould be retained in their allegiance; and to encourage them in the violation of it, was in reality to undermine the foundations of their own authority. The queen had hitherto favoured the inhabitants of the Low Countries, not as a free and independent nation, but as a people who were cruelly oppreſſed; and her intention had not been to enable them to renounce their allegiance, but to induce their king to treat them with greater equity and moderation. In this purpoſe they thought ſhe might ſtill perſiſt. But to acknowledge the States for ſovereigns, and to accept from their hands that ſovereignty which belonged to another, would not only be a violation of that juſtice which princes owe to one another, but might be attended with the moſt dangerous conſequences to her own repoſe. The king of Spain would not reſt ſatisfied till he had retaliated ſo great an injury. The ſtate of Ireland, and even that of England, where there was ſo great a number of catholics devoted to his ſervice, would furniſh him with means of executing his deſign. And from fomenting a ſpirit of diviſion among her ſubjects, he would ſoon paſs to an open invaſion of her kingdom. With *his* arms the ſpiritual thunder of the Roman pontiff would co-operate, and in that caſe ſuch a number of enemies might be excited againſt her, as would endanger the ſtability of her throne."

BUT others of Elizabeth's counſellors were of opinion, that ſo inviting an opportunity as the preſent ought not to be neglected, and that the queen could not, with reaſon, be accuſed of injuſtice for embracing it. The States, compelled by neceſſity, had, ſeveral years before the preſent period, aſſumed the ſovereignty into their own hands,

Book XX. 1585.

hands, and ſince that time they had conferred it upon the duke of Anjou, whom the queen had virtually recognized for their lawful ſovereign. The king of Spain had clearly forfeited his right to their obedience, by his violation of all the conditions on which that right was founded. "Notwithſtanding this, he will no doubt be highly offended," continued they, "if the queen ſhall think fit to liſten to the preſent application. But can he be more an enemy to the queen, than he has already ſhewn himſelf? Has he not long endeavoured to ſtir up her diſaffected ſubjects in Ireland? And in England, does he not purſue the ſame hoſtile and inſidious deſigns? Has he not warmly eſpouſed the cauſe of the queen of Scots? Does he not on every occaſion ſhew himſelf an implacable enemy to the Engliſh name? And what is it that has ſo long prevented him from declaring open war, but that his revolted ſubjects in the Netherlands have hitherto afforded full employment to all the forces which he could ſpare from his ambitious enterpriſes? When he ſhall have diſengaged himſelf from his embarraſſments in the Low Countries, can we doubt that he will turn his arms againſt the queen? It is the part of prudence to provide againſt a diſtant as well as againſt an immediate danger; and prudence and a regard to ſelf-preſervation require that the queen ſhould to the utmoſt of her power ſupport the people of the United Provinces, becauſe in their preſervation the peace and ſecurity of her own dominions are involved. If ſhe reject the application of the States, and either give them no aſſiſtance, or ſuch only as has hitherto been granted, they will ſoon be overpowered, and Philip will then be not only at greater leiſure, but much more able than at preſent to execute his deſigns. But if the queen accept of the advantageous offer that is made to her, and exert herſelf with vigour in defence of this people, who deſire to become her ſubjects,

ſubjects ſhe will encounter her enemy at a diſtance from home, ſhe will be powerfully aſſiſted by a brave and determined ally, and with her fleet acting in concert with that of the States, ſhe will be able to maintain the tranquillity of her kingdom."

ELIZABETH readily perceived the force of this reaſoning: ſhe believed that an open breach with Philip was unavoidable, and ſhe thought it more eligible to begin hoſtilities herſelf now, than to wait till her adverſary ſhould be in a condition to execute his deſigns againſt her. She reſolved however to decline accepting the ſovereignty which the States had offered her, either becauſe ſhe apprehended that it would prove a greater burden than ſhe was able to ſupport, or becauſe ſhe was afraid of exciting the jealouſy of the neighbouring powers. But while for theſe reaſons ſhe deſired that the ſupreme authority might ſtill remain in the hands of the States, ſhe reſolved to afford them her protection; and with this view, after having received particular information concerning their ſtrength, and the number of troops neceſſary for carrying on the war, ſhe concluded a treaty with them, of which the principal articles were thoſe which follow: "That the queen ſhould furniſh the States with five thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe, to be commanded by a proteſtant general of her appointment, and to be paid by her during the continuance of the war. That after the concluſion of the war the States ſhould repay her expences, and that the towns of Brille and Fluſhing, and the fort of Rammekins, ſhould be immediately delivered to her, and ſhould remain in her poſſeſſion till ſhe were fully reimburſed. That the commander of the forces, the governors of provinces and towns, and all the officers and ſoldiers, ſhould take an oath of fidelity to the queen and the States. That in caſe it ſhould be found

Elizabeth undertakes the protection of the States.

BOOK XX. 1585.

found expedient to employ a fleet in the common cauſe, the States ſhould furniſh the ſame number of ſhips as the queen, to be commanded by an Engliſh admiral. That the commander in chief, and two Engliſh miniſters reſiding in the Netherlands, ſhould be admitted into the aſſembly of the States. That none of the rights or privileges of the confederated provinces ſhould be violated, and no change introduced in the eſtabliſhed religion or government. And laſtly, That neither of the two contracting parties ſhould, without mutual conſent, make peace, or enter into alliance with the king of Spain[d].

Leiceſter appointed commander in chief.

THIS treaty was no ſooner ratified, than Elizabeth iſſued orders for carrying it into execution. The earl of Leiceſter (to whom this wiſe princeſs had been long attached in a degree which far exceeded his merit and ſervices) was appointed general of the forces, and went over with them to Holland in the beginning of the year 1586, accompanied by more than five hundred gentlemen, who intended to ſerve under him as volunteers. Leiceſter had neither courage, capacity, moderation, nor integrity, to qualify him for the arduous taſk that was aſſigned to him, but his defects were concealed under the glare of ſuperficial accompliſhments; with which, as he had long deceived the penetration of Elizabeth, he now impoſed upon the people of the Netherlands, and excited in them the moſt flattering and deluſive hopes. From his firſt arrival they regarded him as the reſtorer of their fallen ſtate, and profuſely heaped upon him every mark of honour which their immoderate fondneſs could deviſe. Not ſatisfied with receiving him rather as a prince and a conqueror, who had already wrought their deliverance, than as the ſubject of an ally by whom he had been ſent to their aſſiſtance, they conferred upon him the offices

[d] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Camden, ann. 1585.

fices of governor general of the confederacy, and commander in chief of all their forces by ſea and land. Book XX. 1586.

By this precipitate meaſure, of which they had afterwards the greateſt reaſon to repent, they intended to gratify the queen, and if poſſible to induce her to take a deeper intereſt in their affairs. But they were exceedingly diſappointed in their expectations; ſhe was offended at their artifice, and immediately diſpatched her vice-chancellor * to complain of their conduct, as being calculated to make the world believe her inſincere in the declaration which ſhe had publiſhed, of intending only to aſſiſt the provinces, and not to undertake the abſolute charge of their protection. She deſired that the States would recall that authority which they had conferred on Leiceſter, and commanded him to reſt contented with the portion of power which ſhe had given him. But it is extremely doubtful whether Elizabeth was in reality as much incenſed on this occaſion as ſhe appeared to be. She ſoon diſcovered an unwillingneſs to mortify her favourite's vanity and ambition; lent a favourable ear to the apology that was made to her by the States, and did not inſiſt on a compliance with her requeſt. Whatever was her motive for this conduct, Leiceſter was inſtalled in the government, and inveſted with the moſt ample powers; after which he proceeded to make preparations for putting a ſtop to the progreſs of the Spaniſh arms.

Operations of the prince of Parma.

The prince of Parma, on the other hand, was no leſs active in preparing for the further proſecution of the war. After the acquiſition of ſo many important towns, he had conceived the moſt ſanguine expectations of being able ſoon to complete

* Sir Thomas Heneage.

Book XX. 1586.

complete the reduction of the revolted provinces. But by the interpoſition of Elizabeth he perceived his victory ſnatched from him, when he thought himſelf upon the point of reaping it, and was exceedingly diſappointed and chagrined. Finding himſelf however ſtill ſuperior to his enemy in the field, he reſolved to improve this advantage, and as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit, to proceed with his wonted vigour.

The ſiege of Grave.

THE confederates had, notwithſtanding their loſs of Maeſtricht above related, been able to keep poſſeſſion of two conſiderable towns on the Maeſe, Grave in Brabant, and Venlo in Guelderland. Farneſe was deſirous to make himſelf maſter of theſe two places before he ſhould turn his arms againſt the northern provinces; and early in the ſpring he ſent count Charles of Manſveldt to form the blockade of Grave. Manſveldt executed his commiſſion with little oppoſition, by caſting a bridge over the Maeſe, and by building forts and redoubts not only on the dykes of the river, but on the land ſide of the town, where he pitched his camp, and cut off all communication between the beſieged and the country behind them. The town was defended by an Engliſh garriſon, under the command of a young nobleman, baron de Hemeret, a native of Guelderland. Leiceſter ſenſible that the place was of the greateſt importance for preventing the enemy from advancing into the provinces of Guelderland and Utrecht, went himſelf as far as the city of Utrecht, and from thence ſent count Hohenloe and colonel Norris with two thouſand five hundred foot, partly natives and partly Engliſh, to the relief of the beſieged. The natives arrived firſt, and having taken one of the Spaniſh forts on the banks of the Maeſe, oppoſite to Grave, they had begun to fortify themſelves upon the dyke, when Manſveldt having received intelligence of their arrival, ſent

ſent three thouſand Spaniards over the bridge already mentioned. By theſe troops the confederates were compelled to abandon their fortifications, and to retire along the dyke; but Norris and the Engliſh forces coming up to their aſſiſtance, a bloody battle enſued. The Engliſh, though long inured to peace, gave proof on this occaſion of that ſtrong military genius by which they have ſo often diſtinguiſhed themſelves in their wars upon the continent. They drove the veteran Spaniards before them with irreſiſtible impetuoſity, killed ſeveral hundreds of them, beſides ſeven captains, and a great number of inferior officers, and compelled them to continue their retreat till they reached their fortifications on the bridge. There they were ſupported by freſh troops ſent by Manſveldt from the camp. The battle was renewed, and both parties fought for ſome time with the ſame fury as before, till they were ſeparated by a violent ſtorm of wind and rain, which rendered all their efforts ineffectual. Through this accident the Spaniards ſtill retained poſſeſſion of the bridge, but the rain which fell, furniſhed count Hohenloe with the means of relieving the beſieged. The river being ſwelled to an uncommon height, he broke down the dyke near Raveſtein, which ſtands on the ſame ſide with Grave, and having laid all the country between Raveſtein and Grave under water, he conveyed to the beſieged, ammunition, proviſions, and a ſupply of troops, acroſs the inundation. BOOK XX. 1586.

THE prince of Parma, alarmed with this ſucceſs of the confederates, ſet out for Grave with his main army; and in a few days after his arrival before the place two batteries were planted, and a part of the wall was demoliſhed. It might ſtill however have been defended for a conſiderable time; and De Hemeret, the governor, gave the earl of Leiceſter the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that he would

BOOK XX. 1586.

would hold out to the laſt. But his courage failing, he began to talk of the neceſſity of ſurrendering; and, although only two or three of his officers approved of his deſign, while all the reſt remonſtrated againſt it as cowardly and diſhonourable, he reſolved to put it in execution; and upon the 7th of June, before the breach was practicable, or the enemy had taken any meaſures for an aſſault, he ſent to the prince of Parma a propoſal to capitulate. The prince readily granted him the moſt favourable conditions, and ſuffered him and the garriſon to march out with their arms and baggage. But as De Hemeret was undeſerving of this honour, he ſoon had reaſon to repent of the infamous part into which his cowardice had betrayed him. Both he and the officers who had concurred with him, were condemned by a court martial to be beheaded. The ſentence was acknowledged to be juſt, yet De Hemeret's fate excited great commiſeration in his countrymen. He was too young for the important truſt which had been committed to him; there was no reaſon to ſuſpect him of treachery or corruption, and he ſolicited in the moſt earneſt manner to have his life ſpared, and to be permitted to engage in ſome perilous enterprize in which he might retrieve his honour. But Leiceſter thinking it neceſſary at this time, for the eſtabliſhment of military diſcipline, which had been greatly relaxed, to give an example of ſeverity, rejected all the applications which were made in his behalf [f].

Siege of Venlo.

IMMEDIATELY after the ſurrender of Grave, Farneſe led his army, amounting to twenty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, to beſiege Venlo; and he made the greater haſte in his expedition againſt that place, the only one on the left ſide of the Maeſe which remained in the hands of the confederates, as he underſtood that the garriſon

[f] Meteren, p. 403. Bentivoglio, p. ii. lib. ii. and Strada.

riſon was weak, and that the celebrated Mar- Schench, who commonly reſided in it, had, by ceſter's orders, marched with the greateſt part his troops to ſecure the town of Gueldres. is man, a native of Guelderland, and a ſoldier fortune, is celebrated by all the cotemporary orians, on account of his extraordinary valour, vity, and enterprize. Having firſt attached ıſelf to the Spaniſh party in the Netherlands, he formed for that party ſeveral important ſer- :s, but thinking himſelf diſhonoured by a pre- :nce which the general beſtowed on a Spaniſh :er, he had deſerted to the States. Schench ſooner heard that the Spaniſh army had begun ſiege of Venlo, than he ſet out with a body of ſe in order to throw himſelf into the place. ding it completely inveſted on every ſide, he .cked the beſiegers in the middle of the night, having penetrated beyond the general's tent, :ontinued to advance till he had almoſt reached of the gates of the town; but he could not :r, by reaſon of certain barricades which Far- : had raiſed to prevent the ſallies of the gar- n. Before he had time to demoliſh theſe, the ›le camp was up in arms, and obliged him to ndon his attempt. He fought his way back ugh the thickeſt of the enemy, and eſcaped ı the loſs of between forty and fifty men. made ſeveral other vigorous efforts for the re- of the beſieged, but they were all rendered rtive by the foreſight and vigilance of the .ce of Parma, who repelled his attacks; and, pite of the annoyance which he gave him from ıout, kept up an inceſſant fire upon the town, a great part of the wall was demoliſhed. The :rent nations of which the army conſiſted, were uting with each other for the honour of be- ıing the aſſault, when the beſieged, dreading fatal conſequences that might follow, ſur- rendered

1586.

BOOK XX. 1586.

rendered the town on nearly the ſame conditions with thoſe which had been granted to the citizens of Grave. The prince of Parma found it neceſſary to employ all his authority to prevent the ſoldiers, whom the capitulation diſappointed of their prey, from offering violence to the inhabitants; and he gave a proof of his reſpect for Schench, by treating his wife and ſiſter in the moſt honourable manner, and furniſhing them with his own coach to carry them to whatever place they ſhould incline [s].

The ſiege and deſtruction of Nuys.

FROM Venlo, Farneſe went without delay and inveſted Nuys, which belongs to the biſhopric of Cologn, but was at that time in the poſſeſſion of the States.

GEBHERT de Truſches, the archbiſhop and elector of Cologn, having, about three years before the preſent period, abjured the catholic religion, and married, attempted ſtill to retain his biſhopric and electorate; but his canons, ſupported by the pope and emperor, excommunicated him; and having made war againſt him, in which they were aſſiſted by the prince of Parma, they obliged him to take refuge in Holland, and elected in his room Erneſt, ſon of the duke of Bavaria. The count de Meurs, one of his partizans, ſoon after recovered for him, by ſurprize, the town of Nuys, and obtained from the States a garriſon, with which he had been able not only to defend that town againſt the force of Erneſt, but to over-run the country, and do infinite miſchief to the catholic inhabitants. Erneſt, unable to repreſs their eruptions, had gone himſelf in diſguiſe to the prince of Parma to ſolicit his aſſiſtance, and it was in compliance with his requeſt, that Farneſe, poſtponing the proſecution of his deſigns againſt the northern provinces, engaged in his preſent enterprize.

[s] Meteren. Strada.

. He knew that Philip regarded no under- Book XX.
ıg as foreign to his intereſt, in which the ſe- 1586.
y of the catholic religion was concerned; and
readed that if the garriſon of Nuys was not
ked in time, they might gather ſtrength, and
ıade ſome of the neighbouring proteſtant
es to eſpouſe their cauſe. Some hiſtorians
n, that he was likewiſe prompted by the
pect of that glory which he would acquire,
ld he conquer in a few weeks, as he expected,
vn which Charles the Bold duke of Burgundy
in vain attempted to reduce with an army of
thouſand men in the ſpace of a year.

r this expectation he was not diſappointed.
ough a misfortune which befell the garriſon in
perſon of Cloet the governor, who, being dan-
uſly wounded, was diſabled from attending
ıe operations of the defence, their reſolution
d; and in leſs than three weeks after the
ce's arrival before the town, they began to
: of a ſurrender. That he might ſave time,
deliver the town as entire as poſſible to the
:or, Farneſe agreed without any difficulty to
rmiſtice; and he had begun to treat with the
ıties of the beſieged, concerning the terms of
tulation, when the Italian and Spaniſh troops,
o had been highly incenſed on account of his
ng prevented them from plundering the inha-
nts of Venlo) being tranſported with a ſudden
:, ran forward in contempt of his authority,
aſſaulted the town on different ſides, while
garriſon, who truſted to the armiſtice, were
their guard. Meeting with little reſiſtance,
r quickly ſcaled the walls, ſpread themſelves
r the town, and butchered all who fell in their
', without diſtinction of age, ſex, or condition.
was their barbarous cruelty ſatiated with the
id carnage which they committed. Their fury
ıg turned into madneſs, they ſpurned the
thoughts

BOOK XX. 1586.

thoughts of plunder, and ſet fire to the town; and as the wind was high, and moſt of the houſes were built of wood, it was in a few hours conſumed to aſhes. Two churches only eſcaped, in which a number of women and children had taken refuge; and it was with difficulty that the marquis del Guaſto prevailed upon the ſavage ſoldiers to ſpare the lives of thoſe trembling, miſerable remains of the inhabitants [h].

Siege of Rhineberg.

FROM this diſaſtrous ſcene, Farneſe, now duke of Parma, by his father's death, directed his march towards Rhineberg; another place in the electorate of Cologn, of which, on account of its important ſituation, the States were extremely ſolicitous to retain poſſeſſion.

Operations of the earl of Leiceſter.

THE earl of Leiceſter mean while had been employed in drawing together all the forces which could be ſpared from the garriſons of the towns and forts, and ſeemed determined not to ſuffer any more of the campaign to paſs without ſtriking ſome important ſtroke, which might ſatisfy the expectations of the confederates. But as his army, which conſiſted only of ſeven thouſand foot and one thouſand four hundred horſe, was inferior in number to the enemy, he durſt not hazard an engagement; but reſolved to attack ſome place of importance in the poſſeſſion of the Spaniards, in order to induce the duke of Parma to relinquiſh the ſiege of Rhineberg. He directed his march towards Zutphen, and in order to facilitate his deſign againſt that place, firſt attacked, and made himſelf maſter of the town of Doeſburg; after which he ſat down with his whole army before Zutphen, and began the ſiege in form.

IF

[h] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib iv.

IF he had followed the counſel that was given him, to ſecure certain paſſes which led to the town, it muſt unavoidably have fallen into his hands; as it was neither furniſhed with proviſions, nor with military ſtores. Of this the duke of Parma had been particularly informed by Baptiſto Taſſi the governor; and for this reaſon, although he had made progreſs in his operations againſt Rhineberg, he immediately raiſed the ſiege of that place, and haſtened with all his forces to the relief of Zutphen. As he was acquainted with the extremity to which the beſieged were reduced, he ſent the Italian cavalry, under the marquis del Guaſto, before the reſt of the army, with a temporary ſupply; and ordered a numerous body of Spaniſh infantry to advance with the utmoſt expedition. Through Leiceſter's neglect to fortify the paſſes, a part of this ſupply was introduced into the towns without difficulty, in the night; and on the day following, del Guaſto attempted to introduce the reſt. On this occaſion a fierce rencounter happened between the Italian and Engliſh cavalry. At the firſt onſet the Italians were compelled to retire; but they ſoon returned to the charge. The action then became hot and obſtinate, and the iſſue remained for ſome time doubtful. Del Guaſto, ſeconded by ſeveral officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation, made every effort that could have been expected from the moſt experienced commander. But the Engliſh, led on by colonel Norris and Sir Philip Sidney, proved a ſecond time victorious, and drove the Italians before them till they reached the Spaniſh infantry; when the Engliſh, being ignorant whether the whole Spaniſh army was at hand, thought it dangerous to advance. Of the Italians about one hundred and fifty were killed and wounded, and of the Engliſh thirty. But the latter paid dear for their victory, by their irreparable loſs of the brave and accompliſhed Sir Philip Sidney;

1586. He lays ſiege to Zutphen.

Death of Sir Philip Sidney

BOOK XX. 1586.

Sidney; who is celebrated by his cotemporaries, as a perſon of the moſt conſummate worth; and as he poſſeſſed the favour of Elizabeth, muſt, if it had been the will of heaven to prolong his life, have ſoon attained to the higheſt dignities in her power to beſtow. Soon after this rencounter, the duke of Parma arrived with his whole army in order of battle; and Leiceſter, conſcious of the inferiority of his forces, drew them off from the ſiege, and ſuffered him to enter Zutphen without oppoſition. Here the duke remained till he had viſited the fortifications, and laid in a ſufficient quantity of ammunition and proviſions; after which he repaſſed the Rhine, and having put garriſons into his new conqueſts, he ſet out for Bruſſels.

Leiceſter obliged to raiſe the ſiege. October 12th

His troops were no ſooner diſtributed into winter-quarters, than Leiceſter returned with his army towards Zutphen. He did not however intend to enter ſo late in the year upon the ſiege of the town itſelf, but only to make himſelf maſter of three forts on the oppoſite ſide of the river, which put it in the power of the Spaniards to make frequent incurſions into the territory of Veluwe. In this attempt he ſucceeded, and thereby deprived the Spaniards for a time of what had been the principal advantage which they derived from the poſſeſſion of Zutphen. After which, having ſtationed a part of his troops in theſe forts, he returned to the Hague, where the States had been appointed to convene.

Leiceſter takes ſome forts near Zutphen.

This aſſembly had no great reaſon to be ſatisfied with their new governor's management of the war; and they were highly diſcontented with his civil adminiſtration. During the courſe of thoſe military operations which have been related, he had treated them in many reſpects rather as a conquered province, than a free ſtate, to whoſe aſſiſtance he had been ſent by their friend and ally; and

Leiceſter's arbitrary and imprudent conduct.

and had ſhewn no leſs contempt of their fundamental laws, to which he knew they were unalterably attached, than to the conditions of their treaty with Elizabeth. Inſtead of regulating his conduct by the advice of the States or council, as gratitude and prudence required, he appears to have conceived an early prejudice againſt all thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the ſervice of their country, while he beſtowed his favour on a ſet of artful and deſigning men, of ſuſpected fidelity, who were obſequious to his caprice. BOOK XX. 1586.

By their counſel, he laid ſuch reſtrictions upon trade, that if the States had not interpoſed with vigour, would have proved fatal to it; and obliged many of thoſe Flemiſh merchants who had lately ſettled in Holland and Zealand, to remove into foreign parts. By the ſame advice, he tampered with the coin, and made ſuch alterations in it as enriched his minions or himſelf, whilſt they impoveriſhed the provinces.

Innovations were introduced without the conſent of the States, in the manner of collecting the public money; and after it was collected, inſtead of putting it, as the conſtitution required, into the hands of the treaſurer choſen by the States, Leiceſter ordered it to be delivered to a treaſurer of his own appointment, who refuſed to ſatisfy the States as to the purpoſes to which it was applied. Taxes were levied from the people, for paying not only all the ſoldiers in the garriſons, and all the country troops, but ſufficient likewiſe for the payment of between ſix and ſeven thouſand Germans; yet the ſoldiers in the garriſons were ſo ill paid, that the officers found it difficult to prevent a mutiny; and two thouſand Germans who had enliſted under the count de Meurs, in hopes of receiving a certain ſum on their arrival in the Netherlands, being diſappointed, through

BOOK XX. 1586.

the governor's negligence, or the corruption of thoſe in whom he confided, returned to Germany without drawing their ſwords, at a time when their aſſiſtance was abſolutely neceſſary to the ſucceſs of the campaign.

In the treaty between the States and Elizabeth it had been agreed, that when any vacancy ſhould happen in the government of a town, fort, or province, the commander in chief ſhould fill it up with one of three perſons preſented to him by the States. To this agreement Leiceſter paid no regard, but appointed perſons to governments of great importance, not only without their being named by the States, but even when the States remonſtrated againſt his appointing them. Roland York, a Londoner, who had ſome years before been detected in treaſonable practices, of which they gave Leiceſter timely information, was notwithſtanding this intruſted with the charge of the principal fort near Zutphen, which commanded the country of Veluwe; and William Stanley, an Engliſh catholic, who had been in the ſervice of Spain, was made governor of Deventer, into which place Leiceſter, in contradiction to the treaty with Elizabeth, had put a garriſon of twelve thouſand foot and two hundred horſe, conſiſting moſtly of Iriſh papiſts.

Besides theſe and other inſtances of imprudent and arbitrary conduct, he diſguſted the Dutch troops by appointing Engliſh officers to command them. He compelled the people to furniſh him with carriages, and to ſerve in his army as pioneers; and, in violation of what had ever been eſteemed a fundamental privilege of the inhabitants of the Netherlands, he obliged perſons, proſecuted by his tools, to leave the provinces in which they reſided, and to ſubmit to their trial

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in other provinces, where their profecutors had greater influence to procure their condemnation [b]. BOOK XX. 1586.

SUCH a complication of deſpotic meaſures in the government of a people jealous of their liberty, appears repugnant, whatever were the governor's motives, to the very loweſt degree of prudence, of which we can ſuppoſe him to have been poſſeſſed. It is not ſurpriſing that he was ſuſpected of having formed a plan to ſuppreſs the aſſembly of the States, and to aſſume an abſolute authority; but if his preſumption could impoſe upon him ſo far as to make him believe, that ſo wiſe a princeſs as Elizabeth would, from her partiality to him, and in open violation of her engagements, ſupport his uſurpation, yet his conduct was extremely ill calculated to promote this perfidious deſign. It diſguſted all the better ſort of thoſe who had influence in the provinces, and ſerved to diffuſe an univerſal alarm, before he had taken meaſures proper for ſecuring ſucceſs in his attempt.

THE States however, ſenſible of their preſent dependence upon Elizabeth, reſolved to avoid an open rupture with her favourite, and, notwithſtanding what had paſſed, they received him on his arrival at the Hague with every mark of reſpect. They delivered to him a modeſt but firm remonſtrance, and intreated him with much earneſtneſs to redreſs their grievances. Leiceſter could not juſtify his conduct in any of the particulars that have been mentioned. He attempted, however, to make ſome apology for it, and aſſured the deputies, though with little ſincerity, that for the future he ſhould be careful to avoid giving them any juſt ground of offence. He added, that at preſent he was under a neceſſity of paſſing over to England, on account of certain diſturbances The States remonſtrate.

[b] Van Meteren, lib. xiii. Grotius, lib. v.

BOOK XX. 1586.

turbances in that kingdom, which required his preſence. The States were extremely ſurpriſed at this intimation, as they expected that he would have proceeded immediately to reform the abuſes of which they had complained; but they were in ſome meaſure reconciled to his departure, by his agreeing to a propoſal which they made to him, that till his return to the Low Countries, his authority as governor ſhould be lodged in the council of ſtate; and he accordingly executed a public deed to this effect on the twenty-fourth of November, although it ſoon afterwards appeared that he had done it only to avoid the trouble of any further ſolicitation upon the ſubject. He executed privately on the ſame day another deed, in which he reſerved to himſelf an excluſive authority over all the governors of provinces, towns, and forts, and even deprived the council of ſtate of their wonted authority. This conduct, at once ſo cowardly and inſincere, alienated from him more than ever the affections of the States, and deſtroyed entirely the confidence which they had repoſed in him. It confirmed the opinion of thoſe who believed that he aſpired at the ſovereignty, and filled the minds of perſons of all ranks with the moſt alarming apprehenſions.

1587. Treachery of Roland York and William Stanley.

THE States had, as mentioned above, remonſtrated againſt the truſt committed to Roland York and William Stanley. Theſe men gave ſoon a fatal proof of the juſtneſs of the ſuſpicions which had been entertained of their fidelity. In a few weeks after Leiceſter's departure for England, they entered into a treacherous correſpondence with Baptiſto Taſſi, governor of Zutphen, and began to prepare their meaſures for delivering to him the important fortreſſes which had been intruſted to their care. The council of ſtate received intelligence of their perfidious deſign; but they had not power to hinder them from putting

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it in execution. In the beginning of February, both Deventer and the fort oppoſite to Zutphen were given up to the Spaniards. York did not live long to enjoy the wages of his iniquity, and died in miſery, neglected and forgotten by thoſe to whom he had ſacrificed his honour; but Stanley, having perſuaded moſt of his troops to enter into the ſervice of Spain, and having uniformly profeſſed the catholic religion, (which Philip conſidered as an atonement for the moſt odious crimes) was permitted to retain the government of Deventer, together with the ſame rank in the Spaniſh, which he had enjoyed in the Engliſh army. This man, ſprung from a reſpectable family in England, had been concerned in Babington's conſpiracy in favour of the queen of Scots, and was probably betrayed, by the dread of a diſcovery, into this unworthy conduct, which has involved his name in perpetual infamy. 1587.

THE news of theſe diſaſters ſpread grief and conſternation over the confederated provinces. They recalled the memory of the duke of Anjou's attempt on Antwerp, and excited great anxiety and dread, leſt the examples of York and Stanley ſhould be imitated by the governors of other forts and towns.

Prudence and moderation of the States.

THE States participated of the diſtreſs which the people felt on the preſent occaſion. They ſtill however maintained their wonted fortitude, and without regard to Leiceſter's reſentment, reſolved to provide, as well as their circumſtances would allow, for the preſervation of the commonwealth. In an aſſembly held at the Hague on the ſixth of February, after aſſerting their own ſupreme authority, they enacted, that during the abſence of the earl of Leiceſter, prince Maurice ſhould exerciſe the authority of governor, and that all officers in their ſervice ſhould take an oath of obedience

BOOK XX. 1587.

obedience to *him*, and of fidelity to the States. To this reſolution, which was immediately publiſhed and enforced, two declarations were ſubjoined: the firſt, that the States did not thereby mean to abridge the authority which they had conferred on the earl of Leiceſter, but only to reſtore to the inferior governors their legal rights and powers; and the ſecond, that they highly diſapproved of thoſe general reflections which had been thrown out againſt the Engliſh troops, on account of the late treachery of a few individuals; for there were bad as well as good men in every nation, and nothing could be more illiberal and unjuſt than ſuch undiſtinguiſhing reflections.

They repreſent their grievances to Elizabeth.

BUT while their conduct at home contained this mixture of firmneſs and moderation, they gave vent to their reſentment in letters, which they appointed ſome of their number to carry to Elizabeth and Leiceſter; in which, after making mention of the truſt and confidence which they had placed in him, they entered into a full detail of their grievances.

LEICESTER was highly offended with theſe letters, and endeavoured to perſuade Elizabeth, that they had been written by a party who were his enemies, while the generality were well affected both to his perſon and government. There was indeed a numerous faction in the Netherlands under the direction of the clergy, whom Leiceſter had attached to him by a punctilious attendance on public worſhip, and an affectation of zeal for the reformed religion. Theſe men not only concurred with his partizans in England, in attempting to diſcredit the repreſentation of his conduct, which the States tranſmitted to Elizabeth, but ſtudied to controul the authority of the States at home, and endeavoured to inſpire the queen with the moſt groundleſs prejudices againſt prince Maurice and other popular leaders, through whoſe influence

influence, they ſaid, the States had conceived a diſguſt againſt the Engliſh alliance, and were now no leſs alienated from the queen than from the earl of Leiceſter. Elizabeth did not hearken implicitly either to the States or their accuſers, but ſent over to Holland lord Buckhurſt, a nobleman eſteemed for his prudence and moderation, to enquire into the ground of that contradictory information which ſhe had received, but chiefly with an intention to extinguiſh, as ſoon as poſſible, the ſpirit of animoſity and diviſion to which the governor's imprudence had given riſe. Buckhurſt ſoon diſcovered the falſehood of thoſe inſinuations which Leiceſter's partizans had propagated with regard to the deſigns of prince Maurice and the diſaffection of the States; and he found no reaſon to call in queſtion any part of that remonſtrance which had been ſent to Elizabeth. He wiſely declined entering into any diſcuſſion of the points of difference between the oppoſite parties, approved in general of the conduct of the States ſince Leiceſter's departure, exhorted them to bury in oblivion what had paſſed, and reminded them of the miſchievous conſequences with which the want of harmony muſt be attended in the preſent critical ſituation of their affairs.

Lord Buckhurſt ſent to the Netherlands.

THESE exhortations ſeemed to produce, in ſome meaſure, the deſired effect; the States appeared ſatisfied that Leiceſter ſhould ſtill retain the office of governor, and lord Buckhurſt carried back to Elizabeth ſuch a report of their diſpoſition, as was calculated to preſerve that amity which had hitherto ſubſiſted between her and them; but he ſcrupled not to condemn the conduct of her favourite, and accuſed him of being the cauſe of all the diſturbances which had happened. If any other of Elizabeth's courtiers had been guilty of the ſame indiſcretions with the earl of Leiceſter, it is not to be doubted that he would have felt the weight of her reſentment. He had far exceeded the

Elizabeth's partiality for Leiceſter.

BOOK XX. 1587.

the powers which ſhe had given him. By his miſconduct he had ſtrengthened the hands of her mortal enemy, the king of Spain. And by his miſconduct and arrogance together, he had almoſt involved her in diſſentions with an ally whom ſhe had undertaken to defend, and with whom it was of the higheſt conſequence to her intereſt that ſhe ſhould maintain a perfect underſtanding. Yet ſuch was her partiality for this unworthy favourite, and ſo great the influence which he poſſeſſed, that he found means to turn her indignation from himſelf againſt his accuſer. Lord Buckhurſt incurred her diſpleaſure, and was even put under arreſt, as if *he*, and not Leiceſter, had been guilty [k].

Famine and peſtilence in the ſouthern provinces.

NOTHING could be more agreeable to the duke of Parma than theſe diſtractions in the confederated provinces; but he was prevented from availing himſelf of them, by the miſerable condition to which the provinces under his command were reduced by famine and peſtilence. The country, as well as the towns, in the ſouthern provinces, had of late ſuffered a prodigious diminution of inhabitants. Great numbers had forſaken their habitations, partly on account of their religion, and partly of the ravages which had been committed by the troops; and only a few of thoſe who remained, had either ſeed to ſow, or horſes and cattle to cultivate their grounds. There had been almoſt no crop raiſed in the preceding year within the provinces, and the crops in the neighbouring countries had been worſe than uſual for ſeveral years. From Holland and Zealand the Flemings might have been abundantly ſupplied, but the confederated States, beſides prohibiting all

[k] Meteren, lib. xiv. Bentivoglio, p. ii. lib. iv. Reidanus, lib. vi. Camden, ann. 1587.

all communication with the ſouthern provinces, had placed guard-ſhips upon the coaſts, and in the mouths of the rivers, to prevent them from receiving ſupplies from foreign parts, in the hopes of weakening the Spaniſh army, or of compelling the frontier towns to return into the confederacy. This cruel policy was not attended with either of theſe effects. The duke of Parma brought proviſions for his army from France, Germany, and England, at an immenſe expence, and he gave particular attention to the ſupplying of thoſe towns which lay neareſt to the United Provinces. BOOK XX. 1587.

THOSE dreadful calamities which are the ordinary concomitants of famine, were felt chiefly in the interior parts, where great multitudes died of want, and of thoſe peſtilential diſeaſes which want and unwholeſome nouriſhment produced. In Antwerp, Bruſſels, and other places, many perſons of the better ranks in life, after ſelling their furniture and other effects to purchaſe food, were reduced to beg openly in the ſtreets. In Brabant and Flanders ſeveral villages were entirely deſerted: and the cotemporary hiſtorians add, that from the ſolitude and deſolation of ſome parts of the country, wolves and other wild beaſts were ſo much multiplied, that beſides many perſons who periſhed in other places, upwards of a hundred were devoured by thoſe furious animals, within two miles of Ghent, in a country formerly one of the beſt cultivated and moſt populous in the Netherlands.

SUCH was the ſtate of the ſouthern provinces, which are by nature the richeſt, though governed by the duke of Parma with ſuperior abilities. On the other hand, the maritime provinces were torn by factions, and governed by one who poſſeſſed neither moderation, prudence, nor capacity; yet the Proſperity of the United Provinces

BOOK XX. 1587.

the inhabitants were not only entirely free from thoſe calamities with which their neighbours were oppreſſed, but were richly furniſhed with all the neceſſaries of life, and daily increaſed in numbers. Every houſe was occupied, new ſtreets and new towns were built, and individuals grew richer every day, notwithſtanding the perpetual burden of an expenſive war. For theſe advantages the Dutch were indebted chiefly to their commerce, which had long been conſiderable, but was of late conſiderably augmented by the multitude of manufacturers and merchants who flocked into Holland and Zealand, when Brabant and Flanders were broken off from the confederacy. The calamities of the latter provinces contributed ſtill more to increaſe the migration of people into the former, till they became the ſeat of the greateſt part of that wealth and induſtry, which for ages paſt had diſtinguiſhed the Netherlands above the reſt of Europe [1].

In this condition of the United Provinces, it may appear ſurpriſing, that during the ſpace of eight months no attempt was made by the confederates to recover any of the towns which had been taken from them; but diviſion here, and the want of capacity and vigour in the perſon intruſted with the reins of government, were attended with ſome of the ſame effects as were produced by the famine and peſtilence in the other provinces. Neither prince Maurice nor the States had power at this time to enforce obedience to their commands, except in the provinces of Holland and Zealand. In the reſt, the partizans of Leiceſter diſputed, and counteracted their authority; and thus, the duke of Parma, notwithſtanding thoſe unſpeakable calamities in which the provinces under his government were involved, was ſooner ready than

[1] Van Meteren, lib. iv. p. 434. Thuanus, lib. lxxxviii. p. 9.

the confederates to reſume the operations of war.

1587.

OSTEND and Sluys were the only towns of importance in Flanders which had not ſubmitted to arms. He now reſolved to attack the latter of theſe places; and, in order to conceal his deſign, he ſent Hautepeine and the marquis del Guaſto, with a body of troops, towards the Veluwe, as if he had intended to make his principal attack in that quarter. This artifice had the effect which he deſired. Prince Maurice and count Hohenlohe were immediately ſent to the Veluwe with the army of the States; and in the mean time the duke turned ſuddenly towards Sluys. This place, which lies at a little diſtance from the coaſt, communicates with the ſea by a ſpacious canal, capable of receiving the largeſt ſhips. By this canal, which ſeparates Sluys from the iſle of Cadſand, the town is rendered inacceſſible by land on the weſt and north; and all the ground on the eaſt is broken and interſected, by an infinite number of ſmaller canals derived from the larger, that it is impracticable to approach the place except by a neck of land on the ſouth, leading towards Damme and Bruges. Sluys lies at the diſtance of nearly five miles from Oſtend on the ſouth, and from Fluſhing on the north; from the former of which it might receive aſſiſtance by land, and from the latter by ſea. It was therefore the duke of Parma's firſt object to intercept the communication of the beſieged with theſe two places, and for this purpoſe he began with attacking the fort of Blackenberg, which ſtands half way between Sluys and Oſtend. As the garriſon were utterly unprepared for reſiſtance againſt ſo vigorous an attack, he ſoon compelled them to ſurrender; immediately after which, he proceeded with a part, of his forces to the iſle of Cadſand. At that place, after erecting a fort on the banks of the great canal,

The ſiege of Sluys.

Beginning of June.

BOOK XX. 1587.

canal, nearer the ſea than Sluys, he had recourſe to the ſame expedient which he had employed ſo ſucceſsfully at Antwerp, and blocked up the canal by a bridge of ſhips ſtrongly bound together, and well furniſhed with troops and artillery.

HAVING thus cut off the only channels of communication by which the friends of the beſieged could relieve them, he began to make his approaches to the place itſelf on that ſide which looks towards Bruges, on which alone it was acceſſible. Even there the ground was ſo wet, as to increaſe exceedingly the labour of working the trenches; and the beſieged had, in order to keep the enemy at a diſtance, raiſed a ſtrong redoubt beyond the ditch. The garriſon conſiſted of about one thouſand ſix hundred men, partly Engliſh and partly Dutch, commanded by colonel Groenvelt, one of the braveſt officers in the ſervice of the States. In the beginning of the ſiege they made ſeveral vigorous ſallies, in which they gave the moſt ſhining proofs of intrepidity. But finding that, although in theſe ſallies they did great execution among the enemy, their own numbers ſuffered conſiderable diminution, Groenvelt reſolved to reſtrain them for the future from advancing beyond the redoubt. This redoubt they defended for ſome time with great bravery, and frequently repulſed the aſſailants; but they were obliged at laſt to yield to ſuperior numbers, and to retire within the town.

IN carrying forward the trenches, Farneſe encountered difficulties from the ſoftneſs of the ground, and the inceſſant fire of the beſieged, that were almoſt inſurmountable. Many of his troops were killed, and the marquis of Renti, La Motte, and ſeveral others of his principal officers were dangerouſly wounded.

IN

BOOK XX. 1583.

AFTER Leiceſter's unſucceſsful attempt to raiſe the ſiege of Sluys, he tranſported his troops to Brabant, and made another equally inglorious attempt to reduce the town and diſtrict of Hoogſtraten. This was the laſt military enterpriſe which he undertook in the Netherlands, immediately after which he ſet out for Dort, whither the States had ſent ſome of their number to wait his arrival.

Intrigues of Leiceſter.

THIS aſſembly was now more diſguſted than ever with his conduct. They long had reaſon to ſuſpect, and they had lately received certain intelligence, that he had formed a deſign to deprive them of their authority. A letter of his, writ from England to one of his ſecretaries, had been intercepted, in which, after mentioning his intended return to the Low Countries, he expreſſed, in ſtrong terms, his diſcontent with the limited power which he had hitherto enjoyed as governor; ſent inſtructions to be communicated to thoſe who were privy to his deſigns; and inſinuated, that if he could not obtain a more extenſive authority, it was the queen's reſolution, and his own, to abandon the provinces altogether, and to leave them to their fate.

The States alarmed.

THE States, alarmed with this intelligence, reſolved to ſtand upon their guard againſt his machinations. Being ſtill however unwilling, from their dread of Elizabeth's diſpleaſure, to come to an open rupture with him, they took no notice of this letter, but exhorted him to reject ſuch malignant counſels as might be offered by ill deſigning men, who, in order to promote their own ſelfiſh views, wiſhed to ſow the ſeeds of animoſity and diſſention. From this exhortation, Leiceſter eaſily perceived that the States had come to the knowledge of his deſigns. With great diſingenuity he accuſed them of having violated their faith, by abridging that authority which they had

had intreated him to accept; and he threw the blame of all the misfortunes which had befallen the confederacy, partly on the States, and partly on prince Maurice and count Hohenloe. The States, he ſaid, had neglected to furniſh him with the neceſſary ſupplies; and Maurice and Hohenloe had, on different pretences, refuſed to co-operate with him in his military enterpriſes. Of a writing which contained theſe and ſome other groundleſs accuſations, copies were ſent by his partizans into different parts of the provinces. The parties accuſed publiſhed a vindication of their conduct; and it is impoſſible, from what is preſerved of this altercation, to conſider what Leiceſter advanced, in any other light, but as the mean attempt of a perſon, equally weak and diſingenuous, to blacken the characters of others, in order to conceal the cowardice and imprudence of which he himſelf was conſcious. Such was the judgment formed of it by the impartial world, and by moſt of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. But there was ſtill a numerous party who eſpouſed Leiceſter's defence, and promoted the execution of his deſigns. The clergy were ſtill as much attached to him as ever, and ſpared no pains to bring the people to a compliance with his will. Having with this view called a ſynod or aſſembly, they appointed four of their number to preſent an addreſs to the States, in which, beſides exhorting them to attend to the true intereſt of the country, and the advancement of religion, they adviſed them to maintain concord with the queen of England, and the earl of Leiceſter.

BOOK XX. 1587.

To this addreſs, the States made ſuch a reply as the officiouſneſs of thoſe in whoſe name it was preſented, ſeems to have deſerved. "They had not been inattentive (they ſaid) to thoſe important objects which the ſynod had recommended to their attention; and they could not be more ſolicitous

The officiouſneſs of the clergy.

BOOK XX. 1587.

than they had always been, to preſerve inviolate thoſe engagements into which they had entered with the queen of England and the earl of Leiceſter; but in their turn they muſt exhort the miniſters to be on their guard againſt admitting among them perſons, who under the cloak of religion, made it their buſineſs to calumniate the civil magiſtrates. By perſons ſuch as theſe, who affected great zeal for religion, the church had been ruined in the ſouthern provinces; and its ruin in the United Provinces would ſoon be accompliſhed, if an end were not ſpeedily put to the practices of ſuch deſigning men. They concluded with exhorting the miniſters to take warning from the fate of their brethren in Brabant and Flanders; and to remember, that the only way in which they ought to interfere in public affairs, was to favour thoſe to whom the adminiſtration was committed, with the aſſiſtance of their prayers."

Leiceſter's deſigns are fruſtrated.

NEITHER this wholeſome counſel, nor any other meaſure which the States employed to enlighten and alarm their countrymen, produced for ſome time the deſired effect. Leiceſter ſtill continued to carry on his intrigues in different places, and went from town to town, putting in practice every low art by which he might increaſe the number of his partizans. In Frieſland, North Holland, and even in Dort and Leyden, there were many who eſpouſed his cauſe, and ſhewed themſelves deſirous to inveſt him with authority to controul the aſſembly of the States, notwithſtanding the many ſtriking proofs which he had given both of tyranny and folly. In Leyden a plot was laid for putting him in poſſeſſion of that important city; but the conſpirators were detected, condemned, and executed. And by the vigilance of the States, ſeconded by prince Maurice and William de Naſſau, governor of Frieſland, his deſigns in other places were rendered equally ineffectual.

ɔtual. Having come at laſt to perceive that
s not equal to the attempt upon which he
ıtered, he grew tired of his ſituation, and in
ɔnth of December paſſed over to England,
, not long after his arrival, Elizabeth, either
ı conviction of his incapacity, or from the
of keeping him for the future near her per-
:quired him to reſign his government of the
ıces; which he accordingly did, on the 27th
:ember one thouſand five hundred and eigh-
:n [a].

BOOK XX. 1587.

He reſigns the government.

ɛ flame however which he had kindled was
ſoon extinguiſhed. In ſome towns, the
ɔns, inſtigated by him or his emiſſaries, o-
deſpiſed the authority of the ſtates. Againſt
.rriſon of Medemblinc, they were obliged
ıploy force; and in order to engage other
ɔns to yield obedience to their commands,
ad recourſe to the interpoſition of Elizabeth,
gh whoſe good offices internal tranquillity
t length reſtored.

[a] Meteren, p. 455

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXI.

PART I.

ELIZABETH was the more ſolicitous to heal the diviſions in the United Provinces, as ſhe apprehended that ſhe would ſoon have occaſion for all the aſſiſtance which her allies could afford her. All Europe had reſounded for ſome time with the noiſe of the preparations, which Philip was making, with a view to ſome important enterpriſe. He had been employed for ſeveral months in building ſhips of an extraordinary ſize, and in collecting ſtores for their equipment; while the duke of Parma had made ſuch numerous levies in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, as ſhewed that he intended to take the field againſt the next campaign, with a much more powerful army than any which he had hitherto commanded.

1587. Philip meditates the conqueſt of England.

ALMOST ever ſince the beginning of Philip's reign, a great proportion of his troops had been occupied, either in war with the Corſairs and Turks, in the reduction of the Moreſcoes, or in the

His motives.

BOOK XXI. 1587.

the conqueſt of Portugal. He had never fully exerted his ſtrength againſt his revolted ſubjects in the Netherlands. Nor had he found leiſure to take vengeance upon Elizabeth, for the ſupport which ſhe had given them, and the inſults which he had received from her in America, where ſeveral of his colonies had been plundered by her fleet [a]. To theſe objects he now thought that his honour as well as his intereſt required that he ſhould apply his principal attention. As he did not doubt that, with a much ſmaller force than he intended to employ, he ſhould be able to compel the people in the Netherlands to return to their allegiance, he had begun his preparations, chiefly with an intention to invade England, and he aſpired to the entire ſubjection of that kingdom. But he heſitated for ſome time as to the manner in which he ſhould proceed; and held frequent meetings of his council to aſſiſt him in deciding, whether it was moſt expedient to begin with the invaſion of England, or with the conqueſt of the United Provinces. Idiaquez, one of his principal officers of ſtate, adviſed him to abandon altogether the former of theſe deſigns.

Speech of Idiaquez.

"THE ſituation of England (ſaid that prudent ſtateſman), which is ſurrounded on every ſide with a tempeſtuous ocean, and has few harbours upon its coaſts; the numerous forces which defend it; the genius of the people, and the nature of their government, concur in making me believe that it will be found almoſt impoſſible to ſucceed in an attempt to conquer it.

"THE Engliſh navy is alone equal to that of any other nation; and when joined to the ſhips belonging to the revolted provinces, muſt prove an

[a] By Sir Francis Drake, anno 1585.

overmatch for any fleet that can be ſent from ain. And even allowing that the king's forces uld effectuate a deſcent, yet what ground is re to hope that they will be able either to ſubdue great a nation, or to maintain, for any conſidera- time, ſuch conqueſts as may be made? In ler to accompliſh the moſt ordinary conqueſts, ne favourable diſpoſition in the people towards conquerors is neceſſary; and in order to pre- ve them, there is need for a continual ſupply troops. From no part of the Engliſh nation, s the king any reaſon to hope for aſſiſtance in intended enterpriſe. In the beginning of his gn, he had experience of the ſtrong abhor- ice which theſe iſlanders entertain of a foreign ke. And he knows how difficult it muſt be to ep up a numerous army in England, beſides all other armies which are neceſſary for the de- ice of his hereditary, and his lately acquired do- inions. If England ſhould prove equally perni- ous to Spain, as Flanders has done, would ere not be reaſon to dread the conſequences? ven the conſequences of ſucceſs may prove fa- l; how much more thoſe which may ariſe from diſappointment, by which Elizabeth, being de- vered from her apprehenſions of danger at home, ould be at greater leiſure than ever to ſupport ie provinces in their rebellion; and by joining er maritime force with theirs, do infinite miſ- hief to the Spaniſh dominions, both in Europe nd America. In my opinion therefore, it will e better to ſuſpend the deſign of invading Eng- nd, and to employ both the fleet and army in he reduction of the Netherlands. The rebels will not long reſiſt ſo great a force; and when hey are ſubdued, the king, having fewer enemies o contend with, will be much more able than at reſent to chaſtiſe the queen of England."

THE

BOOK XXI.

1587.

THE duke of Parma, whom Philip conſulted on this occaſion, was of the ſame opinion as Idiaquez; and added, That before the king could enter upon the Engliſh expedition with a probability of ſucceſs, it was neceſſary to acquire poſſeſſion of ſome of the moſt conſiderable ſea-ports in Zealand, for the accommodation of his fleet.

Duke of Parma's opinion.

PHILIP was not naturally either bold or raſh: yet he refuſed to liſten to theſe prudent counſels. Blinded by the ſplendid ſucceſs of his arms in the conqueſt of Portugal, he thought it impoſſible that Elizabeth could withſtand the powerful armament which he intended to employ againſt her. And if England were ſubdued, the reduction of his revolted ſubjects would quickly follow, as they would then be deprived of the only foreign aid, by which they had been hitherto enabled to perſiſt in their rebellion. Nor would the conqueſt of the former, he thought, be either ſo tedious or ſo difficult as that of the latter; becauſe England was every where an open country, and the Engliſh, truſting to their inſular ſituation, had neglected to provide any fortified towns to retard the progreſs of an enemy. A ſingle battle by ſea, and another by land, would decide the conteſt; and as the fleet which he was preparing was greatly ſuperior to any which Elizabeth could equip, ſo he could not ſuppoſe that her land-forces, undiſciplined, and unaccuſtomed to war, would be able to reſiſt his veteran troops, which had been long enured to victory, and were commanded by the greateſt general and the braveſt officers in the world.

Rejected by Philip.

HE was not ignorant how much reaſon the other European powers had to be jealous of his deſign; but he conſidered, that happily they were at preſent either not inclined, or not in a capacity to

State of Europe.

to prevent him from carrying it into execution. The emperor of Germany was his friend and ally. The attention of the northern potentates was wholly engroſſed with the internal adminiſtration of their dominions. And the French monarch, who was more deeply intereſted than any other in oppoſing him, could with difficulty ſupport himſelf upon the throne againſt his rebellious ſubjects.

1587.

BUT there was nothing which contributed more to confirm him in his purpoſe, than the approbation which it received from the pope [b]; who, although it has been aſſerted that no perſon entertained a higher admiration of the character of Elizabeth, conſidered her as the moſt formidable enemy that the church had ever ſeen upon a throne. She had not indeed, on any occaſion, treated her catholic ſubjects with that inhuman cruelty, of which Philip had ſet her an example in his treatment of the proteſtants; but ſhe had ſhewn herſelf intent on extirpating the catholic religion from every country in Europe, to which her power and influence could reach. For almoſt thirty years ſhe had been the chief ſupport of the proteſtants in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. She had entirely aboliſhed the popiſh faith in Scotland, as well as in her own dominions; and not ſatisfied with depriving the unfortunate Mary of her liberty, ſhe had lately after the farce of a ſolemn trial, ordered that princeſs to be condemned as a traitor, and to ſuffer death. This action, for which Elizabeth was ſeverely cenſured by proteſtants as well as papiſts, excited in the violent mind of the pontiff, the higheſt degree of rage and indignation. With theſe paſſions his intereſt concurred; and the hope of ſeeing England, which had formerly

[b] Sixtus V.

BOOK XXI. 1587.

formerly been the moſt precious jewel of the triple crown, brought back to its ancient obedience to the Holy See. He approved highly therefore of Philip's intended enterprize, exhorted him to perſevere in his deſign, and gave him aſſurances that he would befriend him in the execution of it to the utmoſt of his power. Next to an inſatiable thirſt after dominion, it had ever been Philip's principal ambition to be conſidered as the guardian of the church; and his vanity was not a little flattered at this time with having the ſovereign pontiff for his aſſociate [c].

Artifice of Philip to deceive Elizabeth.

HE proceeded therefore with much alacrity in completing his preparations. But although he reſolved to ſpare no expence or pains to ſecure ſucceſs; yet, that he might find Elizabeth unprepared, he concealed with care the purpoſe for which his armament was intended. A part of his fleet, he ſaid, was to co-operate with his land-forces in the reduction of Holland, and the reſt to be employed in the defence of his dominions in America.

ELIZABETH had too much penetration to be ſo eaſily deceived by the artifices of a prince, with whoſe duplicity ſhe was ſo thoroughly acquainted; and in the ſpring of the year 1587, ſhe ſent Sir Francis Drake with a fleet to the coaſt of Spain to interrupt his preparations. By this gallant ſeaman, the Spaniſh Ships of war which had been ſent to oppoſe him were diſperſed, and near a hundred veſſels filled with naval ſtores and proviſions, beſides two large galleons, were deſtroyed in the harbour of Cadiz. Drake then ſet ſail for the Azores, where he took a rich carrac in her way from the Eaſt Indies, and afterwards returned to England loaden with ſpoils, having by this bold and fortunate adventure rendered it impoſſible for

[c] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. See a very different account in Gregorio Leti's Life of Sixtus, lib. vii.

for Philip to execute his enterprize againſt England till the following year. BOOK. XXI.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe hoſtilities, Philip ſtill affected to deſire that all the grounds of difference between him and Elizabeth might be removed, and gave orders to the duke of Parma to propoſe a negociation for peace. It is not probable that the queen was deceived by this, any more than by his former artifice. She reſolved however to appear to be caught in the ſnare: ſhe pretended to believe his declaration with regard to the deſtination of his fleet, and to liſten to his propoſal of negociating an agreement. She readily accepted of the mediation of the king of Denmark; and that her conduct might have the greater appearance of ſincerity, ſhe urged the States to ſend ambaſſadors to Bourbourg, the place appointed for the conferences, and ordered her envoy to repreſent to them the expediency of putting a period to the war. 1587. Fruitleſs negociation for peace.

THE States were much alarmed with her propoſal, and ſuſpected that, in order to avert the ſtorm which threatened her, ſhe had reſolved to ſacrifice the confederacy, and to deliver up to Philip the Dutch towns in her poſſeſſion. She found it neceſſary to remove their apprehenſions on this head, by declaring, that as ſhe had not the remoteſt thoughts of forſaking them, ſo ſhe would never conſent to any terms of peace inconſiſtent with their ſecurity.

SHE could not however perſuade them to ſend ambaſſadors to the congreſs. "They were deeply ſenſible, they informed her, of the weight of thoſe conſiderations which her ambaſſador had urged to induce them to think of peace. They lamented that ſpirit of diſcord which had ſeized on ſome towns of the confederacy, and they heard, with great anxiety, of thoſe mighty fleets and armies

BOOK XXI. 1587.

armies which the king of Spain was preparing for their deſtruction. But their ſituation, though bad in ſome reſpects, was far from being deſperate; they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of more than ſixty towns and forts, each of which could make a vigorous reſiſtance againſt the enemy. In the two years during which the earl of Leiceſter had governed them, eight millions of guilders had been raiſed for the public ſervice, and under a prudent adminiſtration they would be able not only to continue to afford the ſame expence, but even to augment it. But although their ſituation were in reality as ill as ſome had repreſented, it could not ſerve any good purpoſe to treat of peace with the king of Spain, who was unalterably determined never to grant them peace on ſuch conditions as either their intereſt or their conſciences would permit them to accept. And from paſt experience they were perſuaded, that their ſending ambaſſadors to the congreſs would be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences. It would create in many perſons ſuch deſpair with regard to the ſtability of the preſent government, as would determine ſome to change their religion, and others to leave the Netherlands. It would raiſe the ſpirits of the catholics, and induce both them and the proteſtants to withhold their ſhare of the public expences; the former, from the view of forwarding the peace, and the latter, from that of retiring into foreign parts. Thus, both the fleet and the army being ill paid, would become refractory, the commanders of towns and ſhips would provide for their future ſecurity, by entering into ſecret practices with the enemy; and in the midſt of that ſedition, confuſion, and treachery that would enſue, it would not be in the power of the States, or of the queen, to prevent the people from accepting whatever terms of peace the king of Spain ſhould think fit to impoſe.

In theſe reaſons Elizabeth found it neceſſary to acquieſce; but ſhe perſiſted in the reſolution which ſhe had formed with regard to her own conduct, and ordered her ambaſſadors to repair to Bourbourg. In the conferences held there, various terms of accommodation were propoſed, with no ſincerity on the part of Spain, and with little hope of ſucceſs on the part of England. The Spaniſh miniſters ſtill continued to aſſure thoſe of England that no invaſion of that kingdom was intended; and, conſidering how long this congreſs ſubſiſted (for it was not diſſolved till the arrival of the Spaniſh fleet in the channel), it ſhould ſeem that their aſſeverations were not wholly diſregarded by Elizabeth[d].

Elizabeth's preparations.

This artifice however did not prevent her from putting her kingdom into a poſture of defence. An army was raiſed amounting to eighty thouſand men, twenty thouſand of whom were ſtationed on the ſouth coaſt of the iſland, twenty-two thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe were poſted at Tilbury, in Eſſex, under the earl of Leiceſter, and the remainder, commanded by lord Hunſdown, were kept near the queen's perſon, in readineſs to march againſt the enemy whereſoever they ſhould attempt to land. Elizabeth did not truſt implicitly at this juncture either to her own judgment, or that of her counſellors of ſtate; lord Gray of Wilton, ſir Francis Knolles, Sir John Norris, ſir Richard Bingham, and ſir Roger Williams, officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation, were appointed to conſider of the meaſures proper to be purſued; and by their advice, all the ſea-ports which lay moſt conveniently for a deſcent were fortified; the militia was raiſed, their arms and manner of fighting aſcertained, and a reſolution formed that if, notwithſtanding the precautions taken, it ſhould be found impoſſible to prevent the enemy from landing, all the country round ſhould

[d] Meteren, lib. xiv. p. 459. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv.

BOOK XXI.

ſhould be laid waſte, and a general engagement avoided till the ſeveral armies were combined.

1588. WHILE theſe prudent meaſures were purſued at land, Elizabeth exerted herſelf ſtrenuouſly in the equipment of her fleet. When ſhe began her preparations, it did not amount to more than thirty ſhips, and none of theſe were nearly equal in ſize to thoſe of the enemy. But this diſadvantage was in ſome meaſure compenſated by the ſkill and dexterity of the Engliſh ſailors; and the number of her ſhips was ſoon augmented through the alacrity and zeal which her ſubjects diſplayed in her defence. By her wiſe adminiſtration ſhe had acquired their eſteem and confidence. The animoſity againſt her perſon and government, which the differences in religion had excited in the minds of ſome, was at preſent ſwallowed up in that univerſal abhorrence which the catholics as well as the proteſtants entertained of the tyranny of Spain. Great pains were taken to keep alive and heighten that abhorrence. Accounts were ſpread of the horrid barbarities which the Spaniards had perpetrated in the Netherlands and America: deſcriptions were drawn, in the blackeſt colours, of the inhuman cruelties of the inquiſition, and pictures were diſperſed of the various inſtruments of torture employed by the inquiſitors, of which, it was ſaid, there was abundant ſtore on board the Spaniſh fleet. Theſe, and ſuch other conſiderations, made a ſtrong impreſſion not upon Elizabeth's proteſtant ſubjects only, but likewiſe upon the catholics[c]; who, although the pope had publiſhed a bull of excommunication againſt her, yet reſolved not to yield to the proteſtants either in loyalty to their ſovereign, or in zeal for the independency of the ſtate. The whole kingdom was of one mind and ſpirit: ſome catholics

[c] Meteren, lib. xv.

tholics entered into the army as volunteers, and others joined with the proteſtants in equipping armed veſſels. Every maritime town fitted out one or more. The citizens of London furniſhed thirty, although only fifteen were required of them; and between forty and fifty were equipped by the nobility and gentry throughout the kingdom. But all theſe ſhips were of ſmall ſize, in compariſon of thoſe which compoſed the Spaniſh fleet; and there was ſtill much ground for the moſt anxious apprehenſions with regard to the final iſſue of the war.

No perſon felt greater anxiety on this occaſion than Elizabeth; the principal object of whoſe prudent politics for thirty years, had been to avoid the critical ſituation to which ſhe was now reduced. She did not, however, ſuffer any ſymptoms of uneaſineſs to appear, but wore at all times a placid and animated countenance, and in her whole behaviour diſplayed an undaunted ſpirit, which commanded admiration and applauſe.

Preparations and conduct of the Dutch.

THE States of Holland, in the mean time, were not inattentive to the approaching danger, nor did they think themſelves leſs intereſted to provide againſt it, than if Philip had intended to begin his operations with an attack upon the Netherlands. From their fears of an immediate attack, they were delivered by intelligence of the enormous ſize of the Spaniſh ſhips, to which the coaſts of Holland and Zealand were inacceſſible. They turned their principal attention therefore to the aſſiſtance of their ally: and kept their fleet, conſiſting of more than eighty ſhips, ready for action. At Elizabeth's deſire, they ſent thirty of that number to cruize between Calais and Dover; and, afterwards, when the duke of Parma's deſign of tranſporting his army to England was certainly known, they ordered Juſtin de Naſſau, admiral of Zealand, to join lord Seymour, one of the

BOOK XXI. 1588.

Engliſh admirals, with five and thirty ſhips, to block up thoſe ſea-ports in Flanders where the duke intended to embark [e].

THE principal Engliſh fleet was ſtationed at Plymouth, and the chief command of it was given to Charles lord Howard of Effingham, who had under him as vice-admirals, Sir Francis Drake, Hawkins, and Frobiſher, three of the moſt expert and braveſt ſeamen in the world.

The Spaniſh Armada.

IN the beginning of May 1588, Philip's preparations, which had ſo long kept all Europe in amazement and ſuſpenſe, were brought to a concluſion. That Armada, to which the Spaniards, in the confidence of ſucceſs, gave the name of Invincible, conſiſted of one hundred and fifty ſhips, moſt of which were greatly ſuperior in ſtrength and ſize to any that had been ſeen before. It had on board near twenty thouſand ſoldiers, and eight thouſand ſailors, beſides two thouſand volunteers of the moſt diſtinguiſhed families in Spain. It carried two thouſand ſix hundred and fifty great guns, was victualled for half a year, and contained ſuch a quantity of military ſtores, as only the Spaniſh monarch, enriched by the treaſures of the Indies and America, could ſupply.

Duke of Parma's preparations.

PHILIP's preparations in the Netherlands were not leſs advanced than thoſe in Spain. Beſides a flouriſhing army of thirty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, which the duke of Parma had aſſembled in the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Dunkirk; that active general had, with incredible labour, provided a great number of flat-bottomed veſſels, fit for tranſporting both horſe and foot, and had brought ſailors to navigate them from the towns in the Baltic. Moſt of theſe veſſels had been built at Antwerp, and as he durſt not venture to bring

[e] Meteren, lib. xv.

bring them from thence by ſea to Nieuport, leſt they ſhould have been intercepted by the Dutch, he was obliged to ſend them along the Scheld to Ghent, from Ghent to Bruges, by the canal which joins theſe towns, and from Bruges to Nieuport, by a new canal which he dug on the preſent occaſion. This laborious undertaking, in which ſeveral thouſand workmen had been employed, was already finiſhed, and the duke now waited for the arrival of the Spaniſh fleet; hoping, that as ſoon as it ſhould approach, the Dutch and Engliſh ſhips that cruiſed upon the coaſt, would retire into their harbours.

Death of the Spaniſh admiral.

THE Armada would have left Liſbon in the beginning of May, but the marquis de Santa Croce, who had been appointed admiral, was, at the very time fixed for its departure, ſeized with a violent fever, of which he died in a few days; and, by a ſingular fatality, the duke de Paliano, the vice-admiral, died likewiſe at the ſame time. Santa Croce being reckoned the firſt naval officer in Spain, Philip had much reaſon to lament his death, and it ſhould ſeem that he found it extremely difficult to fill his place, ſince he named for his ſucceſſor the duke de Medina-Sidonia, a nobleman of conſiderable reputation, but entirely unacquainted with maritime affairs. This defect in the commander in chief, Philip ſupplied in ſome meaſure, by giving him Martinez de Recaldo, a ſeaman of great experience, for his vice-admiral.

The Armada ſets ſail from Liſbon.

IN theſe arrangements ſo much time was loſt, that the fleet could not leave Liſbon till the 29th of May. It had not advanced far in its voyage to Corunna, at which place it was to receive ſome troops and ſtores, when it was overtaken by a violent ſtorm and diſperſed. All the ſhips however reached Corunna, though conſiderably damaged,

BOOK XXI. 1588.

except four[f]. They were repaired with the utmoſt diligence, the king ſending meſſengers every day to haſten their departure; yet ſeveral weeks paſſed before they could be put in a condition to reſume the voyage.

In the mean time a report was brought to England, that the Armada had ſuffered ſo much by the ſtorm, as to be unfit for proceeding in the intended enterprize; and ſo well atteſted did this intelligence appear to queen Elizabeth, that, at her deſire, ſecretary Walſingham wrote to the Engliſh admiral, requiring him to lay up four of his largeſt ſhips, and to diſcharge the ſeamen. Lord Howard was happily leſs credulous on this occaſion than either Elizabeth or Walſingham, and deſired that he might be allowed to retain theſe ſhips in the ſervice, even though it ſhould be at his own expence, till more certain information were received. In order to procure it, he ſet ſail with a briſk north wind for Corunna, intending, in caſe he ſhould find the Armada ſo much diſabled as had been reported, to attempt to complete its deſtruction. On the coaſt of Spain he received intelligence of the truth: at the ſame time the wind having changed from north to ſouth, he began to dread that the Spaniards might have ſailed for England, and therefore he returned without delay to his former ſtation at Plymouth.

Arrival of the Armada in the channel.

July 30th.

Soon after his arrival, he was informed that the Armada was in ſight. He immediately weighed anchor, and ſailed out of the harbour, ſtill uncertain of the courſe which the enemy intended to purſue. On the next day he perceived them ſteering directly towards him, drawn up in the form of

[f] In three of theſe, the galley-ſlaves, conſiſting of Engliſh, French, and Turks, taking advantage of the confuſion occaſioned by the ſtorm, overpowered the Spaniards, and carried the ſhips into a harbour on the coaſt of Bayonne. Meteren, p. 476.

of a creſcent, which extended ſeven miles from one extremity to another. It was for ſome time believed that Plymouth was the place of their deſtination; and it was the opinion of many perſons in that age, that their enterprize would have been more ſucceſsful than it proved, had they landed there, and not proceeded up the channel. By doing this, it was ſuppoſed, they would have drawn Elizabeth's whole force to the ſouth-weſt coaſt of the iſland, and have rendered it eaſier for the duke of Parma to tranſport his troops. But in this expectation it is probable they would have been extremely diſappointed, as the Dutch fleet alone would have been able to block up the ſea-ports in Flanders; the Engliſh fleet might have deſtroyed the Armada had it once entered Plymouth harbour, and Elizabeth's land forces would have been an over-match for all the Spaniſh troops which the Armada had on board. But if the duke de Medina ever intended to make a deſcent at Plymouth, he ſoon changed his deſign, and adhered cloſely afterwards to the execution of a plan preſcribed to him by the court of Spain. This was to ſteer quite through the channel till he ſhould reach the coaſt of Flanders, and after driving away the Dutch and Engliſh ſhips, by which the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk were beſieged, to eſcort the duke of Parma's army to England, and to land there the forces that were on board the fleet. In compliance with theſe inſtructions, he proceeded in his courſe, without turning aſide to the Engliſh, who were drawn up along the coaſt, and ready to receive him.

1588.

Plan of operations preſented by Philip.

LORD Howard, conſidering that the Spaniards would probably be much ſuperior to him in cloſe fight, by reaſon of the ſize of their ſhips, and the number of their troops, wiſely reſolved to content himſelf with haraſſing them in their voyage, and with watching attentively all the advantages which might

Prudent and gallant conduct of lord Howard.

BOOK XXI. 1588.

might be derived from ſtorms, croſs winds, and ſuch like fortuitous accidents. It was not long before he diſcerned a favourable opportunity of attacking the vice-admiral Recaldo. This he did in perſon; and on that occaſion diſplayed ſo much dexterity in working his ſhip, and in loading and firing his guns, as greatly alarmed the Spaniards for the fate of the vice-admiral. From that time they kept much cloſer to one another; notwithſtanding which, the Engliſh on the ſame day attacked one of the largeſt galeaſſes. Other Spaniſh ſhips came up in time to her relief, but in their hurry, one of the principal galleons, which had a great part of the treaſure on board, ran foul of another ſhip, and had one of her maſts broken. In conſequence of this misfortune ſhe fell behind, and was taken by ſir Francis Drake; who, on the ſame day, took another capital ſhip, which had been accidentally ſet on fire.

Superiority of the Engliſh ſailors.

SEVERAL other rencounters happened, and in all of them the Engliſh proved victorious, through the great advantage which they derived from the lightneſs of their ſhips, and the dexterity of the ſailors. The Spaniards in that age did not ſufficiently underſtand nautical mechanics, to be able to avail themſelves of the unuſual magnitude of their ſhips. The Engliſh ſailed round them, approached or retired with a velocity that filled them with amazement, and did infinitely greater execution with their cannon; for while every ſhot of theirs proved effectual, their ſhips ſuffered very little damage from the enemy, whoſe guns were planted too high, and generally ſpent their force in air.

The Armada oppoſite to Calais.

THE Spaniards however ſtill continued to advance till they came oppoſite to Calais: there the duke de Medina having ordered them to caſt anchor, he ſent information to the duke of Parma of his

his arrival, and intreated him to haſten the embarkation of his forces. Farneſe ſet out immediately from Bruges, where the meſſenger found him, for Nieuport, and he began to put his troops on board. But at the ſame time he informed Medina, that, agreeably to the king's inſtructions, the veſſels which he had prepared, were proper only for tranſporting the troops, but were utterly unfit for fighting; and for this reaſon, till the Armada were brought ſtill nearer, and the coaſt cleared of the Dutch ſhips which had blocked up the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk, he could not ſtir from his preſent ſtation, without expoſing his army to certain ruin, the conſequence of which would probably be the entire loſs of the Netherlands. 1588.

In compliance with this requeſt, the Armada was ordered to advance, and it had arrived within ſight of Dunkirk, between the Engliſh fleet on the one hand, and the Dutch on the other, when a ſudden calm put a ſtop to all its motions. In this ſituation the three fleets remained for one whole day. About the middle of the night a breeze ſprung up, and lord Howard had recourſe to an expedient which had been happily deviſed on the day before. Having filled eight ſhips with pitch, ſulphur, and other combuſtible materials, he ſet fire to them and ſent them before the wind againſt the different diviſions of the Spaniſh fleet. Is thrown into confuſion by the Engliſh fire-ſhips. Auguſt 7th.

When the Spaniards beheld theſe ſhips in flames approaching towards them, it brought to their remembrance the havock which had been made by the fireſhips employed againſt the duke of Parma's bridge at the ſiege of Antwerp. The darkneſs of the night increaſed the terror with which their imaginations were overwhelmed, and the panic flew from one end of the fleet to the other. Each crew, anxious only for their own preſervation, thought of

Book XXI. 1588.

of nothing but how to eſcape from the preſent danger. Some of them took time to weigh their anchors, but others cut their cables, and ſuffered their ſhips to drive with blind precipitation, without conſidering whether they did not thereby expoſe themſelves to a greater danger than that which they were ſo ſolicitous to avoid. In this confuſion the ſhips ran foul of one another: the ſhock was dreadful, and ſeveral of them received ſo much damage as to be rendered unfit for future uſe.

Battle between the two fleets.

WHEN day-light returned, lord Howard had the ſatisfaction to perceive that his ſtratagem had fully produced the deſired effect. The enemy were ſtill in extreme diſorder, and their ſhips widely ſeparated and diſperſed. His fleet had lately received a great augmentation by the ſhips fitted out by the nobility and gentry, and by thoſe under lord Seymour, who had left Juſtin de Naſſau as alone ſufficient to guard the coaſt of Flanders. Being bravely ſeconded by Sir Francis Drake, and all the other officers, he made haſte to improve the advantage which was now preſented to him, and attacked the enemy in different quarters at the ſame time with the utmoſt impetuoſity and ardour.

Auguſt 8th.

The engagement began at four in the morning, and laſted till ſix at night. The Spaniards diſplayed in every rencounter the moſt intrepid bravery; but, from the cauſes already mentioned, they did very little execution againſt the Engliſh, while many of their own ſhips were greatly damaged, and ten of the largeſt were either run aground, or ſunk, or compelled to ſurrender.

Loſſes ſuſtained by the Spaniards.

THE principal galeaſs, commanded by Moncada, having Mauriquez the inſpector-general on board, with three hundred galley-ſlaves and four hundred ſoldiers, was driven aſhore near Calais. She was quickly followed by ſome Engliſh pinnaces, and

theſe

theſe were ſupported by the admiral's long boat, in which he had ſent a body of ſelect ſoldiers to their aſſiſtance. Moncada himſelf, and almoſt all the Spaniards, were either killed or drowned in attempting to reach the ſhore. The rowers were ſet at liberty. About fifty thouſand ducats were found on board. Mauriquez eſcaped, and was the firſt who carried the news of the diſaſter of the fleet to Spain.

ONE of the capital ſhips having been long battered by an Engliſh captain of the name of Croſs, was ſunk in the time of the engagement. A few only of the crew were ſaved, who related, that one of the officers on board having propoſed to ſurrender, he was killed by another who was enraged at his propoſal; that this other was killed by the brother of the firſt; and that it was in the midſt of this bloody ſcene, which paints the ferocious character of the Spaniards, that the ſhip had gone to the bottom [s].

THE fate of two other of the Spaniſh galleons is particularly mentioned by the cotemporary hiſtorians. One of them was called the St. Philip, and the other the St. Matthew, which had on board, beſides ſeveral other nobility, two general officers, Don Francis Toledo, of the family of Orgas, and Don Diego Pimentel, brother to the marquis of Tomnarez. After an obſtinate engagement, in which the admiral's ſhip fought along with them, they were obliged to run aſhore on the coaſt of Flanders, where they were taken by the Dutch. Toledo was drowned, and Pimentel, and all the reſt who ſurvived, were made priſoners.

THE duke de Medina was much dejected at theſe misfortunes, and ſtill more when he reflected on the ſuperior ſkill of the enemy. For it

The duke de Medina deſpairs of ſucceſs.

[s] Meteren and Grotius.

BOOK XXI. 1588.

it is well atteſted, that in all the engagements which had paſſed ſince the firſt appearance of the Armada in the channel, the Engliſh had loſt only one ſmall ſhip, and about a hundred men. Animated by their paſt ſucceſs with ſanguine hopes of final victory, they were now more formidable than ever. Medina dreaded, from a continuance of the combat, the entire deſtruction of his fleet. He could not without the greateſt danger remain any longer in his preſent ſituation, and much leſs could he venture to approach any nearer to the coaſt of Flanders.

Cauſe of his deſpair.

IT now appeared how great an error Philip had committed, in neglecting to ſecure ſome commodious harbours in Zealand. He had from the firſt ſuppoſed that the enemy's ſhips would fly to their reſpective ports, as ſoon as his ſtupendous Armada ſhould appear. But this Armada had been made unfit for the purpoſe for which it was deſigned, by means of that enormous expence which he beſtowed in order to render it invincible. In conſtructing it, no attention had been given to the nature of thoſe narrow ſeas in which it was to be employed; and the conſequence of this important error was, that even if the Engliſh fleet had been unable to contend with the Spaniards in the deeper parts of the channel, yet they would have prevented them from landing; and the Dutch fleet lying in ſhallow water, to which the Galleons durſt not approach, would ſtill have kept their ſtation, and have rendered it impoſſible for the Spaniſh fleet and army to act in concert.

He reſolves to return to Spain.

THIS the duke of Medina at length perceived, and he did not heſitate in reſolving to abandon the further proſecution of his enterpriſe. The only ſubject of his deliberation now was, how he might, with

with the leaſt difficulty and danger, get back to Spain. Had he been ever ſo much inclined to return through the channel, in which he muſt have been continually haraſſed by the enemy, yet the wind, which blew ſtrong from the ſouth, would have prevented him. He therefore reſolved to ſail northwards, and to make the circuit of the Britiſh iſles. 1588.

THIS reſolution was no ſooner underſtood by the Engliſh admiral, than having diſpatched lord Seymour with a part of the fleet, to join the Dutch in watching the motions of the duke of Parma, he ſet ſail himſelf with the greater part of it, in purſuit of the Spaniards. He followed cloſe in their rear for three days; without attacking them. This he declined from the apprehenſion of his not having a ſufficient quantity of gun-powder, with which he had been ill ſupplied by the public offices. Had he not been deterred from renewing his attack by this provoking circumſtance, he might have forced the Spaniards to an engagement off Flamborough-head; and it is aſſerted by a reſpectable cotemporary hiſtorian [h], that ſo great was the diſtreſs of the Spaniſh fleet, and ſuch the admiral's dread of the long and dangerous voyage before him, that he would have ſurrendered without reſiſtance, in caſe he had been attacked. But he was ſaved from the diſgrace in which this action would have involved his name, through the neceſſity under which the Engliſh admiral found himſelf of returning to England, to ſupply the deficiency of his ſtores.

Diſaſters which befell the Armada.

LORD Howard had reaſon to be incenſed againſt thoſe, by whoſe negligence he was thus diſabled from completing the glory which his gallant conduct had procured him. In the iſſue, however, it

[h] Grotius.

BOOK XXI. 1588.

it would have been unfortunate, if he had delayed his return. The two fleets ſailing in oppoſite directions, were not far diſtant from each other, when a dreadful ſtorm aroſe. The Engliſh reached home, though not without difficulty, yet without ſuſtaining any conſiderable loſs. But the Spaniards were expoſed to the ſtorm in all its rage, and became no leſs objects of pity to their enemies, than they had lately been of dread and terror. Having hitherto kept near each other, leſt the Engliſh ſhould have renewed the attack, this circumſtance proved the firſt cauſe of their diſaſters. The ſhips were driven violently againſt each other, and thereby many of them were rendered an eaſy prey to the fury of the waves. At length they were diſperſed. In order to enable them to ride out the ſtorm, the horſes, mules, and baggage were thrown over-board. This precaution was of advantage only to ſuch of the ſhips as were ſtronger, or more fortunate than the reſt. Some of them were daſhed to pieces on the rocks of Norway, or ſunk in the middle of the ocean. Others were thrown upon the coaſts of Scotland, and the Weſtern Iſles. And more than thirty were driven by another ſtorm, which overtook them from the weſt, on different parts of the coaſts of Ireland. Of theſe, ſome afterwards reached home in the moſt ſhattered condition, under the vice-admiral Ricaldo; others were ſhipwrecked among the rocks and ſhallows; and of thoſe which reached the ſhore, the crews were barbarouſly murdered; from an apprehenſion, it was pretended, that in a country where there were ſo many diſaffected catholics, it would have been dangerous to ſhew mercy to ſo great a number of the enemy. The duke de Medina having kept out in the open ſeas, eſcaped ſhipwreck, and arrived at Saint Andero in Biſcay about the end of September.

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THE calamities of the Spaniards did not end with their arrival in Spain. Two of the galleons which had withſtood the ſtorm, were accidentally ſet on fire, and conſumed to aſhes in the harbour. Great numbers, eſpecially of the nobility and gentry, accuſtomed to a life of eaſe and pleaſure, had died at ſea; and many more died afterwards of diſeaſes occaſioned by the hardſhips they had undergone.

VERY different accounts are given by different hiſtorians, of the total loſs ſuſtained. Some aſſert that it amounted to thirty-two ſhips, and ten thouſand men; but others without pretending to aſcertain the number of men, which could not, they ſay, be leſs than fifteen thouſand, affirm that more than eighty ſhips were taken, deſtroyed, or loſt [i]. This dreadful calamity was ſenſibly felt all over Spain, and there was ſcarcely a ſingle family of rank in the kingdom that did not go into mourning for the death of ſome near relation; inſomuch that Philip dreading the effect which this univerſal face of ſorrow might produce upon the minds of the people, imitated the conduct of the Roman ſenate, and publiſhed an edict to abridge the time of public mourning [k].

Rejoicings in England and Holland.

WHILE the people of Spain were thus overwhelmed with affliction, there was nothing to be heard in England and the united provinces but the voice of feſtivity and joy. In Holland medals were ſtruck in commemoration of the happy event; and

[i] As the preſident de Thou, who lived at the time of this memorable event, pretends not to determine to which of theſe relations the greateſt regard is due, it would be in vain at this time to attempt to decide betwixt them.

[k] Meteren, lib. xiv. Grotii Hiſtoria, lib. i. Campana Decad. vii. lib. i. Ferreras and Thuanus.

BOOK XXI. 1588.

and in both countries, days of ſolemn thankſgiving to Heaven were appointed for their deliverance. Elizabeth went for this purpoſe to St. Paul's cathedral, ſeated in a triumphal chariot, and ſurrounded with her miniſters and nobles, amidſt a great number of flags and colours which had been taken from the enemy; while the citizens were ranged in arms on each ſide of the ſtreets through which ſhe paſſed. Nor did the deſtruction of the Armada give joy only to the Engliſh and Dutch. All Europe had trembled at the thoughts of its ſucceſs. For although it can hardly be ſuppoſed that Philip was ſo romantic as to flatter himſelf with the hopes of attaining univerſal monarchy, yet it is not to be imagined that he aſpired only at the conqueſt of England and Holland. He had before this time formed the plan, which he afterwards purſued, of ſubduing France. Nor can it be believed that any thing leſs would have ſatisfied his ambition, than the ſubjection of every proteſtant ſtate in Europe, and the utter extirpation of the reformed religion.

Philip's magnanimous behaviour.

His ambition was, on this occaſion, ſeverely mortified. But as he poſſeſſed in a high degree the art of concealing his emotions, he received intelligence of the diſaſter that had befallen him, with an appearance of magnanimity and reſignation to the will of Heaven, which, if it was not affected, deſerved the higheſt praiſe. He returned thanks to God, that the calamity was not greater. He iſſued orders to have the utmoſt care taken of the ſick and wounded who had ſurvived the general cataſtrophe. And inſtead of forbidding the duke de Medina Sidonia to come to court, as is alleged by ſome hiſtorians, he wrote to him in the moſt obliging terms, expreſſing his gratitude for the zeal which he had diſcovered in his ſervice; and obſerving, that no man could anſwer for

the ſucceſs of an enterprize, which, like that herein the duke had been engaged, depended the winds and waves [1]. BOOK XXI. 1588.

PHILIP's behaviour towards the duke of Parma this difficult occaſion, contained the ſame diſy of juſtice that appeared in his letter to Medina lonia. Notwithſtanding the many proofs which rneſe had exhibited in the ſight of all Europe, of lefatigable vigour and activity, as well as of heroic lour, yet the failure of the expedition againſt gland was by ſome aſcribed to his negligence making the neceſſary preparations, and by others, his exceſſive caution or timidity. But Philip uſed to liſten to theſe groundleſs calumnies. He l continued to repoſe in the duke his wonted nfidence; and teſtified towards him all that at:hment and eſteem which his conduct in the Ne:rlands had deſerved. The truth is, that as the ncipal error in conducting the expedition had en committed, by neglecting the duke of Par:'s advice, ſo no perſon was more deeply intereſtin its ſucceſs; ſince, if the Armada had opened paſſage for his troops, the whole direction of the terpriſe would have belonged to him, and the bleſt opportunity, to which his ambition could pire, have been given of exerting thoſe illuſtri:s military talents which have acquired him ſuch ſtinguiſhed renown.

THE duke had the greater reaſon to entertain e hopes of victory, in caſe his army could have :en tranſported to England, as Elizabeth had, om her partiality for the earl of Leiceſter, be>wed the chief command of her land forces on at nobleman, who was ſo little entitled, either by s courage or his abilities, to ſo great a truſt. Her od fortune, or more properly the kind providence

[1] Ferreras, part xv. Strada, lib. v.

Book XXI. 1588.

vidence of Heaven, ſo conſpicuouſly exerciſed in her behalf, ſaved her from the conſequences with which this unjuſtifiable ſtep might have been attended. It was perhaps the only imprudent meaſure of which, at this difficult criſis, ſhe can be juſtly accuſed; and ſhe fully atoned for it by the wiſdom, vigour, and fortitude which ſhe diſplayed in every other part of her conduct.

PART II.

Situation of Elizabeth.

ELIZABETH's ſituation now was extremely different from what it had ever been ſince her acceſſion to the throne. Having been delivered ſome time before the preſent period from the queen of Scots, who had long been a principal cauſe of her inquietude; ſhe had found the art of appeaſing the reſentment, and even of conciliating the favour, of the ſon of that unfortunate princeſs. She had united her catholic and proteſtant ſubjects in her defence, and had triumphed over her implacable enemy the king of Spain. She had not the ſame reaſon as formerly to dread the power of that monarch, which he had exerted in vain for her deſtruction, and ſhe had very little reaſon to apprehend that he would ſoon renew his attempt to invade her dominions. To prevent this, by furniſhing him with employment elſewhere, had been long her principal motive for taking ſuch deep concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. This motive did not ſubſiſt in the ſame degree of force as formerly, yet ſhe reſolved to adhere faithfully to her engagements with the States, and ſtill to aſſiſt and ſupport them. After Leiceſter's reſignation, ſhe had conferred the command of her troops in the Netherlands upon lord Willoughby, ſubjecting this nobleman, however,

Lord Willoughby.

however to the authority of the ſtates, and leaving the command in chief to prince Maurice, to whom the States themſelves had lately committed it. BOOK XXI. 1588.

Prince Maurice.

IT was not gratitude alone, or a reſpect for the memory of the late prince of Orange, that determined the confederated provinces to repoſe ſo great a truſt at this perilous conjuncture in his ſon, who was at this time only in the twenty-firſt year of his age. Maurice had, from his earlieſt youth, given proof of ſuperior prudence and capacity; and his conduct afterwards fulfilled the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen, with much leſs moderation and ſelf-command, and leſs too of the art of governing the minds of men, which William poſſeſſed in ſo eminent a degree, Maurice was ſuperior to his father in military accompliſhments, and of theſe the confederacy ſtood more in need at the preſent period, than of political abilities.

MAURICE had no opportunity of exerciſing his talents for war, from the time of Leiceſter's departure till the fate of the Spaniſh Armada was decided. A great number of his beſt troops had been put on board the fleet commanded by Juſtin de Naſſau; all the garriſons of the maritime towns had been augmented, leſt the Spaniards ſhould have attempted to make a deſcent; and there was no body of forces left, ſufficient to enable him to take advantage of the duke of Parma's inactivity, by undertaking any military enterprize.

The duke of Parma meditates the ſiege of Bergen-op-Zoom.

THE firſt opportunity of action was afforded him by a reſolution which the duke formed, as ſoon as he perceived there was no longer any proſpect of invading England, to beſiege the town of Bergen-op-Zoom. This town, as its name imports, is ſituated on the river Zoom, at a little diſtance from the place where that river falls into the Scheld;

BOOK XXI. 1588.

and by this laſt river the territory of Bergen is ſeparated from the iſle of Tolen. Farneſe thinking it neceſſary towards the ſucceſs of his intended enterprize, to be maſter of this iſland, ſent count Charles of Manſvelt with a body of eight hundred foot to take poſſeſſion of it; and in order to conceal his deſign, he ordered them to make a feint of marching towards Heuſden. This artifice however had not the deſired ſucceſs. Maurice had taken care to have both Bergen and Tolen properly furniſhed with troops for their defence.

AT low water it is practicable to paſs over to Tolen upon foot, and in this way count Manſvelt endeavoured to approach it. But the governor, count Solmes, was ſo well prepared to receive him, that Manſvelt was ſoon obliged to abandon his attempt, and in his retreat he loſt about four hundred men. In the mean time the duke of Parma had advanced with his army, and inveſted the town on the land ſide, without having met with any conſiderable oppoſition. But the beſieged beheld his operations with great indifference; their communication with Holland and Zealand was ſtill as free and open as before. In order to intercept it, they knew that the enemy muſt firſt reduce two ſtrong forts which ſtood between the town and the Scheld, and this they truſted could not be accompliſhed before the approach of winter.

October.

He is deceived by two Britiſh ſoldiers.

THE duke immediately began his operations with an attack upon one of theſe forts; but before he had made any conſiderable progreſs, he conceived hopes of acquiring poſſeſſion of it in a way much more eaſy and expeditious than by open force. Two ſoldiers belonging to the garriſon, whom ſome hiſtorians call Scots, and others Engliſh, having gone over to Farneſe, offered to deliver the fort to him, on condition of his granting them

them a ſuitable reward for ſo great a ſervice. Farneſe lent a willing ear to their propoſal, and gave them the moſt flattering promiſes; but as he ſtill ſuſpected them of inſincerity, he made them confirm what they had told him by an oath, and required that they ſhould be carried bound in the midſt of the ſoldiers whom he intended to employ in executing the plan which they had ſuggeſted. To this, as well as to the oath required from them, they readily agreed. The duke could no longer remain diſtruſtful, and ordered De Leyva, one of his braveſt officers, to be ready immediately after ſun-ſet with three thouſand infantry, to advance towards the fort. De Leyva ſet out at the time appointed, and arrived at the gate when it was beginning to grow dark. Upon a ſignal given by the two Britiſh ſoldiers the port was opened, but no ſooner had about fifty of the Spaniards entered, than the portcullis was let down, and all the reſt excluded. Thoſe who had entered perceived the treachery of their guides, but being more ſolicitous to ſave their own lives than to take vengeance on the traitors, they ſuffered them to eſcape, and the Spaniards themſelves were inſtantly ſurrounded by the garriſon, and either put to the ſword or taken priſoners. 1588.

Of thoſe who were without, only ſuch as were near the gate were acquainted with what had happened, while the reſt who were ignorant of it ſtill preſſing forward, made it impoſſible for the foremoſt to retire. Theſe men, rendered deſperate by their perilous ſituation, attempted to ſcale the ramparts, but they were ſoon repulſed by the garriſon, who were every where upon their guard. The guns of the fort began to play upon them. The darkneſs of the night increaſed their confuſion, and they fell into an ambuſh which the garriſon had

1588. prepared. A great number was killed, and many were swallowed up in the mud and water with which the fire was surrounded.

The duke of Parma obliged to raise the siege of Bergen.

After this misfortune the duke of Parma despaired of succeeding in his enterprize. Heavy rains had newly fallen, his troops were begun to grow sickly, and all the country round, which was naturally wet, was become almost inaccessible to his convoys of Provisions. Determined by these circumstances, he raised the siege before the middle of November, after fortifying some passes in the neighbourhood of the place, to restrain the excursions of the garrison [m].

No sooner had he drawn off his troops from Bergen, than having put the Italians and Spaniards into winter-quarters, he sent the Germans under count Peter Ernest de Mansfelt to lay siege to Wachtendonck, in Upper Guelderland, a small place, but strongly fortified, and situated in the midst of a marshy soil. Farnese was, notwithstanding these circumstances, determined to employ his troops in reducing it, by loud complaints which were made to him of the continual depredations of the garrison. This garrison consisted of troops formed by the celebrated Schenck, whose bravery would have baffled the utmost efforts of count Mansfelt, had it not been for a circumstance which intitles the siege of this little town to a place in history. It was in this siege that bombs, the late invention of an inhabitant of Venlo, were first employed. To save the town from destruction, the citizens prevailed on the garrison to consent to a surrender, but not till they had sallied out and killed a great number of the enemy; many of whom likewise perished by the inclemency of the season, and the humidity of the air and soil.

The invention of bombs.

IN

[m] Grotius Hist. lib. i. Bentivoglio, and Meteren, anno 1588.

1589.

In conſequence of the loſs of men ſuſtained at this ſiege and that of Bergen, the duke of Parma found his army exceedingly diminiſhed. This conſideration alone muſt have been a ſenſible mortification to a general of ſo great activity and enterprize, but he was ſtill more deeply mortified at the difficulty which he found in ſupporting the forces that ſtill remained under his command. They had begun to murmur on account of the arrears which were due to them, and he dreaded the loſs of that authority over them which he had hitherto maintained. He had earneſtly ſolicited remittances from the court of Spain, and had repreſented the fatal conſequences which muſt attend the irregular payment of his troops. But his requeſts had not for ſome time paſt been liſtened to as formerly, and ſome of the bills which he drew had been returned unpaid. This was owing partly to the low ſtate of Philip's finances, which, great as his reſources were, had been overburdened by the enormous expence in which his late armament had involved him; and partly to the malignity and envy of the Spaniſh miniſters. The duke could not conceal his chagrin at the diſappointment, which was greatly augmented by the decline of his health, and the ſymptoms of a dropſy, which ſome years afterwards put a period to his life[a].

Anxiety of the Duke of Parma.

In this ſituation he received greater ſatisfaction from an event which was one of the conſequences of the intrigues of the earl of Leiceſter. The gariſons of ſeveral towns had, through the influence of that nobleman's partizans, or from the deficiencies in their pay occaſioned by his miſconduct, ſhewn great contempt for the authority of the States and prince Maurice; but they had all been brought

Gertrudenburg, betrayed to the Spaniards.

[a] Meteren, p. 503.

BOOK XXI. 1589.

brought back to their duty, except the garriſon of St. Gertrudenburg, which conſiſted of one thouſand five hundred foot and three hundred horſe, partly Dutch and partly Engliſh. This garriſon having indulged themſelves in greater exceſſes than any other, were conſcious of ſuch a degree of guilt as they thought could not eaſily be forgiven: they were therefore ſtill as refractory and ſeditious as ever, maintaining openly, that they were accountable to none but the queen of England; and ſeizing upon ſhips, and carrying off plunder from the friends as well as the enemies of the confederacy. The States apprehenſive of their delivering the town to the enemy, applied every ſoothing expedient to prevent them. They offered them a full pardon of their offences, got lord Willoughby to interpoſe his influence, and made immediate payment of a great proportion of their arrears; but all endeavours were ineffectual. In the mean time Lanzavecchia, the governor of Breda, being well informed of their temper and diſpoſition, employed ſecret agents to confirm them in their ſeditious purpoſes, holding forth to them the rewards which they might hope for from the duke of Parma, while there was nothing to be expected from the queen of England or the States, but either an ignominious puniſhment, or perpetual diffidence and contempt. They heſitated for ſome time; but when an offer was made to them in the name of the duke of Parma of full payment of their arrears, beſides a ſum of money equal to five years pay, they were unable to reſiſt the allurement; they agreed to give up the town on the terms propoſed, and began to prepare for the execution of their deſign, by diſarming the inhabitants. Upon receiving intelligence of this infamous tranſaction, prince Maurice ſet out by ſea with a body of troops, in order to reduce the garriſon by force of arms. But before

before he had time to make any progreſs in the ſiege, having been informed that the duke of Parma was upon his march to oppoſe him with a ſuperior army, he thought it prudent to retire. The duke ſoon afterwards entered the town, and having fulfilled his engagements to the garriſon, he beſtowed the government upon Lanzavecchia, as a reward for the ſervice he had performed. Gertrudenburg was the firſt town in Holland which the Spaniards had acquired ſince their expulſion from that province about twelve years before; and it gave Farneſe, on that account, the moſt ſenſible joy and ſatisfaction. The States on the other hand expreſſed their indignation againſt the traitors, by proſcribing them; and it ought not to be forgotten, that through various accidents almoſt all of them fell into the hands of the confederates, and had the ſentence of proſcription executed upon them with the utmoſt rigour.

From Gertrudenburg the Spaniſh army was ſent under count Charles of Manſvelt, to reduce the towns of Heuſden and Romerſval, and the fort of Louveſtein; but all their attempts on theſe places were baffled by the activity and vigour of prince Maurice and count Hohenloe.

The duke of Parma returned to Bruſſels, and not long afterwards he ſet out for Germany, to drink the waters at Spa, although it was believed he would not have gone at this ſeaſon, which was the moſt proper for all military operations, if his army had been in a condition to enter upon any enterprize worthy of his former fame *. During his abſence, prince Maurice was barely able to prevent count Manſvelt from making any new acquiſitions. The forces of theſe two generals were [illegible] [illegible]

The duke [illegible] at Spa. [illegible]

May.

* Grotius, p. 132.

Book XXI. 1589.

neither party was inclined to riſk an engagement, and no rencounter paſt between them that deſerves to be recorded.

Atchievements of Schenck.

Some important ſervices were in the mean time performed by the indefatigable Schenck in the interior provinces. Having ſome time before the preſent period, propoſed to the States to build a fort upon the Rhine, at the place where that river divides itſelf into two branches, and forms the iſle of Betuwe[p], the States approved highly of his propoſal, and furniſhed him with every thing neceſſary for carrying it into execution. He finiſhed it with great diſpatch, and having fixed there his head-quarters, he over-ran all the country round, and ſeized every favourable opportunity of annoying the enemy. He took the city of Bonne, upon the Rhine, by ſurpriſe in the night. Having been informed that a body of troops were upon their march to reinforce Verdugo, the governor of Groningen, and were eſcorting a ſum of money to that place for the payment of the garriſon, he choſe his ground with ſo much ſkill, and attacked them with ſuch impetuoſity and ardour, that he routed them, and got poſſeſſion of the money without the loſs of a ſingle man. But there was nothing on which he was ſo intent as the recovery of Nimeguen, which ſome years before he himſelf had conquered for the Spaniards. Nimeguen ſtands on the banks of the Waal, at the diſtance of only a few hours ſail from the fort which Schenck had conſtructed. Having embarked his troops, he ſet out with an intention to reach the town about the middle of the night. Through ſome accident or miſtake he did not arrive till the morning, when he happened unfortunately to land at a houſe where a number of perſons were

[p] Called anciently Batavia.

were aſſembled for the celebration of a wedding. By theſe perſons the alarm was inſtantly given to the reſt of the inhabitants, who were well acquainted with the enmity with which Schenck had for ſome time paſt been animated againſt them, and knew that an univerſal pillage would be the conſequence of his ſucceſs. They ran to arms from every quarter, and made a furious attack upon his men, and, notwithſtanding the moſt intrepid reſiſtance, drove them towards their boats in great confuſion. Schenck endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. The town's people purſued, and ſlew many of them while they were attempting to eſcape. Schenck himſelf was wounded, and immediately afterwards his boat was overſet, and he, and all on board were drowned. Such was the fate of this brave man at the age of forty, by whom, ever ſince his revolt, the Spaniards had been ſubjected to perpetual apprehenſions and alarms [q].

Death of Schenck.

No other material tranſaction occurred during this campaign but the ſiege of Rhinberg, which was undertaken at the earneſt deſire of the elector of Cologn, and the charge of it committed by the duke of Parma to the marquis of Varambon. Colonel Vere, an Engliſh officer of high reputation, was ſent by the States to the relief of the beſieged, and between him and Varambon a bloody battle was fought, in which the Engliſh commander gained a complete victory. After this he entered the town, and fortified it ſo ſtrongly, as enabled the inhabitants for ſome time longer to preſerve their liberty and independence.

Battle of Rhinberg.

It was now the end of autumn, and the duke of Parma was returned from Spa. Soon after his return, his apprehenſions with regard to the conſequences of the irregular payment of his troops, were

The duke of Parma returns from Spa.

[q] Bentivoglio, p. 334.

BOOK XXI. 1589.

were verified by the mutiny of a Spaniſh regiment which lay in garriſon at Courtray. From complaints the ſoldiers proceeded to threats, and at laſt openly refuſed to obey his commands. With the utmoſt difficulty he raiſed money ſufficient to appeaſe them. But as this was the firſt ſedition which had happened ſince the commencement of his government, he was the more ſenſibly afflicted by it, and dreaded, that the example which it afforded, would ſoon be followed by the garriſons in other towns.

The ſurpriſe of Breda. 1590.

THIS event happened about the end of the year 1589; and in the month of February immediately following, another misfortune happened, which convinced the duke, that prince Maurice was an antagoniſt of a character extremely different from that of any other with whom he had hitherto contended. This was the loſs of the important city of Breda, of which Maurice got poſſeſſion by a ſingular ſtratagem, ſuggeſted to him by the maſter of a boat, called Adrian Vandenberg, who had ſometimes ſupplied the town and garriſon with turf for firing. When Lanzavecchia, the governor, was at Breda, all veſſels which came there were carefully examined; but the duke of Parma, having rewarded this crafty Italian, for the part which he acted in corrupting the garriſon of St. Gertrudenburg, with the government of that town, ſtill ſuffered him to retain that of Breda. Lanzavecchia found it neceſſary to be often abſent from the latter of theſe places; and, during his abſence, uſually committed the charge of it to his ſon. Vandenberg having obſerved that on theſe occaſions there was commonly great negligence in ſearching his boat, founded upon this circumſtance his plan for taking the citadel by ſurpriſe. It was communicated to prince Maurice,

rice, who readily embraced it, and immediately applied himſelf to put it in execution. The boat was loaded in appearance with turf, as uſual; but the turf was ſupported by a floor of planks fixed at the diſtance of ſeveral feet from the bottom; and under this floor ſeventy ſelect ſoldiers were placed, under the command of Charles Harauguer[p], an officer of diſtinguiſhed valour and capacity. They had but a few miles to ſail; yet, through unexpected accidents, ſeveral days paſſed before they could reach Breda. The wind turned againſt them, the melting ice retarded their courſe, and the boat having ſtruck upon a bank, was ſo much damaged, that the ſoldiers were for ſome time up to the knees in water. Their proviſions were almoſt ſpent, and one of their number was ſeized with a violent cough, which, if it continued, they foreſaw would certainly occaſion a diſcovery. This man had the generoſity to offer them his ſword, and to entreat them to kill him. They as generouſly declined it; and being reſolved to run all riſks, rather than embrue their hands in the blood of their companion, they ſtill perſiſted in their deſign. Happily their virtue was rewarded: the ſoldier's cough left him, and even the leak in their veſſel was ſtopt by ſome accidental cauſe.

In order to ſecure the abſence of Lanzavecchia, whoſe vigilance there was much ground to dread, prince Maurice had made a feint of marching againſt Gertrudenburg, and this artifice produced the deſired effect. Lanzavecchia was abſent from Breda when the boat arrived. It was admitted within the fortifications of the caſtle, and the ſearch was made in the moſt ſuperficial manner.

[p] A native of Cambray.

Not-

BOOK XXI. 1590.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, there was ſtill the utmoſt danger of a diſcovery, and it would certainly have been made, had not Vandenberg poſſeſſed an extraordinary ſhare of addreſs and art, which he exerted on this occaſion. There being a ſcarcity of fuel in the caſtle, the turf was immediately purchaſed; the ſoldiers of the garriſon were ſet to work in carrying it aſhore, and ſo great a number of hands were employed, that they would ſoon have uncovered the planks, and thereby have detected the plot, had not Vandenberg, pretending to be fatigued with labour and watching, and unable to aſſiſt the ſoldiers any longer in unloading, firſt amuſed them with diſcourſe, and then invited them to join him in drinking ſome wine which he had provided. His offer was readily accepted. The night came on, and the Spaniſh ſoldiers were all either aſleep or drunk. Vandenberg then ſet out, in order to give notice of his ſucceſs to prince Maurice and count Hohenloe, who, according to agreement, had in great ſilence brought forward a body of forces within a little diſtance of the town.

ABOUT the middle of the night, Harauguer iſſued forth from his retreat; and having divided his band into two bodies, he attacked, at the ſame time, both the guards which were placed at the gate towards the country, and thoſe which were ſtationed at another gate which led from the citadel to the town, and meeting with little reſiſtance, he ſecured poſſeſſion of the gates. Young Lanzavecchia ruſhed out againſt him with between thirty and forty of the garriſon; but theſe men were not able to withſtand the determined and deſperate valour of the aſſailants. They were all either put to the ſword or diſperſed, and Lanzavecchia himſelf was wounded and taken priſoner.

THE

alarm was ſo [illegible] in the town. there was a [illegible] companies of Italian foot. [illegible] zens offered to co-operate [illegible] ding the fortifications, all the ſtate of ould come to their relief: but this con- miſon, being ſtruck with an univerſal pa- having no commander in chief to direct rations, ſoldiers from the town. In time prince Maurice arrived in the con- the inhabitants, having now an army rt them, ſent a trumpet with an offer to r, on condition that they ſhould not be d. And to this prince Maurice readily but required that they ſhould pay ten houſand florins to be diſtributed among s.

ICE received the greater ſatisfaction from uiſition, which had been attended with the nly one man, as Breda had been for many e hereditary property of his family; and ſame reaſon the citizens were the leſs re- in ſubmitting to his authority. He ap- the brave Haraugier to be governor of the nd liberally rewarded Vanderberg, and al r ſailors and ſoldiers, in proportion to their

duke of Parma, on the other hand, was ly mortified with what had happened, and ncenſed againſt his countrymen the Italians, l ſo baſely deſerted the town committed to e. He ordered the officers to be arreſted, rwards commanded all of them to be ex- agreeably to the ſentence of a court-mar- ept one, whom he pardoned in conſidera- is youth [t].

Lanzavecchia's imprudence in committing rtant a charge to ſo young a man as his ſon,

[t] Grotius. Bentivoglio.

BOOK XI. 1590.

ſon, was already ſeverely puniſhed by his ſon's impriſonment, and the loſs of the government of Breda. He puniſhed himſelf ſtill farther, by reſigning his government of Gertrudenburg. Such were the bitter fruits of that corruption for which this man had been ſo lately rewarded. According to the principles which warriors and politicians are ready to adopt, his conduct deſerved the reward which was beſtowed upon it; but to the friends of virtue it will give ſatisfaction to obſerve, that, in the courſe of providence, puniſhment is inflicted ſometimes not upon the treacherous alone, but on thoſe too by whom they are prompted, or encouraged in their treachery.

MEANWHILE Farneſe reſolving to recover the town, if poſſible, before prince Maurice ſhould have time to ſecure it, ſent count Manſvelt againſt it with a part of the army. But Maurice had no ſooner acquired poſſeſſion of the place, than he furniſhed it with proviſions ſufficient for many months, and ſtationed a garriſon in it conſiſting of one thouſand two hundred foot and four hundred horſe. Manſvelt did not therefore think it expedient to lay immediate ſiege to Breda; but in order to cut off the communication of the garriſon with Holland, he attempted to reduce a ſtrong fort in the mouth of the river Mark, which commanded the navigation of that river. From this attempt however he was obliged to deſiſt, after having loſt between ſix and ſeven hundred men. He then built another fort at the mouth of the river, and began to make preparations for beſieging the town itſelf. In order to divert him from the proſecution of his deſign, prince Maurice marched with a body of about five thouſand men towards Nimeguen, reſolving to beſiege that town in caſe Manſvelt did not relinquiſh his preſent enterprize.

FARNESE

FARNESE, ſenſible of the great importance of Nimeguen, ſent orders to count Manſvelt to lead his army thither without delay. Maurice perceived then that it was impracticable for him to attempt the ſiege with any probability of ſucceſs, and encamped his troops in the Betuwe, on the north ſide of the Waal, oppoſite to Nimeguen. Having fortified the banks of the river, to prevent count Manſvelt from tranſporting his forces, he built, in ſight of the enemy, a ſtrong fort, afterwards called by the name of Knotzenburg, directly oppoſite to the town; by which he not only deprived Nimeguen of all the advantages which it had hitherto derived from its ſituation; but, as the cannon of this fort could reach the town, the inhabitants were expoſed to continual danger. After having finiſhed this important work, he dug a navigable canal acroſs the Betuwe, from the Rhine to the Waal. This wiſe expedient rendered the navigation of the confederates in thoſe parts ſecure, by making it unneceſſary for their ſhips to paſs by Nimeguen; and it was of great advantage to all the country round, by leſſening the violence of the inundations to which that part of the Netherlands is ſometimes liable. The States of Guelderland and Overyſſel had a juſt ſenſe of the benefits which they derived from his operations, and they teſtified their gratitude by electing him governor of theſe two provinces. 1590.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXII.

PART I.

FROM the capacity and vigour which Maurice had already diſplayed, Philip might have perceived that he ſhould probably find full employment in the Netherlands for all the forces which, in the preſent ſtate of his finances, he was able to ſupport. And conſidering the unfortunate iſſue of his enterprize againſt Elizabeth, and how much the reputation of his arms and counſels had ſuffered from his long unſucceſsful ſtruggle with the inhabitants of the United Provinces, it might have been expected that he would have ſeen the abſurdity of that prepoſterous ambition which had led him to undertake new conqueſts before he had reduced his own dominions under obedience. It does not appear that he ever ſeriouſly entertained the thoughts of renewing his attempt againſt England;

BOOK XXII. 1590.

land; but having never relinquiſhed his deſigns on France, he had maintained his connexions with the heads of the catholic league; and notwithſtanding the difficulty which he found in paying his army in Flanders, he had from time to time ſupplied them with conſiderable ſums of money.

The catholic league.

THESE factious leaders had now more occaſion than ever for his aſſiſtance. After the treaty mentioned above, which Philip concluded with the duke of Guiſe at Joinville in the year 1585, the flames of war between the catholics and proteſtants had been kindled afreſh from one end of the kingdom to the other. Henry, well acquainted with the ſecret intentions of Guiſe and his partizans, which were no leſs hoſtile to himſelf than to the Calviniſts, would gladly have employed all his power for their deſtruction; but he ſoon perceived that he was unable to contend openly with ſo great a force as they had provided againſt him, and therefore diſguiſing his reſentment for the affront offered to his authority, he reſolved to accede to the league, in hopes of acquiring the direction of it, by declaring himſelf its head and protector. In conſequence of this reſolution, great preparations were made for proſecuting the war againſt the Calviniſts, and three different armies were raiſed. One of theſe Henry commanded in perſon; another was ſent under the duke de Joyeuſe againſt the king of Navarre; and the third was led by the duke of Guiſe, to oppoſe a numerous army of Germans, who were upon their march to the aſſiſtance of the Hugonots. Joyeuſe loſt both his army and his life in the battle of Coutras; but the duke of Guiſe, who made up for the ſmall number of his troops by his ſuperior conduct and intrepidity, proved victorious over the Germans, and thereby acquired an increaſe of popularity and fame, which gave him uncontroulable influence over almoſt all the catholics in the kingdom.

dom. Elated with his ſucceſs, and conſcious of his power, this ambitious leader could no longer delay the execution of his deſigns; but reſolved, after depoſing the king, and confining him to a cloiſter, to place the infirm and aged cardinal of Bourbon upon the throne; hoping to engroſs the whole adminiſtration, and to ſecure the ſucceſſion to himſelf, in the event of the cardinal's demiſe. Henry beheld with much dread the precipice on which he ſtood; and in order to avoid it, had recourſe to that deteſtable expedient, of which, in his youth, he had ſhewn his approbation, in the maſſacre of St. Bartholemew, by commanding both the duke of Guiſe, and his brother the cardinal, to be aſſaſſinated. BOOK XXII. 1590.

THIS murder, which even Henry pretended to juſtify only by the plea of neceſſity, did not produce the effect which he expected. Inſtead of intimidating his enemies, it ſerved to inflame their minds with wrath and indignation. In Paris, where the ſpirit of the league had long raged with the utmoſt fury, the people broke his ſtatues to pieces, the eccleſiaſtics declaimed againſt him in the bittereſt and moſt abuſive terms, and the Sorbonne declared him to have forfeited the crown. His ſubjects almoſt every where roſe up in arms againſt him, and the duke of Mayenne, brother of the Guiſes, a prince of extraordinary prudence and capacity, was choſen commander in chief in his brother's room.

IN this ſituation Henry had no reſource left but in the king of Navarre, whom he had deceived and perſecuted. But this generous and heroic prince readily forgot the injuries he had received from him, and made haſte to march with a numerous army to his aſſiſtance. Thus powerfully ſupported, Henry became an overmatch for his enemies; and he would ſoon have compelled the

BOOK XXII. 1589.

city of Paris to ſurrender, when a period was put to his life by a fanatic monk, who being ſeduced by his ſuperiors, burned with the deſire of meriting Heaven, by embruing his hands in the blood of his lawful prince. Such was the unfortunate end of Henry III. the laſt of the race of Valois, which had reigned over France for almoſt three hundred years.

Acceſſion of Henry IV.

THE king of Navarre, the undoubted heir of the crown, and whom the deceaſed monarch had nominated his ſucceſſor, was immediately proclaimed king in the camp, by the name of Henry IV. a name which will be for ever reſpected, not by the French nation alone, but by every friend of mankind and of virtue. Brought up in the hardeſt ſchool of adverſity, patient, frugal, and laborious; brave and wiſe; ſincere, humane, and generous; of the ſtricteſt integrity, and the moſt untainted honour; he had long commanded the admiration of his enemies, as well as of the impartial world. Never did any prince ſucceed to a throne, adorned with more ſplendid, more ſubſtantial, or more amiable accompliſhments; yet ſo fierce was the ſpirit of religious bigotry with which his ſubjects were inflamed; ſo great their abhorrence of Calviniſm; and ſuch their dread, that Henry who was himſelf a Calviniſt, although the moſt moderate of his ſect, would in imitation of the queen of England, overturn the popiſh religion, that many of the catholics inſtantly forſook his camp; nor would any of them have been perſuaded to remain with him, had he not given them ground to entertain hopes of his converſion.

IN Paris he had a numerous Party who would willingly have recogniſed his right, in caſe he would have agreed to embrace the popiſh faith. There were others who, under the pretence of religion, had no other end in view but to ſecure and perpetuate

tuate that unbounded licence which they had long enjoyed, of perpetrating the moſt atrocious crimes; and there were many, who having been gained over by Spaniſh influence, had, in concert with Mendoza the Spaniſh ambaſſador, and Cajetan the pope's legate; a partizan of Spain, formed the deſign of conferring the crown, either on Philip himſelf, or his daughter Iſabella [a]. 1590.

THE duke of Mayenne, who had adopted his brother's plan in all its branches, hoped to make theſe parties ſubſervient to his own elevation to the throne. This deſign, however, he concealed with care; and that he might have leiſure to prepare the means of putting it into execution, he prevailed on a great majority to concur in electing the cardinal of Bourbon king; to which meaſure likewiſe, Philip actuated by a ſimilar intention, gave his conſent.

HENRY in the mean time finding himſelf unable, from the great deſertion of his forces, to maintain his preſent ſituation before Paris, retired into Normandy, to wait there, till ſuccours, which he expected from Elizabeth, ſhould arrive Mayenne putting himſelf at the head of an army much more numerous than that of the king, purſued and attacked him in his fortifications near the town of Arques; but having been repulſed with great ſlaughter, and having ſuffered afterwards a total overthrow in the battle of Ivry, in which, as on many other occaſions, Henry's ſuperior bravery ſupplied his want of numbers, Mayenne was obliged, with the ſhattered remains of his army, to take refuge in the metropolis. There he ſtayed no longer than till he had conſulted with the duke of Nemours, the governor, with regard to the proper meaſures of defence, in caſe the city ſhould be beſieged by the victorious army; after which he ſet

[a] Grand-daughter of Henry II.

Book XXII.

1590.

ſet out for Picardy, to meet the duke of Parma, from whom he expected a reinforcemet of troops. The king arrived ſoon after in the neighbourhood of Paris, and having made himſelf maſter of the courſe of the Seyne, and the Marne, and blocked up every entry by which proviſions might be conveyed into the town, he inveſted it on every ſide, and ſoon reduced the inhabitants to extreme neceſſity.

Siege of Paris.

By the perſuaſion however of their leaders, ſeconded by the Spaniſh miniſter and the pope's legate; by the decrees of the Sorbonne, and the harangues of the clergy; they were confirmed in the reſolution which they had formed from the beginning, to endure every calamity, rather than receive an heretical king, whoſe authority they were taught to believe they could not acknowledge, without endangering their ſalvation.

Philip's views on France.

In their preſent diſtreſsful ſituation they had no proſpect of relief, but from the arms of Spain; nor was Philip leſs inclined now to interpoſe in their behalf, and that of the league in general, than formerly. The affairs of France were at this time the principal object of his attention; and he would gladly have exerted himſelf againſt the king with his utmoſt vigour, eſpecially as the cardinal of Bourbon was lately dead, if the preſent juncture had been favourable to his ambitious deſign, of ſeizing the monarchy for himſelf, or his daughter; by which, more than by zeal for the catholic faith, he had long been actuated. But having penetrated into the views of Mayenne, and found that from him and all his party he had reaſon to expect the moſt ſtrenuous oppoſition; he conſidered, that if Henry were utterly ſubdued, the catholics, ſtanding then no longer in need of his aſſiſtance, would probably unite againſt him, and without regard to the obligations which he had laid them under, render all his expence and labour fruitleſs.

fruitleſs. He reſolved therefore, agreeably to the advice of the duke of Parma, to protract the war, and to afford the league only ſuch aſſiſtance as might prevent the king from acquiring an entire aſcendant over them; hoping thereby to waſte the ſtrength of both the contending parties, and ſooner or later to oblige them to comply with whatever terms he ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. BOOK XXII. 1590.

CONFORMABLY to this plan, the duke of Parma, with whom Mayenne had an interview at Condé, gave him only two thouſand ſeven hundred foot and eight hundred horſe. But as this reinforcement was inadequate to the purpoſe for which it had been ſolicited, Philip became apprehenſive that the reſolution of the beſieged might fail; and dreaded, that if Henry were once maſter of the capital, a prince of ſo great ability and addreſs might ſoon compel the reſt of the kingdom to ſubmit to his authority. To prevent this, he reſolved to poſtpone every conſideration of prudence and intereſt to the raiſing of the ſiege; and ſent poſitive orders to the duke of Parma, to conduct his army to France for this purpoſe, with the utmoſt expedition. Farneſe, though poſſeſſed of capacity and courage equal to the moſt difficult and dangerous enterpriſe, would gladly have diverted Philip from his deſign. He repreſented to him the dangerous conſequences with which the abſence of his troops from the Netherlands would be attended; and he attempted to make him ſenſible of the extreme uncertainty of thoſe advantages which he expected to derive from taking ſo deep an intereſt in the affairs of France. But Philip blinded by his ambition, could not relinquiſh thoſe deluſive hopes which he had long fondly indulged, of adding France to his other dominions. He was deaf to the duke's prudent remonſtrances, and only liſtened to his advice, ſo far as to conſent that he might return

BOOK XXII.

return to the Low Countries, when the ſiege of Paris ſhould be raiſed.

1590. The duke of Parma's firſt expedition into France.

FINDING the king thus obſtinate and inflexible, Farneſe committed the government, during his abſence, to count Peter Erneſt of Manſvelt, and appointed his ſon count Charles to command the ſmall number of troops, which he deſigned to leave behind him for the defence of the Netherlands He then applied with great anxiety to make the neceſſary preparations for his march. For he was well aware of the difficulty which he muſt encounter in his intended enterprize againſt a prince of ſo great abilities as the king of France, in the midſt of his dominions, and at the head of a victorious army, commanded by a gallant and almoſt invincible nobility. This conſideration however, far from intimidating him, ſerved only to make him exert with more than ordinary vigour, thoſe illuſtrious talents with which he was endowed; leſt now, when he was about to enter the liſts with ſo great a rival for military fame, he ſhould forfeit that high renown which his former atchievements had procured him.

Compariſon of him with Henry.

HENRY was at this time about forty years of age, and Farneſe a few years older. From their earlieſt youth they had been alike diſtinguiſhed by the love of arms; and had paſt their lives either in learning, or in practiſing the art of war. They poſſeſſed alike the talent of conciliating the affections of their troops, without any relaxation of diſcipline, or diminution of authority. They were equal too in perſonal courage, in quick diſcernment, and in fertility of genius. But the king was more prompt in his deciſions; the duke more cautious and circumſpect. The latter always cool, and maſter of himſelf, tranſgreſſed on no occaſion the bounds of the ſtricteſt prudence; but the former

was

was often betrayed by his natural impetuoſity and ardour, rather to act the part of a common ſoldier, than of a general, and unneceſſarily to expoſe his perſon to danger. From the ſame impetuoſity of temper, the king was ever fond of ſtriking a deciſive blow, by a pitched battle in the field; whereas the duke choſe rather to accompliſh his deſigns by ſtratagem and dexterity, without bloodſhed. Notwithſtanding this diverſity in their characters, they were indiſputably the greateſt captains of the age in which they lived, and may be compared, without ſuffering by the compariſon, with the moſt illuſtrious commanders either in ancient or in modern times.

FARNESE was ready to ſet out from Bruſſels in the beginning of Auguſt, with an army of fourteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe. On his arrival in France, having convened his principal officers together, he explained to them the conduct proper to be obſerved in the preſent expedition; and repreſented the neceſſity of requiring a ſtrict attention from every individual in the army, to all the rules of military diſcipline. They were about to enter into a kingdom, where the people being naturally jealous of the Spaniards, ſuſpicions would be eaſily excited, that inſtead of having come to their aſſiſtance, he intended to reduce them under the government of Spain. Againſt giving ground for theſe ſuſpicions, which might defeat the intentions of the king, they muſt be continually on their guard, and take effectual care to reſtrain the troops from offering any violence to the natives. They were ere long to purſue their march in the face of a bold and enterprizing enemy; and for this reaſon it would be neceſſary that the moſt perfect order ſhould be obſerved, that no tumult ſhould be permitted in their quarters, and no ſoldier allowed to leave his colours night or day, upon

His wiſe precautions.

BOOK XXII. 1590.

upon any pretence whatever; that the country ſhould be reconnoitred with the utmoſt care; that they ſhould take up their quarters every evening a conſiderable time before ſun-ſet; that the troops ſhould ſtand under their arms, till the intrenchments were completed; and that their intrenchments ſhould be as ſtrongly fortified, as if the enemy were in ſight.

THE duke ſecured the execution of theſe orders, by the activity and vigilance which he exerted. Although he had many officers of high reputation under him, yet he reſolved not to put implicit truſt in any of them. From charts or maps, joined to the information which he received from the natives, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the country through which he was to paſs. He heard in perſon the reports of all the parties which he ſent to reconnoitre; marked out the encampments with his own hand, and beſtowed ſuch particular attention on every thing which he deemed of the leaſt importance, that he left himſelf no other time for repoſe, but the few hours between beating the reveille, and the marching of the troops.

IN order to preſerve his men freſh and vigorous for the time of action, he marched gently forwards; and did not arrive at Meaux, which is ten leagues diſtant from Paris, till the 23d of Auguſt. He was joined at Meaux by the duke de Mayenne, with ten thouſand foot and one thouſand five hundred horſe; and from this place he ſent intelligence to the beſieged, that he hoped to be able in a few days to relieve them.

Diſtreſs of the Pariſians.

THEIR patience was almoſt exhauſted. They had been for many days reduced to the moſt deplorable condition. Great numbers had died of want, or of diſeaſes occaſioned by the unwholeſome food to which they had been obliged to have recourſe;

courſe; and though their bigotry made them ll entertain the thoughts of a ſurrender with rror, it had required the utmoſt vigilance on the rt of the governor, to prevent it from taking ace. They believed it to be impoſſible for them hold out even for the few days, at the end of hich the duke of Parma had given them hopes of his arrival. Of this deſperate ſituation, their aders did not fail to inform him; nor did he dey advancing towards them one moment longer an was neceſſary in order to ſecure a fortunate ue to his enterprize.

BOOK XXII. 1590.

HENRY had for ſeveral weeks entertained the oſt ſanguine hopes of being able to terminate the ge before the duke could arrive [b]. He was now tremely chagrined and mortified, and was at the me time thrown into great perplexity, with ſpect to the meaſures proper to be purſued. Unilling to quit his prize, when he was upon the oint of ſeizing it, he would gladly have divided s army, and leaving a part of it to continue the ockade, have led the reſt to meet the enemy. ut as it had lately ſuffered great diminution by ckneſs, he apprehended that he would find ſufcient employment for the whole, in defending imſelf againſt the Spaniards. After much heſiation he raiſed the ſiege, and ſet out to oppoſe the uke of Parma, before he ſhould approach nearer ie town [c].

Henry raiſes the ſiege.

HAVING advanced as far as Chelles (which lies out four leagues diſtant from Paris) he pitched is camp in a ſpacious plain, which is terminated y two hills of a gentle aſcent, ſeparated from ich other by the road that leads to Meaux. The uke of Parma's army was encamped on the other de of theſe hills, and was well ſecured by ſtrong intrench-

[b] It had laſted four months.

[c] His army amounted to twenty thouſand foot and five houſand horſe.

BOOK XXII. 1590.

intrenchments. In this ſituation the two armies remained for ſeveral days. The duke did not now lie under the ſame neceſſity as before, of precipitating his approach to Paris, becauſe the citizens having ventured, after the king's departure, to make excurſions into the country, had furniſhed themſelves with ſome proviſions from the places adjacent; and the king durſt not attack ſuch ſtrong intrenchments, defended by an army ſuperior in number to his own. But being eager to engage, and dreading the daily diminution of his forces from the ſickneſs which prevailed among them, Henry ſent a defiance to the duke of Mayenne, calling upon him to quit his den, in which he lay more like a fox than a lion, that the conteſt between them might be decided, and an end put to the calamities of the kingdom.

Stratagem of the duke of Parma.

MAYENNE ſent the herald who brought this challenge to the duke of Parma, who anſwered ſmiling, that his preſent conduct he perceived, was not agreeable to the king; but that he had been accuſtomed to fight, only when he himſelf thought proper, and not when it was convenient for his enemies; and he added, that far from declining battle, he would offer it as ſoon as the intereſt of the cauſe which he had come to ſupport, ſhould render it expedient. Agreeably to the ſpirit of this reply, Farneſe kept his army within their lines for two days longer; during which time he was employed in examining the ſituation of the country, and in conſidering how he might accompliſh the end of his expedition, without hazarding an engagement. Having at length fixed his plan of operations, without communicating it to the duke de Mayenne, or any other of his officers, he gave out, that he now intended to offer battle. Of the van, which conſiſted of two ſquadrons of lances, with all the light horſe in his army, he gave the command

command to the marquis De Renti, with inſtructions, that as ſoon as he ſhould reach the top of the interjacent hill, he ſhould ſpread out his troops, and make as large a front as poſſible; and then begin to deſcend ſlowly towards the enemy, but not to engage without further orders, whatever provocation ſhould be given him. He committed the charge of the main army to the duke de Mayenne, and that of the rear to the Sieur de la Mothe; while he reſerved liberty to himſelf, to ride from one part of the army to the other, as occaſion ſhould require.

WHEN the king was informed of this diſpoſition and movement of the Spaniſh army, he could not doubt that the duke had at length reſolved to try the fortune of a battle. His eyes ſparkled with joy. He drew up his army in battle array, with the utmoſt celerity and ſkill; but reſolved to wait till the enemy ſhould deſcend to the plain, where he might enter the liſts with them on equal terms.

WHEN the van of the Spaniſh army had formed ſo large a front, as totally obſtructed the view of every thing behind them, the duke commanded De Renti to ſtop, and to wait for the king, in caſe he ſhould think fit to aſcend the hill. Then clapping ſpurs to his horſe, he galloped back to the duke de Mayenne, who was advancing with the main army, and taking him by the hand, he ſaid with a cheerful animated countenance. "Paris will ſoon be delivered now, my lord; but for this purpoſe we muſt turn back, and direct our march to another quarter." He then deſired both Mayenne and La Mothe to march towards Lagny, a town on the other ſide of the Marne, and inſtructed them to take poſſeſſion of the ground on this ſide, directly oppoſite to the town, and to employ all their

BOOK XXII.

their troops in drawing ſtrong lines of circumvallation round their camp.

1590. THESE orders were executed with great expedition. A battery of the largeſt cannon was planted over againſt the town; and the camp was fortified in ſuch a manner with trenches, breaſt-works, and redoubts, as to render it impregnable.

WHEN this was done, the marquis De Renti, who for ſeveral hours had amuſed the enemy with hopes that he intended to come down from the hill, began to file off towards Lagny; after having planted a body of ſelect troops, under an officer of the name of Baſta, in certain woody parts of the hill, to ſecure his retreat.

THE king in the mean time knew nothing of what had paſſed on the other ſide of the hill; and when he ſaw the marquis De Renti depart, he ſent a detachment after him to attack his rear, and if poſſible to diſcover the duke's deſign. But this detachment fell unexpectedly among the Spaniſh troops under Baſta; and a furious rencounter enſued, which continued with various ſucceſs till night, when both parties retired to their reſpective camps. The king remained all night entirely ignorant of the operations of the enemy. He could not ſuppoſe that Farneſe, a general ſo diſtinguiſhed for his caution, would attempt to tranſport his forces over the Marne, in order to advance to Paris, on the other ſide of that river, while ſo ſtrong a fortified paſs as Lagny lay behind him. And it was ſtill more difficult to believe, that in the face of ſuch an army as lay ready to attack him, he would undertake the ſiege of Lagny; eſpecially as the river lay between him and that place. It was the laſt of theſe meaſures however, on which the duke of Parma had reſolved; and all his movements

movements on the day before had been made in order to enter Lagny. Next morning the king received intelligence of his design, and he had the mortification to perceive that it was beyond his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. On each hand he was perplexed with insurmountable difficulties. The fortifications of the Spaniſh army were already ſo complete, that he could not attack them with the ſmalleſt hopes of ſucceſs. If he ſhould remain where he was, Lagny would certainly be loſt, and thereby a paſſage to Paris opened on the other ſide of the river; and if he ſhould tranſport his army, in order to ſave Lagny, the duke would then be at liberty to march directly by the road on this ſide to the relief of the beſieged. Sect. XII. 1590.

THERE was no other expedient in his power, but, while he remained in his preſent ſituation, to ſend reinforcements from time to time to the garriſon of Lagny.

THE duke of Parma mean while puſhed forward the ſiege of that place with the utmoſt celerity and vigour; having, as already mentioned, planted a battery on this ſide of the river, he opened it next morning, and ſoon laid a great part of the wall in ruins. The garriſon however ſtill believed themſelves to be ſecure, as the river was between them and the enemy; but the duke had thrown a bridge of boats over it ſome miles above the town, and had already tranſported ſeveral thouſands of his braveſt troops. Theſe troops were ready to mount the breach as ſoon as it was made practicable. In the firſt aſſault they were repulſed with great bravery by the garriſon, but an error in military diſcipline, committed by La-ſin, the governor, quickly decided the fate of Lagny. Inſtead of relieving thoſe who had ſuſtained the firſt aſſault, by changing them file by file, according to an eſtabliſhed rule in the defence

He takes Lagny.

BOOK XXII. 1590.

defence of places, he attempted to do it all at once, and thereby threw his men into confuſion. This blunder was perceived by the aſſailants, who returned inſtantly to the charge with redoubled fury, and after taking La-fin himſelf priſoner, put moſt of the garriſon to the ſword, while the king ſtood a ſorrowful ſpectator of the loſs of the place, and the ſlaughter of his men.

Relief of Paris.

AFTER the taking of Lagny, no other obſtacle remained to prevent the Spaniards from approaching Paris on that ſide of the river, but the garriſons at the bridges of St. Maur and Charenton. Theſe were eaſily overcome, and the convoys with proviſions advanced without moleſtation to the gates of the city. The joy of the Pariſians on this occaſion may be more eaſily imagined than deſcribed; they poured forth in multitudes to receive that food of which they ſtood ſo much in need, and every tongue celebrated in the higheſt ſtrains the praiſes of their deliverer.

Error of the French monarch.

No perſon admired more that dexterity by which the duke of Parma had accompliſhed his deſign, than the king himſelf; but his generous ſpirit was ſeverely mortified, and he had the greater reaſon for the chagrin which he felt on this occaſion; becauſe, if, inſtead of encamping his army at Chelles, he had followed the counſel of the wiſe La Noue, and advanced as far as Claye, Lagny might have been ſaved, and the Spaniſh army ſo long retarded, that the Pariſians muſt have thrown themſelves upon his mercy.

HENRY'S uneaſineſs was greatly augmented when he conſidered, that at preſent it was impoſſible for him by any bold deciſive ſtroke to retrieve his error. He knew it to be vain to entertain the hopes of forcing the duke of Parma, now when the end of his expedition was accompliſhed, to expoſe his troops

troops to the riſk of a battle. His own army was greatly weakened by ſickneſs, and the fatigues of a long campaign. All the country round being laid waſte, he began to feel a ſcarcity of proviſions; his exchequer was exhauſted, and many of his nobility and gentry, who ſerved at their own expence, having no farther expectations this ſeaſon of either ſubduing Paris, or compelling the enemy to engage, were impatient to depart. Determined by theſe motives, he retired to St. Dennis, and having diſbanded the greateſt part of his forces, he ſent the nobility to provide for the ſecurity of the ſeveral provinces in which their intereſt lay, retaining only a flying army of his beſt troops, with which he intended during the winter to check the progreſs of the enemy. BOOK XXII. 1590. He diſbands his army.

THIS little army was not ſo formidable as to prevent the duke of Parma from undertaking whatever enterprize he ſhould incline. At the deſire of Mayenne, and the other heads of the league, he laid ſiege to Corbeil; and notwithſtanding the moſt obſtinate reſiſtance, he took it by aſſault, but not till he had ſpent many days in the ſiege, and loſt a great number of men. Siege of Corbeil.

BEING deſirous to preſerve in his own hands an acquiſition which had coſt him ſo dear, he propoſed to the leaders of the league to put in Corbeil a garriſon of his Walloon or Italian forces. By this propoſal perhaps he meant only to make trial of their diſpoſition towards the catholic king; or, conſidering how averſe he himſelf had ever been from his preſent expedition, he intended to make Philip ſenſible of the difficulty of deriving any ſubſtantial advantage from taking ſo deep an intereſt in the affairs of France.

WHATEVER was his motive, Mayenne, and the other leaders, declined conſenting to his propoſal, and in their refuſal gave him a clear diſcovery

BOOK XXII. 1590.

of their jealouſy and ſuſpicion. This diſcovery confirmed him in his opinion, that matters were far from being ripe for the execution of Philip's deſigns, and that probably he ſhould never be able to accompliſh them by any other means than by protracting the war, till the ſtrength and patience of the contending parties were exhauſted. This plan had, as mentioned above, been recommended to Philip by the duke himſelf; and conformably to it, he reſolved, ſince neither party was in immediate danger of being overpowered, to return to the Netherlands. Other motives concurred in determining him to form this reſolution; the inclemency of the ſeaſon, the ſicklineſs of his army, the want of money, and a ſcarcity of proviſions; which laſt was ſo great, as made it neceſſary for him ſometimes to ſuffer his troops to plunder the inhabitants, although he foreſaw that his granting this permiſſion muſt not only prove prejudicial to his diſcipline, but contribute likewiſe to alienate the affections of the people, and thereby to obſtruct his maſter's views.

THE catholic leaders, who had expected that he would have remained in France till the king was totally ſubdued, laboured with much importunity to divert him from his purpoſe; but all their arguments were ineffectual. The ſtate of affairs in the Netherlands, he informed them, rendered his return indiſpenſably neceſſary, but he would ſend them money, and leave ſuch a number of troops as would enable them to proſecute the war. Neither the money [d] nor troops [e] which he promiſed were anſwerable to the ſanguine expectations which they had formed. They ſaw that Philip, notwithſtanding the ſeeming zeal with which he had eſpouſed

[d] Thirty thouſand ducats.
[e] Between five and ſix thouſand.

eſpouſed their cauſe, was ſurely actuated by ſome private motive of ambition; that there was nothing farther from his intention than to bring the war to a concluſion, and that he would never contribute effectually to their gaining a victory over their enemies, unleſs he himſelf were to reap the fruits of it. They found it neceſſary however to conceal their ſuſpicions, and to accept of the ſcanty ſupply of money and troops which the duke had offered. Farneſe in the mean time was preparing for his march; and, as he could not doubt that Henry would give him all the annoyance in his power, he employed the ſame precautions as he had done formerly when he left the Netherlands. Having drawn up his army in four diviſions, he marched always in the order of battle: the country through which he paſſed was diligently reconnoitred by the light horſe, and his camp was every evening ſecured by ſtrong intrenchments.

The duke returns to the Netherlands.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe precautions, the king was determined not to ſuffer him to return unmoleſted. With this intention he had brought a ſelect body of troops to Compeigne, near the borders of Picardy, and he ſet out with them from that place, as ſoon as he got information of the enemy's route, inflamed with the deſire of taking vengeance for the injuries he had received. Henry had full ſcope in the preſent ſcene of action for his wonted bravery and vigilance, nor did he ſuffer any opportunity to eſcape of exerting theſe qualities with ſignal damage to the enemy. Hovering perpetually round them, he attacked them ſometimes in the front, when they leaſt expected it, ſometimes in the flank, and ſometimes in the rear, giving them no reſpite night or day, and filling their minds with continual apprehenſions and alarms.

Book XXII. 1590.

No general could have made greater efforts with ſo ſmall a force; and if the Spaniards had been commanded by a general leſs diſtinguiſhed than the duke of Parma for prudence and circumſpection, it is impoſſible, conſidering the length of their march, the badneſs of the roads, and the ſeaſon of the year, but they muſt have been often thrown into confuſion, and the greater part of them deſtroyed. But the duke's vigilance was not inferior to the activity of the king; while he was perpetually on his guard, and ever ready to aſſiſt whatever part of his army was attacked, he ſuffered no provocation to divert him from the proſecution of his march; and at laſt he brought his troops, though not without conſiderable loſs, yet in good order, into the province of Hainault[f].

PART II.

Affairs of the Low Countries.

THE duke of Parma, on his return to the Netherlands, found that all the unhappy conſequences which he foretold had ariſen from his abſence. Having drained his finances by the French expedition, many of the troops left in the Low Countries had mutinied on account of their want of pay. The forces of the confederated ſtates had over-run the fertile provinces of Brabant and Flanders; and prince Maurice having made himſelf maſter of a great number of the ſmaller towns upon the frontier, had paved the way for future conqueſts.

THESE misfortunes gave the duke of Parma the greater uneaſineſs, as he had little proſpect of being able ſoon either to retrieve his loſſes, or to make

f D'Avila, lib. xi. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. xcix. ſect. vi. and vii.

make repriſals on the enemy. Finding by his inſtructions from the court of Spain, that Philip was as much intoxicated as ever with his ambitious views on France, he was obliged to ſtation the greateſt part of his troops in the province of Artois and Hainault, where they might be ready to march, if neceſſary, to the aſſiſtance of the league. And thus ſeveral of the moſt important towns, which lay next to the revolted provinces, being badly furniſhed with garriſons to defend them, were expoſed an eaſy prey to the enemy. The confederates were too ſagacious not to diſcern the advantage which was thus preſented to them: whereas they had, till lately, been ſatisfied with defending their frontier, which they had done with much anxiety, and often without ſucceſs; they now took courage from the diſtractions in which Philip's prepoſterous ambition had involved him, and reſolved to exert themſelves with vigour in carrying on an offenſive war.

Prince Maurice ſubdues.

THE year 1591 had juſt begun, when colonel Norris led out the garriſon of Oſtend, which had been reinforced by troops from England; and having taken the fort of Blakemberg, between Oſtend and Sluys, he laid a great part of Flanders open to his incurſions. Soon afterwards another party of the forces of the States ſurpriſed the forts of Turnhout and Weſterlo, in Brabant. But theſe conqueſts were inconſiderable when compared with thoſe of prince Maurice, who having put his troops in motion, as early as the ſeaſon would permit, opened the campaign with the ſiege of Zutphen, and ſoon compelled the garriſon to ſurrender.

Zutphen,

and Deventer.

FROM this place he led his army againſt Deventer, a town of ſtill greater importance than Zutphen. Deventer had been, as above related, betrayed to the Spaniards by Sir William Stanly; and

BOOK XXII. 1591.

and Maurice was earneſtly ſolicited to undertake the ſiege of it, at this time, by colonel Vere, who was fired with the generous ambition of wiping out the reproach which Stanly's treachery had brought upon his countrymen. Vere diſplayed in this ſiege all that bravery and conduct, for which he is ſo highly celebrated by the cotemporary hiſtorians; and next to Maurice, who conducted the attack with conſummate prudence, he principally contributed to the reduction of the place. It was vigorouſly defended by the count de Berg, couſin-german to the prince; but the count being grievouſly wounded, and the wall on that ſide where Vere commanded laid in ruins, the garriſon capitulated in a few days after opening the trenches, and the inhabitants returned under obedience to the States[e].

10th June.

THE duke of Parma in the mean time laid ſiege to the fort of Knotzenberg, which Maurice had built in the end of the preceding year. By this fort, the confederates commanded the navigation of the river, and gave ſuch annoyance to Nimeguen, as made the duke extremely uneaſy about the fate of that important city. In order to conceal his deſign, he directed his march firſt towards the fort of Schenck. But Maurice was not deceived by this feint, and had taken care to ſtrengthen the garriſon of Knotzenberg with an addition of ſome choſen troops.

He defeats the Spaniſh horſe.

THE duke therefore met with the moſt vigorous reſiſtance, and loſt a great number of his men; ſtill, however, he perſiſted in the ſiege. Maurice, dreading his ſucceſs, relinquiſhed a ſcheme which he had formed for the reduction of Groningen, and having paſſed the Waal, he pitched his camp within ſight of the enemy. As he did not poſſeſs ſuf-

[e] Vide Bentivoglio, p. 350. Grotius, p. 145. Meteren, p. 530.

ſufficient force to attack their lines, he intended only to encourage the garriſon by his preſence, or to ſtraiten the duke's quarters, and to intercept his convoys. Many ſkirmiſhes paſſed with various ſucceſs, till Maurice at length found an opportunity of putting in practice the following ſtratagem: Having planted an ambuſh of his braveſt troops, he marched up to the enemy's camp, attended by count Solmes and colonel Vere, at the head of ſome companies of horſe. The duke lefs circumſpect and cautious on this occaſion than uſual, ſent out ten companies of Spaniſh and Italian horſe to attack him. A fierce rencounter enſued. Agreeably to orders, the prince's troops ſoon turned their backs and fled. The royaliſts purſued with ardour, till they had paſſed a narrow defile and a bridge, when Maurice returning ſuddenly to the charge, and the ſoldiers in ambuſh pouring in upon them from both ſides, their return to the camp was intercepted, and almoſt all of them were put to the ſword or taken priſoners.

THIS diſaſter afflicted the duke of Parma in the moſt ſenſible manner; a great number of the officers who fell were his countrymen, many of whom were perſons of rank, in whoſe fortune he was particularly intereſted. He perceived that, if he remained in his preſent ſituation, he muſt find it extremely difficult, from the diminution of his cavalry, to ſupply his army with proviſions, and he had not as yet made any conſiderable progreſs in the ſiege.

HE would ſtill however have proſecuted his enterprize, if he had not been obliged to deſiſt from it by orders which he received from Philip, to act only on the defenſive in the Netherlands, and to ſpare his troops as much as poſſible for another expedition

BOOK XXII. 1591.

pedition into France. Maurice hoped to have gained ſome advantage over Farneſe in his retreat from Knotzenberg; but both in this, and in his paſſage over the Waal, ſuch wiſe precautions were employed, as rendered it impoſſible for the prince to annoy him; while they filled that young hero with the higheſt admiration of the duke of Parma's ſkill, and furniſhed him with important leſſons in the military art, which he put in practice on many occaſions afterwards with ſignal glory and ſucceſs.

The reduction of Hulſt,

HAVING paſſed the river, and put his troops in ſafety, the duke ordered new levies to be made in Germany, Burgundy, and the ſouthern provinces of the Netherlands; after which, he went, on account of his indiſpoſition, to drink the waters at Spa. He had no ſooner ſet out, than prince Maurice having embarked four thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, made a ſudden deſcent on that part of Flanders called the county of Waes, and inveſted the town of Hulſt. Mondragone, the governor of Antwerp, loſt no time in drawing together ſuch forces as were ſtationed in the neighbouring places, with an intention to raiſe the ſiege. But Maurice having pierced the dykes, had laid the country under water, and rendered it impoſſible for Mondragone to approach. Agreeably to the intelligence which had induced the prince to engage in his preſent enterprize, the garriſon of Hulſt was weak, and they were badly furniſhed both with proviſions and military ſtores. Their defence therefore was ſpiritleſs and feeble, and they ſoon agreed to a ſurrender.

and Nimeguen.

FROM Hulſt, Maurice returned unexpectedly to Knotzenberg; and as there was no Spaniſh army near, he threw a bridge over the Waal, and laid ſiege to Nimeguen. The garriſon, conſiſting of Germans and Walloons, made ſeveral ſallies to retard his approach;

pproach; and, if they had been ſeconded by the townſmen, the reduction of a place of ſo great extent and ſtrength as Nimeguen, muſt have detained him long. But he had for ſome time paſt held a ſecret correſpondence with ſome of the principal inhabitants, and the people in general were extremely diſaffected to the Spaniſh government. They took courage now, when Maurice was at hand to ſupport them, and having riſen tumultuouſly, required the garriſon, in the moſt peremptory manner, to put an end to their calamities by a ſurrender of the town. The garriſon, conſcious of their inability to reſiſt both the citizens and the enemy, complied with their requeſt; and Maurice was received by them rather as their deliver from ſlavery, than as a conqueror by whoſe arms they had been ſubdued. They were admitted to the ſame privileges as the other towns of the confederacy; and although the adminiſtration was put into the hands of the proteſtants, yet no puniſhment was inflicted on any of the catholics, by whom the city had been kept ſo long under the Spaniſh government. 1591.

AFTER this important acquiſition, Maurice ſet out for the Hague, and received there the moſt flattering teſtimonies of gratitude, attachment, and reſpect. The prudence with which his enterprizes had been concerted, and the celerity and vigour with which he had carried them into execution, filled all Europe with his renown, and gave his countrymen the moſt ſanguine hopes of future proſperity and ſucceſs.

THEIR condition was extremely different at this period from what it had ever been ſince the confederacy had been formed: till lately they had experienced an uninterrupted courſe of calamities; they had been perpetually diſturbed with inteſtine broils, and

State of the confederacy.

Book XXII. 1591.

and had lived under continual anxiety, occaſioned partly by the neighbourhood of their active enterpriſing enemy, and partly by the perfidious deſigns of thoſe whom they had intruſted with the reigns of government. But their domeſtic diſſenſions were now compoſed; the enemy was removed to a greater diſtance, and their frontier was formed either by towns ſtrongly fortified, or by navigable rivers, in which they could avail themſelves of the ſuperiority of their naval force. They were no longer diſquieted by ſuſpicions of the fidelity of their governors, and the loſs which they had ſuffered by the death of the prince of Orange, was compenſated by the extraordinary merit of his ſon.

French affairs.

But there was nothing which contributed ſo much to inſpire them with their preſent hopes, as their knowledge of Philip's attention being ſtill as much engroſſed as ever with the affairs of France. In proſecution of his plan for acquiring the ſovereignty of that kingdom, by fomenting the war, he had, after the duke of Parma raiſed the ſiege of Paris, afforded the leaders of the league only ſuch aſſiſtance as was neceſſary to ſave them from being overwhelmed. Their power was at this time exceedingly reduced, while that of the king had received a proportional augmentation. By his bravery and good conduct, joined to his clemency and moderation, Henry had allured great numbers of his rebellious ſubjects to their duty; and had, at the ſame time, engaged the proteſtants in Germany, and the queen of England, to intereſt themſelves more deeply than ever in his cauſe. For ſeveral months paſt he had been abſolute maſter of the field, and he had lately begun the ſiege of Rouen, with an army amounting nearly to thirty thouſand horſe and foot. Both the town and garriſon were commanded by the Sieur de Villars, who diſplayed the higheſt degree of intrepidity, vigilance, and ſkill in the defence. But there was little

little probability of his being able to defend it long againſt ſo powerful an army, whoſe operations were conducted by ſo great a maſter in the art of war.

Siege of Rouen.

THE duke de Mayenne, and other catholic leaders, dreaded, that the reduction of ſo important a place as Rouen would prove fatal to their party, and they had exerted themſelves ſtrenuouſly to relieve it; but having no army, with which they could venture to enter the liſts with the king, they had recourſe as formerly to Philip, and ſpared no pains to convince him, that, if he did not ſpeedily interpoſe, Rouen, and all the other towns in their poſſeſſion muſt, ere long ſubmit to the king's victorious arms. They were ſeconded in their application by the Spaniſh miniſters in France; and in conſequence of inſtructions ſent from Madrid to the duke of Parma, that general, after his return from Spa, had been entirely occupied in preparing to lead his army a ſecond time to the aſſiſtance of the league.

Duke of Parma's ſecond expedition into France.

HIS preparations were finiſhed about the middle of December, and on the 21ſt of that month began his march, taking the ſame precautions as in his former expedition. He was joined by the duke de Mayenne in the Province of Picardy, and his army, after the reinforcement brought him by the duke, amounted to five and twenty thouſand foot and ſix thouſand horſe.

As in order to preſerve his troops freſh and vigorous, he marched only a few miles each day, it was near the end of January before he reached the province of Normandy. At that time the ſiege of Rouen was far advanced, and the garriſon was reduced to the laſt extremity. When the king therefore heard of the duke of Parma's approach, he could not reſolve to relinquiſh his enterpriſe; but

BOOK XXII. 1591.

but he left his infantry to proſecute the ſiege, and advanced towards the duke with his cavalry, in hopes that, by haraſſing and retarding him on his march, the garriſon would be obliged to capitulate before he could arrive.

Danger of Henry at Aumale.

BY his vigilance, intrepidity and quick diſcernment, Henry was admirably fitted for the bold and dangerous enterpriſe in which he was now engaged; but his impetuous courage was not always under the government of prudence, and betrayed him ſometimes into raſh and deſperate attempts, more becoming an officer of inferior rank, than a general or a king. Of this he gave a ſtriking proof in his conduct on the preſent occaſion. Having advanced before the reſt of the cavalry with three or four hundred horſe, he met unexpectedly, near the town of Aumale, with the forerunners of the duke of Parma's army, and he repulſed them with little difficulty; but although the whole Spaniſh army was in ſight, he would not retire till he had taken a view of the order of their march, nor even after he ſaw the duke's light horſe advancing towards him. With theſe likewiſe he encountered, and fought long and deſperately, till many of his troops had fallen by his ſide, and he himſelf was wounded. Had not the duke of Parma ſuſpected an ambuſcade, he might eaſily have cut off the king's retreat. He was urged by Mayenne to ſend forward more troops for that purpoſe; but he refuſed to comply with the duke's requeſt; and when he was afterwards reminded of the opportunity which he had loſt, he replied, that he could not reproach himſelf for his conduct, as he ſuppoſed that, in the king of Navarre, he had a great general to contend with, and not merely the captain of a troop of horſe.

HENRY was no ſooner able, after his wound, to get on horſeback, than he reſumed his firſt deſign of annoying the enemy on their march; and this he did with more circumſpection than before, but

t with ſuch indefatigable vigour and activity, as pt the duke of Parma in perpetual alarms. Seral warm rencounters paſſed, in which the ceſs was various. The duke's vigilance, and the rfect diſcipline which he maintained, preſerv- his army from ſuſtaining any great calami- . His march however was conſiderably retard-, and there was much reaſon to apprehend, that e beſieged would be compelled to ſurrender be- re he could advance to their relief.

Spirited conduct of Villars.

NOTHING leſs than the intrepidity and ſkill of llars could have protracted the ſiege to ſo great ength. This brave man, far from having any oughts of capitulating, aſpired to the glory of ſing the ſiege without the aſſiſtance of the Spaards. With this view he reſolved to take advange of the abſence of the king, and to exert at ce his whole force in an attack on the beſiegers. ever was attack conducted with more intrepidity id vigour. Great numbers of the royaliſts were it to the ſword; the marſhal de Biron, their mmander in chief, was wounded; their trenches re filled up; many of their cannon were ſpik, or buried in the ditch; and their ſtores of oviſion and ammunition were either carried into e town or deſtroyed. Villars was at laſt repulſed, d obliged to retire within the walls; but not till e enemy had ſuffered ſo much loſs by the ſlaughr which he committed, and the deſtruction of eir works and ſtores, that he expected to be able defend the town for ſeveral months longer, if s garriſon were reinforced.

OF this happy change in his ſituation, Villars ve immediate notice to the duke of Parma, and lviſed him to turn his arms to ſome other quarter, here they might be employed with greater adntage to the common cauſe. It was ſuſpected, at vanity had conſiderable influence in prompting Villars

BOOK XXII. 1591.

Villars to give this advice. The duke was within two days march of Rouen when he received it, and he immediately called a council of war to conſider of what was proper to be done.

HE was himſelf of opinion, that he ought ſtill to purſue his march, in order to attack the enemy before they had recovered from their confuſion; and he obſerved, that if he ſhould only ſend a reinforcement to the garriſon, as the governor had deſired, the king of Navarre would inſtantly renew the operations of the ſiege, and probably exert himſelf with greater vigour than before. But the duke de Mayenne and the other French nobility, leſs bold on this occaſion than the duke of Parma, repreſented, that notwithſtanding the diſaſter which had befallen the royaliſts, it would be extremely dangerous to attack them in their intrenchments whilſt their cavalry were ſo numerous; that when the nobility who ſerved without pay, and were already impatient under the length of the ſiege, and the rigour of the ſeaſon, ſaw that there was no proſpect of a battle, they would leave the camp, and retire to their reſpective homes; that the duke might then attack the king with the higheſt probability of ſucceſs; and that till then the troops might either be employed in ſome other enterpriſe, or conducted to winter quarters, whence they might iſſue forth freſh and vigorous, when a more advantageous ſeaſon for action ſhould arrive. Whether Mayenne ſpoke from conviction on this occaſion, or from his dread of the duke of Parma's acquiring too great a ſuperiority over the king, is doubtful. Farneſe was not entirely ſatisfied with his reaſoning, and could not approve of a reſolution to neglect one favourable opportunity, on account of the uncertain expectation of another. But as the propoſal was perfectly conſiſtent with his plan of protracting the war, he complied with it; and having ſent eight hundred ſelect

ſelect troops to reinforce the garriſon of Rouen, he led his army back to Picardy, and inveſted the town of St. Eſprit de Rue. BOOK XXII. 1591.

He had no ſooner ſet out, than the king applied himſelf with the utmoſt diligence to the proſecution of the ſiege of Rouen; and as he received at this time a ſeaſonable ſupply of cannon and ammunition from the States of Holland, he was enabled to carry on his operations with greater ſucceſs than ever.

In a few weeks the garriſon was again reduced to the moſt critical ſituation, and Villars, notwithſtanding the confidence, of which he had lately given ſo ſtrong a proof, was obliged to let the duke of Parma know, that if he did not return to his relief before the twentieth of April, he would find it neceſſary to give up the town. Mayenne was now as ſolicitous to perſuade the duke of Parma to lead his army againſt the king, as he had been formerly reluctant and averſe. And the duke more readily yielded to his deſire, as certain intelligence had been received, that, agreeably to Mayenne's prediction, the cavalry in the king's army did not at this time amount to more than the half of their former number. Having drawn off his troops from St. Eſprit de Rue, he ſet out without delay for Rouen, and proceeded with ſo great expedition, that he performed the ſame march in ſix days, which had formerly coſt him twenty. The ſiege of Rouen raiſed.

The king was equally diſappointed and ſurpriſed when he heard of his approach. He dreaded the danger to which his army would be expoſed, if he remained in his preſent ſituation, between ſo brave a garriſon on the one hand, and the Spaniſh army on the other; and he would have gone to meet the duke of Parma at a diſtance from the town; but finding, upon an accurate review, of his troops, that they were greatly inferior in number to the enemy, he raiſed the ſiege, after it had laſted for April 20.

BOOK XXII. 1591.

for five months, and retired to Pont de l'Arche, with a reſolution to wait there for the return of his nobility. The duke of Parma in the mean time advanced in battle array, and entered Rouen in a kind of triumph. From Rouen he led his army by the advice of Mayenne, and the other leaders of the league, againſt Caudebec; which it was thought neceſſary to reduce, before the deliverance of Rouen could be deemed complete.

Duke of Parma wounded at Caudebec.

IN taking a review of the fortifications, and marking the ground for batteries, which he did, as on other occaſions, with his own hand, he received a wound by a muſket-ball, which entered his arm a little below the elbow, and pierced downward till it lodged in his wriſt. Without any change in his voice or countenance, he continued to give his orders as before, nor could his ſon and the other by-ſtanders perſuade him to retire till he had inſtructed them fully in his deſigns. In order to diſcover the courſe of the ball, his ſurgeon found it neceſſary to make three different inciſions; and the pain occaſioned by theſe and the wound brought on a fever, which confined him to his bed for ſeveral days. This accident had almoſt proved fatal to his army and to the league. The ſiege of Caudebec was conducted agreeably to his direction, and was ſoon brought to a concluſion; but in undertaking this ſiege, the duke had committed the only conſiderable blunder which we meet with in the hiſtory of his life. Caudebec lies in the peninſula of Caux, which is formed by the Seine on the weſt, and the ſea and the river d'Eu, or Breſle, on the north and eaſt. As the king, by poſſeſſing the towns of Eu, Arques, and Dieppe, commanded the entrance into Caux from the eaſt, it was impoſſible for the army of the league to get out of it, but either by croſſing the Seine, or returning ſouthward the ſame road by which they had come,

had entered the peninſula. In this way they might have eſcaped, if they had attempted it in time; and perhaps they would have done ſo, had it not been judged neceſſary for the general's recovery, that he ſhould remain for ſeveral days at Caudbec. 1591.

THE king quickly perceived the advantage which was preſented to him, and exerted himſelf with ardour to improve it. Having immediately after he had raiſed the ſiege of Rouen, diſpatched meſſengers to ſummon his nobility to return to his camp, they had obeyed his ſummons with their wonted alacrity; and in the ſpace of a few days, his army was augmented to ſeventeen thouſand foot, and between ſeven and eight thouſand horſe. With this army he left Pont de L'Arche on the 30th of April, and arrived on the ſame day within ſight of the enemy, who had encamped at Yvetot, which lies at the diſtance of three or four miles from Caudbec. The Sa[illegible] and exerts himſelf with ardour to improve it.

HENRY's firſt care was to fortify his camp in ſuch a manner, that it might not be in the power of the enemy to compel him to engage; and his next, to make himſelf maſter of all the defiles through which they might attempt to force their paſſage. Many hot rencounters happened, in which both parties gave conſpicuous proofs of proweſs and intrepidity. The royaliſts were frequently repulſed from their ſtations, and much blood was ſpilt. But at laſt they accompliſhed their deſign, and hemmed in the enemy ſo cloſely, that it was no longer practicable for them to approach to the outlet from the peninſula. In this ſituation they remained a fortnight. Their ſtock of proviſions was almoſt ſpent, and Henry began to indulge the flattering hope, that in a few days they would lay down their arms.

BOOK XXII.

1592.

Their paſſage of the Seine at Caudbec.

NOTHING but the bold inventive genius of the duke of Parma could have ſaved them from this diſgrace: he had erred when he had entered the peninſula, while ſo vigilant an enemy as Henry was ſo near. Neither the importunity of the chiefs of the league, nor his ignorance of the country, nor the hopes of finiſhing his enterprize before the king could arrive, are entirely ſufficient to juſtify his conduct. But he now fully atoned for his imprudence in expoſing his troops to ſo great a riſk, by the extraordinary capacity and vigour which he exerted in their deliverance.

As ſoon as he had recovered from the diſtreſs occaſioned by his wound, and taken a view of the poſition and ſtrength of the enemy, he perceived that it would be in vain to attempt to force their lines; and conſequently that, there was no other way by which he could ſave his army from captivity or ruin, but by tranſporting it over the river. To this expedient he reſolved to have recourſe, and he communicated his deſign to the duke de Mayenne, and ſome others of his moſt experienced officers, who all pronounced it to be impracticable. They knew how difficult it was to paſs even the moſt inconſiderable river in ſight of an enemy, and they could not conceive it poſſible for an army ſo much encumbered with artillery and baggage, to paſs ſo broad a river as the Seine at Caudbec, when not only a powerful enemy, ſo vigilant as the king, but the Dutch ſhips of war likewiſe, were prepared to obſtruct their paſſage.

THE duke was fully ſenſible of all the difficulties with which his enterprize muſt be attended, but as the urgent neceſſity of his ſituation would not ſuffer him to relinquiſh it, he perſiſted in his reſolution of attempting to carry it into execution.

HAVING

HAVING firſt cleared the river of the Dutch ſhips, by planting batteries along the banks, he ordered the Sieur de Villars to hold all the boats and barks at Rouen in readineſs and to prepare a number of rafts of ſtrong beams fit for tranſporting the artillery. After this, taking advantage of a thick miſt, on the 16th of May, he ſent out his cavalry by day-break, as if he intended an attack, and while the enemy were thus amuſed, he drew off his infantry from Yvetot to Caudbec. The cavalry followed; and as ſoon as they had retired, the king advanced with all his forces, having no ſuſpicion of the duke's deſign, and wondering that he ſhould have choſen to move his camp to a ſituation in which it was more confined and ſtraitened than before. Henry ſtill thought of nothing but blocking up the paſſages, and fortifying his camp ſo as not to be obliged to accept of battle. 1592.

WHILE the king was thus occupied, the duke employed a great number of pioneers in raiſing two forts, one on each ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to each other, which he planted with cannon, and lined with muſketeers. To prevent the king from taking the alarm, he maintained all the ſame appearances as formerly, of a deſign to enlarge his quarters, and frequent ſkirmiſhes were fought.

AT laſt every thing neceſſary being prepared, the rafts and the boats (of which there was a great number at Rouen employed in the river trade) fell down with the ebbing tide, in the evening of the 20th of May; and on the ſame night, the greateſt part of the troops, artillery, and baggage was tranſported. The king perceiving early next morning a change in the appearance of the enemy's camp, ſent the baron de Biron to reconnoitre it. The baron returned immediately at full gallop, calling out, that the Spaniards were paſſ-

BOOK XXII. 1592.

ing the river. Henry ſet out without delay, at the head of his cavalry. When he came in ſight he had the mortification to obſerve, that only two or three thouſand of the Spaniards remained on this ſide, and that they were ſo ſkilfully defended by the fort, that he could not approach them without ſacrificing the lives of many of his troops. He then planted his artillery on a hill which commanded the paſſage, and the Dutch ſhips came up the river from Quillebeuf; but before the cannon were ready to fire, and before the Dutch were near enough to do execution, the rear of the Spaniards, conducted with much prudence by prince Rannucio, the duke of Parma's ſon, had landed ſafe on the other ſide, and ſet the boats on fire.

NEITHER the king nor any of the French nobility had ever ſuſpected that ſuch a retreat was poſſible; and this circumſtance, joined to the nature of the ground near Caudbec, which concealed the duke of Parma's operations, contributed not a little to the fortunate iſſue of his enterpriſe. Henry had for ſeveral days entertained the moſt ſanguine hopes of gaining a deciſive victory, which would probably have given him immediate poſſeſſion of his kingdom; and his mortification now was in proportion to the confidence of his former expectations: it was the more ſenſible and galling, as his infantry was ſo much exhauſted by the hardſhips of a tedious winter's campaign, that it was impoſſible for him at preſent either to purſue the enemy, or to reſume the ſiege of Rouen. The duke de Mayenne entered this city with a part of the forces, and the duke of Parma directed his march towards the Netherlands, where he arrived in a few weeks without receiving any moleſtation by the way [h].

WHILE

[h] D'Avila, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. vi. and Thuanus, lib. ciii.

1592.

History of Antonio Perez.

WHILE Philip thus kept alive the flames of war in France, he had the good fortune to preſerve his Spaniſh dominions in a ſtate of undiſturbed tranquillity; and as a kingdom in this ſituation furniſhes few materials for hiſtory, hardly any tranſaction paſſed in Spain during ſeveral years preceding the preſent period that deſerves to be recorded; but in the courſe of this year an affair happened which, while it marks the character, and ſhews the ſecret life of Philip, was attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences.

HAVING been engaged in a love intrigue with Anna Mendoza, princeſs of Eboli[1], he had committed the conduct of it to his ſecretary Antonio Perez, who having frequent opportunities of converſing with that princeſs, had become no leſs enamoured of her than the king; and it was generally believed that ſhe had made him a full return to the paſſion which her beauty had inſpired. At the time when Antonio's correſpondence with the princeſs was much talked of, Eſcovedo, the friend and confident of Don John of Auſtria, had arrived from the Netherlands, to ſolicit the king for the return of the Italian and Spaniſh forces; and finding the ſecretary averſe from Don John's deſigns, he reſolved to take vengeance on him, by making a diſcovery to the king of what was reported of Antonio's familiarity with the princeſs of Eboli. Philip readily believed this intelligence, and conceived an implacable reſentment againſt the ſecretary; but he was animated at the ſame time with hatred no leſs implacable towards Eſcovedo; who, he believed, had fomented Don John's ambition, and would ſooner or later engage that prince in ſome deſperate enterpriſe inconſiſtent with his allegiance.

[1] The wife of Ruy Gomez de Silva.

BOOK XXII 1592.

legiance. Philip reſolved to employ one of theſe men as the inſtrument of his vengeance againſt the other, and gave a private order to Perez to have Eſcovedo aſſaſſinated. This order was executed without delay, and ſoon afterwards a proſecution was begun againſt the murderer, with Philip's permiſſion, by the widow and children of Eſcovedo. Philip intended by this meaſure to remove all ſuſpicions of being acceſſary to the murder. But dreading that Perez might, for his own exculpation, make a full diſcovery, he wrote him ſeveral letters with his own hand, requiring that he would conceal the order which had been given him, and aſſuring him, that a ſtop ſhould ſoon be put to the proſecution. It was ſtopped accordingly; and although Perez was forbid to come to court himſelf, he was allowed for ſome years to tranſact the ſeveral branches of public buſineſs which had been intruſted to him, by his deputies or clerks. But no time could aſſuage the king's reſentment: after ſix years he commanded him to be tried for malverſation in the diſcharge of his Office, and having ordered a fine of thirty thouſand ducats to be impoſed on him, he threw him into priſon, and loaded him with chains. Perez was offered his liberty, on condition that he ſhould give up all the king's letters relative to the murder of Eſcovedo. He delivered ſome of them, and was releaſed; but Philip was no ſooner in poſſeſſion of the letters, than a new proceſs on account of the murder was commenced. Perez was again thrown into priſon, and put to the torture; and he now perceived, that nothing leſs than his death was intended. With the aſſiſtance of his wife and friends he eſcaped, and fled to Arragon, his native country, where he expected to avail himſelf of the rights and privileges of the Arragonians. Philip no ſooner heard of his eſcape, than he diſpatched certain officers after him, who overtook him in the town of Calataiude; and having

having forced him from a monaſtery, where he had taken refuge, conducted him to Saragoſſa. When he arrived in that city, he appealed to the Juſtiza, to whom, according to a fundamental law of the conſtitution, an appeal was competent from every other judge whether civil or eccleſiaſtical. 1592.

By the Juſtiza Perez was lodged in the ſtate priſon, called the Manifeſtation, to remain there till his cauſe ſhould be tried. But although no perſon could legally enter this priſon, without the ſpecial permiſſion of the Juſtiza, the marquis of Almenar, the king's attorney for Arragon, broke into it with a body of armed men, and carried off Perez to the priſon of the inquiſition. The people, who had ever been accuſtomed to hold the perſon and authority of the Juſtiza in the higheſt veneration, were inflamed with rage at this indignity, and having riſen tumultuouſly, they reſcued Perez from the inquiſitors, ſurrounded the marquis of Almenar, and after reviling him as traitor to the liberty of his country, maltreated him in ſuch a manner that he died ſoon afterwards of his wounds.

Perez was again lodged in the priſon of ſtate, and remained there for ſeveral months, during which time the governor, or viceroy, ordered thirteen of the principal lawyers of Saragoſſa, to examine whether the cauſe belonged more properly to the Juſtiza, or to the court of inquiſition. After long deliberation they declared, that it would be a violation of the liberties of Arragon, if Perez were tried by any other judge than the Juſtiza; but afterwards, being either corrupted or intimidated, they reverſed this ſentence, under the pretence of the priſoner's having held a ſecret correſpondence with the king of France, a heretic, and pronounced that it belonged to the inquiſition to take cognizance of his cauſe.

The

BOOK XXII. 1592.

THE Juſtiza paid no regard to this opinion of the lawyers, but perſiſted in defending the privileges of his office, and in refuſing to deliver up the priſoner. The viceroy had recourſe to force; and having drawn together a great number of the familiars of the inquiſition, he broke open the ſtate priſon, loaded Perez with chains, and was carrying him off in a ſort of triumph, when the people roſe a ſecond time, and ſet him at liberty. He immediately left the town, and made his eſcape into France, where he gave uſeful information to the king with regard to the deſigns and meaſures of the court of Spain.

PHILIP in the mean time reſolved not to neglect the opportunity which this ſedition of the Arragonians afforded him, to ſhew how little he regarded thoſe rights and privileges of which they had ſhewn themſelves ſo tenacious. Having formed an army of the troops which were quartered in different parts of Caſtile, he gave the command of it to Alphonſo Vargas, with inſtructions to march to Saragoſſa with the utmoſt expedition; and to prevent the Arragonians from preparing for reſiſtance, he gave out that this army was intended to aſſiſt the catholics in France. The Arragonians however having received certain intelligence of his deſign, began to prepare for their defence. Lanuſa, the Juſtiza, having convened the principal inhabitants, and read to them a fundamental law of their conſtitution, by which it is declared, that they have a right to oppoſe by force the entrance of foreign troops into Arragon, even though the king himſelf ſhould lead them, it was decreed with unanimous conſent, that conformably to this law they ſhould take up arms on the preſent occaſion, to prevent the entrance of the Caſtilians under Vargas.

INTIMATION

INTIMATION of this decree was ſent to the other cities of the province, and the inhabitants of Saragoſſa repaired in great numbers to the ſtandard of liberty that was erected. But they had no leader of ſufficient capacity to conduct them, and there was no time for the people in other places to come to their aſſiſtance. Vargas having arrived much ſooner than they expected, they were overwhelmed with terror, and threw down their arms.

VARGAS entered the city without oppoſition, and caſt ſuch of their leaders as had not made their eſcape into priſon. Among theſe were the duke de Villa Hermoſa, the count of Aranda, and the Juſtiza. The two firſt he ſent priſoners to Madrid, but he put the Juſtiza publicly to death without either trial or ſentence, and then confiſcated his effects, and levelled his houſes with the ground; ordering proclamation to be made in the city, that ſuch would be the puniſhment of all thoſe who, like Lanuſa, ſhould adventure to diſpute the authority of the king. The Juſtiza of Arragon put to death.

THE people heard this inſulting proclamation with unſpeakable grief and indignation; but they were obliged to lament in ſecret the ruin of thoſe invaluable rights which they were unable to defend. The palace of the inquiſition was fortified, that it might ſerve the purpoſe of a citadel; and a ſtrong body of Caſtilian troops were quartered there and in the town, where they remained till the minds of the citizens were thoroughly ſubdued. Philip thought it unneceſſary to aboliſh formally their conſtitution of government, as he had given them ſufficient proof how inſignificant they would find it, if they ſhould ever truſt to it as a barrier againſt the encroachments of the regal power.

WHILE this tranſaction paſſed in Spain, the duke of Parma had returned from France to the Netherlands, and from thence the bad ſtate of his health

Illneſs of the duke of Parma.

BOOK XXII. 1592.

health had made it neceſſary for him to go once more to drink the waters at Spa. In the time of his French expedition, many of the troops which he had left behind him had mutinied; and on his return from Spa, he had the mortification to find, that prince Maurice had ſubdued the two important towns of Steenwich and Coverden, although the former of theſe places had been fortified in the ſtrongeſt manner, and was defended by a brave and determined garriſon of one thouſand ſix hundred men.

THE duke's chagrin at theſe events, contributed to quicken the progreſs of his diſeaſe, which having baffled the power of medicine, had now reduced him ſo low, that finding himſelf unable to fulfil the duties of his office, he had applied to the king for liberty to retire.

His death.

BUT Philip believing that no other perſon was ſo able to bring his ſchemes in France to the deſired iſſue, refuſed to grant his requeſt; and when he ſignified his refuſal, ſent him inſtructions to return as ſoon as poſſible to the aſſiſtance of the League. The duke would not deſert a ſtation which he had filled with ſo much honour, and reſolved to ſtruggle with his diſtemper to the laſt. Having by new levies ſupplied ſome of the vacancies in his army, he went, on the 29th of October, to Arras, and there applied with his wonted aſſiduity to haſten the neceſſary preparations for his expedition. The ſtrength of his mind counterbalanced for ſeveral weeks the weakneſs of his body. From the vigour which he diſplayed, thoſe about him conceived hopes that his death was ſtill at a conſiderable diſtance. But on the 3d of December, immediately after ſigning ſome diſpatches which had been prepared for his ſubſcription, he expired in the forty-ſeventh

ſeventh year of his age, and the fourteenth of his government of the Netherlands. BOOK XXII.

In this manner died Alexander Farneſe, duke of Parma, who claims our admiration, no leſs for his political wiſdom and ſagacity, than on account of thoſe more ſplendid military talents which have procured him ſuch diſtinguiſhed renown. It was by his prudence, moderation, and addreſs, more than by the force of arms, that he re-united ſo great a part of the Netherlands to the Spaniſh monarchy; and if Philip had paid the ſame regard to his opinion on all occaſions, which he did on ſome, it is probable that the United Provinces would have been compelled to return to their allegiance. England might in that caſe have been ſubdued, and France might have been ſwallowed up by the exorbitant power of Spain. Though it was happy for Europe that Philip, blinded by flattery and ambition, refuſed to liſten to the counſels that were offered him, yet we muſt admire that ſuperior ſagacity and penetration by which they were ſuggeſted. 1592. and charac-ter.

The duke of Parma in his youth gave no indications of thoſe extraordinary qualities with which nature had endowed him, and men were even diſpoſed to think unfavourably of his underſtanding; but in the war with the Turks, in which he ſerved under John of Auſtria, the flame of his genius broke forth, and burnt afterwards through the whole of his life with unabating ſplendor. His perſon was graceful, his eyes lively and penetrating, his manners courteous, his addreſs inſinuating, and his temper generous and humane.

His vices, ſays a reſpectable Dutch writer[k], were thoſe of the age in which he lived, or of the court

[k] Grotius.

BOOK XXII. 1592.

court in which he had been educated; but what theſe vices were, neither this, nor any other hiſtorian has informed us. He appears not to have poſſeſſed that winning ſimplicity of manners, that perfect ingenuity and candour, by which his great rival for military fame, the French monarch, was ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed; yet the proteſtant, as well as popiſh hiſtorians acknowledge, that as he was dutiful and faithful to his prince, ſo he maintained the moſt inviolable fidelity in all his engagements with the people of the Netherlands who ſubmitted to his arms.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXIII.

AFTER the death of the duke of Parma, Philip committed the government of the Netherlands to count Peter Erneſt of Manſfeldt, whom he ordered to ſend an army, without delay, under the command of his ſon count Charles, to the aſſiſtance of the League. In obedience to this order, Charles immediately began his march with ſix thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe, which was the greateſt number of troops that could be ſpared from the defence of the Netherlands. Theſe troops, when joined by thoſe of the duke de Mayenne, compoſed an army of fifteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, of which the duke was inveſted with the chief command. Book XXIII. 1593. March of Parma.

He began his operations with the ſiege of Noyon, in which he exerted himſelf with extraordinary vigour, and compelled the garriſon to ſurrender, before Siege of Noyon.

BOOK XXIII. 1593.

before the king could arrive to their relief. From Noyon the troops were led into Lower Picardy, where ſome inconſiderable places were reduced. But ſoon after this ſucceſs, count Manſveldt with the Spaniſh army returned to the Netherlands; and the operations of war were interrupted by certain political negociations, from which Philip expected to derive greater advantage than from the progreſs of his arms.

Convention of the States of the League.

HAVING, during ſeveral years, waſted the blood and treaſure of his ſubjects, in fomenting the war in France, in expectation of ſome favourable opportunity of ſeizing upon the crown, his patience had been for ſome time paſt exhauſted; and he had reſolved to make trial, whether it was practicable to realiſe thoſe alluring hopes by which he had ſo long been actuated. With this view his miniſters had repeatedly requeſted the duke of Mayenne to ſummon an aſſembly of the States of the League, that it might be known what catholic Prince they inclined to chooſe for their ſovereign. Mayenne ſtill cheriſhed the hopes of attaining the ſovereignty himſelf, in ſome future more favourable criſis; and he abhorred the thoughts of having the French nation ſubjected to the dominion of Spain. Influenced by theſe motives, he had on different pretences declined for ſeveral months complying with Philip's requeſt; but finding that he would not be diverted from his purpoſe, the duke had yielded to his importunity, and as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, had iſſued a ſummons for the States to meet at Paris on the 26th of January, one thouſand five hundred and ninety-three. Philip ſent the duke of Feria, and Mendoza, an eminent Spaniſh lawyer, to this aſſembly; and he fondly imagined, that by their influence, and that of the cardinal of Piacenza, the pope's legate, a majority of the deputies might be perſuaded to abrogate the

the Salic law, and to place his daughter Iſabella on the throne. BOOK XXIII.

1593. Diſcovery of Philip's views.

BUT it ſoon appeared how much his miniſters in France had deceived him, and been themſelves deceived. Neither the money which he had ſecretly beſtowed to increaſe the number of his partizans, nor the armies which he had employed at ſo great an expence in their behalf, had produced in any conſiderable degree the effects which he expected. Some of the greateſt bigots in the party, and ſome of the loweſt of the people only, had given credit to his profeſſions of zeal for religion; even the eyes of theſe men were now opened, and they perceived how little they had been indebted to the friendſhip of a prince, who now diſcovered, that his principal deſign in aſſiſting them againſt their enemies, had been to take advantage of their diſtreſs, and to reduce them to the unhappy condition of a province of Spain. For it was in this light they conſidered his propoſal; and were no leſs alarmed at his demand of their crown for Iſabella, than if he had demanded it for himſelf. In theſe ſentiments the deputies were ſecretly confirmed by Mayenne. But as both he and they were conſcious that they were utterly unable to contend with Henry, if Philip ſhould forſake them, they ſtudied to conceal their averſion to his propoſal. They neither agreed to it, nor rejected it; but expreſſed their ſolicitude with regard to the perſon whom the catholic king ſhould make choice of for his daughter's huſband; and inſiſted, that in the event of her election, ſhe ſhould not be married to any foreign prince.

THE Spaniſh miniſters informed them, that their maſter had indeed deſigned to give her in marriage to Erneſt archduke of Auſtria; but ſince it was not agreeable to the States, he was willing to beſtow

BOOK XXIII. 1593.

ſtow her upon the duke of Guiſe. The duke de Mayenne did not expect this conceſſion, and was greatly diſconcerted when the Spaniſh miniſters produced inſtructions, empowering them to make it. He was ſtung with the preference which was given to his nephew before his ſon; and he now ſecretly reſolved to obſtruct the election of Iſabella, to the utmoſt of his power. Finding it neceſſary however to diſguiſe his ſentiments, he affected to be highly pleaſed with the propoſal; but alleged that a regard to the honour of his catholic majeſty, as well as to the ſafety of the duke of Guiſe, required that the election of Iſabella ſhould be deferred till an army was aſſembled, ſufficient to overpower her enemies, and to fix her upon the throne. At preſent there was no army in France able to contend with the king of Navarre, and a conſiderable time muſt elapſe before ſo great a force as was neceſſary could be raiſed. The Spaniſh miniſters were ſenſible of the ſtrength of this objection, they likewiſe knew that, without the aſſiſtance of Mayenne, they could not perſuade the States to proceed to the election, and therefore, without great oppoſition, they agreed to a delay. In this manner did the duke de Mayenne, influenced partly by ambition, and partly by concern for the freedom and independence of the kingdom, diſappoint for the preſent Philip's plan to enſlave it; and other events afterwards happened, which would have rendered it impoſſible, even for Mayenne himſelf, had he been ſo inclined, to carry it into execution.

Henry IV. embraces the catholic religion.

THE king of France, who knew the purpoſe for which the States had been convened, though he was in a great meaſure ignorant of Mayenne's views, dreaded violently his concurring with the Spaniards; and felt great anxiety with reſpect to the conſequences which might follow. For Philip,

lip, he believed, would regard an election made by the States of the League, though only a ſmall part of the kingdom, as a ſufficient foundation for his daughter's claim, and would employ all his power to ſupport it, whatever prejudice might thence ariſe to his affairs in the Netherlands. On the firſt opening of the aſſembly, Henry publiſhed an edict, declaring it to be illegal. And he gave permiſſion, at the ſame time, to the catholic lords of his party, to enter into a conference with thoſe of the League; intending to prevent the States from proceeding to extremities, by affording them the proſpect of his ſpeedy converſion to the popiſh faith.

THIS expedient was in ſome meaſure attended with the deſired effect. The nobility of the League, diſquieted with the apprehenſions of being reduced under the dominion of Spain, and conſcious, that if Philip ſhould abandon them, they muſt ſoon yield to the king's victorious arms, were thrown into extreme perplexity; and many of them ſhewed that nothing was wanting but Henry's converſion, to determine them to acknowledge his authority. This condition however was ſtill as neceſſary as ever. From the long continuance of the war, their religious prejudices were become unconquerable. With theſe their ſenſe of honour and conſiſtency conſpired, and their regard to an oath which they had ſworn, never to acknowledge an heretical prince for their ſovereign. They were confirmed in their reſolution, by the pope's legate, and by the archbiſhop of Lyons, and other partizans of Spain; and were ſtill as much determined as ever to adhere to their engagements, without regard to any inconveniences or dangers, to which they might thereby be expoſed.

WHILE the delay of the king's converſion proved an inſurmountable objection againſt him with the

BOOK XXIII. 1593.

members of the League, it gave the moſt ſenſible uneaſineſs to ſuch of the catholics as had eſpouſed his cauſe. They had been induced to remain with him, after the death of the late king, by his promiſe of embracing their religion. They had often urged him to fulfil this promiſe. Amidſt the hurry of arms, he had found it eaſy to employ excuſes, with which they had hitherto been ſatisfied. But their patience was now exhauſted. They entertained ſuſpicions that he had dealt inſincerely with them. Though brave and warlike, they were ſick of the hardſhips and fatigues of war; and they began to hold conferences together, on the ſubject of transferring their allegiance to Henry's couſin, the cardinal of Bourbon. Henry perceived that the critical period was now come, when he muſt reſolve either to change his religion, or to forego the crown, and expoſe himſelf and his proteſtant ſubjects to the fury and vengeance of all the catholics in France, ſupported by his inveterate enemy the king of Spain. Even ſome of the proteſtant leaders were ſo candid as to acknowledge, that without embracing the catholic faith, he would never be able to preſerve poſſeſſion of the throne; and they exhorted him to embrace it, if his conſcience would permit, as the only means by which they, as well as his other ſubjects, could be ſaved from ruin.

NEVER was an ingenuous prince placed in a more diſtreſsful ſituation. And never was a virtuous mind aſſailed by temptations more alluring. For he was not impelled only by ambition, or the deſire of ſecuring a great and mighty monarchy to himſelf, and his poſterity. The deſire of delivering his people from calamities, which were become intolerable, co-operated with his ambition, and both together put his integrity to the ſevereſt trial.

WITHOUT

WITHOUT any longer delay, he invited the catholic divines throughout his kingdom, to come and inſtruct him in the principles of their religion; and having heard him diſcourſe concerning ſeveral of the points in diſpute between the proteſtants and them, he declared himſelf entirely ſatisfied with their arguments, and ſoon afterwards went to maſs in the church of St. Dennis, where he read aloud his confeſſion of the catholic faith, and promiſed to maintain and defend it, againſt whatever attempts might be made for its ſubverſion.

HENRY's conduct on this occaſion was very differently interpreted by his cotemporaries, according as they ſtood well or ill affected to his perſon, or to the religion which he had embraced. It was alleged by ſome, that he had given a convincing proof of his indifference with regard to all religion, and that his converſion could be conſidered in no other light, but as hypocriſy and grimace. But others more juſtly obſerved, that if Henry had been capable of ſo great inſincerity as his enemies aſcribed to him, he would have liſtened to his intereſt at a much earlier period, and not have ſo long expoſed himſelf to the danger of being for ever excluded from the throne. That no other ſatisfactory account could be given of his delay, but the ſcruples with which his regard to truth and his ſenſe of honour had inſpired him. That it was not ſurpriſing, that a prince who had paſſed his life amidſt the tumults of war, ſhould have been but very imperfectly acquainted with the niceties of theological diſputes; or that his opinions in matters of ſuch difficult deciſion, ſhould have been gradually bent to a compliance with ſo great an intereſt as he had at ſtake. And conſidering how candid and ſincere he had ever ſhewn himſelf in all his conduct, it might juſtly be ſuppoſed that he had ſtill preſerved his integrity, and that his religious ſentiments

BOOK XXIII. 1593.

had in reality undergone that change which he now expreſſed with ſo much ſeeming ſerioufneſs and ſolemnity.

Effects of Henry's converſion.

WHATEVER were the real motives of Henry's conduct, it diffuſed a general joy and ſatisfaction among his ſubjects. Worn out with the miſeries of ſo long a war, they exulted at the proſpect of peace, though ſtill at ſome diſtance, and being now freed from the faſcination of their religious prejudices, they could perceive and admire thoſe illuſtrious virtues in the character of their ſovereign, by which he was ſo highly qualified to make them happy.

THE Spaniſh miniſters, on the other hand, the cardinal legate, and the duke de Mayenne, were greatly alarmed at this event, and ſtill more when they obſerved the reception which the news of it met with among the people. They repreſented it as a political device, intended to prevent the election of a catholic prince. They perſuaded a great number of their adherents to ſwear that they would not acknowledge Henry for king, unleſs his converſion were ratified by the pope: and at the ſame time they employed all their influence at the court of Rome, to diſſuade the pope from granting him an abſolution.

Philip ſtill adheres to his plan.

PHILIP was not diſcouraged from the proſecution of his ſcheme, either by the oppoſition which it had received from the States of the League, or by the converſion of the king. He became ſenſible however of his error in pitching on the duke of Guiſe (a young nobleman indeed of great merit and moderation, but poſſeſſed of little power or influence) for his daughter's partner in the throne. This error he corrected, and ordered his miniſters to acquaint the duke de Mayenne, that he was now determined to give the preference to *his* ſon. In conſequence

conſequence of this declaration, a negociation which Mayenne had begun for reconciling himſelf to the king, was broken off. That powerful leader and the Spaniards were henceforth on more amicable terms; and there was no longer any reaſon to doubt, that in future he would exert himſelf with vigour in promoting their deſigns [a]. 1593.

State of his affairs.

BUT there was much leſs probability at the preſent than any former period, that theſe deſigns would ever be accompliſhed. Philip had no general after the duke of Parma's death, qualified to enter the liſts with the king of France. His treaſury was exhauſted, and even his credit was reduced ſo low, that the Genoeſe, and other Italian merchants, from whom he had already borrowed ſeveral millions of money, refuſed to lend him any more. His commanders in the Netherlands had not been able to make the neceſſary levies. His troops there were fewer in number than they had ever been ſince the commencement of the war; and yet ſo great arrears were due to him, that the officers found it impracticable to maintain their authority. The greareſt part of the Spaniſh ſoldiers in the Low Countries had, upon their return from France, forſaken their ſtandards; and having elected officers, and a commander in chief from among themſelves, they had begun to exerciſe the moſt oppreſſive rapacity upon the inhabitants of the ſouthern provinces.

THE example of the Spaniards was quickly followed by the Italians and Walloons. The people in the open country were plundered in the moſt unmerciful manner. Thoſe dreadful ſcenes of deva-ſtation were renewed, which had been acted after the death of Requeſens; and the Flemings had never ſuffered ſo much from the enemy, as they

[a] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cvi. vii.

BOOK XXIII.

now ſuffered from troops engaged to protect and defend them.

1593. Siege of Gertrudenberg.

PRINCE Maurice in the mean time exerted all his wonted activity to improve the advantage which theſe diſorders afforded him, for extending the territories of the States. There was no town which the confederates were more deſirous of acquiring than Gertrudenberg; which, as it lies nearer them than Breda, ſubjected them to perpetual anxiety for the preſervation of that important city; beſides giving annoyance to their inland trade, and furniſhing the Spaniards with an eaſy entrance into Holland.

DURING the winter, Maurice had made diligent preparation for the ſiege of this place; and early in the ſpring, he was ready to take the field with ſuch an army as he judged ſufficient to enſure ſucceſs. In order to prevent the enemy from ſuſpecting his deſign, he directed his march firſt towards Sluys and Dunkirk; afterwards to Bois-le-Duc and Grave; and when by theſe feints he had induced count Manſveldt to divide his forces, he turned ſuddenly to Gertrudenberg.

MANSVELDT, anxious to avoid the reproach to which the loſs of a place of ſo great conſequence would expoſe him, drew together all the forces which could be ſpared from the garriſons of the other towns, with an intention to attempt to raiſe the ſiege. Prince Maurice expected this, and conducted his operations with the utmoſt celerity. Not only his pioneers, amounting to three thouſand, but a great number of his troops were employed day and night in fortifying his camp, both on the ſide towards the town, to prevent the eruptions of the garriſon, and on the ſide towards the country. And not ſatisfied with this, he broke down the

the dike of the river, and laid a great part of the adjacent country under water. After which, having approached the town as uſual by trenches, he opened batteries againſt it at different places; and kept up a continual fire upon it from his fleet, on the ſide towards the river [b]. Bo. XX 159

THE garriſon conſiſted of Burgundians and Walloons, made a brave and vigorous reſiſtance, and thereby gave count Manſveldt time to advance to their relief. The count's army amounted to more than double the number of the beſiegers; and he attacked their intrenchments in different places, where the inundation permitted his approach. But Maurice had conſtructed his works with ſo much art, and ſtrengthened them in ſuch a manner with forts and redoubts, at proper diſtances, that all count Manſveldt's attempts proved ineffectual. His quarters were at the ſame time greatly ſtreightened by the garriſon of Breda, which ſallied out upon him, and made conſiderable ſlaughter among his troops. He found it neceſſary to retire, and Gertrudenberg ſoon afterwards capitulated. In the garriſon there were ſeveral of thoſe ſoldiers, who ſome years before had ſold the town to the Spaniards. Theſe men ſuffered the puniſhment due to their treachery, but all the reſt, and the inhabitants of the place, received the moſt advantageous and honourable terms.

COUNT Manſveldt had, in order to retrieve his honour, by making repriſals upon the enemy, led his army from Gertrudenberg, to inveſt an important fort belonging to the confederates, called Crevecæur. But this attempt likewiſe was fruſtrated by the celerity of Maurice, who arrived before the count's lines were finiſhed; got between [illegible]

[b] The Maeſe at Gertrudenberg is more properly an arm of the ſea than a river, and admits of the largeſt ſhips

BOOK XXIII.

the fort, and though greatly inferior in number, obliged him quickly to raiſe the ſiege.

1594. DURING the reſt of the campaign, Manſveldt acted on the defenſive; and no other event happened in the Netherlands this year, that deſerves to be recorded [c].

Erneſt, archduke of Auſtria, Governor of the Netherlands.

ALTHOUGH Philip had, after the death of the duke of Parma, committed the government to count Manſveldt, he had from the firſt intended that the count ſhould reſign it into the hands of Erneſt archduke of Auſtria. This prince arrived in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-four at Bruſſels, and was received there with every mark of joy and ſatisfaction. He was a prince of a modeſt and gentle diſpoſition; but he poſſeſſed not the capacity and vigour requiſite in the preſent critical ſituation of affairs. Conſcious of his want of military talents, he fondly flattered himſelf with the hopes of prevailing on the revolted provinces to return to their allegiance by argument and perſuaſion. And with this view, he ſent an invitation to the States to appoint ambaſſadors to treat with him concerning peace. But the States rejected his invitation, and accompanied their refuſal with declaring, "That as from experience they could not repoſe any confidence in the king of Spain, ſo they would never enter into any treaty of reconcilement with him; but would maintain their liberty to the laſt, and lay down their lives ſooner than ſubmit to that intolerable yoke from which they had been ſo happily delivered."

IF it is true, as the Dutch hiſtorians relate, that two murderers were detected at this time, whom the Spaniſh

[c] Bentivoglio and Grotius, lib. iii.

Spaniſh miniſters had endeavoured to diſcover from Maurice, it will not appear ſurprizing that the declaration of the ſtates ſhould have contained expreſſions of reſentment. Already as they were now in much more flouriſhing circumſtances than before, and had much leſs reaſon than at any former period to dread the power of Spain. For while their enemy was ſtill more intent on accompliſhing the ruin of France, than on recovering its revolted dominions; and was likely to waſte its ſtrength in that chimerical enterprize, before it could be rendered ſenſible of its folly.

The ſituation of affairs in that kingdom became daily more favourable to its new king. And the king's converſion not only produced the happy effects which were expected in ſome time.

The citizens of Paris were the firſt who gave him a tender of their obedience: and being ſoon afterwards, the Pariſians opened their gates to receive him; and the example of the metropolis, which had ever been the chief ſtrength of the League, was quickly followed by Rouen, Lyons, and almoſt all the other great towns in the kingdom. Henry's conduct was admirably calculated to promote that affectionate zeal of his ſubjects, of which he received at this time ſo many ſtriking proofs. For ſeveral years he had ſuffered from them the moſt cruel injuries and affronts; but his generous ſpirit, ſuperior to reſentment, abhorred the thought of puniſhing thoſe who were willing to lay down their arms, and he received the ſubmiſſion of his moſt inveterate enemies, with a degree of goodneſs and condeſcenſion, which while it won their hearts, determined many others to imitate their example.

He granted to all who ſubmitted to him, the moſt favourable terms; confirmed their privileges, as if they had done nothing to forfeit them; adhered with inviolable fidelity to his engagements; and

BOOK XXIII. 1594.

and publiſhed an edict of general indemnity, in order to ſet the minds of the people every where at eaſe, and to convince them that it would be their fault, and not his, if the public tranquillity were not ſpeedily reſtored.

By theſe meaſures, which were equally prudent and magnanimous, the ſtrength of the League was reduced ſo low, that Philip and the duke de Mayenne might have eaſily perceived the vanity of their deſigns.

Philip's motives for proſecuting the war.

It can hardly be imagined, that either the one or the other could any longer ſeriouſly entertain the hopes of ſucceſs. But Mayenne was ſo deeply engaged with the Spaniards, that he knew not how to extricate himſelf with honour; eſpecially as he had ſolemnly ſworn, with many others of his party, that he would never acknowledge Henry for his ſovereign, till he ſhould receive abſolution from the pope. And though Philip could not now be ſo chimerical, as to expect to procure the crown for Iſabella, yet he could not overcome that implacable hatred, with which he had long been animated againſt the French monarch, in whom (judging of Henry from himſelf) he expected to find an irreconcilable and mortal foe. Beſides, he was not ignorant of the juſtice of Henry's claim to the kingdom of Navarre, which Ferdinand the catholic had wreſted from Henry's anceſtors by fraud and violence; and he could not doubt that this active victorious prince would, as ſoon as his affairs were ſettled in France, either attempt to recover his hereditary kingdom, or endeavour to procure a compenſation for it, by invading the Spaniſh dominions in the Netherlands.

Moved by theſe conſiderations, Philip reſolved to continue his hoſtilities, and by joining his forces with

with thoſe of the duke de Mayenne, to make himſelf maſter of as many towns as poſſible on the eaſtern frontier of France. 1594.

THIS reſolution he communicated to the archduke Erneſt; who, agreeably to his inſtructions, ſent count Charles of Manſveldt early in the ſpring to invade the province of Picardy, with an army of between eleven and twelve thouſand men. The count laid ſiege to the town of La Capelle; and as he attacked it unexpectedly, he ſoon obliged the garriſon to capitulate. Siege of La Capelle. 9th May.

THE king had ſet out from Paris as ſoon as he received intelligence of the ſiege, but could not arrive in time to prevent the ſurrender. Having been joined on his march by the dukes de Nevers and Bouillon, and finding himſelf at the head of a conſiderable army [c], he reſolved to undertake ſome important enterpriſe, by which he might be compenſated for the loſs of La Capelle. One of the moſt conſiderable towns in that part of the kingdom was Laon, a place of great extent, ſtrongly fortified, and well provided with every thing neceſſary to ſuſtain a ſiege. The garriſon, which was numerous, was commanded by Du Bourg, one of the braveſt officers of the League; and there was at that time in the town, beſides a great number of other nobility, the count of Somerive, the duke de Mayenne's ſecond ſon. Theſe conſiderations, far from diſcouraging the king from beſieging Laon, were the motives which determined him to inveſt it, and he carried on his operations againſt it with his uſual activity and vigilance. Siege of Laon.

THE beſieged gave him all the annoyance and interruption in their power; and in ſome ſallies which they made, before he had time to cover his troops,

[c] Twelve thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe.

BOOK XXIII. 1594.

troops, he loſt more than four hundred men. But his anxiety with regard to the iſſue of his enterpriſe, aroſe principally from the neighbourhood of the Spaniſh army, which was joined at this time by the duke de Mayenne, whom Philip, in order to prevent him from entering into an accommodation with the king, had intruſted with the chief command.

Mayenne attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege.

VARIOUS motives concurred on this occaſion to determine Mayenne to exert himſelf with vigour. There was much need of ſome ſplendid inſtance of ſucceſs to ſupport the drooping ſpirits of his party. Laon was the moſt conſiderable town which remained in his poſſeſſion; and beſides his ſon, and many of his faithful adherents, he had left his moſt valuable effects in it, as in a place where there was little danger of their falling into the hands of the enemy. He loſt no time in marching to its relief. His army conſiſted of nearly the ſame number as that of the king, but being inferior in cavalry, he found it neceſſary to approach the town on that ſide, on which there lay a wood or foreſt, where the enemy's horſe could not be eaſily employed. Henry had penetrated into his deſign, and taken poſſeſſion of the wood with a part of his troops. Mayenne at firſt obliged them to retire; but the royaliſts having immediately received a reinforcement from the camp, returned to the charge, and ſtood their ground for ſome time with great bravery againſt the Spaniſh veterans. They would have been compelled however to give way a ſecond time, if the royal cavalry, which had advanced to their relief, under the baron [d], now marſhal de Biron, had not, conformably to their valiant leader's example and command, diſmounted from their horſes, and thrown themſelves into the front

[d] His father had been lately killed at the ſiege of Epernay.

front of the battle. The king himſelf ſoon after came up with the greateſt part of his army; and, if the ground had permitted it, a general engagement would have enſued, but it allowed only of ſkirmiſhes, which continued with various ſucceſs till the evening; when Mayenne, dreading that the king might ſend his cavalry to attack his rear, drew off his forces to a little diſtance from the wood.

ALTHOUGH the nature of the ground in this rencounter prevented the king from availing himſelf of the ſuperiority of his cavalry, yet this ſuperiority proved afterwards of the greateſt uſe. Mayenne being obliged to bring his proviſions through an open country, from places at the diſtance of ſeveral miles, the king ſent out his horſe in numerous bodies to intercept his convoys; and although the duke attempted to bring them under a ſtrong guard in the night, ſometimes from one place and ſometimes from another, yet ſuch was the vigilance of the duke de Longueville, and the marſhal de Biron, to whom the king gave the charge of intercepting them, that almoſt none of them were ſuffered to eſcape. Theſe bold adventurous leaders were continually in motion. No guards which Mayenne could ſpare were able to withſtand their vigorous attacks, and his army was at laſt reduced to ſo great diſtreſs, as made it neceſſary for him to decamp. He was ſenſible how difficult he muſt find it to retire in the face of a ſuperior enemy: but if he remained any longer in his preſent ſituation, his troops, he perceived, muſt either periſh for want, or lay down their arms.

His maſterly retreat.

THE duke had hitherto been unfortunate in his enterpriſes, and his misfortunes had contributed to obſcure his fame; but on this occaſion, he gave a conſpicuous proof of conſummate military ſkill,

as

BOOK XXIII. 1594.

as well as of the moſt unqueſtionable perſonal courage and reſolution. His troops drawn up in the moſt maſterly manner, were every where ſo well prepared to receive the enemy, that the king, who attacked them with his cavalry as ſoon as they began their march, found it utterly impracticable to penetrate their ranks, whilſt Mayenne himſelf marched on foot in the rear, fought on ſome occaſions as a common ſoldier, and by the gracefulneſs of his perſon, added to the fortitude which he diſplayed, commanded univerſal admiration. In this manner he advanced ſlowly, till he reached a narrow defile, where he had planted ſome batteries of cannon; from the dread of which, the king ordered his troops to halt, and ſuffered the duke to purſue his march to La Fere without any farther moleſtation.

Laon ſurrenders.

HENRY then reſumed his operations before the town. The beſieged, though deprived of all hopes of relief, perſiſted for ſome time in their defence; but at laſt, finding their numbers greatly diminiſhed, they offered to ſurrender on condition that the garriſon and the count of Somerive ſhould be allowed to march out with the honours of war; and to this condition the king readily conſented, from his deſire of preventing bloodſhed, and of ſaving the fortifications of the town. The capitulation was ſigned on the 22d of July. The terms of it were religiouſly fulfilled; and Henry, far from diſcovering ill humour or reſentment for the oppoſition which he had met with, embraced with pleaſure the preſent opportunity of teſtifying his eſteem for the duke de Mayenne, by ſhewing particular marks of reſpect and kindneſs to his ſon.

Submiſſion of the duke of Guiſe.

So much goodneſs, united with ſo much heroiſm and magnanimity, had charms in the eyes of Henry's

y's enemies that were irreſiſtible. The reduction of Laon, and his generous treatment of the inhabitants and garriſon, were quickly followed by the voluntary ſurrender of Chateau-Thierry, Amiens, and Cambray. The duke of Lorrain, who from the beginning had given his aſſiſtance to the League, choſe now to be at peace with a prince, in whoſe favour fortune, and his own merits, had produced ſo remarkable a revolution. And the duke of Guiſe whom the Spaniards had tantalized with a glimpſe of royalty, but had afterwards neglected, moved partly by this conſideration, and partly by his admiration of the king, entered into a treaty of reconciliation with him; and having delivered to him the towns of Rheims, Vitry, Rocroix, and ſeveral other places in Champaigne, he was rewarded by Henry with the government of Provence[e]. 1594.

Siege of Groningen by prince Maurice.

DURING the courſe of theſe events, ſo adverſe to Philip's views in France, prince Maurice was engaged in the moſt important enterpriſe which he had hitherto undertaken, the ſiege of Groningen. That city, though almoſt ſurrounded with the territories of the States, had been preſerved till now in its allegiance to Philip, by Verdugo, a Spaniſh officer of great abilities, with whoſe aſſiſtance the catholic part of the inhabitants had been able to keep the proteſtants under ſubjection. Jealous however of their liberty, they had never conſented to admit any Spaniſh garriſon within their walls, but three thouſand of the citizens trained to the uſe of arms had been inliſted in the king's ſervice for the defence of the town, while nine hundred of his foreign troops were permitted to take up their quarters in the ſuburbs.

MAURICE

[e] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. ci. Meteren, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, ann. 1594; and Sully's Memoirs, lib. vi.

BOOK XXII. 1594.

MAURICE had long meditated the reduction of Groningen, not only becauſe it would be of itſelf an acquiſition of great value to the confederacy, but becauſe it was the only place of conſequence in thoſe parts under the Spaniſh dominion, and furniſhed an eaſy entrance to the Spaniards into the northern provinces. Much pains had been taken and great exertions made by Verdugo for its ſecurity. Many bloody rencounters had paſſed between him and the forces of the ſtates, in which, from the ſmallneſs of his numbers, and not from the want either of bravery or conduct, he was generally unſucceſsful; and Maurice, powerfully ſeconded in all his operations by his couſin count William of Naſſau, had at length reduced Verdugo to the neceſſity of quitting the province, and had made himſelf maſter of almoſt every paſs by which the citizens could receive aſſiſtance or ſupplies.

THEY had not neglected to inform the archduke of the imminent danger to which they were expoſed. At their requeſt, the emperor of Germany had tranſmitted to Philip a repreſentation, importing that although they deſired nothing ſo much as to maintain their allegiance, and had preſerved it long amidſt much greater hardſhips and difficulties than any of his other ſubjects had endured, yet if the army were not immediately ſent to their aſſiſtance, they would ſoon find it neceſſary to open their gates to the enemy. Philip, far from diſregarding their application, made them the moſt gracious and flattering reply; and ſent orders to the archduke to poſtpone every other object in the Netherlands to the relief of Groningen. But the greateſt part of his forces were at this time engaged in the war in Picardy; and the remainder having mutinied againſt their officers, on account of their want of pay, refuſed to obey the governor's commands.

PRINCE

PRINCE Maurice therefore applied to the proſecution of the ſiege, with very little apprehenſion of meeting with any interruption from the Spaniards, although agreeably to his uſual cautious maxims, he not only fortified his quarters, but likewiſe the ſeveral paſſes which led to them from the ſouthern provinces. By beginning to open his trenches at a diſtance from the town, the ſiege was ſomewhat retarded, but he thereby prevented the loſs of men which would otherwiſe have been ſuſtained. On the third of June his batteries were unmaſked, and ſoon afterwards all the out-works were laid in ruins. The beſieged, alarmed with the rapidity of his progreſs, called the foreign troops, which were quartered in the ſuburbs, to their aſſiſtance. The defence was conducted for ſeveral weeks with the higheſt ſpirit and intrepidity, and much blood was ſpilt. But Maurice having blown up a ravelin, which was one of the principal defences of the place, the courage of the inhabitants began to fail, and there was nothing to be heard but complaints of the ingratitude of the king, in thus abandoning to their enterpriſing enemy a people ſo diſtinguiſhed for their attachment and fidelity. 1594

THEIR chief magiſtrate, Van Balen, who had long been ſecretly averſe from the Spaniſh government, improved with great dexterity the opportunity which their preſent temper afforded him. He ſtudied to confirm them in their ſentiments of the king's ingratitude; he repreſented to them the folly of flattering themſelves with the hopes of relief from a prince, who was more intent upon conquering the dominions of others, than providing for the ſecurity of his own. He painted in ſtrong colours the miſeries which they muſt ſuffer, if either the ſiege were to be prolonged, or the town to be taken by aſſault; and by expatiating on the advantages which would accrue to them from ac-

BOOK XXIII. 1594.

ceding to the union of Utrecht; he endeavoured to make them ſenſible, that if freedom from a foreign yoke was an object to be deſired, it was infinitely more for their intereſt to ſubmit to the generous enemy, who now beſieged them, than even to be delivered from the ſiege.

THESE exhortations made the deſired impreſſion even upon the minds of thoſe who were moſt attached to the catholic religion. That attachment had been long their only tie to the Spaniſh government; and it was overcome at this time by their indignation on account of Philip's negligence in providing for their defence, joined to their deſire of participating of that civil liberty which had proved the ſource of ſo much proſperity and happineſs to the confederated provinces.

Groningen united to the confederacy.

A DEPUTATION of the principal inhabitants was ſent to treat of a ſurrender; and the prince, without heſitation, granted them the moſt advantageous terms. The city of Groningen was declared to be henceforth a member of the union of Utrecht. All the exemptions and ancient privileges of the inhabitants were confirmed; the civil government of the place was allowed to remain on the ſame footing as before, and liberty of conſcience was eſtabliſhed, with this reſtriction, that no other religion but the reformed ſhould be publicly exerciſed. The citizens on the other hand engaged to acknowledge the ſupreme authority of the States; to ſubmit to the general laws of the union; to contribute their ſhare of the public expences; and to admit ſuch a garriſon into the town as the States ſhould judge neceſſary for its ſecurity. The foreign ſoldiers were permitted to depart with their arms and baggage. The capitulation was ſigned on the 23d of July; and on the ſame day prince Maurice entered the town. He remained in it for

for ſome time till certain articles of the capitulation were executed, after which, having committed the government to his kinſman, count William of Naſſau, he ſet out for the Hague [s]. BOOK XXIII. 1594.

Mutiny of the Spaniſh and Italian ſoldiers.

WHILE Philip's power ſuffered ſo great a diminution in the northern provinces, his affairs in Brabant were daily more and more involved in diſorder and confuſion. The archduke had, with the utmoſt difficulty, raiſed money to ſatisfy the Walloon and Spaniſh mutineers; but no ſooner had theſe men returned to their duty, than the Italians to whom the ſame arrears were due, reſolved to employ the ſame means to effectuate their payment. Many of the officers concurred with the private men in forming this reſolution, and they put it inſtantly into execution, by ſeizing on the town of Sichen, where a part of their number had been ſtationed. They were joined by ſoldiers from all the garriſons in the neighbourhood, who continued flocking to them, till they amounted to two thouſand horſe and foot.

The mutineers protected by Maurice.

NOT ſatisfied with laying the country round the town under contribution, they ſpread themſelves over the province, made excurſions to the very gates of Bruſſels where the governor reſided, and plundered the people with as much cruelty as if they had been engaged in open war. The governor having tried the power of perſuaſion without effect, reſolved to employ force to reduce them; and for this purpoſe he ſent the Spaniſh troops which he had lately pacified, under Lewis de Velaſco, to beſiege Sichen. In the beginning of this ſedition, prince Maurice had made the mutineers an offer of ſhelter and protection in the territories of the States, and they readily agreed to accept this offer in caſe they ſhould find it neceſ-

[s] Meteren, lib. xvii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i. Grotius, lib. iii.

Book XXIII. 1594.

ceſſary; but informed him, that they would defend themſelves in Sichen as long as they were able, againſt the Spaniards. They accordingly did ſo, and made ſeveral deſperate ſallies, in which many on both ſides were ſlain. Finding however that the place was too weak to be long defended againſt an enemy ſo much ſuperior in number, they retired under the fortifications of Breda and San Gertrudenberg, where proviſions were ſold to them by the ſubjects of the States. The intention of Maurice in this ſingular treatment of an enemy, was only to prolong the term of their diſobedience. He made no attempt to perſuade them to enter into the ſervice of the confederacy, but gave permiſſion to the archduke to ſend an ambaſſador to treat with them; and when, after a tedious negociation, they had agreed to take up their quarters in Tirlemont, and to remain there till their demands were ſatisfied, without renewing their hoſtilities, Maurice readily allowed them to depart. They required a Spaniſh nobleman to be given as a hoſtage for the fulfilment of the governor's promiſes; and ſo great was the diſorder of the king's finances at this period that theſe troops were ſuffered to remain inactive at Tirlemont for near a year before their arrears were paid [h].

His motive.

Death of Erneſt, and Fuentes governor.

BEFORE the expiration of this term, the governor was ſeized with a hectic fever, of which he died on the 20th of February, in the forty-ſecond year of his age. He named the count of Fuentes for his ſucceſſor, and his choice was ſoon after ratified by the king. This nobleman having been ſent into the Netherlands a little before the death of the duke of Parma, had, agreeably to Philip's inſtructions, during the government of count Manſveldt and the archduke, poſſeſſed a principal ſhare in the adminiſtration. By his advice, or more pro-

[h] Grotius, lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xvii. p. 581. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i.

properly by his authority, count Manſveldt had publiſhed a barbarous edict, commanding all priſoners to be put to death; and ordering the king's troops who, in their excurſions into the territories of the States, had been ſatisfied for ſeveral years paſt with levying contributions, henceforth to lay waſte the country with fire and ſword.

THE States, in return, publiſhed a manifeſto, in which they expreſſed their abhorrence of this barbarity; but at the ſame time declared, that if the governor did not recall his edict againſt a certain time, they would retaliate the cruelty which it preſcribed upon the troops and ſubjects of the king. This meaſure had been urged by Fuentes, on the pretence of ſhortening the duration of the war, although the experience of his kinſman, the duke of Alva, might have convinced him that, conſidering the ſtrength to which the confederacy had attained, it would ſerve only to increaſe the calamities of the war, and to render it perpetual. Count Manſveldt came ſoon to be ſenſible that theſe muſt be the conſequences, and either revoked his edict, or gave orders to prevent it from being carried into execution.

FUENTES however ſtill continued to exerciſe an unlimited influence in the government. The Flemiſh nobility complained bitterly, as in the time of cardinal Granvelle, of the inſignificance to which they were reduced, and before the death of the archduke they had given ſome ſtriking proofs of their diſcontent. This diſcontent was greatly heightened when the count was appointed governor: they ſaw then how little ſincerity there had been in thoſe ſoothing promiſes which the king had made them ſome years before, when they conſented to the return of the foreign troops. They perceived how little truſt and confidence he repoſed in them, and

Diſcontent of the Flemiſh nobles.

BOOK XXIII. 1594.

and were ſenſible at laſt of the truth of what the prince of Orange had ſo often told them, that, by their agreement with the duke of Parma, they would reduce their country to the miſerable ſtate of a province of Spain. The duke d'Arſchot and count Charles of Manſveldt, who had reaſon to expect to have been preferred before Fuentes, would not ſubmit to the indignity put upon them, but reſigned their employments, and left the Netherlands. The duke d'Arſchot died afterwards in Venice, and count Manſveldt in Hungary, where he commanded the emperor's army againſt the Turks.

Vigorous conduct of Fuentes.

FUENTES in the mean time entered upon the exerciſe of his office, and notwithſtanding the prejudices which the Flemings ſeem juſtly to have entertained againſt him, he ſoon diſcovered that his abilities were not unequal to the charge with which he was inveſted. He applied with great ſucceſs to quell the mutinous ſpirit of the army, and in a few months put it upon a much more reſpectable footing, both as to diſcipline and numbers.

Declaration of war between France and Spain.

PHILIP had greater occaſion now than ever for abilities and vigour in the perſon to whom he committed the government of the Netherlands. The League in France was about to expire, notwithſtanding his exertions to prevent it; and the French monarch, being firmly ſeated on his throne, declared war againſt him, prohibiting all commerce with his ſubjects, and granting liberty to the French to invade and plunder, and take poſſeſſion of whatever dominions belonged to the crown of Spain.

Henry's motives.

THIS meaſure was condemned by many, as being highly inexpedient at the preſent juncture, on account of the exhauſted ſtate to which his kingdom was reduced by the long continuance of the civil

civil wars, and no perſon was more ſenſible of the ſtrength of this objection than the king himſelf; but he believed that, in the preſent temper of the catholic king, peace could not be obtained from him upon honourable terms. He was perſuaded that war with the Spaniards muſt of neceſſity continue ſome time longer; and he thought that as nothing would contribute more to extinguiſh the flames of civil diſcord than a foreign war, it would be eaſier to intereſt his catholic ſubjects in the proſecution of it, if it were regarded as a war between the crowns, to which political motives had given birth, than if it were ſuffered to remain on its preſent footing, and conſidered as carried on by Philip for the ſake of religion. It is not indeed improbable, that perſonal animoſity added force to theſe incitements. Philip had ever treated Henry in the moſt contemptuous manner; and, under the maſk of religion, had endeavoured firſt to exclude him, and afterwards to expel him from the throne. Henry deteſted that artifice and duplicity in Philip's character, of which, in his late attempt to procure the abolition of the Salic law, he had given ſuch inconteſtable evidence; and the terms in which his declaration of war was expreſſed, demonſtrate, that reſentment had, on the preſent occaſion, a conſiderable influence on his conduct.

PHILIP's anſwer to this declaration was perfectly conformable to his character. All his interferences in the affairs of France had proceeded, he ſaid, from his concern for the proſperity of the people, and the ſecurity of the catholic faith; and he declared, that his intention now was not to enter into war with the crown or nation of France, but only to perſevere in protecting the true catholics of that kingdom from the oppreſſion of the prince of Bearn and his adherents[i].

BOTH

[i] D'Avila, lib. xiv.

BOOK XXIII.

1595.

BOTH kings had been employed, before their declaration of war, in preparing for the recommencement of hoſtilities; and Henry, beſides his domeſtic preparations, had entered into a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive with the United Provinces. In fulfilment of an article of this treaty, the States ſent a body of horſe and foot, under Philip count of Naſſau, to invade the province of Luxemburg. Their enterpriſes were for ſome time attended with ſucceſs; but Fuentes, having diſpatched the brave Verdugo with ſuperior forces to oppoſe them, they were obliged, after ſeveral rencounters, to quit the province; and were ſoon after recalled, and ſtationed near the frontier of Brabant, where it was expected they would be of equal ſervice to the French monarch, by detaining the Spaniards in the Netherlands.

Proſecution of the war.

THE army of the States however, even after it was joined by theſe troops, was not able to furniſh full employment to thoſe which the governor had prepared. He left an army under Mondragone to check the progreſs of prince Maurice, and ſet out himſelf for Picardy with the reſt of his forces. His firſt enterpriſe was the ſiege of Catelet, of which he made himſelf maſter in a few weeks, though it was ſtrongly fortified, and bravely defended by the garriſon.

Siege of Catelet.

DURING this ſiege, Fuentes had reaſon to flatter himſelf with the hopes of acquiring poſſeſſion of the caſtle and town of Ham without bloodſhed. The caſtle was held by an officer called d'Orvilliers, and the town by his half-brother, whoſe name was Gomeron. Theſe two men had been violent partizans of the league, and the latter reſolved to deliver the town to the Spaniards rather than to the king of France; but he

Affairs of Gomeron and d'Orvilliers.

he demanded from Fuentes a reward of twenty thouſand crowns for the town, and a ſtill higher reward, if he ſhould prevail upon his brother (which he engaged to do) to deliver up the caſtle. The count readily agreed to theſe terms, and paid him the twenty thouſand crowns upon his admitting a thouſand Spaniſh troops into the town; but required Gomeron himſelf and his two younger brothers to remain with him as hoſtages, till the caſtle likewiſe ſhould be put into his poſſeſſion. To this Gomeron conſented, from a fond perſuaſion that his brother would imitate his example, rather than expoſe *him* and his other brothers to the reſentment of the Spaniards, eſpecially as their mother was in the caſtle, whoſe intreaties he expected d'Orvilliers would be unable to reſiſt. But d'Orvilliers choſe rather to abandon his brothers to their fate, than betray his charge to the enemies of his country; and he admitted the duke de Bouillon into the caſtle, with a numerous body of the king's troops, who attacked the Spaniards in the town, and either put them to the ſword or took them priſoners. The mother of Gomeron, now trembling with anxiety for her children's preſervation, came to Fuentes, and repreſented, that d'Orvilliers repented of what he had done, and was willing to deliver the caſtle to him, if he would come himſelf with his army to receive it. The count, believing her repreſentations to be true, the more readily as he herſelf ſeemed entirely convinced of the truth of it, marched with his forces towards Ham; but finding that the mother had been deceived, and that, in order to avoid her importunity, d'Orvilliers had left the place, and reſigned his government to another, he was inflamed with rage, and put Gomeron to death in preſence of the army. This unhappy man did not perhaps deſerve to ſuffer a puniſhment ſo

Boo XXII 1595

BOOK XXIII. 1595.

hands of Fuentes; but it was due to the treachery and egregious folly into which his avarice had betrayed him [k].

Siege of Dourlens.

FROM Ham the count conducted his troops, after they had reſted ſome days, to lay ſiege to Dourlens. This town being near the frontier of the Netherlands, was ſtrongly fortified and garriſoned by a number of ſelect troops. Still however it was neceſſary, in order to prevent it from falling into the enemy's hands, that the garriſon ſhould be augmented; and no ſooner had the marſhals Bouillon and Villars, whom the king had ſent to watch the motions of the Spaniſh army, heard that Dourlens was inveſted, than they aſſembled all the troops in the neighbourhood, amounting to a thouſand foot and fifteen hundred horſe, and advanced towards the town, in hopes of being able to force their way through the enemy's intrenchments; but Fuentes, having received intelligence of their deſign, left a part of his forces to guard his trenches, and marched out with the reſt, in order of battle, to an advantageous ſituation at a little diſtance from the town. When the duke of Bouillon obſerved Fuentes ſo well prepared for his defence, he counſelled marſhal Villars to retire; but that intrepid general, whoſe courage was ever too ardent and impetuous, refuſed to comply, and ſtill continued to advance, till his troops were almoſt ſurrounded by the Spaniards. A deſperate and bloody battle enſued; but as there was no proportion in reſpect of numbers between the contending parties, the French were almoſt entirely cut to pieces, Villars himſelf was ſlain, and the cavalry, after great loſs, were obliged to retire.

DURING the combat, the garriſon ſallied out upon the troops which had been left to defend the camp and trenches; but through the wiſe precaution

[k] Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

n which had [illegible] the Spaniards gave- 1595
horions: at [illegible] returned with
and vigour the operations of the siege. 1595
g the besieged there were more than three
ed gentlemen, who inspired the garrison with
me generous spirit by which themselves
actuated, and defended the town [illegible]
with extraordinary courage and resolution.

r their skill and conduct were not equal to
avery which they displayed. In an assault
: thirty-first of July, they were overpowered
e assailants, and almost the whole garrison,
nting to more than a thousand men, with
governor the count of Diaz, were put to
vord.

ENTES emboldened by his success, resolved Siege of Cambray.
to lay siege to Cambray; the reduction of
i was the principal object of his present expe-
.

his important city had been wrested from the
ards, as is above related, by the duke of
a; and Anjou had bequeathed it to his mo-
Catherine of Medicis, by whom a French
eman of the name of Balagny had been ap-
ed governor both of the town and citadel.
gny taking advantage of the troubles in
ce, had for several years acknowledged no
ior; and as he had studied to maintain some
e of neutrality between the contending par-
he had been suffered to act as sovereign both
e city and its territory. But apprehending,
the discomfiture of the League, that it was
sary for him to make a choice, either of the
of France or Spain, for his protector, he
d to acknowledge his dependence on the
ch monarch; on condition, that he should be
itted to enjoy under him possession of the so-
gnty, with the title of prince of Cambray;
to these terms Henry the more readily con-
sented

BOOK XXIII.

ſented, as he dreaded, that if he rejected them, they would be granted by the king of Spain.

1595. BALAGNY, being thus confirmed in his poſſeſſion, ſpared no expence or pains in ſtrengthening the fortifications of the place. The garriſon amounted to three thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, the greateſt part of which were French troops, of the moſt unqueſtionable bravery. The town was ſtrong, and it was well furniſhed with military ſtores and proviſions.

DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, ſome of the principal officers in the Spaniſh army endeavoured to perſuade the count de Fuentes to relinquiſh his deſign, by repreſenting, that before he could accompliſh it, either the winter ſeaſon would overtake him, or the French monarch, being diſengaged from his enemies in other quarters, would arrive with a ſuperior army, and attack him after his troops were diminiſhed in number, and exhauſted with the operations of the ſiege; but Fuentes, ambitious to diſtinguiſh his adminiſtration by ſo important an acquiſition, and elated by the ſucceſs with which his enterpriſes had been hitherto attended, refuſed to liſten to theſe remonſtrances; and, having received a great augmentation of forces from the neighbouring provinces, he began his operations without delay. They were carried on with a degree of ſkill and vigour which would have reflected honour on the greateſt generals of the age; and notwithſtanding the moſt intrepid defence, conducted with much prudence by the celebrated de Vic, whom Henry had ſent with a reinforcement of troops to the aſſiſtance of the beſieged, he opened his batteries in a few weeks ſo near the town, that ſome of its principal defences were deſtroyed, and a great part of the wall was laid in ruins. Still however his ſucceſs was doubtful. He encountered the moſt diſcouraging difficulties

ılties in furniſhing his troops with proviſions; nd nothing but the moſt unconquerable reſolution, ıded to the dread of tarniſhing the glory which : had already acquired, could have prevented im from abandoning his attempt. BOOK XXII. 1595.

ıe inhabitants of the town, who having been long ccuſtomed to the mild adminiſtration of their rchbiſhops, had borne with extreme impatience he haughty imperious behaviour of Balagny; and ıad been almoſt reduced to deſpair, by the exortion, rapine, and inſolence of his wife, by whom ıe ſuffered himſelf to be entirely governed. The ıitizens had ſecretly ſent a deputation of their ıumber to the French monarch, intreating him o deliver them from the yoke of their oppreſſor, ınd offering on that condition to ſubmit to his auhority, and to receive a garriſon of his troops. But through the influence of the famous Gabrielle d'Etrées, whom Balagny had gained over to his ntereſt, Henry not only refuſed to comply with heir requeſt, but confirmed Balagny in his uſurp:d authority. But he was ſaved from that mortification, by Cambray given up by the citizens.

THE inhabitants, inflamed now with reſentnent againſt the king, as well as againſt Balagny, reſolved to embrace the firſt opportunity of putting themſelves under the dominion of their former maſter the king of Spain; and they were confirmed in their reſolution, by the numerous eccleſiaſtics in the town, who hoped by this meaſure to effectuate the re-eſtabliſhment of the archbiſhop, whom Balagny had expelled. Having formed their plan, they delayed the execution of it, till Balagny and de Vic were wholly occupied in taking meaſures againſt an aſſault, which they believed to be intended by the Spaniards. At that time they ran to arms, and made themſelves maſters of one

of

BOOK XXIII. 1595.

[illegible]agny, and
[illegible] to divert them from
[illegible] endeavours proved in-
effect[illegible] of [illegible]cipal citizens were im-
mediately sent to [illegible] with an offer to surren-
der the town on the [illegible]ing conditions, to which
he readily agreed: [illegible]t the ſoldiers ſhould be re-
ſtrained from plun[illegible] that all paſt offences
ſhould be forgiven: [illegible]t the citizens ſhould en-
joy their wonted priv[illegible], and the archbiſhop be
reſtored to his ancient [illegible]iſdiction and authority.

THE garriſon immediately retired into the citadel, where they expected to have been able to defend themſelves for a conſiderable time. But having found, upon ſearching the magazines, that there was hardly proviſions enough to ſupport them for three days, they agreed on the firſt ſummons to capitulate. The wife of Balagny had reduced them to this neceſſity, by ſelling, at an exorbitant price, without her huſband's knowledge, the proviſions which had been laid up in ſtore.

DURING the ſiege this woman had diſcovered a degree of ſpirit, capacity, and courage above her ſex; but being unable to bear the conſciouſneſs of that egregious folly into which her avarice had betrayed her, and which was now attended with conſequences ſo fatal to her ambition, ſhe was overwhelmed with anguiſh and deſpair; and refuſing to take either medicine or food, ſhe died miſerably, before the citadel was delivered to the Spaniards.

THE capitulation was ſigned on the ſeventh of October, and the garriſon marched out with all the honours of war upon the ninth; immediately after which, Fuentes having ſtationed five hundred Spaniards in the citadel, and two thouſand Germans in the town, ſet out for the Netherlands with the reſt

reſt of his forces, and put them into winter-quarters in Flanders, Artois, and Hainault[1]. BOOK XXIII.

1595. Affairs in Burgundy.

THE reader will not ſuppoſe that the active ſpirit of the French monarch could be unemployed during the courſe of theſe diſaſtrous events. He was deeply affected by the loſs of the important towns which had been conquered by Fuentes, and would have marched in perſon to their relief, had he not believed that his preſence was ſtill more neceſſary in another part of his dominions. For Philip having reſolved to proſecute the war with vigour in different quarters at the ſame time, had ordered Velaſco, the conſtable of Caſtile and governor of Milan, to lead an army of ten thouſand men into Burgundy; and theſe troops, were upon their arrival in Franche Compté, joined by the duke de Mayenne with a thouſand foot and four hundred horſe. This army was greatly ſuperior to any which marſhal Biron, who commanded in theſe parts, could aſſemble to oppoſe it; and Henry dreaded that the province of Burgundy would be ſpeedily overrun. Having therefore ſent orders to his troops in different parts to follow him, he ſet out himſelf at the head of one thouſand eight hundred horſe and foot, with an intention to haraſs the enemy, till the reſt of his army ſhould arrive.

Battle of Françoiſe.

THE Spaniards had paſſed the Saone, and advanced as far as Fontaine-Françoiſe, when Henry attacked them on their march, with a degree of impetuoſity and ardour that filled Velaſco with aſtoniſhment. The king was bravely ſupported on this occaſion by the marquis de Mirebeau, the count de Gramont, and ſeveral others of his nobility; but above all, by the intrepid Biron, who fought long after he was covered with the blood that flowed from

[1] D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

BOOK XXIII. 1595.

from a wound which he had received in the beginning of the engagement. The king by his exhortations, and ſtill more by his example, inflamed his troops to a degree of madneſs. At the head of his ſquadrons, he plunged ſword and hand into the midſt of the enemy, broke through their ranks, and threw their van into confuſion.

HAD Velaſco ordered his whole army to advance, it is impoſſible but Henry muſt have been ſurrounded and overpowered. But his courage on this occaſion ſupplied the want both of caution and of numbers. Velaſco intimidated by the unexampled boldneſs which he had ſeen diſplayed, gave orders for a retreat, and left the king in poſſeſſion of the field of battle. Early next morning he repaſſed the Saone, notwiteſtanding the earneſt remonſtrances of the duke de Mayenne, who had procured certain intelligence of the ſtrength of the enemy. Mayenne then intreated Velaſco to leave him a part of the forces to raiſe the ſiege of Dijon, which had been inveſted by a party of the royaliſts, and to enable him to defend ſuch other towns on this ſide of the river as were ſtill in his poſſeſſion. But this likewiſe the Spaniſh general refuſed, and continued to retire till he reached the town of Gray; where he fortified his camp in the ſtrongeſt manner, with a reſolution to act only on the defenſive, in caſe the royal army ſhould advance.

Reconcilement of Mayenne with the king.

VELASCO, who was utterly unpractiſed in the military art, appears to have been ſtrongly actuated with a dread of the ſuperior ſkill and bravery of the king. But the duke de Mayenne likewiſe perceived in his conduct towards *him*, on this occaſion, manifeſt ſymptoms of diffidence and diſtruſt. This the duke could not help attributing to Velaſco's inſtruction from the court of Spain; and

and he could not doubt, that through the ill offices of the Spaniſh miniſters in France, Philip had conceived ſome freſh jealouſy of his deſigns. He was therefore thrown into great perplexity, while he believed that he ſhould ere long be abandoned by the Spaniards, as he had already been by moſt of his adherents in France; and could hardly ſuppoſe that now, when his power was reduced ſo low, he would be able to obtain advantageous conditions from the king. After long deliberation, he formed the reſolution of going to Madrid, to juſtify his conduct to Philip, againſt the miſrepreſentations of his miniſters. But he was ſaved from that fatal ſtep by the invincible goodneſs of the French monarch, who, having been informed of his diſtreſs, ſent Lignerac, a friend and confident of the duke, to aſſure him of his eſteem, and to inform him, that he was ſtill ready to receive him into favour, and to grant him the moſt honourable terms.

HENRY did not require an immediate ſubmiſſion from him, becauſe the duke had often declared, that he would never acknowledge his authority till the pope ſhould grant him abſolution; but he deſired that he ſhould retire to Chalons, one of his own towns, and wait there for that event, in full confidence that no advantage ſhould be taken in the mean time either of himſelf or his adherents.

MAYENNE, who knew with how much ſafety he might rely on Henry's promiſe, and was deeply penetrated with a ſenſe of the generous offer which had been made to him, accepted of it without heſitation, and left the Spaniſh camp.

SOON after this agreement, Henry advanced to the banks of the Saone, with a reſolution to tranſport his forces, conſiſting of ſeven thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, into Franche

BOOK XXIII. 1595.

Compté, where Velaſco lay intrenched. In ſpite of the troops which had been planted to diſpute his paſſage, he forded the river about three miles below the town of Gray, and then led his army towards the enemy; but finding their intrenchments too ſtrongly fortified to be attacked with any probability of ſucceſs, he turned aſide, and began to lay waſte the country, or to levy contributions from the inhabitants. Velaſco kept ſtill within his camp. At length the Swiſs Cantons, as friends and protectors of the people of Franche Compté, interpoſed their influence. At their deſire, the king readily deſiſted from his depredations; and having led back his troops into his own dominions, he reſolved to march as ſoon as poſſible to the frontiers of the Netherlands.

The pope grants Henry abſolution.

HE was in daily expectation, at this time, of receiving the pope's abſolution, which had been much longer delayed than he expected, through the violent oppoſition of the Spaniſh miniſters at Rome; but Clement now perceiving, that Henry was firmly eſtabliſhed on the throne, and dreading, that by a longer delay he might exhauſt his patience, and provoke him to throw off his allegiance to the Holy See, in imitation of Henry VIII. of England, in the pontificate of Clement VII. he reſolved to run the riſk of giving offence to Philip, and on the 16th of September pronounced the ſentence of abſolution. This event gave inexpreſſible joy to all the true catholics of France; and the treaty of agreement, which had been begun with the duke de Mayenne, was ſoon after brought to the deſired concluſion. Such other members of the League as had not already ſubmitted, imitated the example of their leader. Internal peace was every where eſtabliſhed, and Henry had leiſure to apply his whole attention to the Spaniſh war [m].

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[m] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, anno 1595. Perefixe Elzevir, p. 230, &c.

1595. Affairs of the Netherlands.

THE tranſactions in the Netherlands this year were leſs important and intereſting than in any former campaign ſince the commencement of the war, which was principally owing to the governor's prudent choice of the vigilant, experienced Mondragone, as commander in chief of the forces during his abſence. About the middle of July, prince Maurice beſieged the town of Groll; but Mondragone, having augmented his army, by making draughts from the garriſons of the neighbouring towns, advanced towards him with ſo much celerity, that not having had time to complete his entrenchments, Maurice was obliged to raiſe the ſiege. The two armies lay long in ſight of each other; and as they were nearly equal in ſtrength, and both generals exerted an equal degree of vigilance and circumſpection, they effectually prevented one another from undertaking any important enterpriſe.

THERE were frequent ſkirmiſhes with various ſucceſs; but the only one which deſerves to be mentioned was a rencounter near the river Lippe, where Maurice ordered count Philip de Naſſau, with five hundred horſe, to lie in ambuſh in a wood, to intercept a party of the enemy which had been ſent out for proviſions. Of this Mondragone had received intelligence, and with great ſecrecy ſtationed a body of horſe ſtill more numerous in another wood at a little diſtance from the firſt. When the Spaniſh foragers arrived at the ambuſcade, they were attacked on every ſide, and repulſed with conſiderable ſlaughter; but being ſpeedily reinforced by their friends in the neighbouring woods, they returned to the charge. The Dutch troops, aſtoniſhed to find themſelves caught in their own ſnare, were at laſt overpowered by numbers; three hundred of them, with their commander, were killed, and the reſt obliged to ſave themſelves by flight.

BOOK XXIII.

1595. Death of Mondragone.

THIS was the laſt memorable event of the campaign, although the two generals remained in ſight of each other till the end of October, when they broke up their camps, and put their troops into winter-quarters; and Mondragone died not long after at the age of ninety-two, having to the laſt preſerved ſufficient vigour to fulfil, with diſtinguiſhed reputation, all the duties of a commander. He had ſerved in the Netherlands near fifty years, and had a principal ſhare in almoſt every military enterpriſe, yet he had the ſingular fortune to eſcape without a wound [a].

[a] Grotius, lib. iv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

During the courſe of the tranſactions recorded in this book, the Dutch performed their firſt expedition to India; but as their acquiſitions at this time were inconſiderable, and their moſt important conqueſts over Philip's ſubjects in that diſtant region were not atchieved till ſeveral years after the preſent period, I have reſerved the relation of the whole for the hiſtory of the ſubſequent reign.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXIV.

FROM the capacity and vigour, of which the count de Fuentes had given ſo many proofs ſince his acceſſion to the government, there was reaſon to expect, that he would have been ſuffered long to retain poſſeſſion of it; but Philip, having from the beginning intended that he ſhould continue governor only for one year, had immediately after the death of Erneſt fixed upon the cardinal archduke Albert for his ſucceſſor. BOOK XXIV. 1595. The archduke Albert governor of the Netherlands.

THIS prince, nephew to Philip, and youngeſt brother to the emperor, had been entruſted with the regency of Portugal. By his prudent adminiſtration he had acquired univerſal eſteem; and Philip, who entertained the higheſt opinion of his abilities, believed that no perſon was better qualified, either to proſecute the war with vigour, or to bring it to the deſired concluſion.

HE

BOOK XXIV.

1596. He arrived at Bruſſels about the middle of February one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſix, having brought with him a reinforcement of Italian and Spaniſh troops, and which was of ſtill greater utility, a ſum of money, amounting to fifteen hundred thouſand crowns.

The count de Fuentes, unwilling to act in a ſubordinate ſtation, in a country where he had enjoyed the chief command, reſigned the government to the archduke, and ſet out for Spain.

Siege of La Fere.

Albert immediately applied to make the preparations neceſſary for a new campaign; and conformably to his inſtructions from Phpilip, he turned his principal attention to the war with France. His firſt object was the relief of La Fere in Picardy, which had remained in the hands of the Spaniards ever ſince it was delivered by the League to the duke of Parma.

Towards the end of the preceding year, it had been inveſted by the French monarch; but as it was ſtrongly fortified, and the garriſon conſiſted of choſen troops, commanded by Alvaro Oſorio, a Spaniſh officer of diſtinguiſhed reputation, Henry was ſatisfied with blocking it up ſo as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies. This he accompliſhed with little difficulty. The blockade had laſted for ſeveral weeks, and Oſorio had conveyed intelligence to the archduke, that if he was not ſpeedily relieved, the want of proviſions would render it impoſſible for him to hold out for any conſiderable time. The Spaniſh army was aſſembled at Valenciennes, and almoſt ready to begin its march; but the more the governor and his council of war reflected on the difficulties which muſt attend the attempting to raiſe the ſiege, by marching directly to La Fere, the more inſurmountable they appeared. For they could not, it was obſerved, approach to that town, without leaving behind them St. Quintin, Ham, Guiſe, Peronne, and ſeveral other fortified

fortified places, the garriſons of which would haraſs them on their march, break up the roads, and intercept their convoys of proviſions. An impaſſable marſh rendered the town inacceſſible on every ſide, except where the French monarch had ſtrongly ortified his intrenchments. Even if they ſhould come in ſight of the town, yet, before they could enter it, they muſt either attack the enemy within their camp, or engage with their whole army in the open field. They could not attack them in their camp, without expoſing themſelves to almoſt certain ruin; Henry would not give them an opportunity of fighting in the field, unleſs his army, which was increaſing daily, were ſuperior to theirs, and the conſequences of a defeat would prove fatal not only to the army, but to all the Spaniſh conqueſts in France, and perhaps too to the king's authority in the Netherlands. 1596.

DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, the archduke formed the reſolution of beſieging ſome other frontier town, of ſufficient importance to induce Henry either to raiſe the ſiege of La Fere, or compenſate for the loſs of that place, in caſe it ſhould be obliged to capitulate.

Siege of Calais.

HE heſitated for ſome time whether he ſhould lead his army againſt St. Quintin or Peronne; but he ſoon laid aſide the thoughts of attacking either of theſe places, and reſolved to undertake the reduction of Calais, which he believed would be an eaſier, as well as a much more important acquiſition.

The Sieur de Rône.

THIS enterpriſe was ſuggeſted to the governor by the Sieur de Rône, a native of France, and formerly a violent partiſan of the League, who had entered into the ſervice of Spain againſt his king and country. He was a man of a dark intriguing ſpirit, whom no tie could bind but intereſt; but he was bold and active, ſagacious and penetrating, and

BOOK XXIV. 1596.

and eminently diſtinguiſhed for his ſkill in the art of war. He had received intelligence that Calais, like many other towns in the kingdom, had been much neglected during the civil war; that although the king had ordered the fortifications of it to be examined, yet his other occupations had not allowed him to beſtow that attention on it which its importance deſerved; and that, as ſome of the works were ruinous, ſo the garriſon was too ſmall to defend a place of ſo great extent. For theſe reaſons, the governor approved highly of De Rône's propoſal, and he committed the execution of it to himſelf.

In order to prevent the enemy from ſuſpecting what was intended, it was communicated only to two or three of the principal officers; and the archduke gave out that his deſign was to relieve La Fere. He accordingly began his march towards that place while De Rône turned ſuddenly to Calais with a body of ſelect troops, and attacked the fort and bridge of Nieulai, which commands the entrance to the town by land. He made himſelf maſter of it with very little difficulty, and then proceeded to attack the fort of Riſbane, which ſtands at the mouth of the harbour, and was of the greateſt importance for the preſervation of the place. The garriſon of this fort made a more vigorous reſiſtance than that of Nieulai; but no ſooner had De Rône opened a battery againſt them, by which only a few were killed, than they were ſeized with a ſudden panic, and offered to capitulate. This rapid progreſs exceeded De Rône's moſt ſanguine expectations, and it gave him the greater joy, as not long after the Riſbane had ſurrendered, ſome ſhips with troops for the reinforcement of the garriſon which had had arrived from Boulogne, finding the entrance to the harbour in his poſſeſſion, were obliged to return.

THE archduke, who was in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, when he received intelligence of this fortunate commencement of his enterprise, set out immediately with his whole army for Calais, and pitched his camp in such a situation as he hoped would prevent the approach of the enemy.

HE first attacked the suburbs, and took them by assault; nor did he encounter greater difficulty in making himself master of the town. His cannon had hardly begun to play upon it, when Vidossan, the governor, retired with the garrison into the castle; and quickly despairing of being able to defend himself in it, any better than he had done in the town, he offered to give it up in six days, if he was not relieved before the expiration of that time. The archduke, in order to save his troops and the fortifications of the place, readily agreed to this proposal, never doubting that he was fully able to prevent the entrance of any reinforcement either by sea or land.

THE king, in the mean time, heard with much anxiety of the progress of the Spanish arms. But the blockade of La Fere having continued for several months, he expected that the garrison must be reduced in a few days to the necessity of capitulating; and he thought it probable, that after finishing his present enterprise (which he could not abandon without loosing all the expence and labour which he had bestowed upon it), he would arrive in time to raise the siege of Calais. He went himself however with a part of his cavalry to Boulogne, that he might be ready to administer such assistance to the garrison of Calais, as might enable them to hold out till his whole army should be at liberty to advance to their relief.

BOOK XXIV.

1596.

Upon his arrival in Boulogne, he was informed of the capitulation above mentioned. He lamented bitterly that he had not brought with him a greater proportion of his troops; but finding it neceſſary to make ſome exertion without delay, he prevailed on Campagnol, the governor of Bolougne, with three hundred choſen men, to attempt to force his way in the night through the Spaniſh lines.

Henry attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege.

This arduous undertaking was executed without the loſs of a ſingle man; and Campagnol had no ſooner arrived in the caſtle, than having read the king's orders to the garriſon, he required them all to ſwear that they would defend the fortreſs to the laſt.

In the evening of the 6th day of the truce, they were ſummoned to fulfil their engagement; when they replied that they had received the reinforcement which they expected. But it ſoon appeared how unequal they were to the defence of ſo weak a place, againſt ſo numerous an enemy.

Early next morning De Rône began to play off his batteries, and in a few hours a great part of the wall was laid in ruins.

Calais taken by ſtorm.

An Italian regiment, through whoſe negligence Campagnol had got into the fort, was ordered to advance to the aſſault, and was followed by the Walloons and Spaniards. The garriſon received them in the breach with undaunted courage, and, after an obſtinate engagement, in which great numbers fell on both ſides, compelled them to retire. But the Italians returned immediately to the charge; and at laſt through the great ſuperiority of their numbers, they overpowered the garriſon, entered along with them into the fort, and put all of them to the ſword, except Campagnol, and a few others, who took refuge in the church, and afterwards ſurrendered at diſcretion. In this manner

ner did Calais fall into the hands of the Spaniards in leſs than three weeks after De Rône had begun the ſiege. The king left Boulogne, after having taken precautions for the preſervation of that place, and returned to La Fere. And the archduke, after ſtaying eight or ten days in Calais to repair the fortifications, led his troops againſt the town of Ardres. 1596.

Siege of Ardres.

THE garriſon of Ardres conſiſted of two thouſand five hundred men, commanded by the marquis of Belin, the lieutenant governor of the province, and by the Sieur de Annebourg, governor of the town, an officer of diſtinguiſhed courage and capacity. By frequent vigorous ſallies, the operations of the beſiegers were greatly retarded. At length however they took the ſuburbs by aſſault, and De Rône began to batter the walls of the town. But conſidering the ſtrength of the place, and the number and bravery of the garriſon, he had little reaſon to hope for ſucceſs before the concluſion of the ſiege of La Fere; when there was no room to doubt that the king would advance without loſs of time to the relief of Ardres.

NOTWITHSTANDING this encouraging circumſtance, the marquis de Belin called a council of war, and urged with great earneſtneſs the neceſſity of capitulating; alledging that it was impoſſible to hold out till the king's arrival, and that the ſooner they ſubmitted, they would the more eaſily obtain advantageous terms. This propoſal was rejected with great diſdain by the ſieur de Annebourg and all the officers in the council. But the cowardly Belin, availing himſelf of that ſuperior authority with which he was inveſted as lieutenant-governor of the province, capitulated, notwithſtanding their remonſtrances, on a condition to which the archduke readily agreed, that the garriſon ſhould march out

out with the honours of war. La Fere having ſurrendered on the day immediately preceding, the king had already ſet out for Ardres, and as his army had of late received a conſiderable augmentation, he entertained the moſt ſanguine hopes of being able to raiſe the ſiege. When a meſſenger informed him of the ſurrender, he was inflamed with indignation, and ordered Belin to be tried for his life. At the importunity of his friends, he afterwards ſtopped the proſecution; but he baniſhed him from court, and deprived him of his office of lieutenant-governor of the province [a].

Albert returns to the Netherlands.

HENRY was now in ſome perplexity with reſpect to his future conduct. He was extremely ſolicitous to recover as ſoon as poſſible the towns which he had loſt; but as his finances were in great diſorder at that time, and Picardy having been long the ſeat of war, was reduced to the moſt exhauſted condition, he perceived that any enterpriſe ſo tedious as the ſiege of a fortified town, muſt be attended with inſurmountable difficulties. He reſolved therefore, in conformity to the opinion of his nobility, to advance towards the enemy, and to compel them, if poſſible, to give him battle. But the archduke, whoſe army was greatly diminiſhed by putting garriſons into the conquered towns, had penetrared into his deſign; and being no leſs averſe from an engagement than Henry was deſirous for it, he left France without delay, and put his troops into quarters of cantonment in the province of Artois. The king being thus diſappointed in his hopes of a deciſive action, diſmiſſed the greater part of his army, and leaving the marſhal Biron with only five or ſix thouſand men to check the excurſions of the Spaniſh garriſons, he returned to Paris, where a great number of important affairs of ſtate required his attention.

WHILE

[a] D'Avila, lib. xv. Beativoglio, &c. Thuanus, p. 116. lib. viii.

WHILE the Spaniſh army was employed in proſecuting the war in France, no memorable event had happened in the Netherlands. This was not owing to any want of activity or vigour on the part of prince Maurice, but to the extreme weakneſs of his army, which the States, from a deſire of ſaving their ſtrength when they were not expoſed to immediate danger, had reduced ſo low, that when all the garriſons were full, he could not lead into the field more than three thouſand men. With the aſſiſtance of this little army, the garriſons of ſome of the frontier towns had made ſeveral bold incurſions into Flanders and Brabant, and either plundered the country, or laid the inhabitants under contributions. The States of theſe provinces had ardently wiſhed for the return of the archduke; and they now intreated him to employ his arms in reducing ſome of the places in their neighbourhood, from which they received ſo great annoyance. Albert, who did not intend, by returning ſo early to the Netherlands, to paſs the remainder of the ſeaſon without action, readily complied with their requeſt; and, after deliberating with his council of war, undertook the ſiege of Hulſt in Flanders.

MAURICE had, ſince his conqueſt of that place about five years before, made great additions to its fortifications. He had likewiſe formed the territory in which it ſtands into an iſland, by means of two large canals which were drawn round it, and, by building forts on theſe canals, and laying a part of the adjacent country under water, he rendered the town almoſt inacceſſible.

THIS at leaſt was the opinion of ſome officers whom Albert had ſent to reconnoitre it. Being ambitious to diſtinguiſh the firſt part of his miniſtration, by performing ſomething [illegible] to the people committed to his care, [illegible]

BOOK XXIV. 1596.

cited at the ſame time by de Rône and other adventurous ſpirits, whom no difficulties could deter from any enterpriſe, he perſiſted in his deſign, and proceeded immediately to put it in execution. In order to conceal it as long as poſſible from the enemy, he made a feint of attacking ſome of the towns in Brabant, and his meaſure was attended with the deſired effect. Of five thouſand men who were in garriſon in Hulſt, prince Maurice ordered two thouſand to reinforce the garriſons of Gertrudenberg and Breda.

ALBERT immediately after turned ſuddenly towards Hulſt, and having prepared a great number of ſmall boats, he ordered two of his principal officers, de la Biche and la Barlotta, to tranſport a part of his forces acroſs the inundation and canals. Theſe men executed their commiſſion with great ſecrecy and ſilence in the dead of the night, and encountered difficulties which required the moſt determined reſolution to ſurmount. The tide did not riſe ſo high as they expected, and they were often obliged to leave their boats, and puſh them forwards, while they ſtood up to their knees in mud. When, after much labour and difficulty, they had brought them to the ſide of the canal, they were diſcovered by the garriſons of ſome forts which had been built to obſtruct their approach; but notwithſtanding the inceſſant fire of theſe forts, they ſtill continued to advance; and having launched their boats in the canal, they at laſt arrived on the other ſide, with the loſs of only a ſmall number of men. Early next morning count Solmes, the governor of Hulſt, attacked them before they had time to entrench themſelves. A bloody combat enſued, in which one regiment of the aſſailants was routed, and their commander killed. But the reſt reflecting on their deſperate ſituation from which it was impoſſible to eſcape, advanced with irreſiſtible impetuoſity, and after much bloodſhed, compelled the garriſon to take ſhelter in the town.

PRINCE

PRINCE Maurice no ſooner heard of what had happened, than he ſet out with all the forces which he could collect, hoping to be able to drive the Spaniards from that iſland, before their number was increaſed. But the archduke advanced with greater expedition, and prevented his approach. It was ſtill practicable for Maurice to tranſport his forces to Hulſt, by the canal which falls into the Hondt or Weſter-Scheld. But before he could reach the iſland in that way, Albert had tranſported his whole army, and begun the operations of the ſiege. The only expedient which Maurice could now employ, was to introduce ſupplies into the town by the canal, the mouth of which was commanded by a ſtrong fort, which he hoped the enemy would find impregnable. For this purpoſe he fixed his reſidence at Cruning in Zealand; and from that place, troops were frequently conveyed to the aſſiſtance of the beſieged, notwithſtanding the moſt ſtrenuous endeavours of the Spaniſh army to intercept them. 1596.

THE ſiege and the defence were conducted with equal vigour, and the combatants on both ſides gave innumerable proofs of the moſt heroic courage. The garriſon ſallied out almoſt every day, and made dreadful havock among the Spaniards. De Rône, to whom the chief conduct of the ſiege had been committed, was killed; and by this irreparable loſs the aſſailants were greatly diſmayed. The archduke, however, perſiſted in his enterpriſe; and although he had loſt a much greater number of his troops than in both the ſieges of Calais and Ardres, he continued his operations with unremitted ardour, till, beſides demoliſhing all the outworks of the place, he had made a breach in the wall ſufficient to admit of an aſſault.

THE garriſon had thrown up a deep entrenchment within the breach, and as they were ſtill as numerous as ever, through the ſeaſonable ſupplies which Hulſt given up to the Spaniards.

BOOK XXIV. 1596.

which prince Maurice from time to time had ſent them, they had little reaſon for deſpair. But being ſeized with a ſudden panic, they urged count Solmes, the governor, with the moſt earneſt importunity, to capitulate; and the count, dreading that, in the preſent temper of their minds, they would probably deliver the town without his conſent, complied with their requeſt.

19th Auguſt.

Victory of M. Biron in Artois.

ALBERT ſtaid no longer in Hulſt than was neceſſary to give orders for repairing the fortifications; after which he returned to Bruſſels, amidſt the joyful acclamations of the people; who flattered themſelves with hopes, that, under the government of a prince ſo ſucceſsful in all his enterpriſes, an entire ſtop would ſoon be put to the incurſions of the enemy, and internal ſecurity reſtored. But their joy on this account was of ſhort duration. Marſhal Biron, whom the French monarch had left behind him in Picardy, with a body of ſelect troops, had hitherto been ſatisfied with acting on the defenſive; but ſoon after the ſurrender of Hulſt, he began to make incurſions into the province of Artois, and kept all the ſouthern frontier of the Netherlands under perpetual alarms. The archduke ſent the marquis of Varambon to oppoſe him; and Varambon for ſome time obliged him to act with greater caution and circumſpection than he had hitherto obſerved. But Biron having received intelligence that the marquis was on his march to offer battle, he advanced rapidly to meet him; and, having placed the greater part of his troops in an ambuſh, he proceeded with the reſt till he had reached the enemy. A fierce rencounter enſued; and Biron continued fighting and retreating, till he arrived at the place where his troops were poſted. He then returned to the charge with his whole forces united; and having taken Varambon priſoner, he put many of his troops to the ſword, and compelled the reſt to ſave themſelves by flight [b].

THE

[b] Bentivoglio, lib. iii. Grotius.

THE Prince of Chimai, now duke D'Arſchot, was appointed to ſucceed Varambon; and his endeavours to repreſs the incurſions of the enemy, were attended with no better ſucceſs than thoſe of his predeceſſor. Biron triumphed over him through the ſuperiority of his cavalry, and continued to exerciſe his depredations in the open parts of the country, till the approach of winter obliged him to retire. 1596.

Expedition of the Engliſh againſt Spain.

DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions in the Netherlands and France, Philip ſuſtained a calamity in Spain, which more than counterbalanced any advantage that could be expected from his late acquiſitions. Almoſt every ſeaſon ſince the diſcomfiture of his Armada in 1588, the Engliſh had undertaken ſome naval enterpriſe either againſt his dominions in Europe or in America. The affairs of the Netherlands and France had not hitherto left him leiſure to take revenge for theſe inſults; nor was his leiſure greater at the preſent period, than it had been for ſome years paſt; but his patience was exhauſted; and his acquiſition of a ſea-port, ſo commodiouſly ſituated as Calais, gave him a facility of annoying his enemy, which he had not poſſeſſed before. He reſolved, notwithſtanding his preſent embarraſſments, to improve the advantage which this circumſtance preſented, and having begun to prepare a naval and military force, he intended to make a deſcent in Ireland; where he had long fomented the rebellious ſpirit of the catholic inhabitants, and had reaſon to believe that they would join his troops as ſoon as they ſhould land.

Earl of Eſſex commander in chief.

ELIZABETH was aware of the impending danger, and determined, if poſſible, to diſſipate the ſtorm before it ſhould approach. For this purpoſe ſhe fitted out a fleet of more than a hundred and fifty ſhips, having about eight thouſand ſol-

BOOK XXIV. 1596.

diers and ſeven thouſand mariners on board, and gave the command of the land forces to the earl of Eſſex, and that of the navy to lord Howard of Effingham. To this fleet the Dutch added twenty-four ſhips, with a proportional number of troops, under the command of Wardmont vice-admiral of Holland, and count Lewis of Naſſau, couſin to prince Maurice.

WITH this powerful armament, Elizabeth intended to make an attack on Cadiz, where Philip's naval preparations were principally carried on. But its deſtination was carefully concealed. Sealed inſtructions were delivered to the ſeveral commanders, not to be opened till they ſhould arrive at Cape St. Vincent's; and they were ordered, in their way thither, to keep at a diſtance from the coaſts of Spain and Portugal, in order to prevent a diſcovery of their deſign.

THESE precautions ſerved effectually the purpoſe which was intended. The whole fleet arrived on the 20th of June within ſight of Cadiz, and found the Spaniards entirely unprepared for their defence. There was in the bay and harbour, beſides thirty-ſix merchant ſhips richly laden, and ready to ſail for America and the Indies, a fleet of about thirty ſhips of war, and a great number of tranſports loaded with naval ſtores, deſigned for the equipment of another fleet, which Philip was then fitting out at Liſbon. But there was no perſon in the place inveſted with the chief command, and no garriſon in it ſufficient for its defence.

Cadiz ſacked and plundered by the Engliſh.

THE Spaniſh men of war, however, were quickly drawn up in the mouth of the bay, and they ſuſtained the attack of an enemy ſo much ſuperior to them, for ſeveral hours, till ſome of their largeſt ſhips were taken, others burnt, and the reſt driven a-ground on the flats and ſhallows.

IMME-

IMMEDIATELY after this ſucceſs, the earl of Eſſex landed his troops, and led them towards the town. A body of Spaniſh forces marched out to meet him; but being unable to withſtand the impetuoſity of the Engliſh, they ſoon turned their backs and fled. The Engliſh purſued, and entered the town along with them. The inhabitants, who were thrown into the moſt dreadful conſternation, made a feeble reſiſtance, and the caſtle ſurrendered before the Engliſh artillery had begun to fire. Eſſex diſcovered no leſs humanity after his victory, than bravery in acquiring it. The town ndeed was given up to be plundered by the ſoldiers, but no cruelty or outrage, ſuch as occurs ſo often in the hiſtory of the Netherlands, was permitted to be exerciſed. The booty was immenſe, and would have been much greater, if, while the commanders were treating with ſome of the principal merchants about a ranſom for the merchants ſhips, the duke de Medina, who lay with ſome troops near the town, had not given orders for ſetting them on fire. It was computed that, in military and naval ſtores, merchant goods, and ſhips, the loſs which Philip and his ſubjects ſuſtained on this occaſion, could not amount to leſs than twenty millions of ducats. Had the advice of the earl of Eſſex been followed, the Engliſh would have attempted to retain poſſeſſion of the town, but Lord Howard and the other commanders regarded his propoſal as chimerical. They believed that they had already fulfilled the queen's intentions: they dreaded the approach of a Spaniſh army, and therefore they made haſte to put their plunder on board their ſhips, and immediately ſet ſail for England.

Deſtruction of the Spaniſh fleet, deſigned for Ireland.

THE affront which Philip received on this occaſion, in having one of his capital towns ſacked and plundered, conſtituted a conſiderable part of his calamity, as it leſſened exceedingly the opinion entertained of his prudence, as well as of his in-

BOOK XXIV. 1596.

ternal ſtrength. This conſideration, joined to an impatient deſire of taking vengeance on Elizabeth, determined him, without regard to the approach of winter, to carry his plan of invading Ireland into immediate execution. By the arrival of his Plate fleet from America, he was enabled to equip in Liſbon and other places a hundred and twenty-eight ſhips of war and tranſports, with fourteen thouſand troops on board, beſides a great number of Iriſh catholics, and a prodigious quantity of military ſtores, and materials and inſtruments for building forts. This fleet, under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, ſet ſail from Ferrol in the month of November; and if it had reached the deſtined port, the Spaniards, with the aſſiſtance of the Popiſh inhabitants, muſt have acquired ſo firm an eſtabliſhment in Ireland, as would have coſt the Engliſh many years, and much expence of labour and blood, to diſpoſſeſs them.

ELIZABETH and her ſubjects, flushed with their ſucceſs at Cadiz, were as ſecure as if the wound which they had lately inflicted on Philip's naval power had been mortal. They had no ſuſpicion of his deſign, and were entirely ignorant of his preparations; but the good providence of Heaven interpoſed remarkably on this occaſion, as it had done formerly, in their behalf. The Spaniſh fleet was overtaken by a ſtorm off Cape Finiſterre, and about forty ſhips, with their crews and ſtores, were loſt. Padilla got back with difficulty to Ferrol; and henceforth all thoughts of the intended enterpriſe were laid aſide [c].

The battle of Turnhout.

THESE calamities were ſucceeded by another no leſs diſaſtrous event, which happened in the Netherlands in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſeven. The fertile provinces

[c] Grotius, lib. v. p. 269. Camden, p. 730. Carte, lib. xix.

vinces of Brabant ſtill lay expoſed to the incurſions of the confederates; and the inhabitants in order to ſave the country and villages from being ſacked and plundered, had been obliged to ſubmit to contributions, with which the united States were enabled to maintain the garriſons of Breda, Gertrudenburg, and other places. The archduke ſolicitous to deliver the people from theſe oppreſſions, had cantoned between four and five thouſand horſe and foot in the open town of Turnhout, which, on account of its neighbourhood to Breda, he judged to be the fitteſt ſituation for watching the motions of the enemy; and he had given the command of theſe forces to the count de Varras, brother to the marquis of Varambon.

PRINCE Maurice, having received intelligence that Varras had been intruſted with this command more on account of his rank and family [d], than his military ſkill, reſolved to avail himſelf of this imprudence, into which the archduke had been betrayed. With great ſecrecy and expedition he drew together an army of five thouſand foot and eight hundred horſe, and ſet out from Gertrudenburg with a deſign to attack the Spaniards in their quarters of cantonment. Varras was informed of his intention only on the evening before, and was determined, in contradiction to the remonſtrances of ſome of his officers, to retire to the town of Herentals. He accordingly ſent off the baggage in the night, and began his march by day-break, without the ſound either of drum or trumpet. His troops, almoſt all of whom were experienced veterans, were at firſt indignant at the thoughts of flying from an enemy whom they had often conquered; but the dread with which their general was actuated, ſoon diffuſed itſelf into every breaſt, and

[d] Of the name of De Rie in Franche Compté.

BOOK XXIV.

and begot a conviction, that their preſervation depended on the celerity of their retreat.

1597. MAURICE was only a few miles from Turnhout when his ſcouts informed him of the count's departure. He immediately ſent Sir Francis Vere with a party of horſe to ſcour the woods and hedges, and diſpatched another party under count Hohenloe, to retard the Spaniards on their march till the infantry ſhould arrive. Beſides count Hohenloe and Sir Francis Vere, the prince had brought with him count Solmes, Sir Robert Sidney, governor of Fluſhing, and ſeveral others of his braveſt and moſt experienced officers, by whom all his orders were executed with equal prudence and intrepidity. Count Hohenloe, at the head of four hundred horſe, began the attack, and quickly routed the Spaniſh cavalry, who, being driven back upon the foot, threw them into diſorder. At this criſis, Maurice himſelf and Sir Francis Vere came up, and having broke through the enemy's ranks, completed their confuſion, and made dreadful havock among them, till the greateſt part of them were either put to the ſword or taken priſoners. Varras himſelf was killed, after having given proofs, that his miſconduct had not proceeded from the want of perſonal bravery, but from the conſciouſneſs of his inexperience, and his ſolicitude for the preſervation of his troops. Above two thouſand were ſlain, and five hundred taken priſoners, while the victors loſt only nine or ten.

IT was in this engagement that a practice invented by Maurice was firſt introduced, of arming the cavalry with carbines inſtead of lances; and to this invention, which filled the enemy with amazement, Grotius aſcribes the great facility with which they were overpowered; for the victory was gained

gained entirely by the horſe, and the infantry arrived only in time to divide the ſpoil. BOOK XXIV.

THE battle of Turnhout, through the great diſparity between the numbers of the ſlain on the oppoſite ſides, contributed more to exalt the *character* of Maurice than any of his former atchievements. Nor was it military renown only which he acquired; he gave a ſtriking proof likewiſe of his humanity in his treatment of the priſoners, whom he protected from all injury and violence with the utmoſt care, and many of them recovered through the tender attention which he beſtowed. He ſent the body of count Varras to the archduke; and Albert on that occaſion aſſured him, that he would follow his generous example, and take effectual pains to prevent all cruelty and outrage in the further proſecution of the war [e]. 1597.

THE loſs which Albert ſuſtained in the battle of Turnhout was ſoon afterwards compenſated by his acquiſition of Amiens, the capital of Picardy, and one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt important towns in France. The citizens, who had been zealous partizans of the League, had lately ſubmitted to the king, upon condition, that all their ancient privileges ſhould be preſerved, and in particular, that they ſhould be allowed to guard the town themſelves, and not to be obliged to admit a garriſon of mercenary troops. The ſurpriſe of Amiens.

THE number of thoſe who were enrolled for bearing arms was between fourteen and fifteen thouſand; but neither their diſcipline nor their vigilance correſponded to the danger to which they were expoſed from the neighbourhood of the Spaniards. They gave the ſame attention to their ordinary occupations as in the time of peace; only a few

[e] Grotius, lib. vi. ab initio. Thuanus, lib. cxviii. c. v. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. iii.

BOOK XXIV. 1597.

a few were employed as centinels and guards, and even theſe performed their duty in the moſt negligent manner.

OF this negligence, Portocarrero, governor of Dourlens, a brave and enterpriſing officer, had received intelligence from one of the citizens[f], and he founded upon it a plan for taking the city by ſurpriſe. Having communicated this plan to the archduke, and obtained his approbation, he collected from the neighbouring garriſons about three thouſand horſe and foot, which he judged to be ſufficient to carry it into execution[g]. On the eleventh of March, he ſet out from Dourlens in the beginning of the night, and before ſun-riſe arrived at an hermitage about a quarter of a mile from Amiens. As ſoon as he perceived that the gate which lay next him was opened, he ſent forward ten or twelve of the moſt reſolute of his ſoldiers, with three officers, called d'Ognano, la Croix, and Del Acro, diſguiſed like the peaſants of that country with long frocks, under which each of them had a brace of piſtols and a ſword concealed. Three of this party carried bags filled with nuts and apples. One of them drove a waggon loaded with large beams, and the reſt followed ſlowly at a little diſtance. When the three firſt had paſſed the paliſades and approached the gate, one of them fell down as by accident, and ſcattered the nuts and apples; and while the guards making game of the ſuppoſed peaſant, were ſcrambling for them, the waggon was driven under the gate. There it ſtopped, and Del Acro, by pulling an iron pin, quickly diſengaged the horſes. He then fired a piſtol, which was the

[f] He had been baniſhed on account of ſome crime.

[g] They conſiſted of eleven thouſand Spaniards, five hundred Burgundians and Germans, four hundred Iriſh, two hundred Walloons, and nine hundred horſe.

the ſign agreed upon, and he, and thoſe who were with him, falling with great fury upon the guard, killed moſt of them, and made themſelves maſters of the gate. The centinel upon the top of the gate-way, perceiving what had paſſed, attempted to let down the portcullis: but it was ſuſpended by the beams and the waggon; and Portocarrero in the mean time brought forward his troops, and ruſhed into the town. The citizens, entirely unprepared for this ſudden attack, were overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment and conſternation. Their reſiſtance was feeble and ill-conducted; and, after about a hundred of their number had fallen, they laid down their arms, and ſuffered the enemy to take poſſeſſion of the town. BOOK XXIV. 1597.

THE news of this diſaſter affected the French monarch in the moſt ſenſible manner, and greatly allayed the joy which his late triumph over the League was calculated to excite. He conſidered that the Spaniards were, before this time, in poſſeſſion of Calais, one of the principal ſea ports in his dominions; and that by their preſent conqueſt they had opened a paſſage from the Netherlands, by which they could make incurſions to the gates of the capital. He was mortified by reflecting on the judgment which foreign nations muſt form of a prince, whoſe glory conſiſted chiefly in victories obtained over his own ſubjects; and he dreaded that the malcontents in his kingdom might take advantage of the preſent calamity, and revive the flames of civil war. He had laboured for ſome time under bad health; notwithſtanding which, he broke off a courſe of medicine which had been preſcribed to him, and ſet out immediately for Corbie on the Somme [h], where, after conſulting with the marſhal Biron and ſome other principal officers, he reſolved to poſtpone every other object of his Henry's diſtraction that ſucceeded.

[h] About three leagues higher than Amiens.

BOOK XXIV. 1597.

his attention to the recovery of Amiens. He then ordered Biron to inveſt the town with ſuch forces as could be drawn from the neighbouring garriſons, and returned to Paris to haſten the preparations neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs.

The ſiege of Amiens.

HENRY knew that the moſt vigorous exertion of his activity was requiſite on this occaſion, and he laboured with unceaſing ardour, till, beſides raiſing a numerous army, he had collected, from every quarter of his dominions, proviſions and military ſtores proportioned to the difficulty of his intended enterpriſe. He concluded at this time a new alliance with the queen of England and the States of Holland; in conſequence of which the former ſent him four thouſand troops, and the latter furniſhed him with a conſiderable ſum of money, and engaged to make a powerful diverſion of the Spaniſh forces in the Netherlands. Having ſent off his troops to Amiens before him, as faſt as they were raiſed, he found, on his return thither in the beginning of June, that the ſiege was already far advanced. Biron, prompted by his natural ardour, and piqued by a ſaying which had dropt from the king, that his affairs almoſt never proſpered where he was not preſent, had exerted the moſt indefatigable vigilance and induſtry. He had rendered the blockade complete, by drawing ſtrong lines of circumvallation round the town, and had begun to make his approaches to the walls. Henry approved highly of every thing that he had done, and in order to pacify his reſentment, ſuffered him ſtill to retain the chief command.

As the number of the troops was conſiderably augmented by thoſe which the king had brought with him, and by the arrival of the Engliſh forces, the operations of the ſiege were carried on with redoubled ardour and alacrity; but the progreſs of the aſſailants

assailants was retarded greatly beyond what had been expected, by the invincible bravery and unremitted vigilance of the governor and garrison, who disputed every inch of ground with matchless intrepidity, and in the numberless sallies which they made, put some thousands of the besiegers to the sword. 1597

By these sallies their own number was considerably diminished, and in one of them Portocarrero was killed. The defence however was still conducted with the same skill and spirit as before by the marquis de Montenegro, a Neapolitan of the family of Caraffa, and the king had reason to despair of being able to finish his enterprise before the arrival of the Spanish army from the Netherlands.

Albert attempts in vain to raise the siege.

The archduke was sensible that it was of great importance to Philip's interest to preserve possession of Amiens, whether he should enter into a treaty of peace with the French monarch, or prosecute the war; and he could not have exerted himself with greater activity in making the preparations necessary to raise the siege. But his levies, as well as all his other preparations, had been carried on slowly, through the extreme difficulty which he found in procuring money. The destruction of the fleet and stores at Cadiz had contributed not a little to increase that disorder which had so long prevailed in the king's finances. For several years Philip had been in the practice of borrowing large sums from the Italian and Flemish merchants, for which he had agreed to pay them an exorbitant interest, and had mortgaged certain branches of his revenue. The inconveniencies arising from hence had become intolerable, and he was determined to deliver himself from them at once, whatever should be the consequence. He had accordingly published an edict in the month of November

BOOK XXIV. 1597.

ber of the preceding year, declaring all the contracts by which he had ſequeſtered his revenue to be null and void; and alleging, as an excuſe for this ſtep, that, through the unfair advantages which had been taken of his diſtreſs, he had reaſon to dread, that unleſs ſome remedy were immediately applied, all his labours in behalf of Chriſtendom and the true religion would be loſt [i].

PHILIP had as little reaſon to be ſatisfied with the prudence, as with the juſtice, of this expedient. His annual revenue, though now freed from all incumbrances, was inſufficient to defray the enormous expence of the preſent war. It was ſtill neceſſary for him, while the war continued, to borrow money; but no merchants either in Genoa or Antwerp, where it had been uſually found, could be perſuaded to advance it; and it was this cauſe chiefly which had ſo long retarded the archduke's preparations for the relief of Amiens.

Surrender of Amiens.

THE blockade of that city had been formed in April, and it was the end of Auguſt before he could begin his march. At that time he ſet out with an army of more than five and twenty thouſand men, and arrived within ſight of the French camp about the middle of September. As his infantry was greatly ſuperior to that of the enemy, he reſolved to offer battle; and from the well-known temper of the French monarch, he doubted not that his challenge would be accepted. But Henry being diſtruſtful of his infantry, the greateſt part of which conſiſted of raw troops, readily complied with the advice of the duke de Mayenne, whom he had brought with him to the ſiege, and reſolved to keep within his lines. The archduke advanced towards him, with his army drawn up in order of battle; but when he perceived that the king's reſolution

[i] Grotius, lib. v.

reſolution was unalterably fixed, that he was well prepared for his defence, and that his entrenchments were every where ſtrongly fortified, he deſpaired of being able to effectuate his purpoſe, and returned to the Netherlands. In a few days after his retreat, the marquis de Montenegro, with the approbation of the archduke, conſented to capitulate, and received from Henry the moſt honourable terms [k].

Progreſs of the war in the Netherlands.

DURING the greateſt part of the ſiege of Amiens, nothing memorable was tranſacted in the Netherlands; but as the archduke had, in order to fill up his army, almoſt drained the provinces of troops, he had no ſooner begun his march, than prince Maurice, having aſſembled between twelve and thirteen thouſand horſe and foot, laid ſiege to Rhinberg, and in a few days obliged it to capitulate, though the garriſon amounted to a thouſand men. He next reduced the town of Meurs with the ſame facility. After which, having paſſed the Rhine, he made himſelf maſter of Grol, Brevort, and ſeveral other places, and then directed his march towards Lingen, the only fortified town which remained in poſſeſſion of the Spaniards on the north ſide of the Rhine. Both the town and caſtle of Lingen were commanded by count Frederic of Heremberg, with a garriſon of ſix or ſeven hundred men; and the count made, for ſome time, a vigorous and ſpirited defence. But the prince, after his batteries were ready to begin to play, having ſent him a ſummons to ſurrender on honourable terms, with an intimation, that as this was the firſt ſummons, ſo he might be aſſured that it would be the laſt: Heremberg conſidered, that his perſeverance muſt be attended with the deſtruction of the garriſon, and therefore agreed to the terms propoſed.

26th September.

End of Auguſt.

ALL

[k] D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. iv.

BOOK XXIV.

1597. ALL theſe conqueſts were atchieved in leſs than three months. In thoſe of Grol and Brevort, places ſituated in a marſhy ſoil, Maurice encountered difficulties which required a vigorous exertion of his ſuperior talents to ſurmount; but as no peculiar or ſtriking circumſtances are recorded by the cotemporary hiſtorians, I have not thought it neceſſary to deſcend to a particular detail. The acquiſition of ſo many frontier towns was of great importance to the United Provinces, as they were thereby delivered from the incurſions of the Spaniſh garriſons, by which the inhabitants of the adjacent country had been kept under perpetual alarms, and the States, deeply ſenſible of this advantage, teſtified their gratitude to prince Maurice, by conferring on him and on his poſterity the rich ſeigniory of Lingen and its dependencies.

1598. Negociations for peace. THESE tranſactions happened towards the end of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſeven; and the following was diſtinguiſhed by a negociation which was ſet on foot for the eſtabliſhment of peace between France and Spain. Neither Philip nor Henry had derived from the war thoſe advantages, by the proſpect of which they had been allured, and both of them had powerful motives for deſiring that it might be ſpeedily brought to a concluſion. Philip's eyes were now opened to the vanity of thoſe flattering dreams of conqueſt by which he had been ſo long deluded. His acquiſitions in France had coſt him more than they were worth; and beſides the expence of making them, they were much more than counterbalanced by the loſſes which year after year he had ſuffered in the Netherlands. His finances, as has been already mentioned, were in extreme diſorder; his credit was ruined by the late violation of his faith; his troops in many places of the Low Countries had mutinied again, on account of their want of pay; and if the war ſhould continue for another campaign, he thought

thought it not improbable that the greater part of them would refuſe to march againſt the enemy. From his advanced age, and broken health, he had reaſon to believe that his death was not far diſtant, and he dreaded the fatal conſequences which might ariſe from leaving his ſon, who was hardly arrived at the age of manhood, involved in war with a prince ſo powerful and enterpriſing as the king of France.

PEACE was no leſs deſirable to Henry than to Philip; thoſe wounds under which his kingdom had bled for ſo many years, were ſtill uncloſed, and numberleſs diſtempers prevailed in almoſt every quarter, to which no effectual remedy could be applied during the continuance of the war.

The pope mediates between the contending monarchs.

WHILE, for theſe reaſons, both princes were alike deſirous of peace, neither of them would yield ſo far to his antagoniſt as to be the firſt to propoſe it. But the ſovereign pontiff, as the father of all catholic princes, and the common friend of the two contending monarchs, acted the part of mediator between them; and Clement diſcovered on this occaſion a degree of zeal and prudence, which juſtly entitled him to that high reſpect in which his character was held by his cotemporaries. At his requeſt, it was agreed by the two kings, that a congreſs ſhould be held at Vervins, a town in Picardy, near the confines of Hainault. The preſidents de Bellievre and Sillery, were appointed plenipotentiaries by Henry; and Ricardotto and Baptiſta Taſſis, by Philip. Alexander de Medici, the cardinal legate, likewiſe repaired thither, and in the month of February the conferences were begun.

Oppoſition to peace by Elizabeth and the States.

THESE conferences were matter of great anxiety to the States of Holland, as they could not doubt that a principal motive which had determined Philip to diſengage himſelf from the war with France, was, that he might be at liberty to employ his whole ſtrength

BOOK XXIV. 1598.

ſtrength againſt the confederated provinces. They were not without ſuſpicions likewiſe, that the queen of England would embrace the preſent opportunity of delivering herſelf from the Spaniſh war, and were therefore much diſquieted with the apprehenſions of being left without an ally to ſupport them. But they were ſoon delivered from their fears with regard to the conduct of Elizabeth, who being entirely convinced that the intereſt and ſafety of their infant republic were inſeparable from her own, gave them freſh aſſurances of the continuance of her friendſhip.

THE French monarch no ſooner agreed to the pope's propoſal of a congreſs, than he ſent an intimation of it to his allies, and expreſſed his deſire, that, if poſſible, a general peace might be eſtabliſhed, in which they, as well as himſelf, might be comprehended. But neither Elizabeth nor the States were diſpoſed to liſten to his advice. The latter were well aſſured that no conſideration would perſuade Philip to treat with them as a free ſtate, and they were unalterably determined never to acknowledge him as their ſovereign. Elizabeth, who had on different occaſions experienced the great advantage which ſhe derived from alliance with them, was no leſs ſolicitous than themſelves that they ſhould maintain their independence; and ſhe believed, that while they maintained it, ſhe ſhould have no great reaſon to dread the power of Philip. She was concerned however at the proſpect of loſing ſo uſeful an ally as the king of France, and ſent Sir Robert Cecil and Mr. Herbert, who were accompanied by Juſtin de Naſſau and the celebrated Barnevelt, from the States, to remonſtrate with Henry againſt the peace.

THESE able negociators left no argument untouched that could diſſuade him from his purpoſe: they reminded him of the alliance into which he had

had lately entered with the queen and the States, and of the aſſiſtance which on different occaſions they had afforded him. They repreſented the danger to which he expoſed himſelf by treating with a prince who had given ſo many ſtriking proofs of inſincerity; and they offered to furniſh him with a large ſupply of forces, beſides money, and a numerous fleet, for the recovery of Calais, and the farther proſecution of the war.

HENRY replied, that no alliance which he had formed with the queen or the States, could be reaſonably interpreted as an obligation on him unceſſarily to prolong the war, which he was perſuaded would ſoon prove the utter ruin of his kingdom. He expreſſed in ſtrong terms his gratitude for the friendſhip which they had ſhewn him, and aſſured them, that no peace which he ſhould conclude with Spain, would prevent him from making a ſuitable return. From the manner of life to which he had been ſo long inured, joined to the provocations which he had received from Philip, they might believe, that it was not an averſion to the war, but the neceſſity of peace that had determined him to embrace a meaſure ſo repugnant to the inclination of his friends. The diſorders which prevailed in his dominions were ſuch, that if the proper remedies were not applied, they would ſoon become incurable, and theſe remedies could not be applied in the time of war; but peace, he hoped, would quickly reſtore his kingdom to its native ſtrength and vigour; when, inſtead of being a burden upon his allies, as he had hitherto been, he would be able, and they ſhould find him willing, not only to repay with intereſt the obligations which they had laid him under, but to defend and protect them, and the reſt of Europe, againſt the exorbitant ambition of the king of Spain.

BOOK XXIV. 1598.

THIS apology, delivered with that irreſiſtible force of natural eloquence, by which Henry was eminently diſtinguiſhed, made a ſtrong impreſſion upon the minds of the Engliſh and Dutch ambaſſadors; they could not doubt of the truth of what they had heard; and before their departure, they had the candour to acknowledge, that as the peace which he was about to conclude was neceſſary for France, ſo it might be found in the iſſue highly beneficial to the other European powers. Henry ſent ambaſſadors to England and Holland to enforce what he had ſaid on this occaſion, and ſtill continued as formerly on terms of cordial friendſhip both with Elizabeth and the States.

Concluſion of the peace on the 2d of May.

THE treaty of peace was ſoon after brought to the deſired concluſion [l]. Several difficulties occurred during the courſe of the conferences, which were removed through the diſintereſted zeal and great authority of the pope and the cardinal legate, and at length, upon Henry's reſigning his claim to Cambray, Philip conſented, though with great reluctance, to give up Calais, Andres, Dourlens, and all the other towns in France, which he had acquired at the expence of ſo much blood and treaſure [m].

Philip tranſfers the Netherlands to Iſabella and Albert.

PHILIP had been the more ſolicitous to put an end to the war, on account of a ſcheme which he had conceived, after the diſappointment of his views in France, of transferring the ſovereignty of the Netherlands to his eldeſt daughter Iſabella, whom he intended to give in marriage to the archduke. And to embrace this meaſure, he was prompted, partly by

l At Vervins.

m Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. iv. p. 464. Sully, lib. ix. D'Avila, towards the concluſion. Thuanus, lib. cxx. ſect. i. and v; and Camden, p. 760, &c. Miniana, lib. x. cap. xii.

by his affection for the Infanta, one of the moſt accompliſhed women of the age, and partly by his eſteem for Albert, whom, of all the princes in Europe, he deemed the moſt worthy of ſo illuſtrious an alliance.

His deliberations on this ſubject.

But while his attachment to his daughter and her future huſband made him deſirous of procuring for them ſome ſovereign eſtabliſhment, he could not, without reluctance, reſolve to ſeparate from the body of his empire ſo rich a portion of his hereditary dominions. To the troops and money of the Netherlands, the late emperor and himſelf had been greatly indebted for moſt of their victories over their enemies in France and Germany; and it had been the Netherlands chiefly, which, by their ſituation in the heart of Europe, had rendered them formidable to the ſeveral European powers, and enabled them ſo long to maintain the tranquillity of their other dominions. The preſervation indeed of theſe provinces had, for many years, proved a perpetual drain for the wealth of the Spaniſh monarchy; but it was doubtful whether, if they were diſjoined from it, they would not be found as great a burden as ever, ſince it would ſtill be incumbent on the king to ſupport the archduke in his new ſovereignty, againſt the attempts of his enemies in the revolted provinces.

These conſiderations were urged with great warmth by the count de Fuentes, in order to diſſuade Philip from the proſecution of his deſign. But ſome others of his counſellors, and particularly the count de Caſtel-Rodrigo, in whom he repoſed the greateſt confidence, were at no leſs pains to confirm him in it, by repreſenting, that the ſeparation propoſed, inſtead of leſſening, would ſerve to augment the ſtrength and vigour of the Spaniſh monarchy.

BOOK XXIII. 1598.

"The Netherlands lay ſo remote from the ſeat of government, and the laws of that country, and the language, character, and manners of the people, were ſo extremely different from thoſe of Spain, that it would be for ever found impracticable to preſerve them in obedience. Their averſion to a foreign dominion, and eſpecially that of Spain, was inſurmountable; the abſence and diſtance of the king had been the cauſe of that inveterate rebellion which had furniſhed employment to his armies for almoſt forty years, and no other effectual means could be deviſed either to reconcile the provinces which had already revolted, or to prevent the reſt from imitating their example, but to give them a ſovereign of their own, who by reſiding among them, might conciliate and ſecure their affections. It was true, that without the aſſiſtance of the queen of England, the rebels muſt long ere now have laid down their arms; but if with the feeble aid which they had received from a queen engroſſed with domeſtic cares, and tottering on her throne, they had been able for ſo many years not only to defend themſelves, but to carry on an offenſive ſucceſsful war, how much reaſon was there to dread the conſequences that muſt follow, if the Britiſh crowns were united, as they would ſoon be, on the head of a prince in the vigour of life, who being free from the embarraſſments of a diſputed title, would have full leiſure to give attention to foreign affairs. From jealouſy of the king, the neighbouring princes would never ceaſe to ſupport the rebellion, and foment the diſcontents of his Flemiſh ſubjects; but if the Netherlands were diſunited from the Spaniſh monarchy, and erected into a ſeparate and independent ſtate, the cauſe of that jealouſy would be removed; it would become the intereſt of France and Britain, and the other neighbouring powers, to lend their aſſiſtance to extinguiſh the war; and even the

the revolted provinces would, in order to ſecure internal tranquillity, chuſe to return to their antient union with the Southern provinces."

1598.

His deed of abdication.

BY theſe arguments, which coincided with Philip's inclination, he was confirmed in his deſign; and on the 6th of May he ſigned the deed of abdication; in which, after declaring his reſolution to give the Infanta in marriage to the archduke, he reſigned the ſovereignty of the Netherlands, and of the county of Burgundy, to that princeſs, to be enjoyed conjunctly by her and her future huſband, and after their deceaſe, by the heirs of the marriage, whether male or female, according to the eſtabliſhed rules of hereditary ſucceſſion.

BUT it was provided, that in caſe this ſovereignty ſhould devolve to a female, ſhe ſhould marry either the king or the prince of Spain. That neither any prince nor princeſs deſcended from the Infanta, ſhould marry without the conſent of the king of Spain; and that in default of iſſue, the Netherlands ſhould be re-united to the Spaniſh monarchy. By other articles, it was ſtipulated that the new ſovereigns ſhould prevent their ſubjects from trading to the Indies; that they ſhould, before their admiſſion, take an oath to permit the exerciſe of no other religion but the catholic, within their dominions; and in caſe they ſhould fail in the execution of this, or any other article, it was declared that the ſovereignty transferred ſhould immediately return to the crown of Spain.

He is received in the Netherlands.

THIS deed was immediately tranſmitted to the archduke; and ſoon afterwards the States of the ſouthern provinces agreed to accept of the archduke and the Infanta for their ſovereigns, with the conditions which the deed contained; being well pleaſed to be delivered, as they

BOOK XXIV.

they expected to be, from the yoke of Spain, which they had found ſo grievous and intolerable.

1598. BUT although this event gave great ſatisfaction to the people ſubject to the Spaniſh government, it was not likely to produce any change in the ſentiments, or conduct of their neighbours in the United Provinces. The new ſovereigns, ſaid the confederates, whom Philip has appointed, will be ſovereigns in name only and appearance, but not in reality. They will be utterly unable to ſupport themſelves without the aſſiſtance of the Spaniſh arms. They will depend on Spain as much as any Spaniſh governor or regent; and the Spaniards will ſtill continue to exerciſe, as formerly, an unlimited influence in the government. In the deed of abdication, the Netherlands are treated, not as a free and independent State, but as a fief of the Spaniſh monarchy; and from the advanced age of the Infanta [m], together with the conditions of the deed of abdication, it was evident that the preſent meaſure could be meant only as a temporary expedient, intended to amuſe the people of the ſouthern provinces, and not as a fixt and permanent eſtabliſhment. But whatever was the king's intention in this meaſure, and whether the ſovereignty now transferred, ſhould or ſhould not return to the crown of Spain, it was the unalterable reſolution of the United Provinces to maintain their liberty, in oppoſition to whatever attempts might be made to deprive them of it by the king of Spain, or the archduke of Auſtria [n].

ALBERT was in the mean time employed in preparing to ſet out for Madrid; but having been detained in the Low Countries much longer than he expected, by a new mutiny of his troops, he

[m] Thirty-two. [n] Van Meteren, Grotius, &c.

he had begun his journey when he received intelligence of the death of the king.

1598. Illneſs and death of Philip.

FOR more than two years this prince had been extremely afflicted with the gout; to which had been lately added, a hectic fever, and a dropſy. Finding his ſtrength ſo much decayed, that he could not expect to live above a few weeks, he ordered his attendants to tranſport him from Madrid to the Eſcurial; and when his phyſicians ſignified to him their apprehenſions, that he would not be able to endure the fatigue: "but I am reſolved, he anſwered, to accompany my funeral to my tomb." Upon his arrival at the Eſcurial, the gout returned with redoubled violence, both in his feet and hands; and ſoon afterwards, ſeveral impoſthumes gathered in his knees and breaſt, which occaſioned the moſt excruciating pain. He was in ſome meaſure relieved by laying the impoſthumes open. But another more intolerable diſtreſs ſucceeded. The matter of his ſores was of the moſt purulent and nauſeous nature, and ſwarms of lice were engendered in it, from which no application and no care or pains could deliver him. In this dreadful condition, he lay in a ſupine poſture, for more than fifty days; during which time he exhibited a ſtriking diſplay of patience, firmneſs of mind, and reſignation to his fate. He gave proof of the ſincerity of his religious profeſſion, by practiſing with great zeal and aſſiduity, thoſe ſuperſtitious obſervances, which the church of Rome preſcribes, as the means of procuring acceptance with the Deity. He ſeemed inclined likewiſe to make atonement for ſome ſeverities which he had exerciſed, and ordered ſeveral priſoners to be releaſed, and their effects reſtored [o].

ABOUT

[o] Among theſe was the wife of Antonio Perez.

BOOK XXIV. 1598.

ABOUT two days before his death, having ſent for his ſon, and his daughter Iſabella, he diſcourſed to them of the vanity of human greatneſs, delivered many ſalutary counſels for the adminiſtration of their dominions, and exhorted them with much earneſtneſs to cultivate and maintain the catholic faith. When they had left him, he gave directions for his funeral; and ordered his coffin to be brought into his chamber, and placed within his view; ſoon after which his ſpeech failed, and he expired on the 13th of September, in the ſeventy-ſecond year of his age, and the forty-third of his reign [p].

His character.

No character was ever drawn by different hiſtorians in more oppoſite colours than that of Philip; and yet, conſidering the length and activity of his reign, there is none which it ſhould ſeem would be more eaſy to aſcertain. From the facts recorded in the preceding hiſtory, we cannot doubt that he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree, penetration, vigilance, and a capacity for government. His eyes were continually open upon every part of his extenſive dominions. He entered into every branch of adminiſtration; watched over the conduct of his miniſters with unwearied attention; and in his choice both of them and of his generals, diſcovered a conſiderable ſhare of ſagacity. He had at all times a compoſed and ſettled countenance, and never appeared to be either elated or depreſſed. His temper was the moſt imperious, and his looks and demeanour were haughty and ſevere; yet among his Spaniſh ſubjects, he was of eaſy acceſs; liſtened patiently to their repreſentations and complaints; and where his ambition and bigotry did not interfere, was generally willing to redreſs their grievances. When we have ſaid thus much in his praiſe, we have ſaid all that juſtice requires, or truth

[p] Miniana, lib. x. cap. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cxx. ſect. xiv.

h permits. It is indeed impoſſible to ſuppoſe he was inſincere in his zeal for religion. But as eligion was of the moſt corrupt kind, it ſerved ıcreaſe the natural depravity of his diſpoſition; not only allowed, but even prompted him to mit the moſt odious and ſhocking crimes. ough a prince in the bigoted age of Philip ht be perſuaded, that the intereſt of religion ld be advanced by falſehood and perſecution; it might be expected, that, in a virtuous prince, ſentiments of honour and humanity would, ſome occaſions, triumph over the dictates of rſtition; but of this triumph, there occurs not gle inſtance in the reign of Philip; who, with- heſitation, violated his moſt ſacred obligations ften as religion afforded him a pretence; and er that pretence exerciſed for many years the t unrelenting cruelty, without reluctance or re- ſe. His ambition, which was exorbitant; his ntment, which was implacable; his arbitrary per, which would ſubmit to no controul; con- ted with his bigoted zeal for the catholic reli- ı, and carried the ſanguinary ſpirit, which that gion was calculated to inſpire, to a greater ght in Philip, than it ever attained in any other ice of that, or of any former or ſucceeding age.

SOME hiſtorians have diſtinguiſhed this prince by title of Philip the prudent[r], and have repre- ted him as the wiſeſt, as well as the moſt reli- us prince, that ever filled the Spaniſh throne. it is queſtionable, whether he be entitled to iſe on account of his prudence, any more than account of his religion. In the beginning of reign, he diſcovered great caution in his mili- y enterpriſes; and on ſome occaſions, made even

[r] El diſcreto.

BOOK XXIV. 1598.

even greater preparations than were neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs. But his ambition, his reſentment, and his abhorrence of the proteſtants were too violent to ſuffer him to act conformably to the dictates of ſound policy and prudence. He might have prevented the revolt of his Dutch and Flemiſh ſubjects, if, after the reformation in the Netherlands was ſuppreſſed by the dutcheſs of Parma, he had left the reins of government in the hands of that wiſe princeſs, and had not ſent ſo odious a tyrant as the duke of Alva to enſlave them. He might, after the defeat of the prince of Orange, have rivetted the chains of ſlavery about their necks, and gradually accuſtomed them to the yoke; if by engaging in too many expenſive enterpriſes, he had not exhauſted his exchequer, and made it in ſome meaſure neceſſary for Alva to impoſe the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies for the maintenance of his troops. He might, through the great abilities of the duke of Parma, have again reduced the revolted provinces to obedience, if he had not conceived the wild ambition of ſubduing England, and acquiring the ſovereignty of France. His armies in the latter part of his reign were never ſufficiently numerous to execute the various enterpriſes which he undertook; yet they were much more numerous than he was able to ſupport. Few years paſſed in which they did not mutiny for want of pay. And Philip ſuffered greater prejudice from the diſorders and devaſtation which his own troops committed, than he ever received from the arms of his enemies. Againſt his attempts on England and France, his wiſeſt counſellors remonſtrated in the ſtrongeſt terms. And prudence certainly required that, previouſly to any attack upon the dominions of others, he ſhould have ſecured poſſeſſion of his own. Yet ſo great was his illuſion, that rather than delay the execution of thoſe ſchemes which his reſentment and ambition had ſuggeſted, he choſe to run the

the riſk of loſing the fruits of all the victories which the duke of Parma had obtained; and having left defenceleſs the provinces which had ſubmitted to his authority, he thereby afforded an opportunity to the revolted provinces, of eſtabliſhing their power, on ſo firm a foundation, as the whole ſtrength of the Spaniſh monarchy, exerted againſt them for more than fifty years, was unable to overturn [s].

[s] If the reader incline to enter more particularly into the private life and character of Philip, than has been thought proper in the general hiſtory of his reign, he will meet with ſeveral intereſting anecdotes, in the prince of Orange's Apology, of which an abſtract is ſubjoined.

APPEN-

APPENDIX;

CONTAINING

AN ABSTRACT

OF THE

APOLOGY OR VINDICATION

OF THE

PRINCE OF ORANGE,

AGAINST

PHILIP's PROSCRIPTION.

APPENDIX.

THE prince of Orange begins his Apology, which is addreſſed to the confederated States with obſerving, that being conſcious of having devoted his life and fortune to the ſervice of the Netherlands, it afforded him great joy to reflect upon the teſtimony given to his fidelity and zeal, in that barbarous Proſcription which had been publiſhed againſt him by the king of Spain. "I have reaſon likewiſe," continued he, "to rejoice at the opportunity which is thus preſented to me, to vindicate my conduct from thoſe malignant imputations, which have been caſt upon it by certain ignoble hirelings; and which are repeated and ſet forth in the blackeſt colours in this Proſcription. For I am not accuſed at this time by any of thoſe obſcure libellers, to whom I have ever thought it beneath my dignity to reply; but by a great and powerful prince, who intends, through my ſides, to wound, and if poſſible to deſtroy, the confederacy. I can with confidence appeal to you, who are well acquainted with my paſt life, whether it has ever been my practice, either to praiſe myſelf or to cenſure others. And I muſt likewiſe appeal to you and to the world, whether now, when I am accuſed of ingratitude, infidelity, and hypocriſy, compared to a Judas and a Cain, called a rebel, a traitor, a diſturber of the public peace, and an enemy to mankind, and when both pecuniary and honorary rewards

1580.

APPEN DIX.

1580.

are promiſed to thoſe who ſhall ſlay or murder me; whether after this, the duty which I owe to myſelf, and to you who have repoſed in me ſuch unlimited confidence, does not call upon me to ſay what I can conſiſtently with truth, to prove the malice and falſehood of my accuſer? If you know his repreſentation of my conduct to be juſt, you will ſhut your ears againſt the defence which I am about to offer; but if you have known me from my youth to be more faithful, and chaſte, and virtuous, than the author of this infamous Proſcription, I ſhall expect that you will attend favourably to what I ſhall advance, and deliver judgment in vindication of my integrity and innocence.

"THE firſt crime of which I am accuſed in this Proſcription, is ingratitude; and a recital is made of favours beſtowed on me by the king himſelf, and the emperor his father; to the latter of whom, it is ſaid, I owed my ſucceſſion to the late Prince of Orange; and to the former, my having been admitted into the order of the Golden Fleece, and appointed a counſellor of ſtate, and governor of the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Burgundy.

"No man reſpects more than I do the memory of the emperor, and I reflect with much ſatisfaction on the many proofs of attachment which I received from him. But the neceſſity which I am laid under to vindicate my character, obliges me to obſerve, that of the ſort of favours which are objected to me, I never received any from the emperor, but on the contrary ſuffered great loſs and prejudice in his ſervice. With reſpect to my ſucceſſion to the inheritance queathed to me by my couſin, the late prince of Orange, it is impoſſible to conceive any ground for alleging that I was at all indebted for it to the emperor. My right to

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hat inheritance was indiſputable; nor was there ever any prince or private perſon, who pretended o call in queſtion its validity. Would not the mperor have been juſtly accuſed of tyranny and njuſtice, if he had prevented me from enjoying it? And does my accuſer reckon it an inſtance of goodneſs in a prince, merely not to defraud and oppreſs his faithful ſubjects? APPEN-DIX. 1580.

"ALL Europe knows what important ſervices the emperor received from the prince my kinſman; who commanded his armies, extended his dominions, and died at his feet. Had the emperor employed his power to diſappoint the laſt will of one who had ſerved him with ſo much fidelity and ſucceſs, would he not have involved his name in perpetual infamy? Beſides, that even although he had inclined to act a part ſo unworthy of his character, yet of the moſt valuable part of that inheritance he could not have deprived me, as it lies within the territory of the king of France, on whom alone I depend for the ſecure poſſeſſion of it. But even allowing that what is ſaid of my obligations to the emperor were true, yet the king of Spain is ſurely not intitled to reproach me with it; who in contempt of all law and juſtice, has, to the utmoſt of his power, endeavoured to deprive me of the inheritance in queſtion, and rendered ineffectual that kindneſs of the emperor, for my unmindfulneſs of which he accuſes me of ingratitude.

"GRATITUDE, in the opinion of this prince, ought not to be confined to the perſon by whom favours have been beſtowed, but ought to extend likewiſe to his deſcendants; and it is becauſe I have oppoſed the ſon, whoſe father was my benefactor, that I am deemed ungrateful. Let him apply this golden rule to his own conduct, as he has applied it to mine; and he will then perceive

APPENDIX. 1580.

which of us is guilty of ingratitude. Maximilian was the firſt of the family of Auſtria, who came into the Netherlands. And no perſon acquainted with hiſtory is ignorant of the important obligations which that emperor received from my kinſman count Egelbert of Naſſau; by whom he was powerfully ſupported againſt Lewis the eleventh of France; by whom the people who had rebelled againſt him were ſubdued; and by whom likewiſe he recovered his liberty, of which the jealouſy of the Flemings had deprived him. Need I mention what every body knows, of the ſervice performed to the late emperor Charles, by count Henry of Naſſau my uncle, who was in reality the perſon that prevailed with the electors to confer upon him the Imperial crown? Was it not by the bravery of René, prince of Orange, that the emperor ſubdued the dutchy of Guelderland; and by that of Philibert, that he gained poſſeſſion of Lombardy and Naples, and the perſon of the pope, and the city and ſtate of Rome? And will his ſon pretend to reproach the memory of theſe great men, by boaſting of his father's kindneſs, in ſuffering juſtice to be done to their kinſman? Am I not authoriſed from the few facts which I have mentioned, to aſſert, that had it not been for the houſes of Orange and Naſſau, which I have the honour to repreſent, my defamer could not have put ſo many pompous titles, as are inſerted in the beginning of his proſcription?

"By what I have ſaid, I would not be underſtood to diſclaim every kind of obligation to the emperor. I ſhall for ever retain a grateful remembrance of the honour which he did me, when after having taken upon himſelf the inſpection of my education, and kept me nine years about his perſon, he gave me the important charge of all his ordnance in the Netherlands; and in my abſence, without any application made in my behalf, in contradiction

ction to the repreſentations of his courtiers, in preference to many officers of great expe- ce, appointed me commander in chief of his y, at the age of twenty-one. I reflect with itude on that teſtimony of regard, with which nonoured me at the time of his reſignation, n having ſent for me from the camp, he gave a public proof of his affection, by placing me t him, and leaning upon me, to ſupport him- under the fatigue of that ſolemnity. I know wiſe, that he meant to give me a further proof iis regard, when he impoſed upon me the irk- e taſk of carrying the Imperial crown to his ther Ferdinand. But will my enemies pretend ſſert, either that I ſhewed myſelf unworthy of e honours, or that my intereſt and fortune were moted by them? Did the troops, when I com- nded them, ſuffer any repulſe or damage? On contrary, although the plague raged among n, and I had two of the ableſt generals of the , the duke de Nevers, and the admiral Coligny, my opponents; I kept them at bay, and for- d the towns of Charlemont and Philipville, in e of their moſt vigorous endeavours to prevent . While the ſervices which I performed corre- nded to the truſt repoſed in me, I can affirm h truth, that honour was the only acquiſition ich I derived from the favour that was ſhewn . From the chamber of accounts it will appear t I never received any pecuniary recompence my ſervices. I am able to prove by the moſt ontestible evidence, that my unavoidable ex- nce as general, added to the expence of my em- ſſy into Germany, and that which I incurred, ien the king required me to receive and entertain e numerous foreign nobility, who crouded to ngratulate him on his acceſſion, amounted to no s than one million five hundred thouſand florins, nd to indemnify me for this expence, what turn did I receive from the king, who now ac-

APPENDIX. 1580.

APPENDIX. 1580.

cuſes me of ingratitude? Having with the emperor's conſent, begun to aſſert my claim to the lordſhip of Chatel Bellin, before the ſupreme court of juſtice at Mechlin; when the counſellors had regiſtered their opinion, and on the day when they were to have pronounced ſentence in my favour, this king, who had juſt ſworn to govern us according to the laws, did, in violation of theſe laws, interpoſe his arbitrary power, and forbid the judges to proceed; nor ſince that time, have they been ever permitted to do me juſtice.

"WHEN what I have ſaid ſhall be conſidered, the governments which were beſtowed on me, will not appear to be more than was due for the ſervices which I have performed; nor more than an adequate compenſation for that extraordinary expence, which theſe ſervices had coſt me. Had the king allowed me to remain in poſſeſſion of theſe governments, he might have had ſome reaſon for reproaching me; although it was not in reality to him I was indebted for them, but to the emperor, by whom it was determined they ſhould be conferred upon me, before his departure from the Netherlands. But ſince my accuſer has laboured to expel me from them; ſince he has, to the utmoſt of his power, deprived me of my poſſeſſions, beſides carrying off my ſon to Spain, in contempt of the privileges of this country, which he had ſworn to preſerve inviolate, becauſe I would not lend myſelf a willing inſtrument of his oppreſſion; after this, I ſay, is he intitled to accuſe me of ingratitude?

"NOR is there any better ground for his accuſation, that I have violated the allegiance, which I owed him as my ſovereign. Though I have rejected his authority, yet I have done nothing more than was done by his anceſtor, Albert duke of Auſtria, the founder of his family, againſt my anceſtor,

anceſtor, the emperor Adolphus of Naſſau. And beſides this, I ſhould gladly know by what title my accuſer poſſeſſes his Caſtilian dominions? Did not his predeceſſor Henry of Caſtile, a baſtard, riſe in rebellion againſt his brother Pedro, his lawful ſovereign, whom he killed with his own hand? And is not Philip the lineal heir of that uſurper? It may be ſaid, that Pedro was a tyrant, and therefore juſtly dethroned and ſlain. And may not the ſame plea be offered in excuſe for the part which I have acted? May it not be ſaid with truth of Philip, that his conduct has been that of a cruel tyrant; and that the cruelties exerciſed by Pedro, were much leſs ſhocking and horrible, than thoſe which have been perpetrated by the duke of Alva and his Aſſociates? I muſt farther obſerve, that as king of Spain, I owe him no ſubmiſſion, but only as duke of Brabant. And as he is duke of that province, I, by reaſon of the baronies which I hold there, am one of the principal members of it. But he has forgotten the conditions on which he received this dukedom. He has forgotten the ſolemn oath which he took to preſerve our privileges; and that it is an expreſs article of the compact betwixt us, that if he fail in his engagements, our obligation to obey him as our ſovereign ſhall ceaſe. All Europe has witneſſed his open contempt of theſe engagements. All Europe will bear me witneſs, when I ſay, that not a ſingle privilege only, but every privilege of which we boaſted, and which he had ſworn to maintain, has been violated; and not in a ſingle inſtance only, but in a thouſand inſtances. In my own perſon, as I have already hinted, I have had ample experience of his lawleſs tyranny: my ſon, at an age when he was incapable of offending him, has been torn from me. All my eſtates and goods have been confiſcated; and I myſelf declared a traitor and rebel, without any of thoſe forms of trial which

APPENDIX. 1580.

APPENDIX. 1580.

which the laws require; and by whom? By men of the loweſt claſs veſted with his authority, by pettifoggers, and others too mean to be employed as pages, by one who holds the rank, which I have long held in the Netherlands. I do not deny, that at his acceſſion I took the cuſtomary oath of Allegiance; but the tie on me to yield obedience, and that on him to afford protection, were mutual; and it is a dictate of common ſenſe, that in obligations of this ſort, the failure of either party ſets the other free from his engagements.

"But even if I had not received any perſonal injury, I ſhould have thought myſelf indiſpenſably obliged to oppoſe the tyrannical meaſures which were purſued. For it is not the prince only who ſwears to maintain the fundamental laws. The ſame oath is required of the nobles, and of all who are admitted into public employments. By this oath I was ſtrictly bound to do every thing in my power to reſcue my fellow citizens from the oppreſſions under which they groaned, and, had I not done what my enemy complains of, I ſhould have been juſtly chargeable with the crime, of which all the world knows that he has been guilty, a breach of the moſt ſacred and ſolemn obligation.

"To this imputation, I know that his partiſans are ready to reply, that although he ſwore at his acceſſion to maintain our privileges, yet the pope had granted him a diſpenſation from his oath. I leave it to divines and others, better acquainted than I am with religious controverſies, to determine whether this arrogance of the pope, in aſſuming power to ſet men free from the obligation of an oath, be not an impious encroachment on the prerogative of Heaven, and I leave it to them to determine, whether this pretenſion is not deſtructive of faith among men, and ſubverſive of ſociety. I ſpeak not

not therefore of the lawfulneſs of Philip's conduct, after having obtained this boaſted diſpenſation, but of his folly in applying for it. The tie between him and his ſubjects was ſtrictly mutual; and by procuring a diſpenſation for himſelf, he at the ſame time ſet me, and all his other ſubjects free from the engagements which we came under to yield him obedience. It is childiſh and trifling to ſay, that by means of the diſpenſation he is free, but that we who have not been diſpenſed with, are ſtill as much bound as ever. For from the moment that he conſiders himſelf as diſengaged, (by what means ſoever his obligation was diſſolved) the condition on which we promiſed obedience being removed, it muſt be abſurd to reproach us with infidelity. APPENDIX. 1580.

"I COME now to that part of the proſcription, in which I am accuſed of having been the author of all the diſturbances that have happened. With ſuch of you as are old enough to remember the riſe of theſe diſturbances, there will be no need to defend myſelf againſt ſo groundleſs an imputation; but for the ſake of thoſe who were too young at that time to form a judgment of what they ſaw, it is neceſſary I ſhould give ſome account of thoſe tranſactions, which are ſo groſsly miſrepreſented in this infamous proſcription.

"No perſon acquainted with the conduct of my accuſer in his other dominions, or with the cruelties exerciſed in Granada, Mexico, and Peru, will be at a loſs to account for the calamities with which the people of the Low Countries have been overwhelmed. In the very beginning of his reign, his deſpotic temper was conſpicuous. The emperor his father ſaw it with deep concern, and when the count de Boſſut, and I, and ſeveral others were preſent, he exhorted him to treat his Flemiſh ſubjects with greater moderation; and foretold, that

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APPENDIX. 1580.

if the pride and arrogance of his Spaniſh counſellors were not reſtrained, the people of the Netherlands would ere long be excited to revolt. But this wholeſome counſel had not the effect which the emperor intended. His ſon ſtill conſulted only with Spaniards; he ſtill foſtered as much as ever his paſſion for arbitrary power; and reſolved, in contradiction to his intereſt, if rightly underſtood, as well as to his oath, to overturn our conſtitution. The condition annexed to your grant of the nine years ſupply, that the money ſhould be diſpoſed of by your own commiſſioners, excited in him and in his counſellors the moſt inveterate reſentment. I have been preſent, when theſe counſellors who knew well their maſter's ſentiments, adviſed him to the purſuit of meaſures, by which you were all to have been adjudged to death. But it was by accident I came to know that theſe bloody counſels had been adopted. From the French king's own mouth, when I reſided at his court as an hoſtage, I learnt that a plan had been concerted with the duke of Alva, to extirpate from France and the Netherlands all who were ſuſpected of being favourably inclined to the reformed religion. I concealed from the French monarch, my ignorance of the deſign; and the indignation which it excited in me. By the interceſſion of the dutcheſs of Savoy, I obtained leave to return into the Netherlands, where (I deny it not, on the contrary I glory in it) I promoted with all my influence that earneſt requeſt, which the States preferred to the king for the removal of the Spaniſh troops.

"I ACKNOWLEDGE, that amidſt the numberleſs falſehoods with which this proſcription is filled, there is truth in another part of the charge which is laid againſt me. I acknowledge, that after having remonſtrated in vain to the dutcheſs of Parma, againſt the cruel

APPENDIX. 1580.

cruel and arbitrary meaſures that were purſued; being prompted by my dread of a civil war, by my concern for the calamities of the people, and by a ſenſe of duty ariſing from the oath which I had ſworn to maintain their rights, I called together the principal nobility, and attempted to open their eyes to the impending danger.

"I ACKNOWLEDGE likewiſe, that I approved of the ſupplication, which was preſented by the nobility, againſt the placarts and executions. I am far from being either aſhamed, or ſorry for the counſel which I gave. That ſupplication was not only the moſt moderate meaſure that could have been deviſed, but was ſtrictly conformable to the conſtitution and practice of the Netherlands; and happy had it been for the king, as well as for the people, had he complied with the requeſt which it contained.

"WITH reſpect to that part of the proſcription, in which my accuſer reproaches me, on account of the favours which I have ſhewn to the proteſtants, I confeſs, that before I embraced the reformed religion, I never hated thoſe who profeſſed it. Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, when it is conſidered that my mind had been early tinctured with its principles, and that my father who had eſtabliſhed it in his dominions, lived and died in the profeſſion of it. I confeſs, that even while, in conſequence of my education at the emperor's court, I held the catholic perſuaſion, I always abhorred the barbarities which were exerciſed by the popiſh inquiſition. I confeſs, that at the time of the king's departure from Zealand, when he commanded me to put to death certain perſons attached to the proteſtant faith, I refuſed to obey, and gave theſe perſons private warning of the danger to which they were expoſed,

APPENDIX. 1580.

expoſed. I confeſs, that in the council of State, I made all the oppoſition in my power to the perſecutions that were propoſed; partly from motives of compaſſion or humanity, partly from my conviction of the abſurdity of puniſhing men for opinions which they could not change, when they did not diſturb the public tranquillity; and partly from a perſuaſion, that the violent remedies employed were calculated to diſappoint the end in view. But while, for theſe reaſons, I was from the beginning averſe from perſecution; you all know that I had no concern, either in the introduction of the reformed religion into the Netherlands, or in the rapid progreſs which it made during the government of the dutcheſs of Parma. You know, that at that time I poſſeſſed not the ſmalleſt influence with thoſe, by whom it was introduced and propagated; and you likewiſe know, that with regard to thoſe diſorders, into which the proteſtants ſuffered their zeal to betray them, ſo far from giving them my countenance or approbation, I exerted my authority to reſtrain them; I puniſhed the perpetrators with ſeverity, and have, on account of the rigour which I exerciſed, been, by many among the proteſtants, moſt cruelly calumniated and defamed.

"I HOPE to be excuſed on this occaſion, for obſerving that there is one circumſtance in the proſcription, that gives me pleaſure. Notwithſtanding the malice and rancour, and contempt of truth which my accuſer has diſcovered, there is one crime, often laid to the charge of the governors of provinces, of which he has not ventured to accuſe me; I mean that of avarice, or the embezzlement of the public money. Of this deſpicable crime indeed, I have been accuſed by ſome unknown perſons in certain defamatory writings that have been circulated. But from the ſilence obſerved on this head by my inveterate enemy, theſe libellers may

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ſee the folly, as well as falſehood of their inſinuations. To you there can be no occaſion to vindicate my conduct. I give thanks to God, that I learnt at an early period, of how much conſequence it was for one who governs a free people, not only to preſerve himſelf untainted, but even to keep himſelf free from the ſuſpicion of corruption. And you know, that on this account I have conſtantly declined taking any charge of the public money; and from the beginning of my adminiſtration, have transferred both the collection and diſtribution of it to others. APPENDIX. 1580.

"I AM accuſed in the proſcription, of having practiſed to return into Holland, by undertaking to defend the people from the tax of the tenth penny, which, it is ſaid, was impoſed upon them by the duke of Alva, without the king's conſent; and I am accuſed likewiſe of having perſecuted and expelled the catholics. If by practiſing, my accuſer means that I ſolicited for liberty to return, there is as little truth in this, as in his other aſſertions. I myſelf was moſt earneſtly ſolicited; and I am ready to ſhew letters which I received, not only from the governors of towns, but from the citizens, intreating me to come and deliver them from the tyranny of the Spaniards. And in complying with theſe entreaties, what did I do, that my duty did not require from me? I attempted to deliver from ſlavery, the provinces which had been committed to my care; whoſe liberties I had ſworn to maintain: and of the right to govern which, the king had no power, without the conſent of the States to deprive me.

"No part of this proſcription gives me greater ſurpriſe, than that in which I am accuſed of perſecution. It is impoſſible but even the Romaniſts themſelves muſt bear witneſs to the falſehood of ſo injurious an imputation. No perſon in the Netherlands

APPENDIX. 1580.

lands can be ignorant, that far from employing rigour, I have often argued and remonſtrated againſt it, and have promoted lenity in the treatment of the catholics to the utmoſt of my power. Of this, even my accuſer himſelf ſeems to make an indirect acknowledgment. I feigned, he ſays, that the perſecution of the catholics diſpleaſed me. But how does he know that I feigned? Have not my actions been at all times open? Why does he not judge from *them* of my intention? Never had one perſon leſs ground for accuſing another of any crime, than my accuſer has to caſt on me the imputation of hypocriſy. Did I, either before, or at the time when he conferred theſe obligations upon me, for which he has reproached me with ingratitude; did I ever offer the incenſe of flattery, either to himſelf or to the dutcheſs of Parma, or his tools and confidents in the council? On the contrary, did I not openly, and without diſguiſe, condemn the meaſures which he had dictated, and which they purſued? Was it poſſible for me to ſpeak more plainly than I did, or to give a clearer teſtimony of my averſion to his deſigns, than by deſiring him, as I did frequently, to ſuffer me to reſign my governments, becauſe it was not in my power to yield him the obedience which he required? Such was my conduct before my departure into Germany; and ſince that time, is there a ſingle ſtep of my conduct that will admit of the interpretation of hypocriſy? Did I not openly ſolicit aid from the German princes to oppoſe him? Have I not raiſed armies againſt him; taken towns which he poſſeſſed; repulſed his forces, and expelled him utterly from at leaſt two of the provinces, over which he tyrannized? Is there any thing in this that can be termed hypocriſy?

"But my accuſer will not find it ſo eaſy to vindicate his own conduct from this odious imputation. Read my defence which I publiſhed ſome years

years ago; and you will perceive to which of us belongs the appellation of hypocrite and deceiver. In that defence, there are copies of letters which I received from him, filled with profeſſions of friendſhip and regard, at the very time, when, as appears from the ſequel, he had doomed me to deſtruction. APPENDIX. 1580.

"But why ſhould I expect to be dealt with equitably, by one whoſe conſcience allows him to affirm, that his miniſter the duke of Alva impoſed the tax of the tenth-penny, and urged the levying of it with ſuch inflexible obſtinacy, without his authority or conſent? Is it credible that one who knew this king's temper ſo well as Alva, and who had ever ſhewn the greateſt ſolicitude to pleaſe him, would have preſumed, by a meaſure ſo tyrannical and unprecedented, to run the riſk of kindling a civil war? Or, if this wary Spaniard was in reality ſo raſh and preſumptuous, can it be believed by any perſon who conſiders the important conſequences with which his raſhneſs and preſumption were attended, that the king would not, long ere this time, have diſavowed him, and made him feel the weight of his diſpleaſure? Was not Alva puniſhed for ordering his ſon to marry his couſin, rather than another woman, whom he had debauched under a promiſe of marriage? Was not this old ſervant baniſhed for this venial tranſgreſſion, from his maſter's preſence, and thrown into priſon, from which he would never have been delivered, if one better qualified to tyranniſe over the Portugueſe could have been found in Spain? And what opinion muſt we form of a king, who for this private offence, could puniſh an ancient friend and ſervant with ſo much ſeverity; while, notwithſtanding the crime of treaſon, the moſt public and notorious, and productive of the moſt dreadful calamities to his faithful ſubjects, he not only ſuffered him to paſs unpuniſhed, but received him with open arms, and loaded

APPENDIX. 1580.

loaded him with honours? After this, will he ſtill employ the language of a good king, and boaſt of his affection for his people?"

In a great part of what remains of this apology, the prince of Orange enters into a detail of the tranſactions recorded in the preceding hiſtory. I ſhall therefore paſs over this, and ſet before the reader what relates to the reproach, which Philip caſts on William's marriage with the daughter of the duke de Montpenſier, who was the princeſs of Orange at the time of publiſhing the proſcription.

"My accuſer," continues he, "is not ſatisfied with ſaying every thing that can blacken my character, and render it odious to the world; but he has likewiſe attempted to taint the honour of my wife." He ſays, "that I have infamouſly married a religious woman, ſolemnly bleſſed by the hands of the biſhop, in contradiction to the laws of Chriſtianity, and of the Romiſh church, and that I did ſo whilſt my marriage ſubſiſted with another woman." Though this aſſertion were ſtrictly true, it would ill become this inceſtuous and adulterous king to accuſe me. But you know that it is entirely without foundation. My marriage with my former wife, now dead, did not ſubſiſt, and the ground of her divorce was approved even by the doctors of the Roman church; and by thoſe illuſtrious princes to whom ſhe was allied. My preſent wife was not, even by the rules of the popiſh church, a religious woman, in the ſenſe meant by my accuſer. The duke of Montpenſier, my father-in-law, who is ſincerely attached to the catholic communion, (not as cardinal Granvelle, and other Spaniſh miniſters, from intereſt, but from principle and conviction) ſpared no pains to put the lawfulneſs of his daughter's marriage beyond doubt or controverſy. He found it the clear opinion, not only

only of the principal perſons in the Parliament of Paris, but of ſeveral biſhops and doctors whom he conſulted, that even if a promiſe of celibacy had been given by my wife, yet, in conſideration of her youth, it would not have been binding, as it would have been contrary to the rules of the Gallican church, to the decrees of the high court of juſtice in France, and even to the ordinances of the councils of Trent, to which my adverſary pays ſuch unlimited ſubmiſſion. He likewiſe found that in reality no ſuch promiſe was ever made; that ſundry proteſtations had been taken to prevent any perſon from imagining that his daughter ever intended to take the vow; and that even in her abſence, the moſt undeniable evidence of this had been produced. APPENDIX. 1580.

"I SAID before, that although my marriage were not ſo unexceptionable as you ſee it is, even by the principles of the church of Rome, it would ill become my accuſer to reproach me on account of it. He ſeems not to have remembered the common maxim, that whoever ventures to accuſe another, ought to be well aſſured that he himſelf is innocent. And yet is not this king, who has endeavoured to ſtigmatiſe my lawful marriage with infamy, the huſband of his own niece? It will be ſaid by his partiſans, that he previouſly obtained a diſpenſation from the Pope. But does not the voice of nature cry aloud againſt ſuch an inceſtuous conjunction? And in order to make room for this marriage, is it not true, that he put to death his former wife, the mother of his children, the daughter and ſiſter of the kings of France? I ſay not this, prompted by my reſentment, raſhly and at random. I aſſert, that in France there is evidence of the horrid deed of which I now accuſe him.

"IT

APPEN-
DIX.
1580.

"It was not a ſingle murder that was perpetrated for the ſake of this extraordinary marriage. His ſon too, his only ſon, was ſacrificed, in order to furniſh the pope with a pretext for ſo unuſual a diſpenſation; which was granted, in order to prevent the Spaniſh monarchy from being left without a male-heir. This was the true cauſe of the death of Don Carlos; againſt whom ſome miſdemeanours were alleged, but not a ſingle crime ſufficient to juſtify his condemnation, much leſs to vindicate a father for embruing his hands in the blood of his ſon. And if Don Carlos was in reality guilty of crimes deſerving death, ought not an appeal to have beeen made to us, his future ſubjects? Did the right of judging, and pronouncing ſentence of death againſt the heir of ſuch extenſive dominions, belong to Spaniſh friars and inquiſitors, the obſequious ſlaves of the father's tyranny?

"But perhaps this good king made conſcience of leaving for his heir a prince, whom he knew to be born in unlawful wedlock. For Philip's marriage with the mother of Don Carlos was not leſs contrary to the laws of God and man, than that other of which I have already ſpoken. At the very time when he eſpouſed the princeſs of Portugal, the mother of Carlos, his marriage ſubſiſted with Iſabella Oſoris, by whom he had two ſons, Pedro and Bernardino; a marriage brought about by Ruy Gomez de Silva, prince of Evoli, to which that nobleman was indebted for his power and greatneſs. And beſides, is it not well known that this king lived in habitual adultery with another woman, the lady Euphraſia? Did he not compel the prince of Aſcoli to take that lady for his wife, when ſhe was big with child by himſelf? And while it has been affirmed with certainty, that that unhappy man was taken off by poiſon, do not even the Spaniſh courtiers aſcribe his death to

to the grief which he conceived from the affront to which he was obliged to ſubmit, and the cruel neceſſity impoſed on him, of acknowledging for his heir the adulterous baſtard of another? Such, and ſo chaſte has been the conduct of this king, who has the aſſurance to calumniate my lawful marriage as a violation of the ſacred laws of chaſtity.

But I ſhall haſten to conclude this apology, after offering ſome remarks concerning the nature of the ſentence that has been pronounced againſt me. It is in this part of the edict of proſcription, that the compiler, whether the king himſelf, or ſome ignoble inſtrument of his tyranny, has employed all the thunder and lightning of his eloquence. But I thank God, it intimidates me no more, than the anathemas of Clement VII. intimidated my kinſman prince Philibert, when he beſieged and took the pontiff priſoner in his caſtle of St. Angelo. After the proofs which I have given, that I fear not all the power which my adverſary is poſſeſſed of; and after contending for ſo many years againſt his beſt generals, with numerous armies under their command, it was weak in him to expect to frighten me with the high ſounding terms of this proſcription. I have leſs reaſon now than formerly to dread the attempts of thoſe abandoned wretches, whom he has endeavoured to inſtigate againſt me. For I am not ignorant, that before this time he has bargained with priſoners, and other murderers, to deprive me of my life. He has now given me a public warning of his bloody deſign. And with the divine aſſiſtance, and the vigilance of my friends, I truſt, that notwithſtanding his diabolical machinations, my life ſhall be preſerved ſo long as the proſperity and intereſt of this people, to whoſe ſervice I have devoted it, ſhall require.

APPENDIX.

1580.

"My confidence on this head is greatly augmented by reflecting upon the indignation, which I cannot doubt will be generally excited by that extraordinary method of proceeding againſt me, which my adverſary has adopted. For there is not, I am perſuaded, a nation or prince in Europe, by whom it will not be thought diſhonourable and barbarous, thus publicly to authoriſe and encourage murder; except the Spaniards, and their king, who have been long eſtranged from every ſentiment of honour and humanity. In having recourſe to private aſſaſſination againſt a declared and open enemy, does not this mighty monarch confeſs his deſpair of being able to ſubdue me by force of arms? Does he not give a teſtimony in my behalf, and diſcover that he dreads the efforts which I may make againſt him? Is it not weak and mean, to make publicly ſo puſillanimous an acknowledgment? But the weakneſs and meanneſs of this conduct is not greater than the abſurdity of his choice of the rewards, which he holds forth to thoſe who ſhall execute his bloody purpoſe. For it is not money only that he offers them, but nobility and honour; as if a regard to honour could influence a man capable of perpetrating a deed, held in univerſal reproach and deteſtation. And if any perſon already poſſeſſed of nobility were to pollute himſelf by ſo foul an action, would not his nobility be from that moment annihilated? Would not all ſociety and connection with him be held diſhonourable?

"Even my adverſary himſelf ſeems to have been in ſome meaſure ſenſible of the truth of this, and therefore he addreſſes himſelf more particularly to criminals and malefactors, as thoſe who are moſt likely to comply with his requeſt. "And in order, ſays he, that his deſtruction may be the more effectually and ſpeedily accompliſhed, we, deſirous of puniſhing vice, and rewarding virtue, promiſe

promiſe on the word of a king, and as the miniſter of God, that if any perſon ſhall be found poſſeſſed of courage, and public ſpirit ſufficient to animate him to the execution of this decree, and to free us from the aforeſaid peſt of ſociety, we ſhall order to be delivered to him, either in land or money as he ſhall incline, the ſum of twenty-five thouſand crowns; and if he ſhall have committed any crime, however enormous, we promiſe to grant him our royal pardon, and if he be not already noble, we hereby confer nobility upon him, and likewiſe on all thoſe who ſhall aid and aſſiſt him." Is not this in plain terms, calling on every deſperate wretch, every outcaſt from ſociety, to aſſiſt him in the execution of his deſign? No crime, however enormous, but ſhall be pardoned; no criminal, however deteſtable, but ſhall be crowned with honour. Does this king deſerve the title which he aſſumes, of a miniſter of God, who thus confounds the diſtinction between vice and virtue; and thus publicly avows his willingneſs to beſtow the higheſt rewards and honours upon men, defiled with the moſt abominable crimes? Have I not ground to rejoice in being perſecuted by one whoſe conſcience allows him to have recourſe to ſuch unhallowed means? And is not ſuch depravity of ſentiment in my accuſer, a teſtimony in behalf of my integrity?

APPENDIX. 1580.

I HAVE now ſaid all that ſeems neceſſary to vindicate my character from thoſe falſe aſperſions which are thrown out upon it in this proſcription. Many things which I might have ſaid, I have purpoſely omitted. Had I deſcended to a particular account of the cruelty, accompanied with a contempt of the moſt ſacred obligations, which has been exerciſed by my accuſer over this unhappy people, I ſhould never have come to a concluſion. But with you there can be no occaſion for giving a more particular detail. You have been ſpecta-

APPENDIX. 1580.

tors of the horrid ſcene; and have borne your ſhare of thoſe oppreſſions, which would fall to be deſcribed.

"But before I conclude, I muſt intreat you to reflect ſeriouſly upon the means to which our enemy finds it neceſſary to have recourſe, in order to accompliſh his deſigns. This infamous proſcription, joined to the pains which he and his miniſters continually employ to create diviſion among the provinces, ſhews clearly that he now deſpairs of enſlaving us by force of arms, while we remain united.

"It is indeed againſt me chiefly, at this time, that his deſigns are directed. "Were I removed, he ſays, either by death or baniſhment, tranquillity would be reſtored." You will eaſily conceive what tranquillity he means, if you call to mind your condition, before I returned into the Netherlands, when you groaned under the tyranny of the duke of Alva. Would to heaven that by my baniſhment or death you could be delivered from your calamities! My enemy ſhould not in that caſe find it neceſſary to employ priſoners and aſſaſſins to deſtroy me. You all know how often I have expoſed myſelf to danger in your defence. I leave it to you, to whom alone it belongs, to determine whether my life and preſence be repugnant or conducive to the intereſt of the provinces. To you only, and not to the king of Spain, I am accountable for my conduct. You have full authority (and I pledge myſelf to ſubmit to it) to diſpoſe, as you ſhall incline, either of my perſon, or of my life. Interpoſe that authority with which I acknowledge you to be inveſted, and give orders either for my departure from among you, or for my death; if you judge either the one or the other for the general good. But if, on the contrary, my paſt conduct has convinced you, as I truſt it has, of the

ſincerity of my zeal and attachment, or if my long experience gives you confidence in my ability for conducting your affairs; I ſhall ſtill continue to employ in your ſervice, the talents which I poſſeſs, hoping that you will liſten to the earneſt exhortations which I have given you, to maintain harmony and concord in the ſtate; and exert yourſelves ſtrenuouſly for the defence of this people, whom you have undertaken to protect; depending on the favour of the Almighty, that your endeavours for this end ſhall be attended with ſucceſs."

APPENDIX. 1580.

INDEX.

INDEX.

ABEN HUMEYA, is elected king of the Moreſco inhabitants of Granada, i. 247. Attempts to poſſeſs himſelf of the city of Granada, 248. Commences hoſtilities againſt the Spaniards, but is forced to fly to the mountains, 249. His ſcattered followers return to his ſtandard, 251. Is murdered, 254.

Albert, cardinal and archduke, is appointed governor of the Netherlands, ii. 373. Undertakes the ſiege of Calais, 375. Takes the town by ſtorm, 378. Takes Ardres, 379. Leaves France, 380. Lays ſiege to Hulſt, 381. The garriſon ſurrenders, 384. Surpriſes the town of Amiens, 391. Marries the infanta, and receives the ſovereignty of the Netherlands, 405.

Alcazar, battle of, between Sebaſtian king of Portugal, and Muley Moluc emperor of Morocco, ii. 78.

Alcmaer beſieged by Don Frederic de Toledo, i. 386.

Aldegonde, St. Philip de Marnix, lord of, promotes the agreement called the Compromiſe, againſt the eſtabliſhment of the Inquiſition in the Netherlands, i. 175. Is ſent by the prince of Orange to the aſſembly of the States at Dort, 353. Is defeated and taken priſoner by the duke of Alva, 390. Defends the city of Antwerp againſt the prince of Parma, ii. 177. His ſpeech to diſſuade the garriſon from a ſurrender, 182. Aſſiſts count Hohenloe in the attack of the counter-dyke of Couveſtein, 192. Is tied up by the capitulation from bearing arms for a year, 198.

Alſt, is ſeized by the mutinous Spaniſh troops, ii. 2. Is recovered by the States, 134.

Alva, Ferdinand de Toledo, duke of, his character, i. 36. His inſtructions on the violation of the truce of Vaucelles, 37. Leads an army into the Eccleſiaſtical State, 40. His motives to granting the pope a truce, 41. Adviſes Philip to awe the Netherlands by an army, 201. Leads an army thither, 202. Impriſons the counts Horn and Egmont, 204. The extraordinary powers he was inveſted with by Philip, 207. Inſtitutes a council called the Council of Tumults, *ibid.* His violent proceedings, 208. His inſolent reply to the magiſtrates of Antwerp, 211. Cites the prince of Orange to ſtand a trial, 215. Confiſcates the prince's eſtates, 216. His brutal proſcriptions, 223. Paſſes ſentence on the counts Egmont and Horn, 226. Defeats count Lewis of Naſſau, 230. Declines engaging the prince of Orange, 235. His vanity and arrogance on the prince diſbanding his army, 272. His tyrannical proſecutions, 273. Impriſons and confiſcates the effects of the Engliſh merchants at Antwerp, 277. Inflames the Flemings by taxation, 279. His reply to the repreſentations of the States, 282. Publiſhes an act of indemnity, 285. Inforces the tax of the tenth penny, 287. Fills the city of Utrecht with ſoldiers, to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants, 290. His ſentence againſt that city, *ibid.* His demands on the city of Bruſſels, 291. His indignation at the ſurpriſe of the fort of Louveſtein, 295. Publiſhes an edict for the immediate payment of taxes, 296. His barbarous purpoſe againſt the inhabitants of Bruſſels, how prevented, 297. Complains of the queen of England protecting the Flemiſh exiles, 298. The citizens of Fluſhing revolt on his attempt to fortify the citadel, 305. His ſuccours to Middleburg intercepted, 311. Beſieges Mons, 332. Cautio

avoids being forced to an engagement by the prince of Orange, 340. Attacks and worſts him in his retreat, 343. Takes Mons, 346. His army plunders Mechlin, 347. Orders his ſon Toledo to perſevere in the ſiege of Haerlem, 375. His barbarity there, 385. Obtains his diſmiſſion from the government of the Netherlands, 391. Review of his adminiſtration, 392. Incurs the king's diſpleaſure in the marriage of his ſon, ii. 29. Is appointed to command the forces employed againſt Portugal, 90. Commences his operations, 91. His barbarity on taking the town and caſtle of Caſcaes, 93. Defeats Don Antonio, 95. Takes Liſbon, *ibid.* His cruelty there, 96.

Alvaro de Sande, his gallant defence of the fort Gerba againſt the Turks, i. 103. Is ſent with reinforcements to Malta, 157. Defeats the Turks, 159.

Amiens, the town of, ſurprized by the archduke Albert, ii. 391. Is beſieged by Marſhal Biron, 394. Is retaken, 397.

Amſterdam, is ineffectually beſieged by the count de la Marc, for its adherence to the Spaniſh intereſt, i. 355. The city accedes to the Pacification of Ghent, ii. 43.

Anaſtro, Gaſpar, a Spaniſh banker at Antwerp, engages a man to aſſaſſinate the prince of Orange, ii. 130.

Anjou, duke of, receives application for aſſiſtance from the Flemings, ii. 37. Concludes a treaty with the States, 46. The intention of this treaty how fruſtrated, 52. Apologiſes for his conduct to Elizabeth queen of England, 53. The ſovereignty of the States conferred on him, 117. Raiſes the ſiege of Cambray, 124. Goes over to England on a proſpect of being married to queen Elizabeth, 126. His arrival in the Netherlands, 129. Solicits aſſiſtance from his brother the king of France, 136. Is refuſed, 137. Reſolves to ſubvert the liberty of the Flemings, 138. Seizes ſeveral towns, and attempts Antwerp, 139. Reconcilement between him and the States, 152. Goes to France, 155. Dies, 161. His character, 162.

Antonio, don, his pretenſions to the crown of Portugal, ii. 81. Is declared illegitimate, 86. Is proclaimed king, 91. Is defeated by the duke of Alva, 95. Is again defeated by D'Avila, 98. Eſcapes, 99.

Antwerp, outrages committed by the reformers there, i. 185. Is garriſoned, and the proteſtant preachers baniſhed, 195. Unſucceſsful petition of the magiſtrates to Alva, 211. Is ſtained by the mutinous Spaniſh troops 409. Is ſacked by the Spaniards, ii. 9. Outrages committed by the proteſtants againſt the catholics there, 68. The duke of Anjou attempts to ſeize the city, 139. Is beſieged by the prince of Parma, 174. A fortified bridge extended over the Scheld, 178. A fruitleſs attempt to deſtroy the bridge, 185. Attack of the counter-dyke of Couveſtein, 192. Capitulates, 197.

Arderes, is taken by the archduke Albert, ii. 379.

Arenberg, count, is ſent by the duke of Alva to oppoſe count Lewis of Naſſau, i. 220. Is defeated by him, 221.

Armada, invincible, of the Spaniards, its force, ii, 258. Is diſperſed by a ſtorm, 259. Is haraſſed by the Engliſh fire-ſhips, 263. Is worſted in an engagement with lord Howard, 264. Cauſes of its failure, 266. Is finally ruined by ſtorms, 268.

Arragon, the people of, diſpleaſe Philip II. by protecting Antonio Perez, ii. 326. Their conſtitution of government aboliſhed, 329.

Arras, Anthony Perenot, biſhop of, his ſpeech to the convention of ſtates of Ghent, i. 80. Is left principal counſellor of the dutcheſs of Parma, regent of the Netherlands, 86. His character, *ibid.*

Arſchot, duke of, invites the archduke Matthias, to be governor of the Netherlands, out of envy to the prince of Orange, ii. 32. Is impriſoned, but releaſed by the mediation of the prince of Orange, 34.

Avanſon, the French ambaſſador at Rome, negociates a treaty between pope Paul IV. and the court of France, i. 27.

INDEX.

Auſtria, houſe of, how it acquired the ſovereignty of the Netherlands, i. 71.

Auſtria, don John of, is appointed commander in chief againſt the Moreſco revolters in Granada, i. 253. His character, *ibid.* Councellors appointed to aſſiſt him, 254. Totally ſubdues the revolters, *ibid.* Is made generaliſſimo of the fleet againſt the Turks, 258. Gains the victory at Lepanto, 259. The proſecution of this victory obſtructed by his Venetian aſſociates, 262. Is offered the ſovereignty of Greece, 263. Undertakes the reduction of Tunis, 267. Fortifies Tunis contrary to orders, 268. Tunis retaken, 269. Arrives at Luxemburg as governor of the Netherlands, ii. 13. His treaty with the States, 19. His admiſſion to the government, 22. His impolitical conduct, 23. His duplicity, 24. Seizes on the caſtle of Namur, 25. His deſigns diſcovered, 28. Battle of Gemblours, 42. Is defeated by count de Boſſut at Rimenant, 44. His death, 53.

Auſtria, Erneſt, archduke of, ſucceeds count Manſfeldt in the government of the Netherlands, ii. 344. Invites the States to treat of peace, which they reject, *ibid.* His troops mutiny, 355. Dies, 356.

B.

Balagny eſtabliſhes himſelf in the ſovereignty of Cambray, ii. 363. The town delivered up to the count de Fuentes by the citizens, 365. The garriſon capitulates, 366.

Battenburg, count of, ſucceeds the count de la Marc, in the command of the forces of the States of Holland, i. 360. Is defeated and killed in an attempt to relieve Haerlem, 378.

Bellin, marquis of, is diſgraced by Henry IV. for ſurrendering Ardres to the archduke Albert, ii. 380.

Bergen op Zoom, diſpoſitions of the duke of Parma for beſieging it, ii. 273.

Berlaymont, his operations againſt the prince of Parma, i. 154. Is [illegible] Netherlands, 158. [illegible] Vernanbon [illegible] 582. Levels Amiens, [illegible] Reduces it, 597.

Bertendona, admiral of Holland, defeats and takes De Glimes at Sacherio, i. 337. Contracts a fleet of flat-bottomed veſſels deſigned for the relief of Leyden, 422. His arrival, 423. Perſiſts in an attempt to relieve Zirickſee, 442.

Bombs, the firſt invention of, ii. 276.

Bommel, the town of, ſeized by the prince of Orange, i. 412.

Bommene, deſperate defence of the garriſon of, againſt the Spaniards, i. 438.

Bourg, the city of, taken by Martin Schenck, ii. 280.

Boſſut, count of, his fruitleſs attempt to recover the Brill, i. 301. Maſſacres the townſmen of Rotterdam, 303. His orders for aſſembling the States of Holland diſregarded, 352. Co-operates with Toledo at the ſiege of Haerlem, 376. Is defeated and taken priſoner by the Hollanders, 388. Defeats Don John of Auſtria at Rimenant, ii. 44. Dies, 102.

Breda, a congreſs held there by Spaniſh and Dutch deputies to negociate peace, i. 426. Is taken by the Spaniards, ii. 123. Is ſeized by prince Maurice by ſtratagem, 282.

Brederode, count, his application to the dutcheſs of Parma, 195. His inſurrection and death, 196.

Brill, taken by the Flemiſh exiles, i. 297. Is attacked by count Boſſut, 301. The inhabitants ſwear allegiance to the prince of Orange, 302. The monks cruelly treated by the proteſtants, *ibid. note.*

Bruges, is delivered up to the prince of Parma, by the prince of Chimai the governor, ii. 160.

Bruſſels, the duke of Alva's barbarous reſentment for the oppoſition to his taxes there, how diſappointed, i. 297.

C.

Cadix, expedition againſt, by the Engliſh, ii. 386. Is plundered, 387.
Calais, the attack of, concerted by the duke of Guiſe, i. 53. Is taken, 54. Is beſieged by the archduke Albert, ii. 375. Is taken by ſtorm, 378.
Cambray, is beſieged by the count de Fuentes, ii. 363. Is delivered up by the citizens, 365. The garriſon capitulates, 366.
Caraffa, cardinal, cauſe of his perſonal reſentment againſt the emperor Charles V. i. 25. Concludes a treaty between his uncle pope Paul IV. and the court of France, 27. His embaſſy to the court of France, 31. Solicits a violation of the truce of Vaucelles, 32. Obtains a ſuſpenſion of arms for the pope, from the duke of Alva, 41.
Carranza. See Toledo, abp. of.
Carlos, Don, his hiſtory, i. 212. The turbulent deſigns formed by him, 213. Is poiſoned by his father's order, 214.
Caſimere, *John*, count palatine of the Rhine, engages to aſſiſt the ſtates of the Netherlands againſt the Spaniards, ii. 17. Is aſſiſted with money by queen Elizabeth of England, 40. Joins the army of the ſtates, 47. Is obſtructed by the jealouſy of the Catholics, 48. Aſſiſts the people of Ghent againſt the Walloons, 52. Goes over to England to juſtify his conduct to Elizabeth, 53.
Caſtel Rodrigo, count de, his arguments to perſuade Philip II. to part with the ſovereignty of the Netherlands, ii. 403.
Catelet, beſieged by the count de Fuentes, ii. 360. Gomeron's treachery and death, 361.
Caudebec, is beſieged by the duke of Parma, ii. 320.
Charles V. emperor, bad conſequences of his partial attachment to the Netherlands, i. 1. Calls his ſon Philip into the Low Countries, 2. Endeavours to have him elected king of the Romans, 4. Solicits his brother Ferdinand to reſign that dignity, 5. His ſcheme in marrying Philip to Mary queen of England, 6. Labours to reconcile the Engliſh to his marriage, 8. Philip's undutiful behaviour to him, 14. Reſigns his dominions, 15. Procures the truce of Vaucelles, *ibid.* Computation of the number of perſons deſtroyed during his reign for their religious principles, 68.
Charles IX. of France deludes the Proteſtants by the treaty of St. Germaine, i. 322. Maſſacres the Proteſtants, 338. His treaty with count Lewis of Naſſau, 403.
Chateau Cambreſis, negociations for peace between France, Spain, and England there, i. 60. Peace concluded, 63.
Cheſter, colonel Edward, is ſent by the prince of Orange with ten companies of Engliſh to protect Leyden againſt the Spaniards, i. 414. His men deſert to the enemy, 415.
Chimai, prince of, his deceitful conduct, ii. 159. Is made governor of Bruges, 160. Delivers the town up to the prince of Parma, *ibid.*
Civitella, is beſieged by the duke of Guiſe, i. 42.
Coligni, admiral de, defends St. Quintin againſt the duke of Savoy, i. 47. Is taken priſoner, 51. Is defeated at Montcontour, 321. Is killed in the maſſacre of Paris, 338.
Cologn, conferences entered into there for peace, between Philip and the States of the Netherlands, ii. 69.
Colonna, his military operations againſt the pope, i. 45.
Compromiſe, a copy of the agreement ſo termed, i. 176.
Condé, prince of, his diſſatisfaction at the inordinate power of the Guiſes, i. 65. Is killed at the battle of Jarnac, 321.
Corbeil, is taken by the duke of Parma, ii. 305.
Corſairs, of Barbary, ſome account of, i. 97.
Council of ſtate, expel their diſſenting members, and declare the mutinous Spaniſh

h troops rebels, ii. 4. Ac-
ſſcours from the prince of O-
to proſecute the ſiege of
, 12.
of Tumults, eſtabliſhed by
in the Netherlands, i. 207.
ary decree of, 208. The ma-
of the members decline act-
11.
battle of, between the duke
reuſe and the Germans, ii.

is invaded by Sultan Selim,

D.

r, is intercepted and routed
ying a reinforcement to St.
, i. 48. Is taken priſoner,

raiſes the ſiege of Middle-
. 309. Commands a fleet at
e of Middleburg, 397. De-
d kills count Lewis of Naſ-
6. His troops mutiny, 408.
apes from them, 409. De-
on Antonio king of Portu-
98.
s, the Spaniſh admiral, de-
nd killed by Boiſot, admi-
Holland, i. 397.
es, mareſchal, is defeated at
le of Gravelines, i. 55. Is
riſoner, 57.
and Sweden, ſtate of, at the
Charles V. reſigning his
ns, i. 19.
, is taken by prince Mau-
310.
anetin, takes Dragut the
priſoner, i. 99.
mbly of the ſtates of Hol-
ld there, i. 353. Send a
f money to the prince of O-
354.
beſieged and taken by count
tes, ii. 362.
nus, defends Leyden againſt
niards, i. 415.
e Corſair, ſome account of,
lakes himſelf maſter of Tri-
. Carries a reinforcement to
irks at Malta, 136. Is
t the ſiege of St. Elmo,

Drake, Sir Francis, by his ſucceſſes obliges Philip II. of Spain to poſtpone his invaſion of England, ii. 252.
Du Lis, his gallant defence of Bommene againſt the Spaniards, i. 438.
Dunkirk is taken by the prince of Parma, ii. 155.

E.

Egmont, count, adviſes the battle, and gains the victory of St. Quintin, i. 48. Defeats mareſchal de Thermes at the battle of Gravelines, 55. Is ſent by the dutcheſs of Parma to repreſent the ſtate of the Netherlands to Philip in Spain, 170. Complains of being deceived by Philip, 174. Refuſes to command the regent's troops, 181. Pacifies the tumults of the reformers, 188. Juſtifies, and declares his readineſs to ſupport Philip's meaſures, 193. The prince of Orange's warning to him, 203. Is impriſoned by the duke of Alva, 204. His trial, 224. Petition of his counteſs to Philip, 226. Is executed, 228. His character, 229.
Egmont, the young count of, endeavours to ſeize the city of Bruſſels for the prince of Parma, ii. 68. Is taken priſoner by La Noue, 112.
Elizabeth, queen of England, her motives for rejecting the propoſed marriage with Philip II. of Spain, i. 61. Her ſtipulations reſpecting Calais, 63. Affords protection to the Flemiſh refugees, 274. Seizes money intended for Philip, in her ports, 276. Confiſcates the effects of the Spaniſh and Flemiſh merchants, 277. Is induced to diſcountenance the Flemiſh exiles, 299. Aſſiſts the revolted Flemings with money, ii. 17. Her policy with regard to the diſturbances of the Netherlands, 38. Engages to ſupply the ſtates with money and troops, 39. Apologies to Philip, 40. Her conduct on the treaty between the ſtates and the duke of Anjou, 47. Meaſures taken toward a marriage between her and the duke, 126. Her anxiety concerning the affairs of the Netherlands, 210. The ſove-
reignty

reignty of the United States offered to her, 211. Declines the offer, but enters into a treaty for their protection, 215. Sends Leiceſter with an army to their aſſiſtance, 216. Her partiality to him, 233. Review of her conduct, 251. Negociates with Philip, 253. Prepares to defeat his intended invaſion of England, 255. The Invincible Armada totally ruined, 268. Her ſituation at this time, 272. Her expedition againſt Cadiz, 386. Oppoſes the peace between France and Spain, 309. Remonſtrates to the king of France againſt it, 400.

Elmo, St. fort on the iſland of Malta, ſiege of by the Turks, i. 134. Is taken by aſſault, 146.

England, objections of the Engliſh to the marriage of their queen Mary, with Philip II. of Spain, i. 7. Meaſures taken by the emperor Charles to reconcile them to it, 8. The parliament refuſes Philip the ceremony of coronation, 11. Philip returns to Spain, 13. State of, at the time of the emperor Charles's reſignation, 18. The conqueſt of, projected by Philip II. of Spain, ii. 247. See *Armada*.

Erneſt, archduke of Auſtria; ſee *Auſtria*.

Eſcurial, the palace of, built in conſequence of Philip's vow on gaining the battle of St. Quintin, i. 50.

Eſſex, earl of, is appointed to command the Engliſh armament againſt Cadiz, ii. 385. Takes and plunders the town, 387.

Europe, ſtate of, at the time of the emperor Charles's reſignation, i. 18.

F.

Ferdinand, brother of the emperor Charles V. is ſolicited by him to reſign his dignity as king of the Romans, i. 5.

Ferdinand, the catholic, ſubdues the Moreſcoes in Spain, i. 239. Compels thoſe of Granada to profeſs Chriſtianity, 240. Reduces the inhabitants of the country, *ibid.*

Flemings, refuſe to ſwear allegiance to Philip II. of Spain, i. 3. Their jealous caution in grants of money to him, 44. Their ancient commercial proſperity, 70. See *Netherlands*.

Fluſhing, revolt of, againſt the Spaniards, i. 305. Don Petro Pacheco, the Spaniſh governor, put to death there, 307.

Fontaine Françoiſe, battle of, between Henry IV. of France, and Valaſco conſtable of Caſtile, ii. 367.

France, its political ſtate in reference to Philip II. of Spain, i. 21. Character of the French at that time, *ibid.* The diſſatisfaction of the nation at the peace of Chateau Cambreſis, 64. State of, on the death of Henry II. 65. The decrees of the council of Trent rejected by the court of, 123. Battles of Jarnac and Montcontour, 321. The Proteſtants deceived by a treaty, 322. Maſſacre of the Proteſtants, 338. State of parties in, under Henry III. ii. 205. The catholic league, 206, 290. The duke of Guiſe aſſaſſinated, 291. The king aſſaſſinated, 292. Acceſſion of Henry IV. *ibid.* He embraces the catholic religion, 338. Calais taken by the archduke Albert, 378.

Frances II. of France, his acceſſion, character, and adminiſtration, i. 65.

Fuentes, count of, ſucceeds the archduke Erneſt as governor of the Netherlands, ii. 356. Enters vigorouſly into the exerciſe of his office, 358. Beſieges Catelet, 360. Puts Gomeron to death, 361. Takes Dourlens, 362. Lays ſiege to Cambray, 363. The town and caſtle delivered up, 366. Reſigns the government to Albert, 374.

G.

Gemblours, battle of, ii. 42.
Gerard, Balthazer, aſſaſſinates the prince of Orange, ii. 162. His examination, 164. His ſentence. 165.
Germany, diſguſt received there at the behaviour of Philip II. of Spain, i. 4. State of at the time of the emperor Charles's reſignation, 18.
Gertrudenburg, is taken from the Spaniards, by the Sieur de Payette, i. 390. Is betrayed to the Spaniards by the garriſon, ii. 278. Is retaken by prince Maurice, 342.
Ghent, a woollen manufacture carried on in that city before the art was known in England, i. 70. The confederacy, called the pacification of, ii. 12. The duke of Arſchot ſeized and impriſoned there, 34. Diſcord between the inhabitants of, and the Walloons, 50.
Giambelli, his contrivances at Antwerp to deſtroy the prince of Parma's bridge, ii. 183. 188.
Gomeron, his private treaty with the count de Fuentes, for the delivery of Catelet, ii. 360. Is put to death by Fuentes, 361.
Granada, the Mooriſh inhabitants of, forced by Ferdinand the catholic, to profeſs Chriſtianity, i. 240. Are oppreſſed by the inquiſition, 241. Are diſarmed by Philip II. 242. Philip's oppreſſive edict againſt them, 243. Remonſtrate againſt it, 244. Revolt of the province, 246. Aben Humeya, their newly-elected king, attempts to poſſeſs himſelf of the city of Granada, 248. The Moreſcoes reduced by the marquis de Mondejar, 249. The province plundered by the troops, 251. The inhabitants take arms again, *ibid.* Are totally ſubdued by Don John of Auſtria, 254. Dreadful ſeverities exerciſed againſt them, 255.
Granvelle, cardinal, rigorouſly enforces Philip's edicts againſt heretics in the Netherlands, i. 162. His removal applied for, 166. I removed by his own deſire, 167. Continues to exert his influence over the king againſt his enemies in the Low Countries, 190. 200.
Grave, beſieged by count Manſveldt, ii. 218. Is taken by the prince of Parma, 220.
Gravelines, battle of, between count Egmont and mareſchal de Thermes, i. 55.
Gregory XIII. pope, perſuades Philip II. to confer the ſovereignty of Tunis on Don John of Auſtria, i. 268.
Groningen, is beſieged by prince Maurice, ii. 351. Submits and accedes to the union of Utrecht, 354.
Gueldres, is betrayed to the duke of Parma, ii. 241.
Guerrero, archbiſhop of Granada, inflames Philip II. againſt the Moors, i. 241.
Guiſe, Francis duke of, leads an army into Italy to ſupport the pope againſt the duke of Alva, i. 41. Beſieges Civitella, 42. Is recalled, 51. Takes Calais from the Engliſh, 54. Takes Thionville, 55. He and his brother engroſs the adminiſtration under Francis II. 65.
Guiſe, Henry duke of, his political intrigues, ii. 205. Forms the catholic league, 206. Enters into a treaty with Philip II. of Spain, 207. Gains a victory over the Germans, 290. Is aſſaſſinated by the king's order, 291.

H.

Haerlem, is beſieged by Don Frederic de Toledo, i. 364. Speech of Riperda to the principal inhabitants, 365. The town deſcribed, 367. Surrenders, 382. Cruel treatment of the inhabitants, 383. Is ſeized and plundered by the mutinous Spaniſh troops, 384.
Hali, the Turkiſh admiral, defeated and killed at Lepanto, i. 259.
Hanſtede, Adolphus, his fleet deſtroyed by the Zealanders, i. 411.

Haſcem, the Corſair, beſieges Oran and Maſarquivir, i. 106. Is forced to a precipitate retreat by the Spaniards, 107. Brings a reinforcement to the Turks at Malta, 149.

Haranguer, Charles, carries a party of men ſecretly into Breda, and ſeizes the town for prince Maurice, ii. 283. Is made governor, 285.

Henry II. of France, his character and political conduct, i. 21. Concludes an alliance with pope Paul IV. againſt the emperor Charles V. 27. Agrees to the truce of Vaucelles, 30. Is perſuaded to violate the truce, and renew the war, 34. His forces defeated before St. Quintin, 49. His motives to wiſh for a peace with Philip, 58. Peace of Chateau Cambreſis, 63. His death, 64.

Henry III. of France, his character, ii. 37. Refuſes to aſſiſt his brother the duke of Anjou, 137. Is offered the ſovereignty of the United States of the Netherlands, 204. State of parties in France, 205. His firm reply to the repreſentations of the Spaniſh ambaſſador, 209. Declines the offer of the States, 210. Declares himſelf the head and protector of the catholic league, 290. Procures the aſſaſſination of the duke of Guiſe, and of his brother the cardinal, 291. Is aſſaſſinated himſelf, 292.

Henry IV. of France, his acceſſion, ii. 292. Defeats the duke of Mayenne, 293. Inveſts Paris, 294. Compariſon between him and the duke of Parma, 296. Raiſes the ſiege on the arrival of the duke of Parma, 209. Sends a defiance to the duke of Mayenne, 300. The duke of Parma deceives him by a ſtratagem, *ibid.* Diſbands his army, 305. Collects troops and haraſſes the duke on his return to the Netherlands, 307. Beſieges Rouen, 314. Abandons the ſiege, 319. Blocks up the Spaniſh army at Caux, 321. Embraces the catholic religion, 338. The principal cities ſubmit to him, 345. Publiſhes a general indemnity, 346. Beſieges Laon, 347. Repels the attempts of the duke de Mayenne to raiſe the ſiege, 348. Laon capitulates, 350. The dukes of Lorrain and Guiſe ſubmit to him, 351. Declares war againſt Philip of Spain, 358. Makes an alliance with the United Provinces, 360. Defeats Valaſco, conſtable of Caſtile, 368. Gains over the duke de Mayenne, 360. Obtains the expected abſolution from pope Clement, 370. Diſgraces the marquis of Belin for the ſurrender of Ardres, 380. Beſieges Amiens, 394. Liſtens to overtures for peace, 400. His reply to queen Elizabeth's remonſtrances againſt it, 401. Concludes a peace at Vervins, 402.

Henry, Don, ſucceeds to the crown of Portugal, ii. 81. Diſcuſſes the claims of the ſeveral competitors for the ſucceſſion after him, 83. Reſolves to marry, 85. His death, 88.

Herenberg, count, deſerts the intereſt of the United Provinces, and goes over to the Spaniards, ii. 159.

Hierges, count de, reduces ſeveral towns in the Netherlands, i. 432.

Hohenloe, count, is appointed to the command of the fleet of the United States, ii. 181. Attacks the counterdyke of Couveſtein, 192. Relieves Grave, 219. Reduces Axel, and defeats Hautpeine, 241.

Holland, revolt of the provinces of, i. 319. Precautions taken there to withſtand the Spaniſh power, 351. The States of, aſſemble at Dort, 353. Eſtabliſhment of the reformed religion, 358. Spaniſh fleet under count Boſſut, defeated by, 388. The States of, refuſe to concur in the treaty with Don John of Auſtria, ii. 20. See *United Provinces*.

Horn, count, pacifies the tumultuous inhabitants of Tournay, i. 188. Is impriſoned by the duke of Alva, 204. His trial, 224. Is executed, 228.

s, Lambertus, cruel perfidy Spaniards to, i. 362.
, lord, the Engliſh admiral, dent management on the ar- f the Spaniſh Invincible Ar- ii. 261. Haraſſes it with ps, 263. Attacks the Spa- ſucceſsfully, 264.
reduced by prince Maurice, . Is fortified by him, and d by the archduke Albert, Surrenders, 384.

I.

battle of, i. 321.
, endeavours to diſſuade Phi- from his projected invaſion gland, ii. 248.
ieur de, is defeated by Frede- Toledo, and his ſuſpicious i. 334.
n in Spain, its hiſtory, and of proceeding, i. 91. Effects inſtitution on the character Spaniards, 92. An Auto celebrated in the preſence of II. 95. The Moors driven Spain by the ſeverities of,

duke de, is defeated and at the battle of Coutras, ii.

e ſtates of, their dependence lip II. of Spain, i. 20. Its on by the peace of Chateau eſis, 67.

L.

le, is taken by count Manſ- ii. 347.
, the count de, commands a Flemiſh exiles by commiſſi- m the prince of Orange, i. Takes the Brill, 300. Be- Amſterdam, 355. Cauſes miſcarriage, 356. His cha- 359. Is deprived of his nd and dies, 360.
aſſiſts count Lewis in the : of Mons againſt the duke a, i. 334. Mons capitu- 346. Undertakes the defence of Maeſtricht againſt the prince of Parma, ii. 60. Is taken priſoner by the Walloons, 112. On what terms releaſed, 113.
La Valette, grand maſter of Malta, his vigorous preparations to defend the iſland againſt the Turks, i. 131. His motives for defending St. Elmo, 135. Retaliates the barbarity of the Turks, 147.
Lagny, is taken by the duke of Parma, ii. 303.
Lanzavecchia, governor of Breda, corrupts the garriſon of Gertruden- burg to give it up to the duke of Parma, ii. 278. Loſes Breda to prince Maurice by negligence, 282.
Laon, is beſieged by Henry IV. of France, ii. 347. The duke of Mayenne endeavours in vain to raiſe the ſiege, 348. Surrenders, 350.
League, catholic, formed in France by the duke of Guiſe, ii. 206. Is joined by Philip II. of Spain, 207. Henry III. declares himſelf its head and protector, 290. The duke of Guiſe and the cardinal his brother aſſaſſinated, 291. The duke de Mayenne choſen commander in chief, *ibid.* Mayenne defeated by Henry IV. 293. Paris relieved by the duke of Parma, 299. Conven- tion of the ſtates of, 334. The dukes of Lorrain and Guiſe ſub- mit to Henry, 351. Is deſerted by the duke de Mayenne, 369.
Leiceſter, earl of, is ſent with Engliſh troops to the aſſiſtance of the Dutch States, ii. 216. Is made governor, and commander in chief of all their forces. 217. Beſieges Zutphen, 224. His arbitrary and imprudent conduct, 226. His fee- ble attempts to raiſe the ſiege of Sluys, 239. His intrigues diſco- vered, 242. Differs with the States, 243. Reſigns his government and returns to England, 245. Is ap- pointed commander in chief of the Engliſh forces to oppoſe the Spa- niſh Armada, 271.

Lepanto,

Lepanto, battle of, between Don John of Auſtria and Ali the Turkiſh admiral, i. 259.

Louis XI. of France, how he loſt the opportunity of bringing the ſovereignty of the Netherlands into his family, i. 72.

Louis of Naſſau, count, collects an army for the relief of the Netherlands, i. 219. Defeats count Aremberg, 220. Is defeated by the duke of Alva, 230. Is deceived by the offers of Charles IX. of France, 324. Seizes Mons, 326. Is beſieged there by the duke of Alva, 352. Mons capitulates, 346. His treaty with Schomberg the French ambaſſador, 403. Is defeated and killed at Mooch, by D'Avila, 407.

Leyden, is beſieged by Requeſens, i. 413. Its ſituation deſcribed, *ibid.* Is defended by Jans Douza, 415. Is blockaded, 416. Reſolution and diſtreſs of the inhabitants, 417. The country laid under water, 418. Is relieved by Boiſot, and the ſiege miſed, 422.

Lisbon, the city of, ſubmits to the duke of Alva, ii. 95.

Lorrain, cardinal of, his arguments for an alliance between France and the pope, againſt the emperor Charles V. i. 29. He and his brother engroſs the adminiſtration under Francis II. 65.

Louveſtein, the fort of, ſurpriſed by Herman de Ryter, i. 294. Is retaken, 295.

M.

Maeſtricht, is beſieged by the Prince of Parma, ii. 57. Is taken by ſurpriſe, 61.

Malta, the iſland of, invaded by the Turks, i. 132. Siege of St. Elmo, 134. St. Elmo taken by aſſault, 146. Attack of fort St. Michael, 149. Arrival of Spaniſh ſuccours, 157. The Turks retire, *ibid.* Reland, and are defeated by the Spaniſh reinforcement, 159.

Manſvelde, count, beſieges Grave in Brabant, ii. 218. Beſieges and takes Wachtendonck, 276. Is appointed governor of the Netherlands on the death of the duke of Parma, 333. Lays ſiege to Noyon, *ibid.* Fails of relieving Gertrudenburg, 342. Is prevented from taking Crevecœur by prince Maurice, 343. Is ſuperſeded in the government of the Netherlands, by the appointment of the archduke Erneſt, 344. Invades Picardy, and takes the town of La Capelle, 347. Reſigns his employment on the appointment of the count de Fuentes to be governor, 358.

Mary, queen of England, her character, and motives for marrying Philip II. of Spain, i. 7. Summary of the marriage articles, 8. Joins her huſband in a perſecution of the proteſtants, 12. Is left by her huſband, 13. Is prevailed on by him to engage in the war againſt France, 45. Her death, 60.

Mary, princeſs of Portugal, married to Philip II. of Spain, i. 2.

Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, married to Maximilian, ſon of the emperor Frederic III. i. 71. Her death, 72.

Matthias, archduke, is invited by the duke of Arſchot and others to take upon him the government of the Netherlands, ii. 32. Is admitted by the States, 33. Leaves the Netherlands, 123.

Maurice, prince, ſucceeds to the offices of his father, ii. 171. His character, 273. Gains poſſeſſion of Breda by a ſtratagem, 282. Provides for its ſecurity, 286. Is made governor of Guelderland and Overyſſel, 287. Takes Zutphen, 309. And Deventer, 310. Defeats the duke of Parma's cavalry by ſtratagem, *ibid.* Reduces Hulſt and Nimeguen, 312. Subdues Steenwich and Coverden, 330. Takes Gertrudenburg, 342. Murderers employed to aſſaſſinate him by the court of Spain, 344. Undertakes the ſiege of Groningen, 351. Reduces

duces it, 354. Affords protection to the Spaniſh mutinous troops, 355. His operations obſtructed by Mondragone, 371. Fortifies Hulſt, 381. Defeats and kills the count de Varas, 390. Progreſs of his operations, 397.

Maximilian, ſon of the emperor Frederic III. marries Mary daughter and heireſs of Charles the Bold, i. 71. Is ſeized and impriſoned at Bruges, 72.

Maximilian II. emperor of Germany, remonſtrates to Philip II. of Spain, againſt the cruel adminiſtration of the duke of Alva in the Netherlands, i. 217. Mediates between Philip and the Dutch States, 425.

Mayenne, duke of, is appointed commander in chief of the forces of the League, ii. 291. Is routed by Henry IV. 293. Summons a convention of the States of the League at Philip's deſire, 334. Marriage treaty for his ſon and Philip's daughter Iſabella, 341. Endeavours in vain to raiſe the ſiege of Laon, 348. His maſterly retreat, 349. Is reconciled to Henry, 369.

Mechlin, is garriſoned by the prince of Orange, i. 336. Is plundered by the duke of Alva's troops, 347.

Medina Cœli, duke of, his expedition to Tripoli, i. 100. His fleet deſtroyed by the Turks, 102. The Flemiſh exiles take great part of the fleet he conducted to the relief of Alva, 310. Is appointed to ſucceed the duke of Alva in the government of the Netherlands, but declines the charge, 391.

Medina Sidonia, duke de, is appointed commander of the Spaniſh Invincible Armada, ii. 259. Deſpairs of ſucceſs, 265. Reſolves to return to Spain, 267. His fleet ruined by a ſtorm, 268. Arrives in Spain, *ibid.*

Mendoza, don Francis de, delivers Oran and Mazarquiver from the corſair Haſcem, i. 107.

Michael, St. fort of, at Malta, ſiege of, by the Turks, i. 149.

Middleburg, is beſieged by count Tſerart, i. 309. The ſiege raiſed by D'Avila, 310. Is beſieged by the Zealanders, 396. Surrenders to the prince of Orange, 399.

Mondejar, marquis of, reduces the Moreſco revolters in Granada, i. 249. His troops plunder the country, 251. Is removed from his command, 253.

Mondragone, leads a detachment of Spaniſh troops through a channel of the ſea, to the relief of Tergoes, i. 316. Defends Middleburg againſt the Zealanders, 396. Surrenders by capitulation, 399. His vigorous preparations for the ſiege of Zirickſee, 440. Checks the operations of prince Maurice, ii. 371. His death, 372.

Mons, the city of, ſeized by count Lewis of Naſſau, i. 326. Is beſieged by the duke of Alva, 332. Capitulates, 346.

Montcontour, battle of, i. 321.

Montmorency, conſtable of France, his reaſons againſt an alliance with the pope, againſt the emperor Charles V. i. 28. Perſuades Henry to conclude the truce of Vaucelles, 30. Is defeated before St. Quintin, 49. Returns to France to negociate a peace, 60.

Mooch, battle of, between D'Avila, the Spaniſh general and count Lewis of Naſſau, i. 407.

Moreſcoes, in Spain, the hiſtory of, i. 239.

Morocco, ſtate of that kingdom, ii. 75. Is invaded by Sebaſtian king of Portugal, 76. Battle of Alcazar, 78. Death of Muley Moloc, 79.

Muley Moloc, eſtabliſhes himſelf in the ſovereignty of Morocco, ii. 75. Enters into an alliance with Philip II. of Spain, 76. Dies during the battle of Alcazar, 79. His character, *ibid.*

Muſtapha, commands the Turkiſh troops ſent to reduce the iſland of Malta, i. 132. Beſieges St. Elmo, 134. Takes it by aſſault, 146. Retires from the iſland, 157. Lands again and is defeated, 159.

Muſtapha, Cara, a celebrated corſair, fortifies himſelf at Pennon de Velez, i. 108. His fort reduced by the Spaniards, 110.

N.

Naerden, cruel maſſacre of the townſmen of, by don Frederic de Toledo, i. 362.

Namur, the caſtle of, ſeized by don John of Auſtria, ii. 25.

Navareſe, the leader of the mutinous Spaniſh troops, conducts them from Aloſt to the relief of the Spaniards at Antwerp, ii. 8. Sacks the town, 9.

Netherlands, enquiry into the ancient ſtate of, i. 69. Fall under the dominion of the houſe of Burgundy, 70. The ſituation of the country favourable for commerce, *ibid.* The ſovereignty transferred to the houſe of Auſtria, 71. Inſtances of the attachment of the emperor Charles V. to this country and its inhabitants, 73. Averſion of his ſon Philip II. to them, 74. Edicts publiſhed againſt the Proteſtants, 76. Rigorous tribunals erected, 77. New biſhoprics eſtabliſhed, *ibid.* The country filled with Spaniſh troops, 78. The dutcheſs of Parma appointed regent, 80. Speech of the biſhop of Arras to the convention of the States at Ghent, *ibid.* Apprehenſions of the people, 81. Arbitrary conduct of cardinal Granvelle, 162. The number of proteſtants increaſe by perſecution, 165. Count Egmont's embaſſy to Spain, 170. Reſult of deliberations to ſtop the growth of hereſy, 173. The enforcement of the edicts againſt proteſtants revived, 174. A confederacy againſt the eſtabliſhment of the inquiſition entered into, 175. Speech of the prince of Orange in council, 178. The ſubſcribers of the compromiſe petition the regent, 182. Intemperate zeal of the reformers, 184. The regent raiſes forces, 190. Valenciennes and Antwerp garriſoned, 194. Quiet reſtored, 196. The duke of Alva ſent thither with an army, 202. The prince of Orange retires to Germany, 203. The counts Horn and Egmont impriſoned, 204. The inhabitants deſert to foreign parts, 205. The dutcheſs of Parma retires, 206. The extraordinary powers Alva was inveſted with, 207. The Council of Tumults eſtabliſhed, *ibid.* The violent proceedings of Alva, 208. Count Lewis of Naſſau raiſes an army, 219. Defeats count Aremberg, 220. Deaths of the counts Egmont and Horn, 228. Count Lewis defeated by the duke of Alva, 230. The prince of Orange raiſes an army and publiſhes a manifeſto, 232. Is obliged to diſband his forces, 237. Tyrannical proſecutions of the duke of Alva, 273. Great deſertion of the inhabitants, 274. The people inflamed by taxation, 279. Oppoſition of the aſſembly of the States, 281. Act of indemnity publiſhed, 285. Its reception, 286. Reſolute conduct of the ſtates of Utrecht, 288. The city of Utrecht filled with ſoldiers, 290. Intrigues of the prince of Orange, 293. The fort of Louveſtein ſurpriſed by Herman de Ryter, 294. The duke of Alva publiſhes an edict for the immediate payment of his taxes, 296. Violent commotions, eſpecially at Bruſſels, 297. The Brill taken by the exiles, *ibid.* Count de Boſſut maſſacres the townſmen of Rotterdam, 303. Revolt of Fluſhing, 305. Revolt of the other towns of Zealand, 308. Siege of Middleburg, 309. The duke de Medina Cœli's fleet

fleet deſtroyed, 310. Other captures at ſea, 311. Siege of Tergoes, 312. Extraordinary relief of, 316. Revolt of the province of Holland, 319. Mons ſeized by count Lewis of Naſſau, 326. Ruremond and other towns taken by the prince of Orange, 335. Mons taken by Alva, 346. Mechlin plundered by Alva's troops, 347. Barbarities exerciſed at Zutphen, 349. Aſſembly of the States of Holland at Dort, 353. Maſſacre at Naerden, 362. Alva removed, and the duke de Medina Cœli appointed governor, 391. Who declining the charge is ſucceeded by Requeſens, *ibid.* Ineffectual negociations for peace at Breda, 426. Reduction of Ziricſee by the Spaniards, 439. Death of Requeſens, 443. Mutiny of the Spaniſh troops, ii. 2. They ſack the city of Antwerp, 9. Pacification of Ghent, 12. The prince of Orange's advice to the States, 14. They apply to foreign powers for aid, 17. Form a new deed of union at Bruſſels, 18. Their treaty with Don John of Auſtria, 19. The departure of the Spaniſh troops, 22. The caſtle of Namur ſeized by Don John of Auſtria, 25. The States get a number of towns into their poſſeſſion, 28. Invite the prince of Orange to reſide at Bruſſels, 30. The prince is counteracted by the duke of Arſchot, 32. The archduke Matthias choſen governor, 33. A new treaty of union, 36. The duke of Anjou applied to for aſſiſtance, 37. Return of the Spaniſh troops, 41. Battle of Gemblours, 42. The powers of the prince of Orange and the archduke Matthias enlarged, 44. The States conclude a treaty with the duke of Anjou, 46. The operations of their numerous forces obſtructed by diſſenſions, 47. The decree called the peace of religion, 49. Diſcord between the Flemings and Walloons, 50. Their forces diſperſed, 52. Death of don John of Auſtria, 53. The prince of Parma appointed governor, 55. He lays ſiege to Maeſtricht, 57. Maeſtricht taken by ſurpriſe, 61. The Walloons gained over by the prince of Parma, 64. The treaty called the union of Utrecht, 65. Conferences for peace at Cologn, 69. The States reſolve to transfer their allegiance from Philip to the duke of Anjou, 110. The ſovereignty conferred on him, 117. All allegiance to Philip of Spain ſolemnly abjured by the united States, 121. Return of the Spaniſh troops, 135. Attempt of the duke of Anjou on the city of Antwerp, 139. Reconcilement of the States with the duke, 152. Diſcontents of the people, 154. Death of the duke of Anjou, 161. The prince of Orange aſſaſſinated, 162. Is ſucceeded in his offices by his ſon prince Maurice, 171. Great progreſs of the prince of Parma, 172. Siege of Antwerp, 174. The city capitulates, 197. Brabant deſerted by many of its inhabitants, 200. Their critical ſituation on the death of the prince of Orange, 203. Offer the ſovereignty to the king of France, 204. To the queen of England, 211. Treaty with Elizabeth, 215. The earl of Leiceſter ſent to their aſſiſtance, 216. Great famine and peſtilence, 234. Ill conſequences of the duke of Parma's expedition to France, to the Spaniſh cauſe, 308. Death of the Duke of Parma, 330. Count Manſveldt appointed governor, 333. Erneſt, Archduke of Auſtria, appointed governor, 344. Who is ſucceeded by the count de Fuentes, 356. Cambray delivered up to Fuentes by the citizens, 365. The archduke Albert appointed governor, 373. The ſovereignty of, transferred to him, 405. This deed how received there, 406. See *United Provinces.*

Nimeguen, is taken by prince Maurice, ii. 312.
Norris, colonel, diſtinguiſhes himſelf at the head of a body of Engliſh, at the battle of Rimenant, ii. 45.
Noyon, is beſieged by count Manſveldt, ii. 333.
Nuys, the deſtruction of, by the Spaniſh troops, ii. 233.

O.

Oran, beſieged by the corſair Haſcem, i. 105. The ſiege raiſed by the Spaniards, 107.
Orange, William I. prince of, his family and character, i. 83. Origin of the diſguſt between him and Philip II. of Spain, 84. Applies for the removal of cardinal Granvelle, 166. Oppoſes the admiſſion of the decrees of the council of Trent, 168. Oppoſes the inſtructions given to count Egmont, 170. Declines enforcing the edicts againſt the proteſtants, 174. His ſpeech in the council, 178. Puniſhes the rioters at Antwerp, 186. Tolerates the reformers, *ibid.* His reaſons for this indulgence, 187. Deſires leave to reſign his employments, 191. Is informed of the king's ſecret intentions againſt him, 192. Retires to Germany, 203. Refuſes to obey the duke of Alva's citation, with his reaſons, 215. His eſtates confiſcated, 216. Applies to the emperor Maximilian for his interpoſition, *ibid.* His inducements to take up arms, 217. Publiſhes a manifeſto, 232. Profeſſes the reformed religion, 233. Paſſes the Maeſe, 234. Offers Alva battle, 235. Is obliged to diſband his army, 237. Prepares to reſume his operations for the relief of the Netherlands, 292. Grants a commiſſion to the count de la Marck, 299. Gives the command of all the forces in Zealand to the count Tſerart, 308. The province of Holland induced to revolt by his negociations, 320. His military preparations, *ibid.* Takes Ruremond 335. Is received at Mechlin, 336. Takes ſeveral other towns, *ibid.* Endeavours in vain to provoke Alva to an engagement, 340. Is attacked and worſted, 343. Diſbands his army and returns to Holland, 345. Receives a ſupply of money from the aſſembly of the States at Dort, 354. Is appointed commander in chief of all their forces, 355. His moderation and prudent regulations, 357. Eſtabliſhes the reformed religion, 358. Equips a fleet againſt the Spaniſh at Middleburg, 397. Reduces Middleburg, 399. Seizes the town of Bommel, 412. His meaſures for the relief of Leyden, 418. His attempts to relieve Zirickſee, 441. Projects the union of the provinces, in the pacification of Ghent, ii. 12. His advice to the States on the arrival of don John of Auſtria, 14. Goes, by invitation, to reſide at Bruſſels, 30. Is counteracted by the duke of Arſchot, 32. Pacifies the people of Ghent, 62. Accompliſhes the aſſociation called the union of Utrecht, 65. His reply to Philip's private offers, 71. Sends aſſiſtance to Sebaſtian king of Portugal againſt the emperor of Morocco, 76. Juſtifies his conduct againſt the popular clamours, 103. Adviſes the States to renounce their allegiance to Philip, 106. Is proſcribed by Philip, 119. His apology addreſſed to the States, 120. An attempt made to aſſaſſinate him, 131. His advice to the States on the duke of Anjou's treachery, 147. Other attempts made to get him aſſaſſinated, 153. Leaves Antwerp on account of injurious ſuſpicions entertained

entertained againſt him, 156. Is killed by Balthazar Gerard, 162. His character, 166. Abſtract of his famous apology, 415. See *Maurice*.

P.

Pacheco, don Pedro de, put to death by the inhabitants of Fluſhing, i. 307.

Paris, maſſacre of the proteſtants there, i. 338. Is inveſted by Henry IV. of France, ii. 294. Great diſtreſs of the Pariſians, 298. The ſiege raiſed by the arrival of the duke of Parma, 299. Submits to Henry IV after his converſion, 345.

Parma, Margaret, dutcheſs of, made regent of the Netherlands, i. 80. Perſecutes the proteſtants in concert with cardinal Granvelle, 162. Publiſhes the decrees of the council of Trent, 169. Sends count Egmont to Spain, 170. Appoints a conference to conſider of means to ſtop the growth of hereſy, 172. Which offends Philip, 173. Revives the perſecution of the proteſtants, 174. Her anſwer to the petition of the nobles, 183. Tranſmits the petition to Spain, 184. Raiſes forces by Philip's command, 190. Her ſucceſs in ſuppreſſing the reformers, 194. Diſſuades Philip from ſending an army into the Low Countries, 201. Obtains leave to retire from the Netherlands, 206.

Parma, Alexander Farneſe, prince of, lays ſiege to Navarino, i. 265. Is ordered by Philip to lead the Spaniſh troops back to the Netherlands, ii. 41. Battle of Gemblours, 42. Is appointed to ſucceed don John of Auſtria as governor of the Netherlands, 55. His character, *ibid*. Beſieges Maeſtricht, 57. Takes the town by ſurpriſe, 61. Gains over the Walloons, 64. Poſſeſſes himſelf of Courtray, 112. Is forced to abandon the ſiege of Cambray by the duke of Anjou, 124. Obtains a return of the Spaniſh troops, 135. Takes Dunkirk, 155. With ſeveral other towns, 156, 158. Bruges delivered up to him by the prince of Chimai the governor, 160 Reduces ſeveral principal towns, 172. His lenity toward the inhabitants, 173. Beſieges Antwerp, 174. Blockades the Scheld by a bridge, 177. Deſcription of this bridge, 178. Repairs the bridge, after an attempt made to deſtroy it, 187. Fortifies the counter-dyke of Couveſtein, 190. Recovers the poſſeſſion of it, 194. The city of Antwerp ſubmits to him, 197. His great power in the Netherlands, 203. Takes Grave in Brabant, 220. Beſieges Venlo, *ibid*. Takes the town by capitulation, 222. His motives to attack Nuys, 223. Lays ſiege to Rhineburg, 224. Beſieges Sluys, 237. Diſſuades Philip from invading England, 250. His preparations to co-operate with the Invincible Armada, 258. Meditates the ſiege of Bergen-op-Zoom, 273. Is deceived by two Engliſh ſoldiers, 274. Abandons the attempt, 276. His difficulties and anxiety, 277. Mutiny among his Spaniſh troops, 282. Sends a reinforcement to the duke of Mayenne, 295. His firſt expedition into France, 296. Compariſon between him and Henry IV. *ibid*. His wiſe precautions on entering France, 297. Raiſes the ſiege of Paris, 299. Deceives Henry by a ſtratagem, 300. Takes Lagny, 303. Poſſeſſes himſelf of Corbeil, 305. Returns to the Netherlands, 306. His cavalry defeated by prince Maurice, 310. Marches again into France, 315. Inveſts the town of St. Eſprit de Rue, 319. Raiſes the

the ſiege of Rouen, *ibid.* Is wounded at Caudebec, 320. His army blocked up by Henry IV. at Caux, 321. Eſcapes by paſſing the Seine, 324. Returns to the Netherlands again, *ibid.* Is ordered back to France and dies, 330. His character, 331.

Paul IV. pope, his character and conduct, i. 23. The ambition of his nephews, 25. Cauſe of his animoſity to the emperor Charles V. *ibid.* Concludes an alliance with France againſt the emperor, 27. Induces Henry to break the truce of Vaucelles, 34. His violent conduct, 35. Paſſes a ſentence to deprive Philip II. of the ſovereignty of Naples, 38. His dominions invaded by the duke of Alva, 40. Obtains a truce, 41. His forces defeated by Colonna, 43. Obtains peace from Philip, 52. Dies 67.

Payette, Sieur de, takes San Gertrudenburg from the Spaniards, i. 390.

Pembroke, earl of, joins the duke of Savoy with a body of Engliſh forces, i. 46. Is ſent home, 51.

Pennon de Velez, the fort of, reduced by don Garcia de Toledo, i. 109.

Perez, Antonio, his baſe treatment by Philip, II. of Spain, ii. 325.

Philip II. king of Spain, his birth and education, i. 1. His character, 2. His firſt marriage, *ibid.* Is called by his father into the Low-Countries, *ibid.* Unpopularity of his manners, 3. Diſguſts the Germans, 4. Returns to Spain, 6. Marries Mary queen of England, 7. Summary of the marriage articles, 8. Arrives in England, 9. His behaviour and manners, 10. Is refuſed the ceremony of coronation, 11. His endeavours to remove the prejudices entertained againſt him, *ibid.* Inſtigates a perſecution of the Engliſh proteſtants. 12. Leaves England, 13. His undutiful behaviour to his father, 14. Review of his dominions and the extent of his power, 17. Dependence of the pope on him, 20. His conduct on Henry II. of France breaking the truce of Vaucelles, 37. Is deprived of the ſovereignty of Naples by the ſentence of pope Paul IV. 38. His ſcruples as to oppoſing the pope by violence, explained, 39. Orders Alva to invade the pope's dominions, 40. Levies forces in the Low Countries againſt France, 44. Engages England in the war, 45. His behaviour on the victory at St. Quintin, 50. Takes the town, 51. Neglects the improvement of his advantages, *ibid.* Concludes a peace with the pope, 52. His motives to deſire a peace with France, 58. Projects a marriage with queen Elizabeth, 61. His conduct with reſpect to his allies, 63. State of his affairs in Italy on the peace of Chateau Cambreſis, and death of Henry II. of France, 67. His averſion to the Flemings, 74. His edicts againſt the proteſtants, 76. His rigorous tribunals for the extirpation of hereſy, 77. Fills the Netherlands with Spaniſh ſoldiers, 78. Appoints the dutcheſs of Parma regent, 79. Meets a convention of the States at Ghent, 80. His inflexibility in religion, 82. Origin of the diſguſt between him and the prince of Orange, 84. Returns to Spain, 89. His partiality to Spain, 90. Orders Caranza, archbiſhop of Toledo, to be proſecuted by the Inquiſition, 94. Enjoys the ſpectacle of an Auto de Fe, 95. The prudence of his civil government, 96. His unſucceſsful armament againſt Tripoli, 100. His great preparations to reduce Pennon de Velez, 108. Wiſhes to exclude all proteſtants from attending the council of Trent, 117. Acknowledges the authority of the council, and orders obedience to its decrees,

125. His vigorous mea-
affiſt the knights of Malta
the Turkiſh invaſion, 130.
generouſly neglects aſſiſting
55. Sends troops at length
feat the Turks, 159. E-
ie prince of Orange's appli-
or the removal of cardinal
le, 166. His reception of
gmont, 171. Is offended
onſultation about means to
growth of hereſy in the
nds, 173. The grounds
iverſion to the prince of
and the counts Horn and
, 189. Reſolves to awe
herlands by an army, 201.
lva thither, 202. The ex-
ary powers he inveſted Alva
7. Hiſtory of his ſon don
112. Orders him to be poiſon-
His reply to Maximilian's
ance on the duke of Alva's
217. Is inſtigated againſt
eſco ſubjects, 241. Diſarms
42. His oppreſſive edict a-
em, 243. The province of
revolts, 246. Makes ſlaves
iſoners, 250. His dreadful
againſt the revolters when
255. Enters into a league
pope and Venetians againſt
es, 258. His behaviour on
ry of Lepanto, 262. Re-
m his demand of the tenth
ntieth pennies from the Ne-
s, 352. Is perſuaded by the
Maximilian to negociate
prince of Orange, 425.
s don John of Auſtria go-
the Netherlands, ii. 13.
ly refuſes to remove him,
y the election of Matthias,
ives of his neglect in ſup-
lon John of Auſtria, 54.
ted of poiſoning him, *ibid.*
to the treaty between the
Parma and the Walloons,
conduct in the conferences
1, 70. His private offers to
of Orange, 71. His in-
ith Sebaſtian king of Por-
5. His negociations with
Muley Moloc and the Turkiſh ſul-
tan, 76. His pretenſions to the
kingdom of Portugal, 81. His
manifeſto, 85. Invades Portugal,
91. Conquers it, 99. Offers a re-
ward for the life of the prince of
Orange, 119. All allegiance to
him ſolemnly abjured by the States
of the United Provinces, 121. His
attention to the affairs of France,
206. Enters into a treaty with the
duke of Guiſe, 207. Meditates the
conqueſt of England, 247. His In-
vincible Armada, 258. This fleet
totally ruined, 268. His magnani-
mity on this diſaſter, 270. His
views on France, 294. Sends the
Duke of Parma to France to op-
poſe Henry IV. 295. Orders the
duke of Parma to march again to
the aſſiſtance of the League in
France, 315. His baſe treatment
of Eſcovedo, and Antonio Perez, 325.
Sends troops to chaſtiſe the people
of Arragon, 328. Aboliſhes the
conſtitution of the Arragonian go-
vernment, 329. Appoints count
Manſveldt governor of the Nether-
lands, 333. Procures a convention
of the States of the Catholic League
in France, 334. His intereſted views
diſcovered by the French, 335.
State of his affairs, 341. Appoints
the archduke Erneſt governor of the
Netherlands, 344. His motives for
continuing hoſtilities againſt Henry
IV. of France, 346. His reply to
Henry's declaration of war, 359.
Invades Burgundy, 367. Under-
takes a deſcent upon Ireland, 385.
Cadiz plundered by the Engliſh,
387. His fleet againſt Ireland de-
ſtroyed by a ſtorm, 388. His ex-
pedient to free himſelf from his
pecuniary embarraſſments, 395.
His motives to a peace with France,
398. Concludes a peace at Vervins,
402. Reſigns the ſovereignty of the
Netherlands to his ſon-in-law, the
archduke Albert, 405. His ill-
neſs and death, 407. His charac-
ter, 408.

Piala, the Turkiſh admiral, deſtroys the Spaniſh fleet under the duke of Medina Cœli, i. 102. Commands the Turkiſh fleet ſent againſt Malta, 130, 132.

Pius IV. pope, diſſuades the duke of Savoy from calling a provincial ſynod, i. 114. Is forced to agree to the re-aſſembling of the council of Trent, 116. Governs the proceedings of the council, 119. Diſſolves the council abruptly, 121. Confirms its decrees by a bull, 122.

Pius V. pope, his character, i. 257. Applies to the princes of Europe to unite againſt the Turks, *ibid.* His death, 266.

Plumart, his expedient for raiſing the ſiege of Tergoes, i. 313.

Portocarrero, governor of Dourlens, his ſtratagem for the ſurpriſe of Amiens, ii. 392. Is beſieged and killed there, 395.

Portugal, ſtate of, at the time of the reſignation of the emperor Charles V. i. 19. State of the diſputed ſucceſſion to the crown, ii. 73. Death of king Sebaſtian, 80. Acceſſion of Don Henry, 81. State of the pretenſions of ſeveral candidates for the ſucceſſion, *ibid.* Don Antonio declared illegitimate, 86. Death of Don Henry, 88. Don Antonio proclaimed king, 91. Is invaded by the Spaniards, *ibid.* Liſbon ſubmits to Alva, 95. Is entirely ſubjected, 99.

Proteſtants, cruel edicts publiſhed againſt in the Netherlands, by the emperor Charles V. and Philip II. of Spain, i. 76. Inquiſitorial proceedings againſt them, 77. Refuſe to attend the council of Trent, and why, 118. Valenciennes reduced and garriſoned, 194. Antwerp garriſoned, *ibid.* Maſſacre of, at Paris, 338.

Q.

Quintin, St. is beſieged by the duke of Savoy, i. 47. The French army under Montmorency, defeated there, 49. The town taken, 51.

R.

Reformation, the rapid progreſs of, i. 67. Penetrates even into Spain, 93. Progreſs of, 112, 169. See *Proteſtants*.

Renneburg, count of, is enticed over to the Spaniſh intereſt, ii. 114. His death, 116.

Requeſens, grand commendator, acts as lieutenant to Don John of Auſtria, at the battle of Lepanto, i. 258. Succeeds the duke of Alva in the government of the Netherlands, 391. His character and firſt tranſactions, 395. Imprudently ſuffers the mutinous Spaniſh troops to take poſſeſſion of Antwerp, i. 409. Publiſhes an act of indemnity, 412. Beſieges Leyden, 413. Undertakes the conqueſt of Zealand, 432. Tranſports a body of forces through an arm of the ſea to Duveland, 433. Beſieges Bommene, 438. And Ziricſee, 439. His death, 443.

Rimenant, battle of, ii. 44.

Riperda, his ſpeech to the principal inhabitants of Haerlem, i. 365. Is beheaded by the Spaniards, 383.

Rome, its dependance on Philip II. of Spain, i. 20.

Rone, the Sieur de, perſuades the archduke Albert to undertake the ſiege of Calais, ii. 375. Is intruſted with the conduct of it, 376. Takes the town by ſtorm, 378. Is killed at the ſiege of Hulſt, 383.

Rotterdam, the townſmen of, maſſacred by count de Boſſut, i. 303.

Rouen, is beſieged by Henry IV. of France, ii. 314. The ſiege raiſed by the duke of Parma, 319.

Ruremond is ſeized by the prince of Orange, i. 335.

S.

Sacherlo, naval engagement of, between the Dutch and the Spaniards, i. 397.

Santa Croce, marquis of, commands the Spaniſh fleet employed againſt Portugal,

Portugal, ii. 89. Is appointed commander of the Invincible Armada, but dies, 259.

Savoy, Philibert Emanuel duke of, commands an army in the Netherlands to act againſt France, i. 44. Is joined by the earl of Pembroke, 46. Lays ſiege to St. Quintin, 47. Defeats Montmorency there, 49. His ineffectual perſecution of his reformed ſubjects, 115.

Schelde, deſcription of the prince of Parma's fortified bridge over, for the blockade of Antwerp, ii. 178.

Schenck, Martin, his brave attempt for the relief of Venlo, ii. 221. Builds a fort on the Rhine, and over-runs the country round, 280. Is killed in an attack on Nimeguen, 281.

Schwartzenburg, count, is ſent by the emperor Maximilian to treat with the prince of Orange, i. 425.

Sebaſtian, king of Portugal, his character, ii. 74. Undertakes the invaſion of Morocco, 75. His interview with Philip of Spain, *ibid.* Lands in Africa, 77. Battle of Alcazar, 78. Is killed, 80.

Selim, Sultan, invades the iſland of Cyprus, i. 257. A league formed againſt him by pope Pius V. Philip II. of Spain, and the Venetians, 258. His fleet defeated at Lepanto, 259. Concludes a ſeparate peace with the Venetians, 266. Dies, 270.

Seſſa, Don Carlos di, burned at an Auto de fe, in the preſence of Philip II. i. 95.

Sidney, Sir Philip, death of, ii. 225.

Sixtus V. pope, encourages Philip II. of Spain to the invaſion of England, ii. 251.

Sluys, beſieged by the duke of Parma, ii. 237. Capitulates, 241.

Solyman, emperor of the Turks, his conqueſts, i. 96. Deſtroys the Spaniſh fleet ſent againſt Tripoli, 102. His preparations to reduce the iſland of Malta, 129. His troops driven from the iſland, 159.

Sonoy, Theodore, commander of the Dutch fleet, defeats count Boſſut the Spaniſh admiral, i. 388.

Spain, the hiſtory of the Moors in, i. 239. The country deſolated by the ſeverities exerciſed againſt them, 241. Revolt of the province of Granada, 246.

Spaniſh troops, thoſe under D'Avila in the Netherlands, mutiny for want of pay, i. 408. Another mutiny of, ii. 2. Seize Aloſt, *ibid.* Are declared rebels by the council of ſtate, 3. See *Navareſe*.

T.

Tergoes, ſiege of, 312. Its ſituation, 313. Extraordinary relief of, 316.

Thionville, is taken by the duke of Guiſe, i. 55.

Toledo, Caranza, archbiſhop of, is ſuſpected of inclining to the reformed opinions, i. 93. Is proſecuted in the inquiſition by order of Philip II. 94.

Toledo, Frederic de, ſon of the duke of Alva, blockades Mons, i. 332. Lays divers towns under contribution, 348. His barbarous treatment of Zutphen, 349. His great progreſs in reducing the revolted towns, 361. His cruel maſſacre at Naerdan, 362. Beſieges Haerlem, 368. Is ordered by his father to perſevere in the ſiege, 375. His perfidious barbarity to the garriſon and inhabitants, 383. His troops mutiny, 384. Beſieges Alcmaer, 386.

Toledo, Don Garcia de, reduces the fort of Pennon de Velez, 109. Is made viceroy of Sicily, 110.

Tournay, the tumults of the reformers there quieted by count Horn, i. 188.

Tournhout, battle of, between prince Maurice and the count de Varas, ii. 390.

Trent, ſummary account of the council of, i. 113. State of Europe at that time, 114. The meeting of revived by pope Pius IV. 116. Reaſons why the proteſtants refuſed to attend it, 118. Is governed by the pope and his legates, 119. Is abruptly concluded, 121. Its decrees

crees confirmed by a papal bull, 122. Its decrees rejected by the court of France, 123.
Tripoli, taken and fortified by the Corſair Dragut, i. 99. Unſucceſsful expedition of the Spaniards againſt, 100.
Tſerart, count de, defends the province of Zealand for the prince of Orange, i. 308. Beſieges Middleburg, 309. Beſieges Tergoes, 312.
Tunis, is taken by Don John of Auſtria, i. 267. Is retaken by the Turks, 269.

V.

Valdez, is intruſted by Requeſens with the reduction of Leyden, i. 415. Confines his operations to a blockade, 416. Is forced to raiſe the ſiege, 423. Is accuſed by his ſoldiers of being bribed and is ill treated, 424. *Note.*
Valenciennes, the city of, reduced and garriſoned by the regent, i. 194.
Valor, Don Ferdinand de, is elected king by the Moreſco inhabitants of Granada, i. 247. See *Aben Humeya.*
Varas, count de, is defeated and killed by prince Maurice, ii. 389.
Varambon, marquis of, is defeated by colonel Vere, ii. 281. Is defeated and taken priſoner by marſhal Biron, 384.
Vargas, a Spaniſh officer, plunders Maeſtricht, ii. 6.
Vaucelles, truce of, procured by the emperor Charles V. previous to his reſignation, i. 16. Is broken by Henry II. of France, 34.
Velaſco, conſtable of Caſtile, invades Burgundy, ii. 367. Is worſted by Henry IV. and retires, 368.
Venice, political ſituation of, at the time of Charles V. reſigning his dominions, i. 20.
Venlo, is beſieged by the prince of Parma, ii. 220. Capitulates, 222.
Verdugo, defends Groningen for the Spaniards againſt prince Maurice, ii. 351.
Vere, colonel, defeats the marquis of Varambon, and relieves Rhinberg, ii. 281. Diſtinguiſhes himſelf at the ſiege of Deventer, 310.
Vervins, conferences held there for a peace between France and Spain, ii. 399. The peace concluded, 402.
Viglius, preſident of the council to the dutcheſs of Parma, regent of the Netherlands, his arguments for receiving the decrees of the council of Trent, i. 168. Offers a remonſtrance to Philip againſt the barbarity of Alva's adminiſtration, 212. His objections to Alva's taxations, 283.
Villars, Sieur de, defends Rouen againſt Henry IV. of France, 314. His vigorous ſally to raiſe the ſiege, 317. Is defeated and killed before Dourlens, 362.
Vitelli, marquis of, his advice to the duke of Alva, i. 329. His death, 442.
Ulloa, Oſorio de, conducts a body of Spaniſh troops through an arm of the ſea, to Duveland, i. 435.
Ulucciali, the Corſair, ſaves a part of the Turkiſh fleet from deſtruction at the battle of Lepanto, i. 262. Is made commander in chief by Sultan Selim, 264. Retakes Tunis from Don John of Auſtria, 269.
United Provinces of the Netherlands, the firſt foundation of that republic laid by the treaty called the Union of Utrecht, ii. 66. The ſovereignty of them conferred on the duke of Anjou, 117. All allegiance to Philip of Spain ſolemnly abjured, 121. The prince of Orange aſſaſſinated, 162. Their critical ſituation on this event, 203. Offer the ſovereignty to Henry III. of France, 204. To queen Elizabeth of England, 211. Treaty with Elizabeth, 215. Leiceſter made governor and commander in chief, 217. They remonſtrate to him on his arbitrary conduct, 229. Repreſent their grievances to queen Elizabeth, 232. Proſperity of, 235. Aſſiſt Elizabeth with ſhips to oppoſe Philip's pro-

jected invaſion of England, 257. Prince Maurice made governor of Guelderland and Overyſſel, 287. Reject the archduke Ernest's offer of treating for peace, 344. Groningen united to the confederacy, 354. Enter into an alliance with Henry IV. of France, 360. Undertake their firſt expedition to India, 372, *note*. See *Netherlands*.

Utrecht, the States of, oppoſe the impoſition of the tenth penny, i. 288. Is filled with Spaniſh ſoldiers at free quarters, 296. The treaty called the union of, ii. 65.

W.

Walloons, ſource of the quarrel between them and the Flemings, ii. 50. Commence hoſtilities againſt them, 51. Are gained over by the prince of Parma, 64.

Wiat, Sir Thomas, his inſurrection in oppoſition to queen Mary's marriage, i. 9.

Willoughby, lord, ſucceeds the earl of Leiceſter in the command of the Engliſh troops in the Netherlands, ii. 272.

Z.


Zealand, the province of, revolts againſt the Spaniards, i. 308. Meaſures taken there to withſtand the Spaniſh power, 351. The Zealanders deſtroy the Spaniſh fleet under Adolphus Hanſtede at Antwerp, 411. The conqueſt of that province undertaken by Requeſens, 432. Siege of Bommene, 438. Siege of Ziricſee, 440.

Ziricſee, beſieged by the Spaniards under Requeſens, i. 439. Surrenders, 442.

Zutphen, its ſituation, i. 348. The cruelties practiſed there by don Frederic de Toledo, 349. Is beſieged by the earl of Leiceſter, ii. 225. Is taken by prince Maurice, 309.

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